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THE
REFORMED
CHURCH REVIEW.

EDITOR:

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YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH, AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE.

FOURTH SERIES. VOLUME II.

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THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW.

NO. 1.—JANUARY, 1898.

I.

THE BIBLE AND THE WORD OF GOD.

BY CALVIN S. GERHARD, D.D.

What is the Bible? The reply to this inquiry has been as divergent as the Bible is comprehensive and the needs of humanity are manifold and progressive. Every age has furnished its own answer. For this reason we will consider briefly, first of all, the historical aspect of the question.

In the development of the Jewish people certain Hebrew writings came to be regarded as Sacred Scripture, because of the subjects to which they related, and because it was believed that the truths which they contained were made known to their authors by the divine Spirit. But that the copyists did not believe in the sanctity of the letter is evident from the history of the variations, between the Septuagint and the Hebrew, which indicate a very free handling of the text. The Apostles and the other New Testament writers, in quoting from the Old Testament, also pay but little attention to verbal accuracy. They evidently looked upon the Law and the Prophets as containing divine truth and important predictions, but their attention was mainly fixed upon the substance of the writings, and not upon the words in which the thoughts were expressed.

The Jewish rabbis, in the time of, and subsequent to, the be-

ginning of the Christian era, entertained far more mechanical views. They believed that God either wrote all the Law with His own hand, or else dictated it word for word to Moses as His amanuensis. The prophetic writings were distinguished from the Law as inferior to it, and the poetical books were regarded as occupying a still lower plane.

When we turn our attention to the early Church Fathers, we find that they are, to a great extent, free from the crudities and extravagance of the rabbis, but living, as all men necessarily must, amid the conditions and environment of their own age, they could not escape from the influence of the mechanical theory of inspiration which was taught both in the Talmud and in the Platonic philosophy, a marked development of which we have in Philo's view.

They speak of the Scriptures as "divine," "God-inspired" and "heavenly," and regard them as infallible, although from the earliest times two tendencies manifested themselves, the one legal and traditional, and the other critical and speculative. But the representatives of both tendencies made free use of the allegorical method and thus had ample opportunity to escape from the tyranny of their theory, by reading any fanciful esoteric meaning desired, into the text, every jot and tittle of which, according to Origen, for instance, was inspired in the highest degree, while, at the same time, he could speak of the "scandals," "offences" and "impossibilities" which cleave to the letter.

For a time the allegorical method had free scope, but by and by the Church found it necessary to limit this arbitrary mode of dealing with the Bible. Hence there gradually arose the churchly and dogmatic control of Scripture. Discussions, polemical writings and the decisions of general councils followed, and continued into the Middle Ages. Then came the period of scholasticism, with its powerful thinkers, endless questions and hair-splitting trivialities, in connection with the dogmas of the Church. The revival of learning, and the rise of the *Renaissance*, which touched all departments of human life, led also to a more careful study of Sacred Scripture, and thus opened the way for the Ref-

ormation, which rediscovered the Bible, and found it to be practically a new book. It was now studied and handled without rules or theories. It appealed to the Reformers not primarily through dogmas, confessions and creeds, but as the word of God, and therefore as an all-sufficient guide in faith and morals. The Bible, as the word of God, was primary and fundamental. Everything else was secondary. With the Reformers the first question always was, What saith the Lord?

But while they continually appealed to the word of God, which they found in the Bible, they also saw and felt that the Bible and the word of God were not in all respects identical. This was particularly the case with Luther, who vehemently affirms that a single letter of Scripture is of more consequence than heaven and earth, while at the same time he rejects as faulty not only certain passages, but even entire books. He can find no place for the Apocalypse, makes light of Jude and speaks of James as an epistle of straw. Zwingli admitted the existence of historical errors in the Bible, and Calvin saw the inferior and temporary character of the Old Testament. And yet they all stoutly maintained that in the Bible believers possess the unerring word of God, which the Pope has no right to contradict or oppose, which will overcome all opposition, and is the unfailing source of new life and power to the Church, being authoritative and sufficient concerning things necessary to salvation, both as respects faith and as respects morals.

But the Reformers had neither time nor inclination to form a dogmatic theory of inspiration. During the 17th century, however, as the Roman Catholic Church continued to emphasize her infallibility, the Protestant Church began to feel the need of a counter instrument, which could be appealed to as wholly divine and unquestionably infallible, and as, therefore, more than a match for the infallibility of the Church of Rome, which it was claimed was only a pretense. It was accordingly maintained that to hold fast to the absolute infallibility and equal verbal inspiration of all parts of the Bible was *a necessary assumption of faith*. This arbitrary theory of an infallible letter continued

until about the middle of the 18th century, when the historical conditions under which the biblical writings originated, and by which they were shaped, commenced to be taken into account.

Since that time two tendencies have been at work, the one traditional and conservative, the other critical and progressive. The struggle has passed through various phases of mysticism, rationalism and critical historical inquiry, freely modified by the marvelous discoveries of science, until so prominent a public journal as the *New York Tribune* boldly asserts that "the doctrine of evolution has overthrown the popular anthropomorphic conception of God, and the popular belief in the literal truthfulness of the Bible." Whether the doctrine of evolution has done this, or not, something certainly has happened.

The Bible, in the form in which it used to be accepted, is slipping away from us. It no longer has the kind of power in reference to scientific questions that it once had. Formerly it was regarded as an oracle, containing an account of the creation scientifically correct. The first question, therefore, with relation to the advances of science always was whether its claims were in agreement with revelation. The Church, drawing its proofs from Scripture, compelled Galileo to retract his contention that the earth revolves around the sun. When the discoveries of geology first began to make known the antiquity of the earth and the manner of its formation, its conclusions were set aside as impossible because in conflict with the infallible statements of the Mosaic record. In our time all this has been reversed. The Bible no longer coerces science, but science coerces the Bible. Instead of squaring the facts of geology with the Bible, the modern defense of Scripture admits without question that geology is right and then endeavors to show how the biblical account of the creation may be reconciled with the established facts of physical science.

The Bible, interpreted according to the old methods, no longer leads, but follows timidly in the wake of science, like a once mighty giant shorn of its strength. Nature is eagerly studied, and when its processes are made known, they can neither be set

aside nor ignored. The reconcilers seemed to be able to manage astronomy and geology, but when it came to the doctrine of evolution it was soon evident that no reconciliation along the old lines of thinking was any longer possible.

The question, What is the Bible? thus returns upon us with redoubled force.

The true answer to this inquiry can be found only by a free but reverent examination of the Bible itself, subjecting the books of which it is composed to the same searching scrutiny to which other important literary works are subjected, inquiring into their authorship and manner of composition, and the literary methods of the age and people which produced them ; in fact, by remembering and realizing that *the Bible is literature* and can be properly understood only according to the methods by which other literature is understood. Its divinity does not make it any the less human, but more so. The holy men of God, who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, still spoke according to human conditions and in all respects in an intensely human manner. To understand them we must take into consideration the time, place, environment and way of thinking of the people among whom they lived, as well as each writer's personality, training, temperament and immediate purpose.

Such a course of procedure will not hinder us from coming to a knowledge of the divine revelation which is contained in the productions of the biblical writers. On the contrary, it will help us to appreciate all the more the great truths which are enshrined in the Bible. To admit frankly the limitations and imperfections which honest scholarship has found in the Scriptures is not to question the presence of the supernatural in them, or to discredit either revelation or inspiration. Man, created in the image of God who is Spirit, has a divinely derived constitution, and as such is a spiritual being. God dwells with him in the spirit and thus can make Himself known. In revelation He inwardly discloses His thoughts and will, and in connection with this disclosure the recipient's soul is divinely quickened and elevated, that is, inspired. Revelation and inspiration have, however, not been

confined to a few individuals in one particular nation. On the contrary, they have been and are now as broad as the race. Every man has something of the Spirit of God in him, and therefore all men are potentially inspired. But this possibility becomes actual only in those who are challenged with divine truth and open their hearts to its reception. *The Hebrew and Christian Scriptures are the most highly inspired of all books because their authors give an adequate account of the closest approach which God has made to man on earth.* The power and efficacy of the Bible do not lie in the fact that it was given to the world in a manner different from other sacred writings. The primary question to be settled is not that of its inspiration. The conviction that it is inspired came in the first place as an inference and must always come in the same way. The Apostles believed that the Old Testament was inspired, but they did not so regard their own writings. The Christian Church has, however, discovered in the Gospels and Epistles the highest degree of divine power and therefore of inspiration. So to-day, the best way to approach the Bible is not under the influence of a theory of inspiration, but with an honest desire to become fully acquainted with a book which must be allowed to speak for itself in its own manner, without any reference to the question as to whether it is inspired or not inspired. Every other valuable book that we know of had to make its way into recognition and influence without any previous claims in its favor. The question is never raised whether Homer, Shakespeare and Bunyan are inspired, but the excellence of their literary productions is more fully appreciated by each succeeding generation. Now, whatever men may say about inspiration, the real truth of the matter is that the Bible can survive and maintain its supremacy, only by submitting to every form of criticism that can be brought against it. If it is a better and a truer book than any other, as we emphatically believe it is, it will rise to, and remain at the top; otherwise it will go down. The time is rapidly approaching when we will no longer ask, whether the Bible has come from God to men in a manner different from other good books, but

whether it has more of God in it than other literature. And, if the external prop of mechanical inspiration is taken away, the power of the Bible will not wane, but, on the contrary, it will increase. *Truth can always be depended upon to make its way without the help of any pretended authority lying back of it.* The Bible without any theories to hold it up and give it recognition is great enough to secure its own supremacy. No other book has ever taken such a hold on the world.*

The revelation of which the Hebrew people were the bearers, through their theocratic institutions, worship, customs, rites and individual prophets, is recorded by the Old Testament writers as they were able to receive and transmit what was made known. In the New Testament we find the same law ; making room both for

*“What is the Bible to the Christian man? *His authority as to Christ and the Christian experience*; or, more tersely, his authority on Redemption. This involves the question, How does the Bible become to him such an authority? The standard answer has been: ‘Because the Bible is inspired.’ Another answer (Principal Fairbairn) has been: ‘Because the Bible is a revelation of God.’ Another answer (Robertson Smith) has been: ‘Because the Holy Spirit authenticates the Bible in the believer’s soul.’ The key, though, to the complete answer lies in the fact that the Bible is implicated in the process by which the Christian experience is obtained. Beginning with the sense of sin, this is gained whenever the Holy Ghost can relate a man’s ethical unrest to the demands of God. These demands are often forced upon the conscience by Christian testimony and preaching; but when the man yields to these demands he recognizes that the final authority for them is the Bible. So with the man’s initial belief in our Lord, there is the Holy Spirit and a varying complex of influences; but the complex is made effective by the Scripture record of the birth, work, claims and personality of Jesus. Precisely so, whatever the preparation, it is the Bible, read or heard, which masters a sinner under the stress placed upon the Saviour’s death. * * * * *

“If the Bible is authority as to Redemption, still there is need of understanding this authority. How, then, can a Christian man understand the Bible? I answer: ‘By means of his Christian consciousness.’ Without noting the shades in usage, since the days of Lessing, and then of Schleiermacher, economically I can say that by Christian consciousness is here meant, the *insight* resulting from the domination of the mind by Christian experience,” modified by environment and historical conditions. “In this insight are two elements, one intellectual, the other intuitional. * * * In the profoundest sense the Bible is a progressive revelation to the Christian man. * * * As Professor Bowne has said: ‘Truth is revealed only when it is understood, and in this sense the revelation of God is still going on.’”—Professor Curtis in *The Independent*, Nov. 18, 1897.

Paul's and for James's conception of Christianity. In Christ the truth comes out centrally and fully, but is imperfectly recorded, being transmitted through varying traditions. How easily Jesus could have put His revelation into the form of a carefully prepared infallible book! But He wrote nothing. He simply intrusted the truth, which He desired to impart, to living men. He made no provision whatever to have His words and His works recorded in a book, but He took the greatest possible care to secure no less than twelve men, who should be constantly with Him, and thus become his disciples and apostles, each with a somewhat different conception of His person, and each sure to give his own account of Christ, in his own way. Instead of exerting Himself to produce an exact infallible document to speak for Him, He selected men of different types and temperaments and endeavored to secure their apprehension of himself, each in his own manner.

This enabled Him to give to the world a better and fuller revelation of Himself, although less inerrant. When the New Testament literature came to be written and collected, the Church, in addition to the Acts of the Apostles and the Apocalypse, found itself in possession of four brief memoirs of the Saviour, composed from four different standpoints, containing discrepancies and difficulties that cannot be honestly explained away, and yet withal such a full, varied and many-sided portraiture of Christ as no single biographer could possibly ever have produced; and of epistles which were written mainly to supplement the living voice of the preacher, whose presence it was not always possible to secure at all the places where it was desired.

What was the purpose of all this on the part of our Lord but to emphasize the mighty fact of biogenesis—that life can only come from life? A living stalk of wheat cannot be produced by writing a book on wheat. The living seed alone can bring forth the living stalk and the golden harvest. Christianity cannot be propagated by a book. “Ye search the Scriptures,” says Jesus, “because ye think that in them ye have eternal life, and these are they which bear witness of me.” The Bible is the greatest historical witness to the truth of the Gospel, embodying the ex-

periences of God's children, and telling of Him who is the way, the truth and the life, but the Scriptures are not the life. Their office is to bear witness of the life, which is in Christ and in His people.

The value of the Bible cannot be overestimated as such a witness-bearer to the truth. The experiences of Abraham, David and Isaiah, of Peter, Paul and John, and especially of the Lord Jesus Christ, constitute a many-sided mirror, in which the children of God can see reflected all the needs of their lives, in virtue of which the Bible becomes a lamp unto their feet and a light unto their path. Its varied lines, so complex and numerous, all converge and gather themselves up in the universal Man, who is the solution of all riddles, and the only source of spiritual life and light, for in Him alone dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. He is God manifest in the flesh, the personal utterance of the Divine, the Logos incarnate. He illuminates, interprets, corrects and fulfills the written word. His words, His acts, His life, His person are of central and fundamental importance. In Him revelation and inspiration reach their perfection. His person, words and deeds are, in a unique sense, creative and epoch-making. We can understand the Scriptures only as we understand Him. In the Bible we find God not only adapting Himself to human capacity, but also submitting to its limitations. Man's reception of the divine, however real, true and vital, goes forward within the confines of progressive apprehension. Some parts of the Bible express divine truth very imperfectly, as, for instance, the Book of Ecclesiastes, the Book of Esther and the 109th Psalm. Jesus Christ is the touch-stone by which all Scripture must be judged.

The relation of the Bible to the word of God now begins to appear. The Bible contains and is the word of God, but its various parts differ greatly in their degree of inspiration, and the divine word is not confined to the Bible. What then is the word of God. A very simple definition, and probably the best that can be given is this: *The word of God is what God says to His people, whether in or outside of the Bible.* It is a great mistake

to identify the word of God with the Bible. Just as the imperfections and discrepancies of Scripture are not words of God, so, on the other hand, God says much to His children, in addition to that which is set forth in Scripture. The Bible is finished, but the word of God is still in process of delivery. *The Bible gives us an account of God's dealings with certain individuals, families and nations in past ages, and, because God is unchangeable and self-consistent, it is the accredited standard by which are tested all utterances, whether past or present, which claim to have divine authority.* But the word of God is broader and deeper than what is written, because its kingdom embraces Him who is the author of all truth and the deepest reality of the whole creation. Jesus Christ has a message for every age and for every man on every worthy subject. His words are still spirit and life. As such they enter into the life of the community and of the individual. The living God speaks living words to living men. The Bible enshrines His mind and heart, His will and purposes, His life and love, His very self, to as great an extent as a series of writings, which are the product of personal communion with God, can do so. And the Bible has been used as a powerful factor in making Him known, particularly when it has been interpreted, as it always should be, in the light of its central truths, which are that the Son of God is come in the flesh, and that the believer is freely justified by faith in Him. But revelation cannot be confined within circumscribed limits, even though these limits be the Bible. It comes through history, which is as broad as humanity. It simmers and glows in human hearts and minds until it comes to the birth in one, or in many servants of Jehovah. It means the breaking in of divine truth into the mind, and is conditioned by the degree of receptivity at hand in communities and individuals. It is not wholly absent from Pagan nations, and among Christians is not entirely restricted to the religious sphere. Every pure poetic vision, every genuine philosophic intuition, as well as every great generalization and every seizure of a salient law of the universe, must be regarded as a revelation of the divine, and thus as a new word of God.

A similar movement, but of a higher order, goes forward within the distinctively Christian sphere. This is evident from the fact that the Bible means more to every succeeding Christian era than it did to previous ones. The truth of which it speaks is not only better understood, but is also more fully revealed through its many-sided adaptation to varying historical conditions. Christ's all-pervading life, which is the deepest power at work among Christian nations, embodies itself in and through His people, who must learn to give expression to the truth which He imparts to them as they are able to bear and use it. According to their degree of receptivity He makes His word known to chosen men, and thus fits them to give direction to Christian thought in the midst of crises and exigencies. This opens the way for new applications of the fundamental principles of Christianity, as was the case, for instance, when the American conscience demanded the abolition of slavery within our borders. Such is the case now with certain sociological and other well-known scientific and religious problems.

The word of God is making itself heard and felt with regard to all of these issues; even with relation to the Bible itself. It does this by bringing home to the consciousness of the Church of Christ what Sacred Scripture really is, and therefore we need have no fears as to the outcome. Already there is a very general consensus of opinion that the Bible is not a scientific treatise, that it has no ready made answers on any subjects, that it is not a thesaurus of proof-texts, that it does not anticipate the discoveries of astronomy, geology, biology and evolution, and that it need not be reconciled with science, because it looks at the subjects, in which both are interested, from a different standpoint and for another purpose, being concerned only with the religious aspect of the problem.

The study of the Bible as literature has shattered many beautiful theories, has exploded numerous pet traditions, has produced endless confusion in the camp of the bibliolaters, and has alarmed those who pin their faith to the letter of the record, but it is also liberating the book, which neither friend nor foe has been able to

destroy, by subjecting it to the scientific scrutiny, which in this age of inquiry nothing can escape. We are beginning to see that a literature which is the outflow of personal communion with God is safe, and that searching investigation and merciless criticism are only burning away the dross and bringing to light the truth. The Lord Jesus Himself is the real author of the rallying cry, "Back to Christ." The substance of His teaching is: Come to me, and through me go to the Bible, and through my words come back to me; for in me only will you find rest, by finding life and light.

READING, PA.

II.

PRESENT STATUS OF THEOLOGY IN THIS COUNTRY.

REV. A. E. TRUXAL, D.D.

That Theology is a progressive science will not be questioned by many of the readers of this REVIEW. Its course, like that of other sciences, is ever onward and forward. As the world advances in intelligence, knowledge and culture, theology advances too. Investigation, study and experience always enlarge and correct man's understanding of any subject. Theology forms no exception to this rule.

The Bible furnishes the material for the science of Theology. And the Bible never changes. It is a finished book. As the original manuscripts of the various books of the Bible have long since perished and as we possess only copies of them more or less distantly removed, there is of course a possibility, if not, indeed, a strong probability, that some words and passages in our Bible are not authentic. And the copyists may have omitted words and sentences here and there, and changed or modified others. Nevertheless there is a vast abundance in the Bible well authenticated upon which to rest the Christian faith, worship and life. So that it still remains true that the Bible never changes ; that it is a finished book.

But the apprehension of the Bible does change from age to age. The Church learns by experience. Light comes to the Christian theologian from the history of the Church as this has been unfolded in the centuries that have passed away. Man's general conceptions are modified, changed and enlarged by the advancement made in natural knowledge. The theologian's knowledge of man and the world will influence his theological conceptions. As progress is made in the sciences of cosmogony, astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, psychology, ethics,

archæology, language and history, the study of Theology is stimulated and necessitated to conform itself to the new conditions created. The Bible is re-studied and its teaching apprehended from the standpoint gained by the advancement made in the natural sciences. New conditions demand a new application of the truth revealed through the word of God, and Theology is ever ready to bring the truth of God to bear upon every condition, relationship and need of the world's life.

Again, the Holy Spirit is given to the disciples to guide them into all truth. That promise is still in force. The Holy Spirit remains in the Church and with Christians. It seems to us, consequently, that we must believe, and that it is our privilege and pleasure to believe, that Christians are led by the spirit of the Lord from age to age into clearer, fuller and more correct conceptions of revealed truth. Hence it follows that there is progress in Theology. Old ideas wear out and pass away and new ones are called forth to take their place. The religious consciousness of the Church changes. Theologians modify and amend their views. Former conceptions are dismissed and new ones formed. This makes Theology a living science. If it were a fixed science it would be a dead science, and a dead Theology would soon be followed by a dormant church.

The progress in Theology, however, is neither rapid, constant nor regular. The theology of a given period may be better in many respects than that immediately following. The history of the Church furnishes a number of examples establishing this fact. Yet taking in view the entire course Christianity has run, it is still apparent that Theology is a progressive science. Sometimes, it is true, it remains very much the same through a number of centuries. Then again, in the course of a single generation many changes take place in theological thought. These changes, however, are never either violent or great. The bulk of Theology of **any** age is always conserved in the subsequent period. Ideas grow slowly and die slowly. This fact is illustrated by the views held in regard to the atonement. During a period of nine hundred years the theory was generally maintained that the death of

Christ was a ransom paid to the devil, who, it was supposed, had obtained some right in man. For another nine hundred years now the Anselmic theory, in one form or another, has held sway in nearly all theological systems. This view is in the present day being very seriously questioned by many theologians. We mention these things in this connection to show that ideas and general conceptions are of exceedingly slow growth. Yet it still remains true that Theology is evermore modifying and changing itself, and hence assumes new forms from time to time. Protestant Theology has run through different periods or stages which may be designated as Reformation Theology, Confessional Theology, Rationalistic Theology and Evangelistic Theology. And from present indications it would seem that a new phase is about to challenge the world, which may, perhaps, properly be called Ethical Theology. This brings us to note more particularly the present status of Theology as it prevails amongst us.

We can, of course, speak on this subject only in a very general way. The field of Theology in the present day is a very large one. Very many subjects are being investigated and studied, and they are viewed under a variety of aspects. And in regard to most of these subjects many different views are expressed, so that it is a difficult matter to obtain a full view of the whole field and to discern clearly the real status of Theology at the present time. One thing, however, is very clear, and that is that many of the most recent productions do not hold close by the confessional standards of the Church. The standards of the sixteenth and seventh centuries no longer control the thinking of theologians as was the case fifty and a hundred years ago. So that the confessions of the churches are not the key to the prevailing theology.

First. The Bible as a book or as The Book, is not viewed in the same light in which it was formerly considered. Biblical criticism as this has been carried on during the last half of the century has caused theologians to form new conceptions with reference to the Book of Books. That this is the case is evident from the fact that the question has been raised, What is the

Bible? And the various answers given to this question constitute still further evidence that the thought of the Church is undergoing a change in regard to this subject. The human side of the Book has been brought forward for consideration. Its production and formation have been investigated. The Book has been taken apart and the different parts have been analyzed. All portions of it have been scrutinized and are not regarded as of like value or equally inspired. It is held that it contains a divine revelation and that it is a divine revelation. But it has largely been robbed of its charm as being wholly and purely a divine Book. This fact has shocked some pious thinkers and filled them with fear and trembling. But it need not be an evil: just so the Book has not lost its value and interest for any one as revealing to man the truth, the will and the purpose of God. We do not in this connection take upon ourself the difficult task of describing the prevailing views of the Bible held by the Church at the present time. Our present purpose is simply to note the fact that as a general rule the Bible is not regarded in the same light by theologians of the day in which it was held in former periods of the Protestant Church; and, further, to state that this change has been brought about by the Higher Criticism.

Second. It must be observed also that the doctrine of the inspiration of the Bible has been undergoing a change in the minds of many theological thinkers. The plenary inspiration of the Scriptures is no longer held as formerly. Some writers do indeed yet use the term to set forth their position on the subject; but when they explain their idea of plenary inspiration they at once show their conception to be something different from the thought attached to the term in former times. In fact, the tendency of theological thought of the present day is to attach much less importance and value to the idea of inspiration than was formerly the case. Dr. Behrends, in his book, "The Old Testament Under Fire," which is a work on the conservative or traditional side of Theology, makes the following statement: "The doctrine of inspiration, as so conservative a theologian as the late Dr. Chalmers frankly admitted, has never been definitely formu-

lated ; and it may be doubted whether it ever can be. It really belongs to speculative divinity. The only practical question is whether the statement of fact and doctrine, given in the Scriptures, are trustworthy and authoritative in the realm of faith and conduct." In other words, do the sacred Scriptures reveal the truth of God ? Do they make known, as nothing else does or can, the will and purpose of God in regard to man ? If so, the form and degree of inspiration, the nature and character of it, are questions of minor importance. The doctrine in regard to the divine inspiration of the Scriptures has for many minds lost its significance. Yet it must be admitted, on the other hand, that some defenders of the faith hold that the maintenance of the Church and the existence of our holy Christianity depend on the inspiration of the Scriptures ; that when inspiration is lost, all is lost.

Third. Another special feature of Theology in the present day is the prominence given to Biblical Theology. This department has developed a more specific meaning than formerly. Biblical Theology, is, of course, nothing new. But in former periods it was studied largely in the light of preconceived theories or systems. Whether avowedly or not, the teachings of the Bible and of the books of the Bible were studied with the view of making them support some system of dogmatic Theology. Biblical Theology of the present day is pursued, as much as possible, independently of Systematic Theology. The efforts put forth have in view the discovery of the real meaning of the sacred writings. The question is, what subjects does this or that writer treat in his book or books, and what views does he express in regard to them ? The aim of Biblical Theology is to bring out the facts as they appear in the various books of the Bible. The primary duty of the bibliologist is not to harmonize and systematize the various teachings of the authors of the scriptural books, but to discover and set forth these teachings truthfully and correctly. He must forget everything else excepting the subject before him and pursue it faithfully to the end, regardless of consequences. Biblical Theology, as thus studied, becomes exceedingly interesting,

and very important too. It is claimed, and we believe justly, that the importance of this branch is fully equal to that of Systematic Theology. Dogmatists, on the other hand, insist that Systematic Theology must ever remain the leading and controlling department of theological science.

Fourth. Many writers of the present day make the love of God central for their thinking rather than His power. The controlling idea in their treatises is divine goodness instead of divine sovereignty. And when love is made the governing idea nearly all the various subjects belonging to the sphere of Theology appear in a different light from that in which they are presented when divine power is made the controlling thought. When the power of God is focal in a system of Theology, the various topics relate themselves to the focus and to each other in a certain order and with a certain meaning and force. When the love of God is made focal these topics assume a different arrangement towards each other and to the focus, and severally take on a new or at least modified meaning and carry with them either greater or less significance than formerly. That the idea of love is affecting much of the theological thinking of the day is quite evident. What influence it will have in modifying and changing existing systems of Theology we would not undertake to predict. But from the present outlook it would seem to us that some old ideas for a long time tenaciously held, will, in the near future, be driven from the field.

Fifth. Closely connected with the conception that God is primarily a God of love are the ideas expressed by the terms, the Fatherhood of God, and the Brotherhood of Man. These are very popular sentiments at the present time. They have taken a firm hold on the minds and hearts of the Christian masses and have found acceptance with many teachers and preachers of the Gospel. They are most positively and rejoicingly proclaimed from the religious rostrum. Religious assemblies are inspired with these ideas and their halls are made to resound with their repeated utterance. A large portion of the pulpit delights in proclaiming the thoughts that God is the Father of all men, and that all men are brethren one of another.

These two propositions, however, stand in opposition to theological views previously entertained. It had been held for many years in certain portions of the Church that God is the Father of the elect only; that the non-elect can in no proper sense be regarded as the children of God. Again in other systems of thought the proposition had been laid down, that God is the Father only of the Lord Jesus Christ and of those who have become united to Him by regeneration. All those who are out of Christ, who, according to the first conception mentioned, are the non-elect, are the children of wrath or the children of the devil. The general position on which these views rest is that all men through the fall have lost their sonship. None are the children of God. And, hence, those only whom God, according to His own good will and pleasure, has elected to faith and glory, or those who have been redeemed through the Lord Jesus Christ by faith in Him, do and can have God for their Father. All others remain under the bondage of sin and are of their father, the devil. But the pulpit of the present day, the religious platform and most of the popular theological writings have discarded these views and they emphasize the fact that God, in a very important sense, is the Father of all men, has a fatherly interest in all, and desires the salvation and eternal blessedness of all. These two general conceptions which seem not to agree with each other are after all closely related and perhaps they may be reconciled with one another; but it is nevertheless true that religious thought and feeling in regard to this phase of theology are flowing in new channels in these latter days.

Sixth. Another doctrine, once very generally held and taught, that is now being modified by the views of the present day, is the doctrine of man's total depravity. It has been held that man, through the dire effects of sin, has become religiously and morally dead, spiritually helpless and hopeless; that of himself he cannot think a good thought or perform a good act; that he cannot believe unless power be first given him from on high—for faith is the gift of God; that no man can come to the Lord Jesus Christ to follow Him unless the Father draw him; that man is not able

even to respond to the overtures of grace unless power be given him to do so.

That man is a sinner and needs the help and grace of God is admitted by all; but that he is so utterly depraved and helpless as the above view represents him is seriously questioned by many theological thinkers. There are those now who reject the doctrine of total depravity as it had been generally held from the time of Augustine onward. These believe that some moral worth and ability remain in man; that redemption and salvation involve an ethical process; that man can respond to the overtures of mercy and assert his will in favor of the good by which he is confronted through the gospel; and that the key to the situation as it really exists is to be found in the words of Scripture which say: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do for His good pleasure," in which the two factors in the process are recognized—man's work and God's work. They do not believe that mankind is a mass of moral corruption. On the other hand, they hold that some good is to be found in individuals that may be impregnated and quickened by the Holy Spirit through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ. These cannot understand that it is necessary to make men utterly worthless morally in order that God and His grace may be glorified by man's salvation. To their minds more glory would accrue to God and the grace of God by the salvation of a being with moral powers in active exercise than of one whose moral faculties are dead.

Seventh. Another subject in regard to which present theology, at least a large portion of it, is not in agreement with the old, is the reconciliation between God and man. The prevalent views of the past have been that God needs to be reconciled to man, or that mercy and justice in the God-head need to be reconciled to each other; that God has been alienated from man, that He is angry with man on account of his sins, that His wrath rests upon man; that something must now be done in order to reconcile God to man again, that His anger must be appeased and His wrath removed in order to the possibility of man's salvation and glorifi-

cation. But man cannot make the necessary satisfaction ; God, therefore, gives His only begotten Son to become man, suffer and die, and by his sacrificial death satisfy the justice of God and thus make room for the exercise of divine mercy towards man, and change the anger and wrath of God into pleasure and good will.

Much of the theology of the day sets these views aside and brings to the fore-front the idea that man needs to be reconciled to God. The obstruction is in man, not in God ; man needs to be brought into proper relation to God, not God to man ; while *we* were enemies, *we* were reconciled to God ; God has reconciled *us* to Himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation. The emphasis is placed on the necessity of man's reconciliation to God from whom he had become alienated through sin.

There may be a sense in which both propositions are true. Man and God may need to be reconciled to each other. There can be no question as to man's alienation from God ; and the attitude of God's feelings can not be the same towards a sinner as it is towards a saint. But it does make a difference in theology as to which side of the reconciliation is mainly emphasized ; and theological thinking of the present day to a very considerable extent lays the greatest stress on the necessity of man's reconciliation to God, and in so far forth the old theology is being modified.

Eighth. In regard to the atonement, Theology is in an unsettled state. Many theologians can no longer endorse the penal suffering or substitutionary theory that has in one form or another prevailed in the Church for many years. There never was at any time in the history of the Church an exact unanimity of thought and belief in reference to the atonement ; yet every age has had a prevailing view. Previous to Anselm for a period of nine hundred years the doctrine generally held was, that the death of Christ was a ransom paid to Satan in order to satisfy his right in man obtained through the fall. This view was maintained by such able men as Origen, Irenæus and Augustine. By Anselm then was formulated the conception that the sacrifice of Christ was neces-

sary to bring about a reconciliation between justice and mercy in the Godhead and thus make man's salvation possible. The ransom was paid to God. To this conception were added afterwards more definitely the ideas of substitution and vicarious suffering. This enlarged Anselmic view has for a long time prevailed very generally in the Church. It is found in various theological systems; it has entered into the confessions, the prayers and the hymnology of the Church to a large extent.

But in the meantime other theories have been advocated, too. The *moral influence* theory was taught by Abelard, Maurice, Bushnell and others; the *governmental* theory by Hugo Grotius; the *mystical* theory by modern German theologians and Mercersburg theology; and at present, views are being promulgated which may properly be called, we think, the *obedience* theory.

The substitutionary and penal suffering theory is being assailed on all sides as having too many unmoral features connected with it and being weighted down with consequences that cannot be maintained. The critics hold that the ideas of justice, righteousness and others, lodged in the moral nature of man must have their source in the Divine Being; that if God Himself acted on the basis of moral ideas different from those which He has given to man and according to which man must act, then there could be no communion and fellowship of man with God, and religion would be only a vain show without any real meaning. The penal suffering theory tested by the laws of ethics is found wanting. Our idea of righteousness will not permit one moral agent to suffer for the sins of another. Our conception of morality will not allow the idea of transferring the moral character, good or bad, from one person to another. We have not the space left to mention and describe all the objections that have been raised to the substitution theory of the atonement. We simply note their existence. What is wanting at present is a definitely stated and fully elaborated theory of the atonement that will meet all the objections that have been raised against the theories heretofore promulgated. Perhaps some genius will be moved in the near future to produce a work on the subject that will satisfy the relig-

ious consciousness of the day, though some German theologians, of the Ritschl school, question whether the human mind is capable of formulating a theory of the atonement that will be consistently logical throughout and true to all the facts in the case.

The theology of the day falls into two schools: the traditional and conservative, and the radical and progressive; or the old and the new. It may be said that the old rests on the Word of God and therefore must be true. That is begging the question. The question is, What do the Scriptures teach on these various subjects? The advocates of the New Theology hold that the Scriptures do not teach many of the views that have been held. All parties must appeal to the Word of God for justification of their position. A proper and correct understanding of the teaching of the Scriptures is involved in the true Theology.

How far will the new ideas in the various departments of Theology enter into the general religious thought of the country? Different predictions have been made in answer to this question. The New Theology may be only a passing hurricane; then let us stand aside, and let it pass. It may be the beginning of a steady rain that will refresh the dry and thirsty ground of the theological plain; then let us not fear it.

III.

SOCIAL EVOLUTION, BY BENJAMIN KIDD.

A DIGEST

BY REV. CHARLES E. CORWIN.

We stand at a crisis in the world's history. Through all previous ages there has been an evolution of society, but it has never been more rapid than in the immediate past. Within a century there has been a wonderful advance in all departments of human knowledge, yet we only stand at the doorstep of the temple of social science. Sociology has hardly assumed the dignity of a science, for, while chemistry and astronomy have attained unity and stability, a proper foundation for further advanced sociology is yet in a chaotic state, the stones of the future edifice are indeed hewn in the quarry, but the structure itself is still unbuilt. The last century taught mankind the political commandment, "Thou shalt cease to be a slave of the nobles and despots who oppress thee, thou art free and sovereign." Mankind has in general learned this lesson, but the problem now before us, as yet unsolved, is expressed thus: "It is a grand thing to be free and sovereign, but how is it that the sovereign often starves?" For the solution of this problem all departments of knowledge must contribute. Too long has man in society been considered in a partial and therefore false manner. "To the politician he has been the mere opportunist; to the historian he has been the sport of forces apparently subject to no law; to the exponent of religion he has been the creature of another world, and to the political economist he has been the covetous machine." The time has come for social science to proceed on the method of the other sciences and, sending her roots down wherever she may find nourishment, to bear on her boughs the fruits of an investigation, not partial and lawless, but com-

plete and according to the great law of evolution which holds throughout the universe.

II. There is no phenomenon so wonderful as the evolution of human society. We trace the progress of mankind from the day when, as a brute-like creature, he lurked amid the rocks and woods, to the present, when he is only a little lower than the angels, and has authority over the birds of the air and the beasts of the field, when he stands lord of creation, having conquered the earth and subdued it. Yet man is a part of nature and subject to the same laws of progress which are the same now as they ever were. What is the law of progress? It is the law of selection and rejection. "Progress has been due to the opportunity of those individuals who are a little superior in some respects to their fellows of asserting their superiority and of continuing to live, and of promulgating as an inheritance that superiority." It is the law which Christ formulated thus: "To him that hath shall be given, and from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." With man this law can be traced throughout his history. The first feature which we note in primitive society is its military character. The secret of success of all savage society is the secret of success of the fighting organization. We watch the growth of the great world powers of antiquity from Babylon to the culmination of military society in Rome, and we find the same law of progress through conflict. We behold Rome overcome by the force of the barbarians and we watch with wonder the operation of the same law during the middle ages, that seed time of the modern world. While the law still acts its method changes, for no longer is the conflict so much one of clans as it is of individuals. Development and progress is still by fiery competition. Wars in future will probably cease, but the condition of human progress will remain the same, that condition which appears so stern, but is in reality a law of mercy, if not to the present at least to the future, the law of the survival of the fittest.

III. While evolution proceeds in the whole universe according to this law, yet in the case of man its action is modified by two

factors, his reason and his capacity for action in society. Man can only reach his highest development in society, and therefore whenever individual interests conflict with social interests it is all important that the interests of the individual be subordinated to the interests of society. The great law which we have considered requires for the evolution of any form of life that the few individuals succeed at the expense of the many. If, however, we may suppose that any species of creature could at any time remove the onerous conditions of the progress of their race they would gladly do so. True, the removal of this law would mean the progressive degeneration of the race, but what creature would weigh the advantage of his descendants born ages hence against his own personal comfort which he would increase by the removal of this law. It is obvious that none of the lower forms of life have the power to even modify the law of progress by which the descendants profit at their expense. The new factor apparent in the evolution of man, however, is reason, which renders him capable of suspending in great measure the operation of this law. The development of his interests, all-important to him, and the development of the interests of the social organization, all-important to the race, are not identical. Why then does he subordinate his personal interests to the interests of future generations in whose prosperity he can have no share?

IV. The most characteristic phenomena of human society are the phenomena of religion. All civilization, customs, habits were grounded in religion. All mankind, whether conscious of it or not, are subject to its influence, not least those who profess to have escaped from its authority. In all this vast series of phenomena man is discovered to be in some way in conflict with his own reason. While in all other matters he exalts his reason and glories in its possession, in religious matters, despising it, he sets up sanctions for his conduct which are supernatural against those which are natural, ultrarational against those which are rational.

V. We have seen that the distinguishing feature of social history is the development which the race is undergoing, but for the majority of individuals at any given time this development is not

of personal interest, but is in antagonism to their personal interest. Man's reason which gives him the power to arrest this process is held in abeyance while the development continues. By what force, therefore, is this accomplished? The force by which mankind is advanced at the expense of individual interest is the superrational sanction imposed upon his action by religious belief. From time to time efforts are made to develop a religious system which lacks the supernatural, but they have always ended in failure and always must, for "no form of belief is capable of functioning as a religion in the evolution of society which does not provide a superrational sanction for social conduct in the individual, or, in other words, a rational religion is an impossibility, representing from the nature of the case an inherent contradiction of terms." The definition of religion, therefore, from the standpoint of social evolution may be formulated as follows:

"A religion is a form of belief, providing an ultrarational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing."

Considering the various systems of religious belief from the standpoint of this definition, we discover that however diverse in form and ceremony they may be, however great may be the distance from the totem worship of the degraded savage to the spiritual conception of the intelligent Christian, they all have this one characteristic, they bind the actions of men by the force of a supernatural sanction. Religion is, therefore, seen to be the complement of reason, for it produces the proper relation between the individual and society, necessary for the development of the latter on the advance of which the improved condition of future society depends.

VI. It is hard for us to realize, living in the midst of our present civilization, that the condition of society around us is the rare exception. Although the conditions are rare and modern, their roots reach down into the first century of our era, for at that

time was the seed of our social organization planted. Slowly had the society of the past reached its highest stage in a complete military organization, but since the religions of the past were failing, society, unsupported by religious sanctions, was rapidly falling into decay. Then burst upon the world the Christian system with the mighty force of young and immature life. Christianity forced upon the world with an energy unknown before, the superrational sanction necessary for social development. Self seemed to be annihilated, and the wave of asceticism, which is so disgusting to us, is the logical result upon certain minds of the tremendous force of the supernatural. And so for fourteen centuries the history of our civilization was the history of the growth of other worldliness. "This period was barren only in the sense that any period of vigorous, but immature growth is barren." Now that the superrational sanction has obtained its full force, it becomes necessary that the individualism which is proper and useful for the present should not be swallowed up. Since Christianity would be perfect she must not only develop society as other religions can do, but she must also develop the individual as other religions do not, and this she does by her ethetical system, especially by her expression of the brotherhood of man. The great movements of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were born of the conflict between these forces in the progress of adjustment of one to the other in the evolution of society. We have seen that in the States of old the military idea predominated. Based upon a foundation of slaves and unqualified freedom stood the military class holding all beneath them in contempt. The political history of these last centuries is the story of the enfranchisement of these masses.

VII. It is to this spirit of altruism by which men are freed that the proper development is due, the spirit which finds its origin in the charity of the New Testament. This spirit, altho' developing in the ages of faith, has come to its fruition later than its correlative. The growth of the humanitarian feeling is the expression of this idea. Slavery has fallen before it and the sympathies of men in an ever widening circle have included even the lower animals

in their embrace. The relation of the stronger races to the weaker has undergone a radical change and the relations of the different classes in society are modified to a degree unparalleled. Indeed, the higher classes are so imbued with the altruism of Christianity that they hardly resist, nay often help, the tremendous upward movement of the masses whose advance in power means their own decrease relatively at least. The results, as yet incomplete, but coming with irresistible force, are not the results of the intellect, but of the Christian religion by which the world is at last solving the problem how the antagonistic forces, the force by which society advances and the force by which the individual advances may be harmonized without injury to either party.

VIII. Slowly through untold ages all life has been evolved, and the social organism has proved no exception to the general rule. The cosmic process has everywhere been triumphant in human history, and mankind, at least within the limits of western civilization, has about reached the goal toward which, as toward a guiding star, the eyes of statesmen and reformers have been directed—the attainment of the political heaven of *Laissez-faire*. The great political parties of reform have at last attained their end, for substantially is it true that before the law all men are free and equal. One reform has followed another with hardly a pause and the object of these measures has been to secure equal political rights for all. Every man politically may work out his own salvation or damnation unhampered by the restrictions of government. But as we have approached the object of our endeavor the goal has receded before us, and we find that we are carried forward past the limits of our former desires. Whither are we tending? We find that public opinion, the foundation of all progress, is tending more and more to side with the inherently weaker cause and, under the stimulus of the altruistic feeling, coming to propose measures which leave the doctrine of *Laissez-faire* far behind, a tendency to strengthen and equip, at the general expense, the lower and weaker against the higher and wealthier classes of the community. And effort for the solution of this

problem is expressed in the various socialistic systems that have appeared in every part of our civilization, and which among certain classes have almost attained the dignity of a religion. Socialism always has one definite end in view to which all its proposals directly or indirectly lead. This is the final extinction of that struggle for personal existence which has been waged. But the attainment of its object is probably impossible, for the law of all life is progress through conflict. Perfect peace, at least as the world is now constituted, means degeneration, and therefore a truly socialistic state, in which the struggle for existence was unknown, would be in a condition of progressive degeneration. Perhaps the culmination of the present tendency may be somewhat as follows: The ethical system which has supplied the motive force in the past will continue to operate. The sanctions of religion will continue to develop the organism of society, while the altruism characteristic of Christianity will continue that process by which the conditions of men individually have already been immensely ameliorated, by which political freedom has already become a fact, until social equality is attained. This will not be accomplished by the methods of socialism which are contrary to the absolute law of progress, but it will be accomplished by the raising of all to the condition of a fair opportunity, and equipping each individual equally for the struggle of life.

IX. If we have followed the line of thought thus far we have learned that our civilization is an organic growth, which is tending to raise the rivalry of life to the highest degree of efficiency by bringing all the individuals to a footing of equality. We have seen that this advance derives its force from the altruistic feeling which finds its origin in the religion of Christ. Many persons at the present, however, claim that there is a weakening in the religious sentiment among men. The rationalism which is antagonistic to religion, and which has been so highly exalted throughout the century, will be found on investigation to be unequal to the task of advancing in union the race and the individual. On examination, we find that, contrary to general opinion, the evolution of society is not primarily intellectual.

There can be little doubt that the ancient Greeks were, on the average, superior to the men of modern times in mental power, and yet their civilization failed to maintain itself, and is now dead. The feeble races which are destroyed by the stronger, as much by the arts of peace as by the spoils of war, are fully equal to their conquerors in brain power. The highly cultured intellect bears its own doom within itself for society is continually dying at the top and growing from the bottom. But five out of more than 500 aristocratic families of England can trace their history as far back as the fifteenth century. And so is it true that the intellectual portion dies out and its place is taken by those of a lower condition who in turn fail and leave their place to others. By the operation of this law, the average of mental power is prevented from rising. The intellectual development is not, therefore, a necessary factor in social evolution, but there are certain factors with which the progress of society is constant, but without which decay and degeneration are always apparent. These qualities are discovered to be the result of the superrational sanctions of religion combined with the high ethical system of Christianity, and therefore we are enabled to formulate the proposition that the evolution which is slowly proceeding in society is not primarily intellectual, but religious in character. Since the evolution of society by the analogy of the whole universe, material and spiritual, must continue, it follows that the race must become increasingly religious as the centuries go by.

X. The past is the prophecy of the future, and yesterday is the parent of to-morrow. History, so long considered as an exception in the great cosmic process, is discovered to be a beautiful part of a great whole, and by its study each one of us may possess himself of the prophet's mantle.

The two contending forces of individualism and socialism in the wider meaning of the term, are the combatants by whom man's progress is secured. The power of religion in the past has secured the success of the socialistic force injurious to the individual, but useful to the race and to posterity. Christianity indeed has produced like results with other systems, but she is different from

all others in that she has, like them, proved herself the foundation of the state, but the protector and liberator of the individual man. Under her influence the evolution of society proceeds through three stages: in the first the good of the few is obtained at the expense of the many, that the unborn generations may reap the benefit; in the second the greatest good of the greatest number at the present time is sought. This is a stage fraught with danger to mankind, for to stop at this would mean the degeneration of the race. Already we seem to be about to enter upon a third or final stage, the stage in which the problem of the individual and of the whole is solved not, by the destruction of either, but by the salvation of both. The stage in which the greatest good of the greatest number, not only at the present time, but of all generations to come is obtained. To bring this glorious result to pass has been the task assigned to the religion of Christ, and the accomplishment of it is the kingdom of God among men for the coming of which the founder of the system taught His disciples to pray.

IV.

FUNERAL REFORMS.

BY REV. STANLEY L. KREBS, A.M.

Together with many other clergymen, experience in the practical work of the gospel ministry has convinced me of two things in reference to modern funeral customs: 1. Of the necessity of funeral reform; 2. Of the desirability of its immediate discussion, and adoption, if possible.

It has come to be generally admitted that several of the customs obtaining at modern funerals should be modified and others dropped altogether. The points here presented are those which I have jotted down in my private notebook from time to time as events have suggested them. I find, however, that many other ministers have been struck with exactly the same points. This fact but confirms me in my opinions thus far formed, and encourages me to submit them to others for individual consideration and judgment. Every man must settle this question for himself. For, the fact that your neighbor or friend conducts a funeral in a given way, is no more a reason for you, when the sad necessity arises in your own family, doing exactly as he did, than that we Americans are in duty bound to follow the funeral customs of the ancient Greeks and Romans.

CUSTOMS OF THE PAST.

Indeed, how unreasonable some of the customs of the most enlightened and highly civilized nations of the past seem to us now! For example, among the cultured nations just mentioned, "when a man of note died, a wax mask was immediately taken of his features, and colored in exact resemblance to his look in life and health. This mask was affixed to a bust of wood or marble, inclosed in a marble or alabaster shrine, and set up in

the atrium of the deceased. On the occasion of a public funeral, these wax masks were removed or fac similes of them were made and worn by professional actors hired for the occasion, who might resemble the distinguished dead in stature, and strive further to impersonate them in dress and action. The dead man seemed thus to be accompanied and ushered to his rest by a guard of honor composed of all his famous forbears. Nor was family pride always content with the image of historic personages merely, but mythical ancestors were also introduced, and Tacitus tells us that Æneas and all the kings of Alba Longa walked in the funeral train of Drusus, and that sixty-four years after the battle of Philippi, at the funeral of the aged Junia, niece of Cato, wife of Cassius, and sister of Marcus Brutus, the images of twenty most illustrious families were carried before her. Equally absurd and ostentatious will some of our familiar customs of to-day appear to historians 30 or 50 years hence.

Such were the obsequies for the rich and famous. The very poor were simply hauled to vast common pits, into which the bodies were flung uncoffined, while the remains of malefactors, even in Horace's time, were exposed unburied, to the action of the elements and to birds and beasts of prey. We think this custom was as reprehensible as the ostentation of the rich.

There must be and there are, unquestionably, certain principles of Christian etiquette, propriety and æsthetics, and certain natural dictates of common sense, which should constitute the norm and guide for every intelligent person.

I wish to present at present not so much the positive side of this question, but rather the negative, namely what should be avoided and abolished.

The first on the list is the reprehensible and notorious custom of

EXTRAVAGANCE.

Entirely too much money is spent on funerals. Millionaires can afford highly expensive and ornamented caskets, cavalcades of carriages and edens of flowers. Some people argue that even the rich should not do this because of the bad example or pre-

cedent they thus set to those who cannot afford it. But it seems to me it is better for the world if the rich spend their money than if they horde it. I must here, however, make the startling (?) statement that all people are not millionaires, though many feel and act as though they were. Many are not heirs even to thousands; only a few will fall heirs to hundreds, while the large majority will fall heir to nothing, except debts. And for the great masses of the people who live from hand to mouth, and even for the "well-to-do" classes, to spend from 100 to 200 dollars and often as much as 300 and 400 on a funeral casket, is an act which I can characterize as nothing less than a sin, a sin against the survivors who need that money sorely and sadly for the very primal necessities of life, for food, rent and clothing. Such expenditures often, very often, plunge those who are guilty of it into debt for months and years, and even forever. We cannot blame the undertakers, who cater to the public demand. Aye, the undertakers must often suffer too, by reason of non-payment of dues justly owing them. I fully agree with the man of common sense when he says, "It is not only false reverence and mistaken affection, but downright dishonesty, for a man's family or friends to indulge expenditures that cannot be met."

Another item of extravagance connected with modern funerals is the

PROFUSION OF FLOWERS.

I have seen the corpse buried beneath a veritable avalanche of expensive flowers, often arranged in the form of anchors, crosses, harps, "gates-ajar," names, etc., when I knew the donors could ill afford the outlay. Floral offerings are tender and beautiful expressions of affection and esteem, but it is easy to carry this custom to extremes and turn it into an intolerable burden. A single, simple lily or rose is more beautiful and chaste than the artificial forms above enumerated. I am most decidedly of the opinion, moreover, that it would be infinitely better to give these tokens to the deceased before he lies a corpse. If my friends, *e. g.*, love and esteem me, let them show it while I can

appreciate it. But when the eyes are sightless orbs, when floral fragrance can no longer stir a pleasurable emotion in the brain, and when the heart can no longer beat a responsive thrill of recognition and gratitude, then you are *too late* with your flowers. No, no, give them to the living. Or, send them to the sorrowing survivors, a week, a month, a year after the death of the loved one, for that is the time that loved one will be most keenly and bitterly missed, and not on the day or amidst the excitement of the burial services.

Another item of extravagance is the

CAVALCADE OF CARRIAGES,

which, in these degenerate days, are used to carry the family, and the pall-bearers, and the relatives, and the neighbors, and the friends, and the acquaintances, and even neighborhood loafers to the cemetery. These carriages are often multiplied, too, by the ostentatious simply to make more of a show on the streets.

Surely this is a needless expense, for it seems far more impressive and appropriate if only the immediate family, pall-bearers and officiating clergyman go to the cemetery, and if the cemetery service be made as brief as possible. But hundreds of curiosity-drinkers love to go there just to gratify a heathenish pruriency to see the last struggle and agony of the mourners, hear their crying, count their tears, and measure the depth of their grief. It is all decidedly wrong, and should be abolished instantan.

And now it certainly must be true that if all the money spent on these three items, on costly caskets, cavalcades of carriages and feasts of flowers—if all the money thus wasted was lavished upon the deceased while living, it would be far wiser and more justifiable; but the best of all would be, that it be given to the needy family and survivors, be given to them *by their not thus uselessly spending it*. Funeral extravagance should certainly be abolished. “And devout men carried Stephen to his burial.” There are but few burial services recorded in Scripture. Among them stands this record of the burial of the first martyr. How

beautiful in its simplicity ! It stands out in rugged contrast with the foolish and extravagant burial services of modern times. "Let all things be done decently and in order," or, as the Greek may otherwise and perhaps better be translated, "let all things be done *becomingly* and in order."

SECOND, PUBLICITY AND OSTENTATION

should be scrupulously avoided. We think this is a matter of good taste, and will at once appeal to persons of any delicacy of sentiment, refinement and culture.

It shocks one to see in the columns of the newspapers a report that the remains of one's beloved, of him or her who was near and dear to you, "were attired in patent leather slippers and button-hole bouquet, covered with an eiderdown blanket, trimmed with ribbons and lace," and that the whole "reposed in a solid oak casket, with heavy silver mountings, silver extension bar handles and plate;" and that other remains were attired in "a black satin robe, covered with quilted satin eiderdown blanket, trimmed with ribbons and lace, and reposed in a rosewood O. G. casket with heavy silver trimmings and plate."

Well and sensibly says the editor of the *Morning Herald*, of Reading, Pa., in commenting editorially upon this custom: "The real pathos is in gowning all that is left of the loved ones as if they were en route to a fancy dress ball, and in further permitting such publicity as these journalistic details necessitate. Even if the patent leather slippers and the button-hole bouquet and the plush casket and the heavy silver trimmings appeal to the mourners as the truest and noblest means of expressing their grief, yet does it seem to us pitiful that these funereal facts should be blazoned forth to the world."

The remedy is: Insist that newspaper reporters shall say nothing about the casket, flowers or corpse, except, if necessary, in a very general way. Good taste requires it, and I should think the delicacy of true affection would demand it. Many people seem to think that by the amount of money and the publicity they give to the funeral of a friend or relative, they can make

amends for ill-treatment or neglect while the deceased was living. Giving the dead a "good" funeral, as it is called, is resorted to as a salve for conscience. Of course, it is all hypocrisy, aye, ostentatious hypocrisy, and contributes no little to the perpetuation and spread of that sin in society. Were it the custom to have private funerals, it would in a large measure uproot this evil weed, and, perhaps, also, make people treat each other better.

THIRD, FUNERALS SHOULD BE PRIVATE.

Let it be heralded far and wide, from the very house-tops so that all shall hear, that making an exhibition of the dead is not showing respect for them. Much is done for mere effect. It is in bad taste and barbarous. It attracts to funerals those vampires of curiosity who go just to see how the people "take on" over the death of their departed. "Mourners thus make an exhibition of their grief to a curious crowd. Better by far if they were shut up alone with their dead and with God, and by simple prayer asked for sustaining grace." The exposure of the remains of some loved one to the gaze of a curious crowd is, to a sensitive person, a cruel infliction, prolonged and intensified as the curious throng, many of them utter strangers, pass in solemn file by the casket or coffin.

Accordingly, the more cultured and progressive people are having private funerals, services at the house only, and very brief at the cemetery. Thus the curious public, sight-seekers and scene-lovers, are excluded.

We think, however, there are two exceptions to this rule, for public or church services should be held (1) when the deceased was a public character, such as a clergyman, a civil officer, an author, artist, public benefactor, etc., (2) where the circle of relatives and friends is large and the house too small to accommodate them all.

FOURTH, ABANDONING THE CORPSE TO STRANGERS.

When one comes to reflect, this seems the most inexplicable of all the unreasonable customs prevailing. Think of it! relatives, even the very nearest and dearest, assemble way off in some re-

mote room of the house upstairs, and during the last hour or moments when the body of their loved one reposes in the familiar and endearing spot of home, abandon it to strangers down in the front room, who sit around it close and compact. Strangers, near, dear ones, far off!! What can possibly be the justification of this custom? Is it an effort on the part of the bereaved family to show courtesy to their friends? If this be true, then it ought to be reversed, for then of all times is the time when friends should show courtesy to the bereaved. I should want to be with my loved one or his body, sacred, because of the beloved soul which but lately tenanted it, during its last hour in the sacred precincts of home. This custom is certainly not doing things in the natural order. It is contrary to I. Cor. 14 : 40. It is not "in order." It is both meaningless and unnatural.

Another custom which we would be pleased to see abandoned is

THE WEARING OF CRAPE.

It may not be objectionable to hang a piece of black cloth or ribbon on the front door as the recognized and conventional sign to the public that death is within, though some think even this should be done away with and flowers used instead. The Society of Friends has taken strong ground on this general question and has refused to sanction the practice of putting on mourning for the dead, first, because it is not always a truthful expression of feeling; secondly, because it often entails on survivors cost and expense which cannot suitably be incurred, and which sometimes leads into debt; third, because at a time when God would speak to the soul, through the solemn visitation of death, it is very undesirable to have the mind diverted by attention to outward attire; fourth, because injury to health and sight is frequently the result consequent upon the pressure of work at such times; and lastly, because, when we know that our dear ones are taken to eternal bliss above, the sable garment of woe seems at variance with the "Voice from Heaven, blessed are the dead that die in the Lord."

Backhouse and Taylor, in their history of the "Early Chris-

tian Church" say, "It was consonant with the new and glorious hope brought in through the Gospel, that the early Christians should despise and cast aside the whole paraphernalia of mourning which they saw around them—the sackcloth and ashes and rent garments of the Jews, the black apparel of the Romans, and the mourners hired to wail in both eastern and western nations."

Cyprian expresses himself in very strong terms on the same subject; writing concerning those who died in the pestilence during the reigns of Gallus and Valerian, he says: "How often and how manifestly has it been revealed to me by the condescension of God that I should publically declare that our brethren who are escaped from this world by the Lord's summons are not to be lamented, since we know that they are not lost, but gone before. Though they are to be longed for, they are not to be bewailed; and it is not becoming to us to put on *black* garments *here*, when they are already clothed in *white* raiment *there*."

Surely, indeed, funerals are sad and sombre enough. Why make them more so by figures clothed in black, which represents night, death, hopelessness and heathenism? Black crape is a relic of barbarism. Augustine very forcibly queries, "Why should we disfigure ourselves with black, unless we would imitate the *unbelieving* nations, not only in their wailing for the dead, but also in their mourning apparel? Be assured these are foreign and unlawful usages, but if lawful, they are not becoming." Along with these words of Augustine let us place those of St. Paul: "Let us do all things *becomingly* and in order."

Of course, those who at present wear crape or mourning apparel cannot be blamed, for they accepted custom as it is, without asking any questions. But those who are instructed and able to think for themselves should have the courage to break away from the unchristian tyranny of this century-long habit.

"During recent years," says W. M. Butler, "there has been a decided stand against wearing crape. The tendency in funeral goods is toward brighter hues." The Princess of Wales dispensed with crape during her mourning for the late Duke of Clarence. "Black is not the color of heaven. The Gospel of

Jesus Christ is full of hope. Why, then, should Christians clothe themselves with the emblems of darkness and despair? The burial rites of the early Christians were characterized by emblems of trust, peace and victory. They sang songs of triumph." We do not hear of those early Christians wearing crape for St. Stephen, or St. James, or John the Baptist. Every Christian that does it is perpetuating a distinctly heathen custom that speaks of the diametrical opposite to the Christian's hope and assurance.

SIXTH, MAKE THE SERVICES AT THE CEMETERY AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE,

especially in bad or winter weather, for the sake of the health of those who attend. How many cases of cold, catarrh, pneumonia, rheumatism, neuralgia, etc., have been contracted at cemetery services! We agree with the recommendation that the funeral director should inform the gentlemen that it will not be considered a mark of disrespect if they remain standing with their heads covered. Many a man, by removing his hat at the grave in cold or stormy weather, has taken a cold which has resulted in his death.

SEVENTH, ABOLISH SUNDAY FUNERALS.

This proposition has everything in its favor. The men engaged in the stables or in the undertaking business need the Sunday rest, and the poor minister is nearly worn to death by a Sunday funeral. For, besides the funeral, he has his many other duties to perform on that day, so that one Sunday funeral nearly makes two—nearly kills the officiating clergyman. Besides, on Sundays large crowds gather in the cemeteries, and the curious are glutted whenever a funeral comes along. With wise planning all Sunday funerals can be avoided.

EIGHTH, BRASS BANDS

are out of place, particularly as at present used, by reason of the outrageously bad taste they exhibit in the selections they play when returning from the interment. Says "George Gordon:" "A funeral may be solemn enough at the outset. The 'Dead March in Saul' does not last out the four hours of the band's

engagement. It is useful enough for consigning a corpse to the earth. But the 'Washington Post,' 'Three Cheers for the Red, White and Blue,' and the effervescent 'Yankee Doodle' are the tunes that conduct the cortégé home. Indeed, the whole affair, after the impressive prologue, wears such an air of genial gayety that it dwindles into a perfect picnic ere the day is done."

This thing is only too common, and his description, alas ! only too true. It turns so solemn a thing as a funeral into a farce. It should be incontinently abolished.

NINTH, KISSING THE CORPSE.

The practice of kissing the dead is attended with so much danger to health and life that wise people ought certainly to hesitate before they engage in it. Bacilli or germs of various diseases are thus directly imparted to the living. Remember, too, that the corpse you kiss is not the person you loved, and will soon be earth, ashes, dust.

In conclusion permit me to say, Don't make too much of burials. The greatest and best on the roll of Christian saints and heroes are buried in

UNKNOWN GRAVES—

Moses, St. Paul, St. John, St. James, St. Matthew, etc. Where are their graves? How were they buried? Where are the costly marble monuments to mark their resting places and keep green their memory. Their funerals must have been simple and unpretentious indeed, so much so that no record has been kept and not even a hint dropped.

Call to mind, too, how severely simple were the obsequies of our Lord Himself. So simple and quiet were they that any disinterested observer would never have imagined Him to be any great or famous personage. He was buried without a costly casket, without flowers, without a stream of humanity passing by and staring at those matchless features fixed in death, without a brass band, without a calvacade of carriages—in fact, with only a few true friends to mourn Him, so few, indeed, that you could have counted them on the fingers of one hand. And in connec-

tion, remember the simplicity of the funeral of His servants, John the Baptist and St. Stephen. “And His disciples came, and took up the body, and buried it, and went and told Jesus.” “And devout men carried Stephen to his burial.” Indeed, it seems that the simpler the service the more solemn and impressive.

Again, *don't make too much of death and dying*. That is not half as important for character as living.

LIVING CHANGES AND SHAPES CHARACTER ; DEATH DOES NOT, either in the case of the wicked or of the good. Don't magnify either the terror or the pomp of death. For, first, when a wicked man dies, you cannot drag him into the place and condition of soul called “heaven,” by a hearse drawn with six span of Arabian steeds or a whole cavalcade of carriages ; you cannot sing him into the celestial temple by even a Handel and Haydn chorus of trained musicians ; you cannot preach him into the mansions above even by Talmagian eloquence. Earth to earth, dust to dust, ashes to ashes with the body—to the judgment bar of God with the soul.

And, secondly, when a good man dies, don't make too much even of that death. His works will live in a long chain of blessings after him, even though a silver-lined hearse and a cavalcade of carriages do not follow him to the grave ; his indestructible good deeds will sing his praises better than a Bostonian chorus, and people will continue to bless his name and talk kindly of him even if there should happen to be no minister to pronounce his eulogy. Do not make too much of death.

Let us see to it that we live aright. Take care of your character *before* death, and afterwards, both here and yonder, it will take care of itself. Our song and rule should be the words of one of the most beautiful hymns that has ever been written, from the pen and heart of the now sainted Dr. Henry Harbaugh, the Reformed classic,

“Jesus ! I live to Thee,
The loveliest and best ;
My life in Thee, Thy life in me,
In Thy blest love I rest.”

If this be our experience, then at the end of life and all through we can also sing,

“ Living or dying, Lord,
I ask but to be Thine ;
My life in Thee, Thy life in me,
Makes heaven forever mine.”

When this is true, what will it matter to our free and triumphant spirits what men do with our bodies that will soon turn to corruption and a feast for worms—whether they sink them into ocean’s mysterious depths, or burn them with fire, or bury them in the ground?

Let us live honest, consistent, helpful lives, and then when we are dead, the instinct of humanity and the intelligent sympathy and culture of our friends will dictate a becoming disposal of our mortal remains, whilst the immortal part, the soul, will return in native freedom and glory to God Who gave it.

V.

CRITICISM OF SOCIALISM.

BY REV. A. G. GEKELER.

The socialist theory of value is, briefly, that the value of commodities is determined by the amount of labor socially necessary to produce them. "Use-values are combinations of two elements—matter and labor. If we take away the useful labor expended upon them, a material substratum is always left, which is furnished by Nature without the help of man. The latter can work only as Nature does, that is by changing the form of matter. Nay, more, in this work of changing the form he is constantly helped by natural forces. We see, then, that labor is not the only source of material wealth, of use-values produced by labor. As William Petty puts it, labor is its father and the earth its mother." And this earth cannot be made absolute private property. The earth is the Lord's, and for His creatures, and neither the divine law, as found in the books of Moses, nor our modern law admits the right of absolute ownership in land. If the title to all the land of a state were vested in one person, that person would have neither the moral nor legal right to push the people off his property. The right of ownership in land is simply a convention, a thing that has developed in the course of time and has proven generally useful in our present social system. It is the amount of labor usefully expended upon things, land included, that is the measure of their value. And if labor is the sole human factor in the production of commodities, it is a just inference that they of right belong to the producers, in proportion as they have been active in the production. If this inference were not drawn, probably no objection to this theory of value had ever been made.

With this proposition on value Socialism stands or falls. Hence we should expect strong objection to be made to this

fundamental position. But all I find against the theory comes to this, that labor, in order to be productive of value, must be *intelligent*, and what is already included in this, it must be expended upon an object of *demand*. Matter, irrespective of its character, has weight. But the blind exertion of human power is not wealth producing, more likely it is destructive. But it is the essence of labor to be human, *i. e.*, intelligent. Idiots are never hired.

Of course, pyramids have no exchange value at present; although great skill and much labor were expended upon them, they now meet no want. Yet when Brassey was asked what it would cost to-day to build a pyramid, he could make no estimate except on the basis of the cost of labor.

One critic brings forward, that the effort of a man in picking up a diamond, found by chance, is surely no measure of the diamond's value. Another refers to a masterpiece of art, a painting by Meissonier, and asks, What proportion does the value of the canvas and the pigments bear to the fabulous prices paid for the painting? The fair reply is, that diamonds and the precious metals have their values determined by the labor *commonly* necessary to find them, the average amount of labor necessary at any stage of society to find the precious metals and stones is what constitutes their standard of value and this standard already existing of course determines the value of chance finds also. As to works of genius, they form a separate class. They bring scarcity prices, and are personal monopolies, and, furthermore, among the quantities of commodities continually thrown upon the market, what an insignificant portion are the product of chance or genius! These two exceptions are of so small moment that they do not invalidate the labor theory of value.

More formidable seems the objection that the values of agricultural products cannot be measured or determined by the labor embodied in them. The time needed to dig a ton of coal or make a pair of shoes is constant and quite accurately determinable. But the labor needed to produce a ton of wheat or a cask of wine varies with the seasons and can never be foreknown. The

bounty of the seasons is a more important factor than the labor of man. But even here it is the labor embodied that determines the value of provisions. The difference between good and bad years is like the difference between more and less efficient machinery. In one year the labor of the farming community is spread over x commodities, in another over $1\frac{1}{3}x$, and the values will vary in some such proportion.

The only modification of the labor-value formula is, that it holds good only of those commodities which can be produced in practically unlimited quantities, and this is a modification of little importance, since, with rare exceptions, commodities can be produced to that extent. And now, when it comes to the division of these values, into necessary and surplus values, into the share of labor and the share of capital, what is the objection to the socialist inference, that, as labor is the father of values, to labor the valuable things made belong? Strangely enough, the opposition sets itself squarely upon the platform of socialism and uses the labor theory of value in the favor of the entrepreneur!

Thus Professor Kirkup says in the *Brittanica*: "Marx's conception of labour is the same as that of Ricardo, and as a logical exposition of the historic contradiction between the two principles on the basis of Ricardo, the work of Marx is quite unanswerable. It is obvious, however, that the definition of labor assumed both in Ricardo and Marx is too narrow. The labor they broadly posit as the source of wealth is manual labor. In the early stages of industry, when the market was small and limited and the technique was of the simplest and rudest description, labor in that sense might correctly be described as the source of value. But in modern industry, when the market is world-wide, the technique most complex, and the competition most severe, when *inventiveness*, *sagacity*, *courage* and *decision* in *initiative*, and *skill* in *management*, are factors so important, no such exclusive place as has been claimed can be assigned to labor. The Ricardian principle therefore falls to the ground. And it is not historically true to maintain, as Marx does, that the profits of the capitalist are obtained simply by appropriating

the products of unpaid labor. In *initiating* and *managing* the capitalist is charged with the most *difficult* and *important* part of the work of production."

But here capital's claim to its customary share of the product is not based upon the right of the capital employed, nor upon the productiveness of capital, but upon the efficiency of intelligence and prudence in management. Since the enterprise, sagacity and courage of the capitalist contribute as much to the product as the labor of many operatives, it is but fair that his reward should be many times greater than that of the operative. But this is not a reward of capital, it is the reward of brains and industry! Let it be observed that this justification of the capitalist's share is socialistic to the core; this is not a refutation, but an adoption of Marx's theory of value. It is to every man according to his product! However, the socialist disputes the superlative efficiency of the capitalist. This lauded audacity and foresight—in short, this speculation—is possible and profitable only in our irrational system of competition. One man speculates successfully, but how many, equally intelligent, fail! Speculation, courage and decision, are called for only in the dark. When the real state of affairs in an industry is known or easily accessible to all, the audacity and foresight of the entrepreneur are in vain; then success is not a matter of brains, but of the heavy battalions of capital. How high an estimate must we put upon the brain and, forsooth, the courage of the sugar trust, in buying up all the raw sugar it could lay hands on, when it was cock sure of the impending imposition of a protective tariff? How much brains was necessary to foresee a rise in the price of wool after McKinley's election? Not brains were needed, but cash on hand. Not brains, vast capital is needed to run down the price of stocks in order to buy low, and raise the price to sell. Not the abundance of brains, but the lack of honor and fair play were the factors in building up the vastest trust of the century.

Henry Demarest Llyod in "*Wealth vs. Commonwealth*" gives some examples of the value of brains, and other things, in fortune making.

A trustee of the Standard Oil Company was questioned in a State investigation :

“Had you ever been interested in the refining of oil in any manner when you first became connected with the oil business?”

“Never.”

“Or the production of oil?” “Never.”

He was a railroad man and had been taken into the combination for his value as such ; but when he was asked if he could tell any of the rates of freight his company had paid, he said : “I cannot.”

“What is your business and where do you reside?” another of the trustees was asked by the State of New York. “I decline to answer any question until I can consult counsel.”

“What is the capital stock?” was asked of another. “I do not know.”

“How much has the capital been increased since?” “I don’t know.”

“Where are the meetings of the Standard Oil Company held?” “I don’t know.”

“How many directors are there?” “I don’t know.”

“Do they own any pipe lines?” “I don’t know.” “I don’t know anything about the rates of transportation.”

“Did not the concern with which you were so connected purchase over 8,000,000 barrels of crude petroleum in 1881?” “I am unable to state.”

He was asked to give the name of one refinery in this country running at the time, 1883, not owned or substantially controlled by his concern ? “I decline to answer.”

He was asked if he would say the total profits of his trust’s companies for the last year, 1887, were not as much as \$20,000-000 ? “I haven’t the least knowledge on that subject.”

Asked on the witness stand in the Buffalo explosion case when it was he formed the trust with \$70,000,000 of capital, the president replied : “I am unable to state,” and he could not say where its articles of agreement were, nor who has control of it. When questioned before the Interstate Commerce Commission, he

could not tell within \$25,000,000 how much business they were doing a year. The head of the New York Central Railroad could not tell when a stock dividend of something like \$46,000,000 had been declared on one of his roads. * * *

The gravest objection made against socialism is, that it would be the end of freedom. Herbert Spencer says: "Even did their plans succeed, it could only be by substituting one kind of evil for another. A little deliberate thought would show that under their proposed arrangements, their *liberties* must be surrendered in proportion as their material welfare were cared for."

If this were true, it ought to persuade all men rather to abide by the present society with all its evils, than to fly to a despotism, no matter what temporal conveniences it promised. But this grave indictment against socialism is really a judgment on the men who make it. What, to them, is liberty, beyond the opportunity of making money? This is the sacred liberty that would perish.

Does socialism involve fettered speech and the censorship of the press? Does it involve less liberty in choosing congenial labor?

Does it stand for restriction or extension of education? What is liberty without leisure? And what is liberty without bread?

On the contrary, socialism means the largest liberty possible to all, secured by shorter hours of labor, and security of employment. That freedom, which those who are in the possession of a competence enjoy, will be the rule and no more the exception.

The one criticism of socialists, which is sound, is that they generally oppose religion. Marx rejoiced that the starting point of the German socialism is the "positive abolition of religion." Many are avowed atheists, and it would be an easy matter to collect many quotations from the writings of men high in their party which reveal a passionate enmity to the Church. Pastors often hear said: "So and so never goes to church; he is a socialist."

But irreligion may not be essential to socialism, possibly it is entirely accidental. Schaeffle, Ely and others have so judged, and their conclusion is easily reached by examining the principles

of the theory. Socialism is a theory of society and is as indifferent to religion as our party platforms. The simple truth is that the leaders of socialism in Europe have been free thinkers first, and socialists afterward. But their opposition to religion has a practical reason. The Gospel inculcates patience in the endurance of wrongs. A Christian will scruple to use violence against the powers that be. Christianity makes good martyrs, but poor fighters. Hence the Church is the strongest prop of the present order. The Church is the greatest hindrance to the realization of the socialist program. Perhaps this is no compliment to the Church, but it is a fact that European socialists must reckon with and which explains their extreme hatred of the Church.

The attitude of both parties must change. Religion is secure in the lap of Nature. The stability and order and beneficence displayed in creation are the ever present manifestation of Him to whom homage is due. A movement ignoring God and the deepest hunger of the human heart cannot conquer. The brotherhood of man cannot be realized while the existence and Fatherhood of God are denied.

On the other hand, the evils under which society groans can not be healed if Christians are content to have their souls saved in the world to come. If we can be sure that evils exist in our system that are condemned of God, we may be sure that it is our duty to labor with might for their extinction. The Church ought to be the alma mater of Christian reform, of reforms called for by the spirit of Christ. A social system embodying the mind of Christ, let it be called by whatever name, it is now the duty of Christians to prepare and establish.

VI.

ST. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF SALVATION, IN THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

BY THE EDITOR.

In the July number of this REVIEW, for 1897, we discussed St. Paul's doctrine of redemption, or of the objective side of the work of divine grace in the reconciliation and transformation of sinners, as this doctrine seems to be formulated in the greatest and most perfect of the apostle's writings. In the present article we propose now to take up the subjective side of the same work, or what may appropriately be called the doctrine of *salvation*. Salvation from the Latin *salus*, *health*, German *Heil*, may be defined as moral soundness or health, or as the subjective result of the objective work of grace in the soul. In treating this subject we shall, as before, make the Epistle to the Romans the main basis of our study, giving due consideration, however, also to such passages of other Pauline writings as may seem to bear upon our theme.

The essential moments in Paul's doctrine of salvation, we think, will generally be admitted to be the conceptions of *justification* and *sanctification*. These conceptions may be separated in thought, but in reality they belong together, forming one concrete process of life ; and, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of many theologians in the past, we believe that they were so held together in the mind of St. Paul. Justification may, doubtless, be regarded as a forensic act whereby a sinner is declared righteous on the ground of faith in Christ ; but faith in Christ involves the principle of a new spiritual life in the believer, whose unfolding is sanctification, and the end a Christ-like character. We may say, then, that justification and sanctification are related as the beginning and continuation, and also as the negative and positive side, of the same spiritual process. The word of justifi-

cation is pronounced in the divine judgment on the promise and prospect of sanctification which are in the sinner ; and sanctification results as a consequence of justification, while faith is the subjective condition of both. These conceptions, we believe, will be verified by a closer study of St. Paul.

The verb *δικαιοῦν* is used in the Bible in three distinct senses, of which the first is primary and fundamental : These are *factitive*, *demonstrative* and *declarative*. In the first sense it means *to make one righteous*. This is in agreement with the rule that verbs ending in *οω* usually signify the making of a person or thing into what is implied in the root. It is contended, even by so high an authority as Professor Thayer (*Lexicon, ad verbum*), that this sense is exceedingly rare, if not altogether wanting, in the New Testament. We believe, on the contrary, that this sense underlies the whole range of meaning in which the word is used by St. Paul. When Paul speaks of God as being “just and justifying him that is of faith in Jesus” (Rom. 3 : 26), we believe that the action of the verb must be understood to produce the same quality in its object as that from which it proceeds in God. In the second sense *δικαιοῦν* means to demonstrate or show one to be righteous who is such in reality. If a person has been falsely accused, and is by a legal investigation shown to be innocent, this is *justification*. In this sense the word is used in the Old Testament ; as, for instance, in Deut. 25 : 1 where judges are enjoined to “justify the righteous and condemn the wicked.” In the third sense, finally, the word means to declare one righteous who is not such in fact—to absolve from guilt, *to pardon*, with the implied idea that the pardon granted shall work a moral transformation in the person pardoned. In this sense the word is, doubtless, most commonly used in the New Testament, especially in those writings of St. Paul in which he contends against the Pharisaic doctrine of salvation by works. This declarative sense of the word seems to be predominant, for instance, in Acts 13 : 38, 39, where justification is clearly equivalent to remission of sins ; also in Rom. 3 : 24, where justification is declared to be an act of free grace on the part of God ; and in Rom. 3 : 25, where,

after having spoken of redemption and propitiation in the blood of Christ through faith, the apostle sums up by saying: "We reckon therefore that a man is justified by faith apart from the works of the law."

This idea of justification, in the sense of forgiveness of sins through faith in Jesus Christ as the principle of an actual divine righteousness in men, is the key-note of Paul's Gospel. The Gospel, as Paul apprehended it, "is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; for therein is revealed a righteousness of God from faith unto faith." The Gospel as divine power first works in the soul of the sinner the sense and assurance of forgiveness, and then induces in him that quality of righteousness which belongs to God Himself. This idea of a divine righteousness, in distinction from the righteousness supposed to be acquired by the observance of the law, is the leading peculiarity of St. Paul's teaching. In the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, however, he shows that this is not an entirely new idea. It was already fore-shadowed in the Old Testament. For of Abraham it is said (Gen. 15: 6), that "he believed God, and He counted it to him for righteousness." What did God count to him for righteousness? Not his works—not circumcision, not sacrifices and offerings—nor either the righteousness of another, but his faith. When he was old and as yet childless, Jehovah promised him that his seed should be as the stars of heaven for multitude. This promise Abraham believed; and this heroic act of faith was imputed to him for righteousness. Such is the record in Genesis. And so now, the apostle continues, "to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reckoned for righteousness." This idea of the imputation of faith for righteousness, or simply of righteousness, without works, is then further illustrated and confirmed by a quotation from Ps. 32: 1: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not sin." And this blessedness has nothing to do with the observance of the law. Abraham was not yet circumcised when his faith was accounted unto him for right-

eousness. He simply felt sure that God was able to keep His promises, and trusted in His words without any hesitation or doubt; and *this* was reckoned unto him for righteousness. So now, in like manner, the faith of the Christian, who believes on Him that raised up Jesus, our Lord, from the dead, is reckoned unto him for righteousness.

Here, and nowhere else, the apostle twice uses the expression *imputation of righteousness*. What does he mean by this expression? The answer to this question may be gathered from the above representation of the blessed man. The blessedness of the man to whom righteousness is imputed, is just the blessedness of him whose iniquities are forgiven and whose sins are covered, or, in other words, the blessedness of the man to whom the Lord imputes not sin. The imputation of righteousness, then, consists not in setting to one's account a foreign merit, but simply in the non-imputation of sins, or *in the forgiveness of sins*. Justification is the imputation of righteousness or of faith for righteousness; and the imputation of righteousness is the non-imputation of sin; and the non-imputation of sin is merely the gratuitous forgiveness of sins. A person is justified in the specific sense in which Paul uses the word in relation to the Christian believer, when his sins are forgiven, or when his conscience is absolved from the sense of guilt and condemnation; but in the radical sense of *being made righteous*, which must be supposed to be the ultimate aim of divine forgiveness, one is completely justified only when he has developed a right Christian character. Justification, then, does not consist primarily in making a sinner righteous, either by the imputation or impartation of another's righteousness, or by a magical transformation of his moral nature. Righteousness is a personal quality that can only be acquired by personal action and conduct. To conceive of it as something ready-made and transferable from one person to another, is to make it unmoral. Those who adopt the vicarious punishment doctrine of the atonement usually define justification as the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Christ by His active and passive obedience has acquired an infinite quantity of merit; and

of this God sets to the account of the believing sinner a sufficient amount to cover up his sins and make him pass for righteous. Here we have the essence of the doctrine of supererogation and of indulgence. The idea of righteousness has ceased to be an ethical conception, and has been transformed into the notion of a physical commodity, that can be bought and sold, and arbitrarily transferred from one person to another. And this view is not materially improved by saying that the righteousness of Christ is not *imputed* but *imparted* to the believer in justification. A moral quality can not be imparted from one person to another. A father cannot impart his character to his son, as he has imparted to him his blood, or as he may impart to him his money. The son can, indeed, make the father's character his own, and the father can help him to do it, but only by a process of moral action. So the believer can make the character of Christ his own by a moral life, which has its principle in faith, through which Christ Himself exercises in him the power of a moral dynamic. But this is something very different from the notion of a direct legal imputation or physical impartation of Christ's righteousness. This notion is not a Pauline idea. Paul never says that the righteousness of Christ is imparted to the believer, or that the believer is accounted righteous because of the righteousness of Christ. He says that *faith* is imputed for righteousness (Rom. 4 : 5) ; and when immediately afterwards he speaks of *righteousness* being imputed (verses 6 and 11), it is plain that this is intended to mean no more than is asserted in the foregoing proposition, namely, that faith is the condition of the sinner's being accounted righteous.

Faith is imputed for righteousness. The apostle's fundamental conception of faith may be inferred from his account of the justification of Abraham, in connection with his statement (Rom. 4 : 23, 24), that "it was written not only for his sake, that righteousness was reckoned unto him, but for our sake also unto whom it shall be reckoned, *who believe on Him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead*, who was delivered for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification." Faith is *trust*, it is *confidence*,

that falters not at any difficulties, and is sure even when it cannot see. So Abraham believed. He accepted God's promise that he should be made the father of a numerous posterity. He was sure that God could and would fulfill this promise. He trusted in God, and that was his faith. And so the Christian trusts in God, who raised up from the dead Jesus Christ, our Lord; and this is the substance of his faith. "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth Jesus as Lord, and shalt believe in thy heart that God raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved" (Rom. 10: 9). The contents of this faith are that Jesus Christ was delivered up on account of our trespasses, and was raised from the dead on account of our justification. To accept the truth that Christ died for our sins, and that God in His death sets forth His reconciling, pardoning love, that is the essence of Christian faith, according to St. Paul. Such faith is not helped by any theory or theories of the atonement. The essence of the atonement may be a transcendental process which is above the reach both of our experience and of our reflection; but the fact is a truth for our faith, which is attended by the most blessed results. For he who accepts this truth is pardoned—his sins are forgiven, in the sense that in his conscience he is absolved from the feeling of condemnation and guilt. He is assured that God is not angry with him, but loves him; and that, not having spared His own Son, but having delivered Him up for us all, He will also with Him freely give us all things. It is generally said that faith is the *condition* of justification, or the *condition* of the appropriation of the saving grace of God in Christ. If, however, by condition we understand something *different* from the appropriating act, then this distinction cannot be regarded as valid. Faith is the appropriation of saving grace, as eating is the appropriation of life-supporting food. When we eat, we do not merely fulfill a condition of appropriating food, but we do in the very act appropriate it. So when we believe in Jesus that He was set forth in His blood as a propitiation, and that He was delivered up on account of our trespasses and raised again on account of our justification, we do not merely fulfill a condition in conse-

quence of which God may pardon us, or in consequence of which we may be justified; but we are justified in the act of believing, and in this act we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ. Faith is the very act in which the absolution of the conscience and the realization of peace are brought to pass. The man who believes not the grace of God exhibited in the blood of Christ remains an enemy of God—he is not reconciled, the atonement is not a reality for him, and he bears in his conscience the sense of condemnation. On the contrary, he who believes, “his faith is reckoned unto him for righteousness,” which we may now understand to mean that the believer’s faith itself is the realization of the sense of pardon and peace in his conscience. In his faith the believer realizes that his sins are forgiven and that he stands before God as righteous; and this, as we understand it, is justification by faith in the distinct Pauline sense of the word.

But is, then, the exercise of justifying faith merely a subjective activity, like a dream, for example, which has no objective reality? In a dream one may enjoy the delights of a banquet without swallowing a particle of food. Is it so also with faith? Faith is the sense or feeling of reconciliation and peace with God. Is this merely a subjective persuasion without any objective reality corresponding to it? Some, perhaps, would say that this is an irrelevant question. The adherents of the school of Ritschl, who would confine all theology to the study of phenomena, would tell us that we have no business to go back beyond the experience of justification which is given in the act of faith itself. We believe, however, that the question is a legitimate one. We may rightly ask whether our experience of justifying or pardoning grace has any corresponding reality in the activity of the divine mind. To suppose that it has not, would be to suppose that man is really his own saviour—that it is not God who forgives sins, but that man really forgives his own sins. We must, therefore, suppose that to our sense of pardon there corresponds a divine judgment absolving us from the guilt of our sins. But God’s judgments must be according to truth. In pronouncing one righteous He cannot violate the inherent *rightness* of His own being. If, then, in the

justification of the sinner through faith there is an expression of divine judgment, the question arises, how can God be true and yet justify the ungodly? How can God pronounce a sinner to be righteous who is not yet such in fact?

We believe that the answer which may be given to this question from the standpoint of St. Paul is two-fold. It may be said that God can pronounce the believing sinner righteous because He is able to view him, first, not as he is in himself, but as he is in Christ, and secondly, not as he is now, but as he is going to become in consequence of the principle of faith which is in him. According to Paul the condition or occasion of justification is faith in Jesus Christ. God is the justifier of him that has faith in Jesus (Rom. 4: 25). But evidently the ground or reason of the justifying act on the part of God is not in *faith*, but in *Christ*. We are justified *because of Christ*—justified in His blood (Rom. 5: 9). Being justified by faith we have peace with God *through our Lord Jesus Christ*, through whom also we were brought into this state of grace in which we now stand. We may say that it is Christ in the believer that constitutes the ground of divine judgment upon him. In a certain sense we may say even that the believer is justified, or regarded and treated as righteous in the forum of the divine judgment, for the *sake* of Christ, or on account of Christ's *merits*. These terms are not Scriptural, and they have been abused in the service of a false theory of salvation, which has brought Christianity into reproach with earnest ethical minds. When it is said that sinners are justified for the sake of Christ, or on account of Christ's merits, this has usually been understood to mean that Christ's righteousness is set to the account of sinners in an external, legal way. In this sense the words have entered into hymns and prayers. We pray that God may forgive us our sins and treat us as righteous for the sake of Christ's merits; never reflecting that if this were understood in the sense in which it is so frequently taken, there would be no use in praying for it. For if the merits of Christ consisted in His having paid the penalty of our sins, and having acquired a treasure of righteousness sufficient to make us

all rich, then God would be bound in His own justice to let us have the benefit of this arrangement. Such a conception would make Christianity wholly unethical and unreal, and, according to our conviction, finds no support in the writings of St. Paul, or of any other apostle.

And yet the expressions in question may be used in such sense as to convey the truth which the New Testament undoubtedly contains. Certainly there must be some consideration or motive on the ground of which God forgives sins ; otherwise sin would not be an evil for God, and forgiveness would be no reality. This consideration can not be the payment by the Redeemer of a legal equivalent in the way of punitive suffering, for in that case forgiveness would not be forgiveness ; it would not be gratuitous, *δωρεάν*, as St. Paul declares it to be. The consideration which forms the ground of the divine forgiveness, then, must be *Christ Himself*, who was perfected as the captain of our salvation through suffering, and having been glorified has become a life-giving Spirit, a principle of divine virtue, and therefore of salvation, in humanity. This salvation, however, is not a magical transformation. On the contrary, it can be appropriated only progressively in the moral way of faith. Hence no sinner can be ethically righteous the moment that he has begun to believe. The *saints* of Paul's Epistles are by no means free from all moral imperfections. But a *forgiven* sinner, a *justified* sinner, the believer must be supposed to be from the moment he believes. Such at least was the experience of St. Paul, who exclaimed, "There is therefore now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 8 : 1). It is, then, for Christ's sake that God can account the believing sinner as righteous. It can not be for the sake of what the sinner is in himself at the moment that he is accounted righteous, but for the sake of what Christ is. Christ's merit, Christ's *worth* forms the ground on which the sinner is freed from condemnation and declared righteous in God's sight. That, we think, is Paul's teaching. But in this divine judgment Christ and the sinner must be supposed to be looked at as one. Christ was identified first with the sinner by

bearing the world's whole sinful lot, and now the sinner is identified with Christ in His exalted state of perfection ; and it is because of this union that the sinner can be justified for Christ's sake.

The union between Christ and men is first a transcendental union, that is, a union outside of and beyond any form of experience. It is an essential union, like that subsisting between men and the first Adam, and forms the ground of all divine influences and tendencies in humanity. The life which is in the Logos incarnate in Christ is the light of men. But the union between Christ and believers is also a moral union, which begins in the principle of faith and grows into a complete personal oneness. Through faith Christ dwells in men's hearts in love (Eph. 3 : 17), and this involves a gradual moral assimilation of them to Himself. And here, then, we have a second ground for the divine judgment pronounced in justification : it is the consideration, not of what the believer now is, but of what he is capable of becoming in Christ. It is not a false judgment when the young oak tree that has never yet produced acorns, is pronounced an oak. It has the nature of an oak tree, and if it shall ever bear any fruit at all, it will be acorns. So the believer has in himself potentially the nature of a Christian, that is, the nature of Christ ; and this Christian nature may in course of time be expected to develop its peculiar characteristics and to bear its proper fruit. And it is in anticipation of this development that God, who views all temporal processes *sub specie eternitatis*, is able to declare the believer righteous, although his character of righteousness is yet to be formed. The promise of a Christian character, which is involved in faith, is a condition of the judgment of justification. Augustine has said somewhere that in order to justification it is not sufficient that man believe in God ; God also must believe in man. That is doubtless true. The divine judgment of justification must take for granted that the promise of fruit contained in the blossom of faith will be fulfilled. What if this expectation should fail to be realized ? Would the judgment of justification then stand ? No, certainly not. The unmerciful servant in the

parable, whose debt of ten thousand talents had been forgiven, was afterwards delivered to the tormentors until he should pay all, because he himself was not willing to forgive his fellow-servant. The divine judgment is capable of being reversed, if the conditions on which it depends fail to be realized. Should it be said that this conception imports an element of time into the operations of the divine mind, we would reply that it is our Lord who so represents the matter, and that if God could create a temporal world, He must also be supposed to be able to adjust Himself to its conditions. But, as we have already seen, the presupposition of justification is sanctification. Where sanctification, that is, the development of a Christ-like character in the believer, does not ensue, there justification ceases to be a reality, and the man is still under condemnation. The act of justification in the declarative sense, then, presupposes the process of justification in the causative sense. Or justification and sanctification are reciprocal elements and stages in one divine process of salvation; and the former cannot be realized without the realization of the latter. "Whom He justified, them He also glorified."

It is as thus conditioned that St. Paul continually presents the subject of salvation in the Epistle to the Romans and elsewhere. There is in the believing Christian the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, which has freed him from the law of sin and death; and this new law of life has in it the tendency to produce a corresponding walk in the spirit (Rom. 8: 2). If this tendency should fail of its effect, then there would be no salvation. The apostle Paul nowhere in all his writings uses the term regeneration, or new birth, *παλιγγενεσία*, except in Tit. 3: 5, if indeed that epistle be from his hands. But in the Epistle to the Romans and elsewhere he sets forth the idea, not that the Christian has been born again, but that *he has died and risen with Christ*, and is for this reason now able and bound to walk in newness of life. There is a new life in him, which is the consequence of a spiritual resurrection with Christ. The essence of this new life consists in a new adjustment of the relations of flesh and spirit; the latter having, in consequence of union with the crucified and risen Christ,

obtained the ascendancy over the former. And this new life now is the source and principle of sanctification. There were those who slandered the apostle's doctrine by representing it as immoral, or at least as having an immoral tendency. They said, if it be true that we do not need the works of the law in order to justification, then it is immaterial what kind of life we lead; we may sin; and the more we sin, the more will grace be magnified in the remission of our sins. To this misrepresentation of his doctrine the apostle furnishes an answer in Rom. 6 : 1-11. Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound? By no means. The very conception is impossible. Christians who are justified by faith in Christ, have died with Christ unto sin, and are risen with Him unto newness of life. "I am crucified with Christ," exclaims the apostle (Gal. 2 : 20), "yet I live; and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." The carnal self has been put to death, and the spiritual self, which is created anew after Christ has been quickened into active life. Our old man, the carnal nature, has been in principle crucified with Christ, that the body of sin might be done away, that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin.

This moral transformation, this change which has begun to take place in our moral nature, is *what is signified in our baptism*. Commentators are generally agreed that this reference to baptism implies an allusion to immersion. The plunging of the body under the waves, they say, signifies death and burial with Christ; and the coming up again from under the water signifies the rising of the soul unto newness of life. This may be admitted, provided we do not thereby turn immersion into a law, and so make of baptism merely a legal institution, like those of the Old Testament, which receives its significance wholly from its form. The apostle's reference is only an illustration, not the laying down of a law. It doubtless recognizes immersion as a mode of baptism; but it does not imply that this is the only mode that is permissible. There may be other elements in the spiritual transaction signified by baptism, which may be better represented by some other mode than immersion. If the apostle had been asked whether immersion is the only valid mode of baptism, and whether persons who

have not been immersed may not be regarded as Christians who have spiritually died with Christ and risen with Him, he would probably have answered with his impassioned *μὴ γένοιτο*, *perish the thought*. The apostle was not a legalist, or formalist, and would have scouted the idea of the origination of the Christian life in the soul being bound to any one external ceremony. If in what he says he refers to immersion at all, which is by no means absolutely certain, he refers to it only as a symbol of what takes place in the soul at the moment when the Christian life comes to its birth therein. But this revolution in the life of the soul, which is signified by the terms *dying* and *rising* again, and which, being itself essentially a transcendental process, is once for all certified to the Christian subject by the sensible act of baptism—this revolution has given to the life of the soul a new moral tone and tendency, which is wholly inconsistent with sin, and will act as a powerful influence or impulse, “law of the spirit,” towards the fulfilling of the law of righteousness. This law of the spirit, however, is not regarded by the apostle as an irresistible force, but as a moral influence; so that the exhortation is still in order: “Even so *reckon ye also yourselves* to be dead unto sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus.”

In consequence of the new creation, or new birth, which is signified in Christian baptism, the opposite elements of human nature are brought into right relation to each other. The flesh has become subordinate to the spirit. Its impulses and passions are no longer the controlling forces in human life. The spirit has been instated in its place of rightful dominion by a new accession of power from the Spirit of God. “Ye are not in the flesh, but in the spirit, if at least the Spirit of God dwelleth in you,” says the apostle (Rom. 8:9). But this dominion of the spirit over the flesh, in consequence of the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, is not of such sort that the flesh no longer retains something of its nature and tendency, and that the spiritual life goes on with mere involuntary spontaneity. Indeed the spiritual life differs from the carnal just in this, that the spiritual is entirely rational, voluntary and free. In the spiritual life there

is nothing compulsory. The natural, the carnal, on the other hand, is irrational and unfree—mere darkness and passion. It is, therefore, not impossible for the spiritual, in the very exercise of its power of freedom, to abdicate its dominion, and again to become unfree. The renewed soul *may* live after the flesh. There is no irresistible grace preventing such a result. And then, in case it does so, the consequence is death. “If ye live according to the flesh, ye shall die; but if by the spirit ye do mortify the practices of the body, ye shall live.” The Epistle to the Romans is a barren soil for proof-texts in favor of the doctrine of irresistible grace. Whatever may be the ultimate issue of grace—whether it result in the salvation of few, or many, or all—grace itself is never an irresistible force, and the human will is always free over against its operations. The Spirit of Christ which dwells in the believer, is not a Spirit of bondage, but of freedom. “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17). It is the operation of this Spirit in the believer that sets him free from the power and bondage of sin. But this liberation from the bondage of sin does not involve the annihilation of the self-determining power of the will; for that would be the destruction, not the salvation of human nature. The will in its Christian state is entirely free to direct itself. It may be *led* by the Spirit of God; it is never driven or forced.

And this normal relation of the human spirit or personality to its psychico-physical organism, brought to pass by the operation of the Spirit of Christ in the soul, is what, according to St. Paul, constitutes *divine sonship*. He says (Rom. 8:14), “As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are *the sons of God*.” This state of divine sonship is not the result of a natural birth-right, but of *adoption*, *υἱοθεσία*. An adopted son, *υἱὸς θετός*, is one who is not a son by nature, but one who has been by a legal act put into the place of a son and invested with the rights of sonship. A slave might be thus raised from the condition of bondage and put into the position of a son. The master then becomes to him a father, whom he now honors and obeys, not from motives of fear, but of love. So the Christian believer has

been instated in the position of son of God. He has come to realize that God is in truth his Father ; and he now honors and obeys Him, not from considerations of law, but from motives of filial love. It is by reflections of this sort that St. Paul comes to his conception of *adoption*. It has often been observed, especially in more recent times, that St. Paul's conception of adoption and of divine sonship does not agree exactly with the teaching of our Lord concerning the divine fatherhood. According to the teaching of our Lord all men are children of God. In the mouth of our Lord the proper and most distinctive title for God is that of *Father*. The force of this fact is sometimes sought to be broken by the assertion that, when Jesus calls God Father, He does so always in relation either to Himself or to His disciples who have come to stand in a peculiar ethical relation to God. We do not believe that there is any ground for this distinction. Jesus uses this expression, *Father*, not with reference to the character of men, but with reference to the character of God. He has looked into the inmost nature and heart of God, and has apprehended Him in His profoundest relations to His personal offspring, and He expresses His conception by the tender term of Father. In this view God's fatherhood is universal, embracing all rational beings as His offspring. Indeed, Paul himself also accepts this view, when, in his speech at Athens, he adopts the sentiment of the Greek poets, Aratus and Cleanthes, that men are the offspring of God. In the teaching of our Lord, the parable of the Prodigal Son represents most clearly the relation which men in their natural condition are supposed to sustain to God. The prodigal, though lost and erring, and wandering far from home, is still a son, with the essential instincts and feelings of a son. And the father has not ceased to be a father, and to entertain towards his erring son the feelings of a father. Though grieved and sorrowing on account of his undutiful conduct, the father loves the lost son with an undying love. And this is a parable. The true Father, He of whose fatherhood every earthly fatherhood is but a dim reflection, is the Father in Heaven, who loves His human offspring with an infinite love, and whose mercy

endureth forever. And men have some sense, too, of this relationship. In their deepest degradation they can never entirely lose the consciousness of their divine descent—of their heavenly origin and destiny—of their being the offspring of God. And this persistence of the divine fatherhood, on the one hand, and of the human feeling of divine sonship, on the other, forms the ground of the possibility of conversion. The prodigal can say, I will arise and go unto my father, because he still believes in the reality of fatherhood. And so the sinner can call upon his Father in Heaven, because of his conviction of the unchanging reality of the divine fatherhood, and because of the indestructible sense of his own sonship. He does not become anything essentially different from what he was before, when he recognizes God as his Father, and himself as a dutiful child of God. He does not need to go out of his humanity in order to become truly a son of God and reverence and obey Him as a Father. On the contrary, his humanity is from the beginning constitutionally disposed and adapted to this end. Consequently he does not first begin *to be* a son of God when he begins to love and obey God; but, on the contrary, he loves and obeys God because he *is* a son, and only when he does this is he true to his own essential nature. This we believe to be the teaching of our Lord on this subject.

St. Paul, as we have already intimated, came to his conception of adoption by a different process of reflection. His principle was not theological, but anthropological. He started from the notion of the *legal status* which must form a stage of development in the life of all men. There is first a stage in the moral life of each man, as there was once in the life of the race collectively, when men are *without law*. It is the stage of infancy, before the law has become an object of consciousness. "I was myself living without law once," says the apostle (Rom. 7: 9); and that is true of all men. Then, after the stage when men are without law, there comes a stage when they are *under the law*. It is the period of the commencement of the moral life in its seriousness. The consciousness of the law has been awakened. Its imperative has been heard, either in sounds from Sinai or

some other sacred mount, or in tones from the interior of conscience. The law now becomes the regulator of life. Men live by rules. They do *this*, because the law says, *thou shalt*; and they forbear to do *that*, because the law says, *thou shalt not*. This is the spirit of legalism, or the spirit of Phariseeism, seeking to be justified by the works of the law. It is anxious, scrupulous, uneasy, unfree. It is the spirit of the slave, not the spirit of the son, except through that early period, when the son himself, being under guardians and stewards, differeth nothing from a bondservant or slave (Gal. 4: 1). The slave obeys the master, because he fears his lash; the son, at least after the true spirit of sonship has arisen in him, obeys the father because he loves him and is sure that his commandments are right. And this is the difference between the Jew and the Christian. The piety of the Jew is legalistic, anxious, servile; that of the Christian is free, loving, joyful. But the Christian, too, has once, for a longer or shorter time, occupied the position of the Jew. He passed through the stage of the law, when he served God as a slave, and when he cried out, "O, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" Every one's experience of this legal bondage may not have been as painful as that of St. Paul; but every Christian will have felt it, and will know what it is. But this is a condition from which the mature Christian has been delivered. The stage of the law has been passed, and he has entered into the condition of evangelical liberty. He obeys now, not in the spirit of the slave, but in the spirit of the Son. And this change—this transition from the stage of the law to the stage of filial liberty and love, the apostle designates by the term *adoption*. By the operation of redeeming grace the slave has been adopted and made a son, whose principle of moral conduct is no longer the law, but the emotion of filial love. Such evidently is Paul's reasoning. In Gal. 4: 3-7 he says: "When we were children, we also were held in bondage under the rudiments of the world (*rudiments*, στοιχῆα, *elements*, legal institutions of Judaism and heathenism); but when the fulness of the time came, God sent forth His Son, born of a woman, born under

the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father. So that thou art no longer a bond-servant, δούλος, *slave*, but a son; and if a son, then an heir through God." And it is in the same sense that He speaks in our present epistle (8: 14-17): "For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God. For ye received not the Spirit of bondage again unto fear; but ye received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. The Spirit himself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are children of God; and if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs of Christ."

Two consequences follow from this conception of divine sonship. The first is stated in the passage last quoted: "If children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ." An heir is one who receives his allotted possession by right of sonship either real or constructive. An inheritance is something that comes to one, not in consequence of work or merit, but in consequence of a personal relationship. Now the blessing of salvation, the good which Christianity promises, is an inheritance—a free gift which the Heavenly Father bestows upon His children, not a purchase for which they are bound to pay by means of their works, and which will be measured out to them in proportion to their merits. Salvation is a moral good. It is the soul's state of perfection and the blessedness which is in the consciousness of that perfection. It is not an external possession, and can, therefore, not be purchased by outward legal performances. As a state of soul and character it is the result of a moral process which has its principle in the divine righteousness working through faith as a sanctifying power. In this process works, when they are of a really ethical quality, and not merely ritual performances, have their proper place and value; and St. Paul would never have approved of the proposition, which some theologians have imagined they derived from his system of teaching, that good works are dangerous to salvation. Good works are not dangerous to salvation, but on the contrary they are themselves moments or elements in the process by which salvation is

accomplished. But, then, they are not in the nature of a service rendered to God as a price in consideration of which He puts us in possession of salvation. They are rather divinely provided occasions which God, Who has created us in Christ Jesus for good works, afore prepared that we should walk in them (Eph. 2 : 10), and by walking in them perfect the character of our souls. They have their value in relation to the formation of Christian character; and hence St. Paul, in the conclusion of one of the profoundest and most genial passages in all his writings, exhorts his readers always to abound in the *work* of the Lord, knowing that their labor is not in vain in the Lord (1 Cor. 15 : 58). A really good work, though not the price of salvation in a commercial sense, is never without its value in the moral process of salvation; and the true Christian will be thankful for every opportunity of performing such work. An act of charity, for instance, like that of the good Samaritan, blesses the actor more than the object, for it stamps itself into his character, and makes him the more capable of the enjoyment of the love and bliss of heaven. Hence also, in the Apocalypse (19 : 8), the fine linen in which the bride of the Lamb is arrayed, is said to be the *righteous acts* of the saints, *δικαιώματα τῶν ἁγίων*; implying that their works have grown into characters which may be compared to pure and shining garments. But in all this there is nothing like the Pharisaic idea against which Paul contended with so much vigor, that good works are the price of salvation, and that salvation is a matter of law rather than a matter of grace. Salvation is still an inheritance, not a purchase.

But a second consequence following from the conception of divine sonship, as understood by St. Paul, is the regulation of the moral life, not by the commandments of the law, but by the impulse of love. "Ye are not under the law, but under grace," writes the apostle. If any one, however, should suppose that, because he is not under the law, but under grace, the Christian may violate the ethical principles of the law, he would be greatly mistaken. The law is not evil, but good. "The law is holy," writes the apostle, "and the commandment holy, and righteous, and

good." Formally Paul never distinguishes between what has in theology been called the *moral* and the *ceremonial* law. What he means by the law is the law of the Old Testament, in which moral, ceremonial and civil precepts are mixed up in motley confusion. But in his own mind Paul, nevertheless, clearly distinguishes between the several elements which are contained in the law, and when he speaks of the law as something good and holy, he doubtless has in mind especially its moral precepts, which are identical with the immutable moral principles of right. From the observance of these there can be no dispensation. The ceremonial ordinances of the law have passed away. They were local, accidental and temporary. They may in times past have had their value as shadows of good things to come, but they have now no longer any significance for the Christian conscience. But it is different with the ethical principles of the law. These are principles of the universe; and they are principles of the divine nature itself. Hence they can never be abrogated. They must ever continue to rule the moral life of men. But in the manner in which they exercise this rule there may be an important difference. The rule may be external, or it may be internal. For the Jew, and for the man occupying the legal standpoint, it is external; for the Christian, or for the man occupying the spiritual standpoint of grace, it is internal. The Jew obeyed the law because it was *law*, and said to him *thou shalt*, or *thou shalt not*, and when he thought that he could in a *legal way* escape its precepts and yet get credit for obedience, he would not scruple to take advantage of the situation. The Christian, on the contrary, obeys the law because it is *right*, and because he *loves* the right. "Love," says the apostle, "is the fulfillment of the law" (Rom. 13:10). Love does not abrogate, it does not violate the law, but it fulfills it. It fulfills it, however, not because it threatens punishment to the transgressor, but because it is in its own nature good and right. This is the difference between the obedience of the Jew and the obedience of the Christian, or between that of the slave and of the son. And here we have the foundation, too, for the distinction between general and Christian ethics. A slave

and a son may obey the same person. The matter of obedience also may be the same, but nevertheless the quality of obedience may be wholly different. The one obeys from fear, the other from love; to the one obedience is a task without joy, to the other it is a pleasure. Now the Christian is a son. He is not under the law, but under grace. But he may not for that reason sin. He is not above the law, that he may trample it under foot. His right relation is to be one with it, or to be in it, *ἐννομος*, and to let it determine his conduct as an inward vital principle.

This is Paul's ideal of a Christian man, who has been justified by faith, and in whom faith is working as an active principle of sanctification. And no Christian character is complete without the realization of this ideal. Nor, indeed, is the process of justification itself, as Paul conceived it, complete until it has actualized itself in the sanctification of the believer, or in his being actually made righteous. Hence, as we said at the beginning of this paper, justification and sanctification may be regarded as opposite sides—negative and positive—or as successive stages of one process of salvation; and they are so connected that each presupposes the other. Justification, in the declarative sense, anticipates sanctification, and sanctification rests upon justification. It is a matter worthy of remark that St. Paul, while he insists upon justification by faith without works, always, when he comes to speak of the final judgment in which a man's eternal destiny is fixed, makes that depend upon works. God, he says, will render to every man according to his works, in the day when He shall judge the secrets of men, according to His Gospel, by Jesus Christ (Rom. 2:6–16). And this judgment will apply to all men alike, Christians as well as those who are not Christians, for in 1 Cor. 5:10, he says “that we must all be made manifest before the judgment seat of Christ; that each one may receive the things done in the body, according to what he hath done, whether it be good or bad.” This is in accordance with Christ's own description of the last judgment; but, of course, it can not mean that, in the judgment, works will come into consideration as meritorious performances by the weighing of which men's weal

or woe will be determined, but it must rather be supposed to mean that men will be judged according to the character which they have formed in consequence of their works. In the judgment the great question will be what a man is as the result of the saving grace of God; and no one will enter into the eternal kingdom of God without having formed a character corresponding to the life and love of that kingdom. Thus the righteousness of God revealed in the Gospel, while at first it declares the sinner righteous for the sake of Christ, will and must at last make him righteous by the appropriation of Christ's character. What bearing this view will have upon the nature of the life in the intermediate state, we can not here discuss. But if the process of sanctification is not complete at death, and if it must be complete in the judgment, then the inference will be that existence in the intermediate state must be subject to moral conditions, under which moral development and progress in sanctification may still be possible.

There remains but one question more to which only a few passing remarks can be devoted in conclusion, and that refers to the relation between the objective work of redemption and the subjective work of salvation. Ritschl and his school are in the habit of placing redemption last in the order in which sinners are delivered and brought into their true estate of children of God. Instead of the order of *redemption*, *justification* and *sanctification*, they speak of *justification*, *sanctification* and *redemption*. So also Paul says (1 Cor. 1: 30): "But of Him (God) are ye in Christ Jesus, who was made unto us wisdom from God, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." But in the Epistle to the Romans, redemption is regarded as the objective divine foundation of the process of salvation, rather than as its culmination or conclusion. There may, however, be this reason for putting it last, that it is not in itself an absolutely finished act without regard to its results in humanity. In itself redemption is the act of Christ accomplished in His atoning sacrifice. Now, if this were an act of expiation literally covering the penalty of all the sins of all men, then it would be in itself a complete act

of deliverance, without regard to its results among men. But that, we do not think, was Paul's idea. According to Paul, the act of redemption is redemption really only when it issues in actual salvation for men. Christ's sacrifice becomes an actual propitiation only through faith. It is not a legal act, accomplished in the sinner's stead, but a dynamic and ethical act, looking to faith and sanctification in the sinner as the completion of its own meaning. Though first in time, and in the logic of reality, as the divine foundation of the process, its full meaning is only realized in the end of sanctification and glorification; and for this reason it may not be altogether wrong to treat of it last in a systematic representation of human salvation. But, what is of more importance than this merely logical question, is that the divine act of redemption necessarily presupposes the human process of salvation. It has been said that the divine idea of redemption would be satisfied even if not a single human soul were saved except that of Jesus. We believe, on the contrary, that it must be said rather that the full meaning of redemption can only be realized in the actual salvation of all those for whom Christ died.

VII.

THE IMPENDING CRISIS.

REV. WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, PH.D.

That the present course of history is moving on toward a consummation is universally admitted. It is the only conclusion consistent with a rational view of human life. It is likewise the teaching of revelation. God "hath appointed a day, in the which He will judge the world in righteousness." However much confusion there may seem to be in the movements of history now, however much unrighteousness may seem now to prevail, it will not always be thus. There is both law and reason in the onward march of events, which in their own good time will bring the present course of history to a consummation and cause righteousness to triumph.

Can we form any sort of rational conception of what the character of that consummation will be? By what kind of powers and forces will it be brought to pass? What will be its relation to preceding history? What will be the nature of the crisis which it will involve?

One thing is made unmistakably clear by the prophecies of the New Testament Scriptures. That consummation will involve a final and decisive separation between the opposing forces which are now contending for the mastery in human life. That is the thought in the picture of the judgment, which we find in the latter part of the 25th chapter of St. Matthew, "But when the Son of man shall come in His glory, and all the holy angels with Him, then shall He sit on the throne of His glory ; and before Him shall be gathered all nations ; and He shall separate them one from another, as the shepherd separateth the sheep from the goats ; and He shall set the sheep on His right hand, but the goats on His left." And from what follows, it is not at all difficult to

see what kind of a separation it will be. There will be two classes, and only two. The righteous will be welcomed to the right hand, which means favor and honor and blessedness ; while the wicked will be driven to the left, which is the symbol of condemnation and misery and death. The same representation is found elsewhere, especially in the parable of the wheat and the tares. Both grow together until the harvest ; but “in the time of the harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather up first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them ; but gather the wheat into my barn.”

This may be taken as the essential characteristic of that consummation which is involved in the final judgment. There will be a ripening of both wheat and tares ; the kingdoms of light and of darkness will both reach their full-grown development ; and then, when each has reached its perfect growth, the two will be fully and forever sundered. This, however, will necessarily involve several other things. Before such a complete and absolute separation can take place, there must be an unerring judicial determination of the character of each and all, so that every one may find his proper place. That likewise is represented as part of the consummation. St. Paul speaks of “the day when God shall judge the secrets of men, according to my gospel, by Jesus Christ.” Hence he says, in another place : “Wherefore judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who will both bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and make manifest the counsels of the hearts.” How this shall be accomplished, we shall not now inquire further than to say that it will of necessity come with the full development of all life, which that day will involve. If the wheat and the tares will then be both fully grown, there will no longer be any possibility of mistaking their character. So long as both are in the blade it is impossible to tell them apart ; but in the harvest there remains no difficulty in distinguishing between them.

The separation will likewise bring with it as a necessary consequence a rewarding of each, such as is involved in all the descriptions of the New Testament. For the righteous to be finally and

forever separated from sinners and from every form of evil will be their full salvation; it will be their full and complete union with the good and with God; and that will be happiness and bliss forever. While for the wicked to be finally and forever separated from the society of the good and from all that is good, will be the fulness of condemnation. It will mean to be ruined and wretched forever.

By what kind of powers and forces will this separation, with all that it will involve, be brought to pass? Will they be powers from above and beyond our present human life? Or will they be forces which are now resident and working in the bosom of human society? Or will it be both? And, if so, how will they be related?

There is much in the New Testament which would at first seem to imply that the powers which will bring to pass the great separation will be from above and beyond our present human life. Thus in the picture of the judgment, from which I have already quoted, it is the Son of man, who, by His appearing, "shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd separateth the sheep from the goats." At the close of the parable of the wheat and the tares, the Saviour says, "The Son of man shall send forth His angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom all things that cause stumbling and them that do iniquity, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire." So St. Paul says that it will be the Lord, who at His coming, "will both bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and make manifest the counsels of the heart." In each case it is the Lord, with His holy angels, who is represented as the direct and active agent in bringing to pass what will be involved in the great day.

Doubtless we can not emphasize this thought too strongly. If good men were left alone in the great and final crisis, they would be utterly defeated. Satan never for one moment leaves his hosts without his supervision and help, and we may well suppose that he will put forth his utmost exertion in the final onset. Even now "our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of

this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places ;” how much more may we not expect those superhuman powers of evil to be at hand in that day? As we need to put on the whole armor of God, now, that we may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil, so we will need to look to the hills from whence cometh our help in that day. As it will be the day of “the appearance of the glory of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ,” so it will be the day in which He will manifest the greatness of His power and might. That and that alone is the blessed hope for which we can look amid the darkness of our present life, and especially in connection with the crisis of that day.

But we should make a very serious mistake, if we should conceive of His help in that day as something totally different from the help which He is giving us now. He is present with His Church even now ; and our only hope in the struggles in which we are now or at any time in history engaged, is in the help which we derive from Him. Even now His holy angels are present with their ministries of help. “Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to do service for the sake of them that shall inherit salvation?” Though there has been no visible manifestation of their presence or ministry since the close of the Apostolic age, no one who accepts the fact of their existence, as ministering spirits, can for a moment question that they have been present continually in the history of the Church and participated in her conflicts and victories. Even the glorious appearing of our Lord will not be totally different from His presence in the Church now. When He stood in the presence of Caiaphas on the morning of His crucifixion, He said, “Henceforth ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming on the clouds of heaven.” Undoubtedly, His “coming on the clouds of heaven” is the same fact as that described in St. Matthew, 25:31, where it is said, “But when the Son of man shall come in His glory, and all the holy angels with Him, then shall He sit on the throne of His glory.” But it is just as clearly identified with His “sitting at the right hand of power,” which began immediately

after His apparent defeat through His crucifixion and death. Both expressions are joined with "henceforth," which means that from that day on His "sitting at the right hand of power," and His "coming on the clouds of heaven" would be a fact of which His enemies would become sensible. So that even His glorious appearing is a historic fact, which is powerfully influencing history all the while, not a fact to be sundered from the rest of history going before, but a fact which by its power is even now directing the struggles of the kingdom of light and bringing to pass its great victories.

The parable of the wheat and the tares very clearly connects the separation of the great day with preceding history. That which will then be gathered out of the kingdom is simply the tares of the field now come to full maturity. The wicked in that day will simply be the tares gathered together in bundles for the burning. But we remember the origin of the tares. While men slept an "enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat and went his way." The tares sprang up with the wheat, grew side by side with it and have come to maturity at the same time. When the servants at the beginning proposed to gather up the tares they were forbidden lest they should root up the wheat also. Both were allowed, and purposely allowed, to grow together until the harvest. Between the separation at the end and the sowing at the beginning there is a vital connection. They are vitally joined by the growth which comes between. They are simply the beginning and the end of the same process which has gone on without interruption.

That, however, is simply a picture of the relation between the separation at the end of the present course of history and what goes before. Here the good and the evil have existed side by side, have each of them had their own growth, and come to maturity at the same time. The end and the beginning are likewise related to the growth which comes between. But this growth has been characterized by conflicts and struggles all the way through history. The kingdoms of light and darkness have not existed side by side in the world in the same peaceful way as

the wheat and tares in the same field. Their difference has all along implied antagonism, in which they have at every step divided the men of the world between them. And that division has essentially been the same as the separation at the end, except that in each case it has been a partial separation only, involving of necessity a partial victory only. But the separation, as far as it went at any time, was of the same kind as the final separation, and brought about by the same forces. On the one side was the good under the King of righteousness, on the other was the evil under the direction of the prince of darkness. Each has exerted the power which is inherent in its own kingdom, and the separation in each case was brought to pass by the victory of the one over the other. This will become clearer if we examine somewhat more fully the parallel growth between the kingdoms of light and darkness in the world.

Is the world growing better? Or is it growing worse? It is an old question, which has been variously answered according to the standpoint of the person replying. Some say unhesitatingly, yes, it is growing better. They point us to many evidences about us to show how the material and moral conditions of men are better than formerly, how works of charity abound as never before, how the Church is being extended into heathen lands, how Christian ideas are everywhere leavening society, how heathen superstitions are everywhere crumbling before the advance of civilization and Christianity, and how the standards of intercourse between men and nations are continually rising higher and higher. There are others who take just the opposite view. They are just as certain that the world is growing worse. They point us just as confidently to the evidences of increasing wickedness, to a decay of faith and piety in the Church itself, to the fact that, with advancing civilization, vices are being carried to the heathen of which they would never have known but for the advances of the commerce of our Christian nations, to the fact of political corruption in high places and low, and to vices which are honeycombing our so-called Christian society in ways which remind us of the declining days of the Roman empire.

Which is the correct view? I have no hesitancy in saying that neither is correct. Both are partially true, but neither is wholly true. Each sees one side of the truth; neither sees the whole truth. So far as the world is in the kingdom of light it is growing better—steadily and rapidly growing better. In as far as it is in the kingdom of darkness it is growing worse—just as steadily and rapidly growing worse. Part of the world has accepted the Gospel, and is being grandly and gloriously saved. There can be no question as to whether that side of the world's life is growing better or worse. There is more devotion to Christ and His Church to-day than at any time in the history of the world. There is a larger and better apprehension of the truth than ever before. The Church knows more of Christ and of His revelation to-day than at any time during her history. So it is with regard to the practical response to the truth as it is in Jesus. There is a larger and fuller response to the demands of Christian love than at any time. To affirm the contrary would be not simply to fly in the face of the plainest facts of history; it would be to deny the clear implications of God's word. If the wheat grows, as the time of harvest approaches, how can it be otherwise but that the kingdom which it represents must grow likewise?

But that is only half the truth. A large part of the world is not in the kingdom of light. It is still in the kingdom of darkness; and it is there not because the Gospel has not been presented to it. A large part of the human race is on the outside of the kingdom of light, because that is its deliberate choice. Granting that many millions are in heathen darkness, because the Gospel has never yet been preached to them; and granting that many, many thousands are on the outside in Christian lands, because of mistaken methods of the Church in presenting the truth; the fact still remains that many are on the outside, because they love darkness rather than light. It is simply an untruth to say that they are where they are, because the Church has not made the proper efforts to reach them. They are in the kingdom of darkness, because their deeds are evil, and because that kingdom corresponds to the condition of their inner life. In them the

kingdom of darkness has its living embodiment in the world; and what is more, it has its growth as well as the kingdom of light. It would be a serious misconception of history as well as of Scripture, to suppose that the kingdom of light has grown for more than eighteen centuries, and the kingdom of darkness not. According to the very structure of the parable, to which I have referred, the tares must grow as the wheat grows. Both grow together until the harvest. But that at once implies that there are aspects of the world's life which are growing worse. The mystery of inquiry is being manifested continually more and more. There are forms of wickedness in the world to-day which are blacker and more diabolical than any which the world has ever seen.

But if this be true, what must be the result? Evidently things can not go on in this way forever. Abraham Lincoln once affirmed with regard to the United States that they could not exist half slave and half free. The fact of slavery constituted an irrepressible conflict, which made it necessary that the whole country should become the one or the other. So we may say of the world. It can not exist forever half bad and half good, half in the kingdom of darkness and half in the kingdom of light. As surely as light is opposed to darkness, as surely as righteousness is opposed to sin, so surely must this condition of the world's life lead to a crisis, in which the one or the other will gain the victory. A crisis must come, in and through which the world will become either all light or else all darkness.

Have we any means of determining what will be the nature of that crisis? Will it be a peaceful crisis, in which the light will gradually dispel the darkness, as the day dispels the night? Or will it be a crisis, involving bloodshed and war, in which the two kingdoms will be arrayed against each other in deadly conflict?

The world has seen some crises which were, at least, comparatively free from violence. Great questions have been settled by peaceful methods, truth gradually triumphing over error, and the right taking the place of the wrong so quietly yet persistently that great revolutions have been accomplished without either

bloodshed or war. Thus we are sometimes pointed to the contrast between the English and French Revolutions, as furnishing illustrations of two totally different methods for solving the great problems of history and for passing its serious crises. And there can be no question about the fact that the English Revolution accomplished practically the same things that were attained in the French, yet with comparatively little violence. And the question may be fairly raised, Does it not indicate the way in which the final crisis between the two kingdoms of light and darkness will be solved? It is the hope of many; and there are undoubtedly indications which look in that direction. The tendency among nations is to substitute arbitration in the place of war for the settlement of international disputes. It is both the more rational and far the more economical method. As civilization advances, we may undoubtedly look for a more general application of the principle. Even Japan, which is just waking up out of its semi-barbarous condition, seems ready to submit its differences with another power to an impartial tribunal. May we not expect all the nations to attain to such a degree of sanity, that they will not learn war any more?

Even our most hopeful advocates of arbitration admit that there are difficulties in the way which seem insuperable. There are some problems which, they confess, it can not solve. Can a nation, for example, submit a question of national existence, or even of national honor, to a tribunal for arbitration? Should a nation feel itself so wronged by an adverse decision that it should feel its very life to be involved, can we expect it simply to yield without a struggle? Not certainly so long as the present order prevails. To admit it would imply that all the nations would first accept the Gospel and become consciously incorporated in the kingdom of light. But on the supposition that the kingdom of darkness will continue to exist alongside of the kingdom of light to the end, that it has a history with a development and growth of its own, that conclusion is impossible.

To say the least, that is not the way in which the great crises of history have been solved. Take the crisis in our own history,

in and through which it was decided that this nation should exist all free, instead of all slave. Compromise after compromise was passed by our Congress; the energies of our best statesmen were given to finding a peaceful solution; and more than once it was thought that the end had been reached. As we now look back, we can see how it would have been both cheaper and better for the nation to have emancipated the slave by giving the slaveholder an ample compensation; and now that the question has been decided by the bloody arbitrament of the sword, all of us, even the slaveholder, would prefer to have had that form of solution. But that was impossible before the clash of arms had come. Sin and passion and prejudice had so beclouded men's minds that such a solution could neither be offered by the one side nor accepted by the other. Will it be different with the final crisis? May not men become so enlightened that they will no longer be subject to such blindness and prejudice? If sin continues what it is, we must answer most emphatically in the negative. Not only will the mystery of iniquity manifest greater malignity; but those, who are willingly led captive by sin, will be more and more blinded by its power. Does any one suppose that Satan will lie down like a lamb, and allow himself to be bound, without a struggle, for the awful prison house into which he knows that he shall be hurled? Or does anyone suppose that the wicked, who will finally have made evil their deliberate choice, will give up the earth with its sinful pleasures for hell with its awful horrors, simply because it has been so decided by a tribunal of arbitration? The only basis on which we can suppose that such a tribunal of arbitration could enforce its final decision against the evil is on the supposition that both Satan and all wicked men would be converted; and for that there seems to be no hope. Even the advocates of "the larger hope" have to look to the ages beyond this present order for the realization of such a consummation. In this present order, in this age, at least, no such a thing can be expected.

There seems, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the crisis through which this age will reach its consummation will be

one of intense struggle and of supreme antagonism. There are many things, both in contemporary history and in Scripture, which point in that direction. What is the meaning of the immense preparations for war which are going on on all sides? Armaments are being prepared such as previous ages could never have conceived. It is a singular fact that, while nations are talking of arbitration and submitting their minor differences to settlement in that way, they are straining every nerve to get ready for war. It is true, we are told that our modern armaments are a deterrent against war; that, owing to the enormous expense and the fearful destruction which the next war will involve, nations will be afraid to go to war; and that, consequently, these very preparations are a harbinger of universal peace. Doubtless, there is a measure of truth in the assertion. Nations will hesitate far longer before they make an appeal to the sword. But simple fear can not avert the resort to the dread arbitrament. It may, so long as the issue is greatly in doubt, or so long as the end to be attained does not seem to greatly overbalance the increased risk and expense. But let conditions arise in which the balance of power shall become greatly disturbed, and in which the end to be gained will greatly overbalance the risk to be run by the stronger power, and simple fear will not prevent war. The very existence of these fearful engines of destruction will only increase the temptation for the stronger power to go to war and to crush out the weaker. And does not the fact that "the whole world lieth in the evil one" indicate that there is a strong presumption that such conditions will by and by arise? The Saviour's discourse on the end of this age, at least, bears out this conclusion: "And there shall be signs in the sun and moon and stars, and upon the earth distress of nations, in perplexity for the roaring of the sea and the billows; men fainting for fear, and for expectation of the things which are coming on the world; for the powers of heaven shall be shaken. And then they shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud with power and great glory."

The final issue of the crisis can, of course, not be in doubt; for righteousness will triumph. But the form in which the tri-

umph will come no one can foretell. The power by which the victory will be gained will be the Lord's, as the victory will be His. And the manifestation of that power will bring the final manifestation of His glory. It will be His glorious appearing. But what that will be it is as yet idle for us to inquire. How He will come, how He will rescue His saints out of the hands of their enemies, how He will cause the right to triumph, we cannot tell. To quote the statement of the angel at the Ascension, "This Jesus, which was received up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye beheld Him going into heaven," as some do, to show that the return will be an outward visible return to this present order, is to miss the point of the declaration. For though the Ascension was visible to the disciples, who stood there gazing into heaven, it was not visible to ordinary sense or sight. The disciples did not see the risen Lord until the inner eye of their faith had been opened. He never appeared to any one who did not have this power of an inner vision; and His appearance at the Ascension was not an appearance which was visible to ordinary sight any more than any that had preceded. Hence His coming "in like manner" can not mean His coming back into this present order in such a way as to be visible by the ordinary sight of men. And so the help or the deliverance which He will then bring to His saints will not be of a carnal or material kind, as if He had come back to take up then the arms of flesh and blood, which He refused to use during the days of His humiliation. Those chiliastic conceptions, which look for that sort of deliverance, are likely as far wrong as the Messianic expectations of the Jews at His first coming. But, while we cannot tell the form of the deliverance, we have the assurance of the glorious fact. In some way, and we may be sure a way far more glorious than any carnal interference could be, Jesus will bring victory to His saints in the last dread affray. Hence He tells us, "When these things begin to come to pass, look up and lift up your heads; because your redemption draweth nigh."

As we cannot tell the form of the victory, so we cannot tell the time when the crisis will come upon us. One thing only we

can be sure of. As the crisis will grow out of the conditions which are now prevailing in the world, as it will be precipitated by the antagonism which is now going forward between the kingdoms of light and darkness, it is constantly impending. As was the destruction of Jerusalem, so are all the crises of history types and premonitions of the final crisis. Each of them carries in itself the conflict which will issue in the final onset; and so each of them is, in a sense, a preliminary struggle, admonishing us that the final one is impending. That may come sooner or later, according to the conditions which prevail. We know not how soon. The long-dreaded European war, if ever it comes, may be the beginning of the end. We cannot tell. But we know that the crisis is impending, and that each crisis in the world's unfolding life is hastening its coming. God speed the day, and grant, for the elect's sake, that the days of the awful struggle may be shortened!

VIII.

PHILOSOPHY AS A FACTOR IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM OF THE REFORMED CHURCH.

BY REV. JOHN S. STAHR, D.D.

The injunction of our Lord to Peter: "Feed my lambs," may be regarded as a charge to the Christian Church of all ages. This charge means more than the indoctrination of the young in the elements of Christian truth; it includes education in the widest sense under the fostering care and in the catholic spirit of Christianity itself in such a way as to realize, in the acquisition of knowledge, in intellectual and moral culture, in genuine human development, the ideal of normal manhood as exemplified in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ. It presupposes during the period of elementary education, if this education is carried forward in the public schools, a training in the family and by the Church in such form and to such an extent that the spirit of it will form the background and the setting of the knowledge acquired and discipline received in the school sufficiently to give tone and character to the whole process in the interest of Christian nurture. Furthermore, it implies at the other end a sufficient body of Christian truth and principle to insure a safe progress through the mazes of higher learning, and to keep the soul sure and steadfast by the anchor of faith as it grapples with the problems of thought and life in pushing human inquiry to its farthest limits. As the waters of the Mississippi in the lower part of its course flow on by the velocity previously acquired, so the mind imbued with Christian truth and enlightened by the vision of things in their relation to Him "in whom all things consist" in the earlier stages of its growth, will continue to

move in its true orbit in the pursuit of knowledge in all departments of art and science.

Elementary education is thus safeguarded by oversight, and university training is made safe by the previous steadying of character. Does this cover everything that is included in the term education in the widest sense? A little consideration will show that this is not the case. Between these two extremes of the process of education lies an intermediate stage which is of the most profound significance. On the border land between youth and manhood, when parental oversight can no longer cover the whole range of interest, and the budding possibilities of a large, free life are manifest on every side; when the individual feels that he is thrown on his own resources in thought and action; when independent opinions are expected, and controlling principles of conduct take shape from within; when the acquisition of knowledge and acquaintance with the life of the world widen the horizon, and conflicting claims press for recognition on every side: there is more need, than ever before, of a religious environment and the warm, inspiring breath of Christian truth and love. This stage is covered by the American college, a unique institution with a unique mission and office, made so, especially, by the fact that neither the high school nor the university can be substituted for it without serious loss—loss which cannot but prove permanent from the standpoint of sound culture as well as from that of religion. It is sometimes said that facts are facts irrespective of religion or politics, and that it makes no difference by whom or under what auspices they are taught. This is a great error. There are no isolated facts. All facts have their relations, and what they signify to the human mind—to use a phrase now very common among psychologists—depends upon their apperceptive adjustment, that is to say, upon the relation in which they come to stand as ideas to other ideas by which they are modified or raised to a higher significance. Here is a powerful argument in favor of the American college as a distinctive institution under the care of some religious body, specifically charged with the training of men in such a way as to realize the

ideal of true manhood. This requires discipline and knowledge, principle and character. Discipline and knowledge are universally recognized as desirable, and every system of education worthy of the name is expected to furnish them; but it is not so universally understood that principle and character are not their necessary concomitants. A well-disciplined mind, trained to observe and investigate, and enriched with stores of knowledge, is by no means always, or even generally, an indication that its possessor is a man of sound principle and good character. Now, while virtue cannot be imparted like knowledge, nor character formed by a process of drill, it is, nevertheless, true that until the unfolding life has received a definite cast or form by self-determination, under influences which kindle, stimulate and give direction to the virtuous principle, moral and religious culture are as legitimately the province of an institution of learning, as physical and intellectual development.

The college, accordingly, stands for thorough and well-rounded culture. Its province is, first of all, to furnish training in all the general spheres of knowledge which belong to the culture of the age in which the student lives, together with such a training of the faculties in definite lines of investigation that he will be able to enter upon special study or practical life with broad sympathies, keen insight, and mature strength. Going hand in hand with this, there must be a moral culture which leads to the formation of manly character and a religious development broad and catholic and in full sympathy with the reigning life of his religious profession. And, finally, the college is at least to begin a culture which will afford the student *the right view of things*, a point of view (*Weltanschauung*) which will open up every avenue of thought and life, and serves as a coign of vantage in every phase of his subsequent career.

The writer has set forth his educational creed to this extent, not with a view to a full discussion of the significance of the college in education, but rather for the purpose of raising the question whether Philosophy as such is a college discipline, and of determining how and why it has been, in the estimation of all,

whether for good or for evil, so potent a factor in the educational development of the Reformed Church in the United States. In order that this purpose may be, in a measure, at least, realized, it is necessary to turn to the early history of our literary and theological institutions, to trace very briefly the origin and progress of the system of thought for which they soon became noted and to sketch in outline the fundamental principles which produced so fruitful a growth in subsequent years.

It is, of course, not intended to claim a place in the college curriculum for Philosophy in the widest sense as a separate discipline taking up Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics in the same way that the student takes up Algebra, Geometry and Analytics. The student is not prepared for that, nor has he the time for it. Neither is it intended to advocate a partial devotion to metaphysical studies so that the ability to talk philosophical jargon may hide a mass of ignorance in other branches of study. No amount of philosophical study can, in a system of modern education, take the place of Mathematics and Natural Science on the one hand, nor of Languages, Literature and History on the other. And yet two points may be unhesitatingly affirmed. First, a sound system of philosophy must underlie the whole course of study, and in the light of it the different departments of instruction must be administered. Secondly, room must be made for a course of instruction in which the fundamental principles of the system come to view, as in History, Psychology, Logic, *Æsthetics*, Ethics, Social Science, etc. Failing in this, a course of instruction lacks unity, and, in the end, proves woefully defective. No student can claim to be even measurably well-informed who does not have some knowledge of philosophical principles and of their application to the different departments of knowledge; and in such branches of study as Psychology and Ethics, which are acknowledged to be of prime importance, no matter how much stress may be laid upon empirical observation and the inductive method, there is always underlying them a system of philosophy expressed or implied.

Now and then one still hears the silly objection to such study

that Philosophy is dangerous and tends to lead men astray. So also is manhood dangerous, because it brings with it responsibilities of which the child is in blissful ignorance ! The naïve view of things, which is the peculiar characteristic of childish knowledge, cannot continue through life ; the unfolding reason will inquire into the nature of things, and a mature mind must have some kind of philosophy ; it is only a question as to what kind. It is true, there are many people, no doubt, who, in the simplicity of their hearts, take things to be entirely as they appear on the surface. But the moment a doubt is raised as to the adequacy of their explanation of the common phenomena of sense, they are at sea ; their philosophy is at fault, and they are “like reeds shaken with the wind.” In such conditions it is that Bacon’s maxim is verified : “A little philosophy inclineth a man’s mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to religion.” He who has not learned to think of these things is likely to find himself rudely awakened some day, in the same way that Germany was aroused out of its dogmatic slumber by the critical philosophy of Kant. And then comes the question, What kind of philosophy will the mind espouse ? Will it be materialistic or spiritual, atheistic or Christian ?

It was the good fortune of the Reformed Church and of its representative literary and theological institutions to have their educational system directed and molded by men who were thorough scholars and profound thinkers, men trained and thoroughly versed in the philosophy of Germany, who were in sympathy with American life and thought, and who were, at the same time, devout Christians and humble believers in revealed religion. These men were competent to speak with authority as scholars, as teachers, as leaders of Christian thought and qualified by their attainments and character to elaborate a course of study in the different departments of knowledge and to formulate a system of thought, the fructifying influence of which is felt to-day like the warm breath of spring upon the snows of April. The foundations of this system were laid at a time when American institutions of learning paid little attention to philosophic thought, and

when the old dogmatic systems or the sensational philosophy of Locke furnished the basis on which rested the mental and moral science of the day, as far as there was any; and as for Logic, it was dry and formal with little apprehension of the fact that thought itself might be studied to greater advantage and with better results than the mere categories of judgment or the forms of the syllogism. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that when a vigorous effort was made to introduce into the study of Psychology, *Æsthetics* and Ethics the results of the most advanced thought and the best scholarship of Europe, and when the waves of influence thus generated spread over the whole course of study and made themselves felt in theology and kindred branches, a profound impression was made not only in Marshall College at Mercersburg, but also in the larger centres of learning in this country, and even among scholars and theologians of the Old World. It argues much in favor of the ability of the teachers and the merits of their system that there was brought about an intellectual activity, a ferment of thought, a stimulus to study and investigation, and a radiation of influence such as can only be produced in the educational history of the world by the conjunction of master minds with earnest students, upon congenial soil, and under favorable conditions of growth. The enthusiasm and activity of those affected by the movement were unbounded. They read philosophy, they talked philosophy and some of them even dreamed philosophy. It must be confessed that they did this sometimes to little purpose, and at other times to their injury. So, too, it must be confessed, that the philosophical principles taught were often misunderstood, sometimes misrepresented, and occasionally perverted so as to lead to wrong conclusions and produce unfortunate results. But, for all this neither the system taught nor its authors can be held responsible. The best things may be abused. Even such prime necessities of life as food and raiment may, instead of ministering to the body, become harmful when wrongly used. And the early ages of the Church afford abundant proof that the teachings of our Lord Himself and the apostles were misconstrued and perverted. But that the influence of the

philosophical principles which gave tone and character to the life of our literary and theological institutions was most salutary, is demonstrated by the fact that they have preserved their vitality and proved their power to make thinkers and workers, in the professor's chair or in the pulpit, at the bar or in business. Moreover, these very principles, at first ridiculed and rejected by many who stood outside of the movement, have now become the common possession of all the great centres of thought and learning in the country. There is not a university in the land where philosophy is taught that would not be ashamed to-day to advance the objections and criticisms which these teachings at first had to encounter.

It was not the avowed purpose of those who may be considered the authors of what we have called a system of thought to formulate a complete system of philosophy. They were earnest, practical men, bent upon the thorough education of the young men who placed themselves under their care in the institutions of the Church; and they knew very well that a formal system of philosophy was not what these young men needed. But their teaching throughout, the course of study which they inaugurated, the scientific and ethical principles which they inculcated, the faith which they professed, and the theory which they taught formed a harmonious whole in which their philosophy is manifest, and from which the fundamental truths of their philosophical creed may be inferred. It is not easy, at least not to one who was not in the movement from the beginning, to determine precisely how much is due to one or to the other of the master minds to whom all, by common consent, turn as the leaders in this process of educational development. Frederick Augustus Rauch, John Williamson Nevin and Philip Schaff were *facile principes* among those to whom we may fairly look as the teachers at whose feet so many have received their initiation into the profound truths of science, philosophy and theology; while among those who were at first the students of these great leaders, and afterwards became the efficient exponents of their teachings, Harbaugh and Higbee have gone to their reward, while others still abide among us rich

in labors and honor, and the respect and gratitude of those who have in turn come under their influence. Drs. Rauch and Nevin may, however, be regarded as responsible for the philosophy of the movement, whilst the so-called "Mercersburg Theology" (with which we are at this time only incidentally concerned) may be attributed to the conjoint labors of Drs. Nevin and Schaff. Dr. Rauch undoubtedly introduced into the college at Mercersburg the system of thought under consideration and gave it definite shape in his *Psychology* and in his lectures on *Æsthetics** and *Ethics*. The former at once became exceedingly popular, and it is even at the present day a valuable book. The latter were never published, but the lectures on *Ethics* were almost ready for the press when the lamented author died. It is but fair to assume that they, as well as the lectures on *Æsthetics*, became the nucleus of the lectures on these subjects which have become classic in the history of our institutions. It would, however, be unjust to Dr. Nevin to suppose that he only continued or enlarged and improved what he received from the hands of Dr. Rauch. Dr. Nevin, perhaps the profoundest philosopher yet produced on American soil, in full sympathy with Dr. Rauch and entering into his labors from the same point of view, himself went to the original sources and mastered the whole field of German philosophy. He enlarged and perfected what Dr. Rauch had only begun, and he introduced the richest treasures of German thought into the system which was developing from within under the guidance of his masterly hand. We should expect, therefore, to find that while no doubt the earlier lectures on *Æsthetics* and *Ethics* were based on those of Dr. Rauch, the later ones were not only more elaborate but also reconstructed in form and method so as to constitute a new development of the subject. The later lectures on *Ethics* have perhaps more in common with J. H. Fichte, and those on *Æsthetics* with F. Theodor Vischer than with those which Dr. Rauch had delivered. And yet the whole movement is substantially the legitimate development of

* See "What is Poetry?" by Dr. Theodore Appel, *Mercersburg Review*, Vol. XI.

the system founded by Dr. Rauch during the short span of years in which he was permitted to labor as the first president of Marshall College. Drs. Rauch and Nevin were not merely imitators of any previous author or thinker. Both of them, on the basis of thorough study and complete mastery of the whole field, freely constructed their system and exercised their undoubted right to cut loose from their masters whenever, in their judgment, they pressed their views too far, or became one-sided in their development.

Dr. Rauch, after a full course of study in the University of Marburg, spent a year at Giessen, and afterwards went to Heidelberg, where he was the favorite student of Dr. Karl Daub, a master in Philosophy and a sincere, orthodox Christian. He thoroughly mastered the whole course of philosophic thought from Kant to Hegel and Herbart and, like his master, he maintained the integrity of his faith without falling into the pitfalls of rationalism on the one hand, or of pantheism on the other. In the main features of his system he was, no doubt, a disciple of Hegel; but, as we shall presently see, he distinctly avoided the pantheism with which Hegel has been charged. Moreover, when he came to America he became a patient student of American life and thought. As he had also studied Reid and Dugald Stewart, it is at once apparent that he was especially qualified for the task which he had undertaken, which was to adapt the best fruits of German culture to American soil and thus to meet the educational needs of his adopted country.

It is proposed at the present time only to inquire what the salient features and fundamental principles of this system are, and to point out some of their obvious consequences and applications. It might be both interesting and profitable to discuss these features in detail, but that would require more time and space than our present limits will permit.

The standpoint from which the movement proceeded is that of the critical and dialectic method pursued by the great leaders of the philosophical movement in Germany. Kant, the Königsberg philosopher accomplished two things, once for all, however unsat-

isfactory his results may have been in other respects : he put an end to the dogmatism which had weighed like an incubus upon the thought of his age, and he proved conclusively that the sensationalism of Locke was wholly inadequate to explain knowledge and the operations of the mind in the apprehension of universal and necessary truth. After the merciless dissection to which Kant subjected the old dogmatic systems and his profound inquiry into the conditions of knowledge, the days of the dogmatic philosophy were ended. Henceforth no system could expect to gain or hold the confidence of students that was not able to give an account of itself and to bear the test of the keenest criticism. It may be true that the human reason is not the source of all truth, yea that there is truth which transcends the power of the reason fully to fathom ; but all truth, whether of human or divine origin, must authenticate itself to the reason and conform to its innate laws.

The sensationalists taught that all knowledge has its origin in the senses. “ *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non autea fuerit in sensu.*” Locke says : “ Whence hath mind all the materials of reason and knowledge ? To this I answer in one word, from experience ; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external, sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, preceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two (that is sensation and reflection) are the fountains of knowledge whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.”* Kant, on the other hand, maintains that every act of cognition involves two elements ; 1st, that which is furnished by the senses ; and, 2d, an element not given by sensation, but derived solely from the intellect. The senses can give us impressions of light, heat, sound, weight, etc. ; but when we conceive of bodies as having extension, or of events as following in succession, or as dependent upon one another, the ideas of space and time and causation are not derived from the senses, but they

* Essay on the Human Understanding, Book 2, Chap. I., Sec. 2.

are derived from the intellect itself, which adds them as the necessary form which all knowledge must take; they are means of knowledge rather than objects of knowledge. "Hence, if sensibility, in consequence of an instinctive and inevitable habit, shows us things in time and space, it does not show them as they are in themselves, but as they appear to it through its spectacles, one of whose glasses is called time, the other, space. As they appear to it! which means that sensibility gives us appearances, or *φαινόμενα*, and that it is incapable of giving us the *thing-in-itself*, the *νοούμενον*. And, since the understanding obtains the materials which it needs exclusively from the senses, since there is no other channel through which the materials can come, it is evident that it always and necessarily operates upon phenomena, and that the mystery concealed beneath the phenomenon forever baffles it, as it forever baffles the senses."* Kant thus, while he admitted the existence of an external world or non-ego as the condition of sensation, made all knowledge, in the proper sense of the word, subjective, and placed the thing-in-itself, whether material or immaterial or by whatever name we may call it, beyond the reach of the thinking ego, and, therefore, outside of the pale of knowledge. From this position it was easy to pass over into an entire negation of the purely objective world, as was actually done by the Post-Kantians, so as to land in subjective idealism. "If the thing-in-itself cannot be conceived either as a quantity, or as a cause, or as a *reality*, it cannot be considered as *anything*; it is nothing, or rather it exists only in the thinking subject; like space, time and the categories, it is *identical* with the subject which conceives it. The *matter* of our ideas, the transcendent substratum of the phenomena of sense, is the same as the substratum of the inner phenomena, the soul, or ego, or reason giving to itself not only the *form*, but also the matter of its ideas."† Kant himself was able to reach the certainty of an external world, of immortality, and of God, only through his doctrine of the *primacy of the practical reason* or the WILL which postulates

* Weber's History of Philosophy, Eng. tr., p. 444.

† Weber's Hist. Philos., p. 477.

freedom and, therefore, the moral order and the *noumenon*. The Post-Kantians, however, did not, as is so frequently supposed, deny the existence of an external world; they denied its independent or separate existence and attributed its origin to the ego itself—not, indeed, to the individual ego, but to the absolute ego. “The objective world is not, as ‘common sense’ and empiricism claim, an obstacle which the ego *encounters*; it is a limitation which the ego *gives* to itself. The limitation of the ego, the objective world, exists, but it owes its existence to the activity of the subject. *Suppress the EGO and you suppress the world*. Creation is reason limiting itself; it is the will or pure thought, limiting, determining or making a person of itself.* There is thus an earnest effort to reduce the whole world to a unity, to do away with the dualism of subject and object; and this movement finds its highest development in the *absolute idealism* of Hegel.

According to Hegel the common source of the ego and of nature is immanent in the reality of things as they exist in the order of the world’s development. The whole world is a movement of *becoming* (*ein Werden*), a movement in which the fundamental idea of *being* unfolds itself in a process, and this process itself is the absolute. According to Schelling the absolute transcends both subject and object, and things as they exist proceed from it. For Hegel, however, the absolute is not outside of things, but in them, ever active, ever living, leading on to the manifold variety of the world until the process culminates in man, in self-consciousness and freedom. The absolute is like Goethe’s Erdgeist :

“In Lebensfluthen, im Thatensturm
Wall’ ich auf und ab,
Webe hin and her!
Geburt and Grab,
Eine ewiges Meer,
Ein wechselnd Weben,
Ein glühend Leben,
So schaff’ ich am sausenden Webstuhl der Zeit,
Und schaffe der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid.”

*Fichte’s Complete Works, I., pp. 83, ff.

But this movement is according to law, and it tends towards a definite goal, both of which are immanent in the movement throughout its whole extent. The law both of human thought and of unconscious nature is *reason*; the goal towards which all things tend is, likewise, reason, but self-conscious reason. Hence the terms *absolute* and *reason* are synonymous. Reason is thus the law according to which being is produced, constituted or unfolded. It is a subjective faculty and an objective reality; it is the essence and norm of thought, and it is the essence and law of the evolution of things.* It is thus involved in the whole process of becoming through which the world is brought to pass—a process which means simply differentiation, that is to say, the resolution in ever higher unities of the differences and contradictions which inhere in every stage of existence from the simple idea of being up to the culmination and summing up of the whole movement in man.

The system of Hegel is an attempt to solve the problems of thought and being on the basis of a thorough-going monism. It is no doubt one of the profoundest systems to which the human mind has ever given birth in the field of speculative philosophy; and it is no wonder, therefore, that it should have been variously interpreted. On the one hand, it has been pronounced atheistic or pantheistic; on the other hand, it has been claimed that it is open to a theistic interpretation. James Hutchinson Stirling, a profound student of Hegel, the translator of Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, is convinced that Hegel believed in the existence of God as the Creator of the universe, as a God of absolute power, holiness, goodness and justice, and quotes Hegel himself as exclaiming: "I am a Lutheran, and will remain one." It is, however, difficult to see what room there is in the system for a transcendent, personal God. God is the absolute, or rather the absolute is God, and this is the rational process immanent in the world movement struggling to its full realization in the human consciousness. Here the pantheistic idea seems to be in the foreground, and there is no real act of creation by which the universe is constituted.

* Weber, p. 499.

But if there is room for doubt with respect to the system of Hegel, there is no room for such doubt with respect to Dr. Rauch and the system of thought taught at Mercersburg and at Lancaster. Rauch's Psychology and the whole series of lectures on the Philosophy of History, Æsthetics and Ethics are not only capable of a theistic interpretation, but they presuppose and explicitly assert an act of creation, the existence of a transcendent, personal God, the divinity of Christ, and the truth of divine revelation.

We may, accordingly, enumerate the following as the chief features of the system taught at Mercersburg and Lancaster :

1. The first characteristic is that as over against materialism or sensationalism it professes *idealism* ; not indeed the subjective idealism of Fichte nor the absolute idealism of Hegel in its wholeness, but rather a moderate idealism which teaches that the phenomena of the universe can be explained in terms of mind rather than in terms of matter. Human experience has to do with two classes of phenomena, the *thing* series and the *thought* series, both of which, on the testimony of consciousness, are to be regarded as equally real. But the deeper, the more fundamental reality is to be found in the thought series, that is on the side of spirit rather than of that of matter. "The relation of our thought to cosmic being involves a dualism and a parallelism. A dualism, for our thought, though able to grasp objects only through conception, is not able to view its conceptions as real, but only as valid for reality. It likewise involves a parallelism, as otherwise thought would not grasp reality. And, finally, the representation of the thing series in the thought series is possible only through a highly complex activity within the latter. But while this is the case for finite thought, it is impossible to view it as expressing the ultimate relation of thought and being in fundamental existence. We have frequently complained of the idealist for overlooking the dualism of our knowing in the interests of a metaphysical monism. It is now in order to complain of our traditional philosophers that they generalize the dualism of our knowing into a necessity of all knowing. Our thoughts are not things,

but are valid for things ; nevertheless, we must at last come down to a thinker whose thoughts are things ; that is, to a thinker whose objects are only his realized thoughts.”* That is to say, that while our thinking is confronted with an external, material world, an objective order which we can neither make nor unmake, this objective order is nevertheless the result or product of thought in the divine mind in the act of creation. The thoughts of God come to their expression, or are realized, in the very act of thinking in the facts of creation. “He spake and it was done ; He commanded and it stood fast.”† Nature and the whole objective order, therefore, has everywhere underneath and behind it the divine energy that called it into existence ; yea, it exists only as the same divine energy upholds and preserves it by the unceasing activity of the Creator.‡ From this point of view the perplexity of Faust in trying to translate *Εν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος* vanishes ; for whether we say word, thought, energy or deed, it comes very much to the same thing. The world originated out of the thought of God, inasmuch as the divine thought and the divine will go together towards their actualization in time, and we, as Kepler said, simply think God’s thoughts after Him. It is, therefore, not only true that thoughts or ideas govern the world, but it is also true that thoughts or ideas underlie and in fact constitute the world.

Does this view of the world, then, do away with the antagonism between matter and spirit ? Certainly not, as far as our experience goes. The thing series and the thought series still confront each other ; but they converge as you trace them to their origin and the contradiction is solved in the idea of force or energy which constitutes the soul of each. And all through the development of the natural world, the more we study it, the more we get a scientific knowledge of its phenomena, the more we shall see that “things are not what they seem.” We look out upon the

*Bowne’s Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 310. (Bowne uses the word reality here to denote external or corporeal reality. S.)

† Ps. 33: 9.

‡ Heid. Cat., Q. 27.

world and are delighted by the green fields and the majestic mountains. But the green is not in the fields. All that we get from that source is force transmitted in vibrations of a certain rapidity with a definite wave length, and green as a sensation is the mind's interpretation of the effect which this force has upon the sensorium. So again the majesty of the mountains is not the impression made by immediate vision, but it is the result of the mind's own working in the perception of distance and magnitude and relations which are cognized by the working up of the original data of sense into the higher form of real knowledge—that is, the discernment by subjective reason of objective reason as the latter lies before the mind in the order of nature for the uses of the former.

2. If the spiritual underlies the material it is easy to see why, in the system to which reference is had, so much stress should be laid *on the idea*. This word is used with a great deal of latitude and often very vaguely. Looking closely into its meaning we can find at least five different significations: (1) It signifies a mental image or a thought, not a presentation, but a representation; (2) an immediate or intuitive truth; (3) in the Kantian sense, a conception of the reason which transcends all possible experience, as the idea of God, of immortality; (4) in the Platonic philosophy, the archetypes or patterns of things as they are supposed to have preëxisted from all eternity; and (5) the essential nature or absolute truth of every form of existence. The idea of a tree, for instance, does not exist independently of a tree, but it is in every tree as its type, or as the divine thought which in the existence of the thing comes to its expression. In the last sense the word is of frequent occurrence in the system, and it is not possible to understand its conception of the beautiful, the true or the good without it.

3. The idea, in the sense in which it has just been explained, comes to signify the same thing as the *universal* or *concept*, although the latter is reached by approach from a different point of view. The former comes intuitively, the latter by a process of thinking; but, in the nature of the case, if they signify the

same thing, they must be equally real. Accordingly, we have to do here with *realism* as over against *nominalism*.^{*} That is to say, concepts or universals are not merely names which the mind gives to the results reached by a process of abstraction, but they stand for something real which, as apprehended by the mind, has its objective counterpart, not as an independent existence before the thing, but as concretely embodied in the thing. The classification of natural objects depends on real resemblances, that is on features which as a substratum are contained equally in the objects compared. They are in these objects because they represent that which is due to the immanent forces by which the objects have come to be what they are. The mind, in the construction of science, accordingly, does not make resemblances and differences; it only finds what is in nature objectively, and its species and genera represent real entities. Dr. Rauch, who is generally very clear in his definitions and statements, here seems to grope to some extent in the dark in his chapter on pure thinking where he identifies the contents of thinking or the object with the thought itself, justice with the thought of justice, and the concept man, with the thought of humanity. This is analogous to his definition of the body, that it is not the external frame but the life and power which connects the elements that is the body, instead of saying that the materials as such do not constitute the body, but that the body consists of the materials as they are held in their living relation by the power of organization. The thought is real because it has its object or counterpart in the sphere of being, just as the body is real in so far as the organizing power of the soul holds *something* in its grasp and uses it as its organ. The concept man, therefore, comes to be the same as the idea of humanity, coextensive with the race, and realized in every individual.

4. The world, or the universe, constitutes a grand organism, developing from its beginning by a process of differentiation and

^{*} It is important to remember that the word realism may be used in two entirely different senses, according as it is the opposite of idealism on the one hand, or nominalism on the other.

growth until its underlying idea is fully realized. In every stage of the process all the parts are related, and the meaning of the movement and the significance of every part become clear only in the light of the *organic idea*. This is true of nature and of history, of the intellectual and moral development of the individual man and of society. This principle, it may be confidently asserted, colors the whole system of thought, and it has proved to be the most fruitful impulse in the intellectual and moral development of the century which is now drawing to a close. *The doctrine of historical development*, according to law, as the expression of the will of God immanent in the whole movement, anticipated Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection and kindred theories, and proved as stimulating and helpful in history and theology as the others did in the field of natural science. In fact, it is the theory of evolution apprehended from the theistic standpoint and applied with a larger sense of its scope and significance.

It is in place, in this connection, to emphasize two peculiarities of our system, with respect to which current thought is disposed to take issue. The first is the conception of law. The empiricists, such as Mill, for instance, define law as *the constant occurrence of events in the same order*. This definition is inadequate, although it is very generally accepted. No empirical observation of the uniform occurrence of two or more facts or events in the same order can establish a causal connection between them or make their occurrence in that order necessary. And yet this is precisely what the case requires. There must be a connection between the facts or events, so that one determines the other. Law is the force or nexus that operates to bring about the dependence and establish the relation of cause and effect. That is to say, law is not an external uniformity of sequence, but an internal relation of necessity which issues in outward conformity. This conception of law changes for us the whole aspect, both of nature and of history. As physical law is immanent in the former, so moral law, grounded in the constitution of man, is immanent in the latter; and, although the two

orders are different, the same fundamental principle is striving in both towards its full realization.

The other point concerns the mode in which the mind operates in the thought process or in the formation of concepts and ideals. It is quite usual to say that in the building up of a concept the mind abstracts the common qualities or attributes of a number of objects and combines them into a unity; or that in creating a new image, the imagination constructs it out of old elements, getting one feature here, another there, and then combining all these into a whole, as a mosaic is made up of many independent parts. This view makes imagination and thought mechanical processes. It may be seriously doubted whether the mind ever lays hold of a quality or attribute as a pure abstraction. The constructive processes of the mind, at all events, we have reason to believe, are organic and not mechanical. The mind does not take dead parts and put them together, and then breathe into them the breath of life. As a living organism, it assimilates one element to another and constructs plastically new and higher combinations—each a whole, although at first imperfect and of low organization, until the product has received its full development and the thought or image, instinct with life, is complete. The artist in creating his ideal, let us say of a Madonna, does not take the brow of one face, the eyes of another, the nose and lips of a third, the cheeks and chin of a fourth and put them together as so many separate parts. Granting that he receives suggestions and materials from so many different sources, the ideal is developed from within, each part being assimilated in the living whole as it develops by an organic process. This whole, in its totality and in its individual features, embodies the artist's idea of perfection—the highest degree of excellence, which, at the time, is for him possible. The same is true of the moral or religious ideal. The product of the constructive imagination in the form of an ideal not only embodies the best of all past experience, but it also transcends experience by an intuitive apprehension of the idea of the perfect to the plane of which it must rise in its creative act. It is quite true that ideals vary in different men and in the same men at dif-

ferent times. But this only proves that, as light is modified by the medium that receives and reflects it, *the inspiration of the ideal* is conditioned and modified by the subject which it affects.

5. The cosmos culminates in man. *If, therefore, the cosmos is a grand organism, man holds the central place in it, and the significance of the whole comes to view in the nature and constitution of man.* It is admitted on all sides that nature reaches its highest development in man, and that to the latter, because of his physical, intellectual and moral superiority, is accorded the place of honor and dignity in the whole order. But this is only one side of the truth. Man is superior to nature ; but he is also related to nature. He stands at the head, not because of an accident, not as the result of an unconscious striving, of a blind upward growth the unforeseen and, therefore, unexpected end of which is a creature of such wonderful beauty, power and dignity. Nature would be as little complete without man, as a vertebrate animal without a head ; and as the growth of the embryo presupposes and involves the growth of the spinal cord and brain, so the development of nature presupposes and involves the coming of man. The *man-idea* lies in nature from the beginning, and, therefore, in the complete system all the parts are related to man, and, by virtue of that relation, to each other. Science, on the one hand, and art, on the other, are the fruit of this correspondence and interrelation, for each of them, in its own way, only shows how man finds himself, the depths of his own soul revealed in nature, and nature made clear in the light of his own consciousness.*

There is only one way of accounting for this wonderful fact. Man is made in the image of God, and nature is the process by which the divine idea unfolds itself until it appears unveiled in man, and this is accomplished by the ever fuller impartation of the divine in proportion, as nature becomes its commensurate organ. Again, we have the upward movement in man met by a corresponding downward movement of the divine until we get

*See Dr. Nevin's "The Wonderful Nature of Man," in the *Mercersburg Review*, Vol. XI., p. 317.

the full union of God and man by means of the incarnation in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ. *The constitution of nature and the position of man in the cosmos, accordingly, are intelligible only in the light of the Christ idea, and Christology is of fundamental significance in the interpretation of nature and the study of the historical development of the human race.*

6. The old *Mercersburg Review* used to bear on the title-page the motto of Anselm: "*Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam.*" This motto emphasizes the intellectual and moral standpoint of the system of thought which we have been discussing, viz., the principle *that faith is in order to knowledge*. This does not mean faith in propositions or doctrinal statements, but faith in verities or fundamental facts. The primary data of consciousness cannot be questioned. The *ego*, the world and God authenticate themselves to consciousness, and all higher forms of knowledge presuppose them. Without such positing of a beginning, progress in knowledge is not possible. All science begins with that which is accepted by a primary act of the mind, an act of faith. This gives a place where to stand, and that being gained, the whole realm of nature and history, of things human and divine is open for investigation. It is in this way that we advance from stage to stage of knowledge. For this reason the profession of faith in Christianity begins with the Apostles' Creed, not with a system of doctrine like the Augsburg or Westminster Confession. The Creed moves in the line of fundamental facts; the confessions embody the results of investigation and study, truths which flow out of the unfolding life of Christianity, the subjective explanation or apprehension of that which is involved in the fundamental facts. The objects of faith are ever the same, but knowledge is continually deepening and widening under the guidance of the spirit that leads into all truth.

From this brief, and, it is to be feared, inadequate statement of philosophical principles, we may perhaps be enabled to draw an inference as to the advantages which have accrued from the

teaching of such a system in the institutions of the Church. It has opened a new field of vision to all earnest inquirers on the road to knowledge, and given both zeal and direction to their efforts. It has introduced order and unity into the intellectual, moral and religious development of the Church, and emphasized a development of thought and life which has proved highly beneficial to those engaged in secular pursuits, but especially so to those who, in turn, have become the teachers of others or the leaders of educational thought. Above all, while it has held fast to the old, fundamental facts of science and religion, it has insisted upon the great law of progress as applicable to every department of life and thought, saying with Tennyson :

“ Yet I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose runs,
And the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns.”

IX.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

HARNACK'S CHRONOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

Some months ago, when vague reports began to circulate as to the contents of Professor Adolf Harnack's recent book, *The History of Primitive Christian Literature*, there was a general expression of satisfaction in conservative theological quarters, because of the support which it was believed to lend to the traditional views of the origin and character of the books of the New Testament. Harnack is one of the most celebrated professors in the most celebrated university of modern Europe, namely, that of Berlin. He occupies the chair once occupied by the venerated Neander. He is a man of prodigious learning and of marvelous industry, whose productive activity in the sphere of historical theology seems to be without limitation. Manifestly, such a man's opinions on subjects connected with his chosen line of investigation, can not but be of great weight, when deliberately and formally expressed. Until recently, however, Professor Harnack's views were not regarded with much favor by many English and American theologians. He was generally looked upon as a Ritschlian in theology, and as being tainted with the peculiarities of that school; and he was regarded as being altogether too free in his methods of investigation to deserve much confidence. He was believed to lean too much to the side of the Higher Criticism to be safe and trustworthy in his views as to the history and contents of the Bible.

But according to the first reports of the character of the most recent of his publications, referred to above, he seemed suddenly to have taken a long step backward, in the direction of conservative and traditional views; and, of course, his "conversion" was hailed with no small degree of delight. It was said that he had

completely overturned the views of the rationalistic critics from Baur to Reuss, that he had confirmed, upon the whole, the long established traditional theory of the origin of the various Biblical books, and that it would not be long now until the present critical craze would be completely ended. The books of the Bible were all written by the persons and at the time represented by the long received tradition, even the critical doubts of Eusebius and his talk about *antilegomena* being groundless; and the post-biblical literature of the early Christian centuries was in general composed just as tradition had always affirmed. Great, after all, is tradition! One of the greatest scholars of the age has spoken, it was said, and his testimony is in favor of traditionalism; and it is a testimony that must be regarded as the more valuable as it comes from a sort of unwilling witness—one whose inclinations have always been in favor of radicalism. Verily, the cause of traditionalism must be supposed to be strong, when a man of such tendencies is forced thus to come out on its side. And so Harnack was for a time regarded by some as a very Daniel come to judgment; before whose face the critical hosts would be put to flight, as the mists are before the face of the morning sun.

But now, as more correct information comes to be received concerning Professor Harnack's real views, it is found that these expectations must be greatly modified, if they are not to be entirely disappointed. It is true, indeed, that Professor Harnack has reached conclusions and published views which are favorable to the general conception of Christianity that has always been current in the Church; and for this he deserves the thanks of all who are interested in the prosperity of religion, certainly. But, of course, no less than this was to be expected of him. He is himself a Christian theologian who believes in Christianity, and whose scientific interest in theology is sustained by his Christian faith. Christianity for him is a reality capable of scientific study and treatment; and the Biblical literature, to his mind, contains true and trustworthy information concerning the origin and nature of Christianity. Harnack has no favor for the extravagant critical theories of the new Tübingen school,

which brought down the origin of most of the New Testament books to the time of the second or third century, and supposed them to have been written in the interest of divergent theological tendencies then prevailing in the Church. These theories, if indeed they still made any stir in the world, Harnack may be supposed to have finally put to rest. So far his work may be said to be a reaction in favor of traditional views, and will, doubtless, be gratifying to all earnest theologians, even the majority of the higher critics themselves included. And in this respect Harnack himself speaks of his work as involving a *retrograde movement*." "I do not hesitate," he says, "to use the word retrograde, for one should call things by their right names, and in the criticism of the sources of early Christianity we are undeniably on a retrograde movement towards tradition. The time will come, and even now is on the way, when we shall trouble ourselves very little about the untangling of the literary-historical problems of early Christianity, since the chief matter to be established by such investigation will be universally accepted, to wit, the substantial correctness of tradition save for a few noteworthy exceptions."

We have taken this quotation from a notice of Professor Harnack's book in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*; and we have given it in full because it seems to represent quite accurately Harnack's position. A close scrutiny of this quotation will show that Professor Harnack's "retrograde movement" is, after all, not exactly in the direction of English and American traditionalism. What he claims is that the traditional view of the origin of the literature of the New Testament, and, indeed, of early Christian literature generally, is *substantially* correct, but that even to this there are some *notable exceptions*. What these exceptions are will appear from a brief review of the chronology of the New Testament, which our Berlin Professor adopts. For the purpose of such review we shall make use of an article by Francis A. Christie in the *New World* for September, 1897. The origin of the Pauline literature, with the exception of the Pastoral Epistles, is supposed to be in the main rightly repre-

sented by the received tradition. Indeed, Harnack dates all the genuine epistles of St. Paul some four or five years earlier than has generally been the case, as also he supposes Paul's conversion to have taken place a few years earlier than others have supposed ; and he receives all the writings which go under Paul's name as genuine, with the exception of the Pastoral Epistles. These he does not believe to be from the hands of Paul. They are accretions or compilations, which may have had a Pauline basis, but which received their present form sometime in the years 90–110 A. D., and to which additions were made as late as 150. The Epistle of James, which some suppose to be the very earliest portion of the New Testament, is, according to Harnack, not genuine. It is a compilation of material from widely different sources, made by some Christian teacher not earlier than A. D. 120, and edited by some one else still later. The Epistle to the Hebrews, the traditional date of which is about A. D. 62, is by Harnack supposed to have been written sometime between 65–100 A. D., probably by Barnabas, as Luther suspected long ago. The first Epistle of Peter was never intended for a composition of the Apostle Peter, and was written probably between 83–93 A. D., long after Peter's death. Second Peter is a clear case of forgery, dating from about the year 175. It plunders material from the Epistle of Jude, which itself is not genuine, and dates from the first third of the second century. Of the Synoptical Gospels, the earliest one, upon which the others are more or less dependent, is that of Mark, dating from 65–70 A. D.; while Matthew must have been written very soon after 70, as it bears evidence, especially in the eschatological discourse, of the agitations of that year of judgment ; but it contains also later additions. The date of the Gospel of Luke is fixed between A. D. 80–93, which is also the latest limit for the date of the Acts of the Apostles, in which, it is said, there are obvious mistakes about the relations of things in Apostolic times, which would prevent us from dating it earlier. The so-called Johannine writings, including the Apocalypse, were composed, according to Harnack, by one author, but that author was not the *Apostle* John, but John, the *Presbyter*

of Ephesus, who flourished during the reign of Trajan, A. D. 80–110. This Presbyter John, mentioned by Papias as quoted by Eusebius, was doubtless a disciple of the Apostle John, with whom ecclesiastical tradition afterward confounded him. It will thus be observed that none of our Gospels are supposed to have been written earlier than from thirty-five to forty years after our Lord's death, nor later than eighty years after that event. But this is early enough to vouch for their substantial historical accuracy.

From all this it will appear that Harnack's retrograde movement is, after all, not of a very thorough-going character, and that he has not gone back on the critics as much as was by some supposed. This retrograde movement will hardly satisfy those conservative theologians whose religion is the Bible, according to the phrase of Chillingworth, and whose faith in Christianity would be seriously disturbed by the supposition that any of the books of the Bible were not written by the persons by whom they have always believed them to have been written. Of course, these views of the Bible Harnack does not share. For him the Bible is not religion. *Substantial correctness* is all that he cares to claim for the traditional view of its origin and contents; just as the same quality might be claimed for Herodotus or Thucydides. But that is something very far from the claim of infallibility either for the canon of the Bible or for its contents; and those who had been led to believe that Harnack had demolished not merely the critics of the Tübingen school, but Graf, Wellhausen and Driver as well, will be greatly disappointed when they come to know his real position. What Harnack holds, and thinks he has proved, is that most of the books of the New Testament—for those of the Old Testament do not come within the sphere of his investigation—were probably written within the apostolic period, or shortly thereafter, and may be accepted as trustworthy sources for the knowledge of primitive Christianity. But he does not regard these books as having been produced by divine dictation and as possessing the quality of infallibility or inerrancy. He views them, not from the dogmatic

standpoint of inspiration, but from the critical standpoint of history.

Is there anything in this, now, that should alarm us as to the security of our Christian faith? Does this view make the foundations of Christianity any less sure than the traditional view does? Is it harder for us to believe in Christianity, if we doubt that Paul wrote the Pastoral Epistles, or that John wrote the Gospel which goes by his name, than it would be if we had no such doubts? The answer to these questions must depend upon our general view of the nature of Christianity. What is Christianity? If Christianity be supposed to be a system of doctrinal propositions directly revealed from heaven, whose accuracy and infallibility are guaranteed by certain external credentials attached to the instruments of the revelation, then the question, *What think ye of the Bible*, becomes the most important question with which religious thought can be concerned—more important, even, than the question, *What think ye of Christ?* Our conviction of the truthfulness of Christianity must then depend upon a logical examination of the credentials of the Bible, or rather of the credentials of its various authors, and our faith will be the result of a logical operation. The process of conversion will then become essentially an intellectual and judicial process. The authors of the Bible must be called up, and their claims and credentials must be examined, much as witnesses are examined in court; and we are Christians or not Christians, according to the issue of such examination. Such a process Bishop Sherlock once conducted, against the deists of his time, in his famous treatise entitled *Trial of the Witnesses*, in which he brought the apostles into court and made them give their testimony in regard to the facts of the Gospel. And such a process every soul must, in effect, conduct before it can come to have Christian faith; and the degree of faith must be in proportion to the thoroughness and ability of the examination and to the satisfactoriness of the result. What now, if in such trial the witnesses should be found to be entirely different persons from what they have been believed to be, and from what the accepted theory requires them to be? If,

for instance, the author of the Gospel of John, when brought upon the witness stand, should prove to be a different person from the Apostle John, must not he and his testimony be at once ruled out of court as being entirely unworthy of credence? Such a supposition will at once show how this theory, instead of favoring and facilitating belief in Christianity, must, in fact, constantly imperil it. If this theory of Christianity were correct, then the only way to security and calmness of faith would be never to question the witnesses at all, but simply to accept their testimony blindly, or on the authority of tradition. What one does not know, that one can believe; but any questioning would be certain to lead to uncertainty and doubt. And in no case could Christian faith, in this view, amount to more than *probability*. Any truth that depends wholly upon external historical testimony can not, in any proper sense of the term, be *demonstrated*, and *absolute certainty* in regard to it must be out of the question.

But this is not the theory of Christianity which the Bible itself teaches; and we are sure that it is not the theory which commends itself to the best and profoundest Christian reflection. Christianity is life, not logic. What Christian is there who, when reflecting upon his Christian experience, is not convinced that his faith rests upon a more immediate and therefore a surer foundation than that afforded by any chain of historical investigation and reasoning? If there be such a Christian, his faith must always be exposed to the uncertainty arising from the consciousness of the liability to error accompanying any intellectual process. *Humanum est errare*; and any faith that rests merely upon an operation of the human intellect, no matter what its premises may be, must always be open to the suspicion of error. Suppose a person of common intelligence and common honesty were to propose, as a condition of believing in Christianity, to prove to himself the genuineness, veracity and authenticity of the Bible. That would be an undertaking of vast proportions and of vast difficulty. Few men, indeed, would ever get through with it. The majority, feeling the imperative need of

having religion, would be content in the end to fall back upon the conclusions of others. But suppose one should have accomplished the task proposed, and what then? Would there be no room for him to doubt his conclusion? Might there not be a chance of his having mistaken the facts in the case, or of having misunderstood the witnesses? Might there not be some fallacy lurking in his process of reasoning, that would vitiate the results arrived at? May not even the great and learned Harnack be wrong in some, at least, of his positions? Clearly, then, if Christian faith were the result merely of a logical process, there could be no such certainty, no such assurance and trust, as the soul demands in matters of religion, and as the Christian feels that he possesses in his experience.

The Christian believer is immediately and infallibly certain of the truth which he believes. Of course, this can not be said of any secondary or derivative propositions of doctrine, but only of the substantive truth of faith. That truth authenticates itself immediately to the believer's heart and conscience. It does not derive its authority from some other and extraneous source, but from itself; and details of Christian doctrine may participate in this self-authenticating power in proportion to their nearness to the heart of faith. The Christian does not say, I will believe in Christ, provided I can demonstrate the reality of His miracles, or prove the correctness of His genealogy, or, provided, I can put my fingers into the print of the nails or thrust my hand into His side; nor does he say, I will believe in the truth of the Bible, provided I can be made sure by whom and at what time each particular book was written. The Christian believes in Christ because Christ is a present divine reality to his soul, answering to its deepest wants and yearnings. In the exercise of faith he apprehends the Christ at once as his Lord and his God, and, like Thomas, he needs no further argument. And so the Christian believes the Bible, not because he knows precisely by whom each book was written, and has been assured of its inerrancy by some infallible authority, but because its religious substance or teaching corresponds to his idea of divine truth

and satisfies his spiritual hunger ; although, of course, he never thinks of extending this quality to matters which are not religious, such as statements in history or science. As the ideal embodied in a work of art, by virtue of which it inspires and thrills the soul of the beholder, does not at all depend upon the question as to who made it ; so the inspiration and quickening energy of Sacred Scripture does not depend upon the question of authorship, but solely upon its spiritual nature and quality. Is not that in accordance with the test which Christ Himself proposes in order to prove the divinity of His own teaching ? “ If any man be willing to do His will, he shall know concerning the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.” The Bible contains a collection of sayings and doings of Christ, and of other godly men who are more or less closely connected with Him ; and these sayings and doings are presented as historical facts, just as historical facts are presented in other writings. The Bible does not claim to be essentially different from other books, or to be absolutely free from error. It simply claims to be substantially correct in what it presents ; and this claim is generally admitted by critics as well as by traditionalists. How, now, shall we know that the matter thus presented is divine truth capable of enlightening the mind and quickening the soul ? We answer, *by experiencing this very effect*. Let this truth be accepted and taken up into the soul and see whether it has life and power in itself or not. Countless numbers of sincere Christians, in all ages, who had not the slightest idea of apologetics, have thus tested it and found it to be the power of God unto salvation. How would one test the vitality of a grain of corn which he may be holding in his hand ? Not, certainly, by any mechanical or chemical process. One could not by cutting it up, or dissolving it, find the life which it contains. But put it into the warm bosom of the earth, and it will show whether it has life or not. And so it must be with the Word of God. That Word is spirit and life ; but this quality cannot be proven by any process of historical or antiquarian research, however important and profitable such processes may be in many re-

spects, but only by receiving it into the heart and letting it produce its proper effect there. Christ is the way, the truth, and the life; and His words are spirit and life; and all this He proves to be in the life of His believing people. Here is a firm foundation for Christian faith to rest upon, far above the storms of criticism that may rage around the question of the literary composition of the Bible, and far above the debates of doctrinal theology. This foundation Harnack's conclusions in Biblical chronology have not shaken; nor would they have strengthened it, if they had been more in harmony with the expectations and wishes of the traditionalists.

FUTURE PROBATION OR ELSE ABSOLUTE PREDESTINATION.

The idea of an extension of the possibility of probation and of salvation into the spirit world after death is accepted by a large number of leading theologians at the present time. This idea is not the notion of a second probation, after death, for those who have deliberately rejected the offer of divine grace and salvation in the present life; but it is the idea of one Christian probation for all men. One decisive and sufficient trial for eternal life every man must have. And as without Christ and faith in Christ there can be no salvation, it follows that somewhere and somehow Christ must be presented to every soul in such way as to make possible a free and conscious choice in relation to Him. Such presentation of Christ, wherever it may take place, will involve an element of probation, or trial, for the result can not be regarded as fixed by the previous moral development of the subject; since, in that case, the great majority of mankind would, after all, have no real chance of salvation, as their lives are passed in circumstances most unfavorable to right moral development.

That, now, is the idea of future probation in its most essential form; and in that form it is held by a large and growing number of influential theologians. It was held, for example, by such men as Martensen, Dorner Nitsch, Julius Müller, Lange and Ebrard, of the past generation, among the Germans. Some of

our readers who studied Ebrard's Dogmatics, at Mercersburg, from thirty to forty years ago, will remember the startling effect with which they read, in vol. 2, page 743, of said work, that Sheol, or Hades, "though a sad and cheerless place, is still a place where prayer may be made in the name of Jesus, where sins that remained unforgiven here may still be forgiven, save only that against the Holy Ghost, and where conversion is still possible." The same view is held in England by such able thinkers as Maurice, Farrar, Phumtre, Stanley, Alford and many others; and in this country by the large and ever-growing school of the "new theology," which is a revolt within the sphere of Calvinism against the decretal principle in the theological thought upon which Calvinism is built.

In the Lutheran Church in this country, which, we think, can easily claim to be the Gibraltar of ancient Protestant orthodoxy, the theory of future probation, the very exponent of anti-Calvinism within Calvinism, seems, curiously enough, thus far to have received little, if any, favor. Professor R. F. Weidner, of the Lutheran Theological Seminary of Chicago, in a popular commentary on the General Epistles, noticed in the October issue of this REVIEW, speaking of this theory, page 189, says: "It is contrary to Scripture and opposed to the unanimous teachings of the Church in all ages. The principle of interpretation employed (in the establishment of this theory), and the rationalistic tendencies displayed are subversive of the most important evangelical doctrines. If this theory were true, the whole of Christian doctrine as taught in the Bible and believed by the Church would have to be reconstructed. This erroneous theory has its origin in a false sentimentality, and in a one-sided knowledge of the scheme of redemption, and in a false and strained exegesis." Thus speaks a Lutheran, who is not afraid of making assertions, who is sure that he is a Lutheran, and certain that Lutheranism is now and always right.

There are, however, Lutherans, especially on the other side of the Atlantic, who do not agree with Professor Weidner at all on this subject. They think that they understand the Bible, and that

they have a fair knowledge of the scheme of redemption ; and yet they hold this theory of future probation just as positively as Professor Weidner rejects it. One of these is Bishop Dahle, a Norwegian Lutheran, whose position in the Church of his native land attests his ability as a theologian, and invests his opinions with more than common importance and interest. Indeed, as a bishop, he may be supposed to be in some sense speaking for the Church to which he belongs ; at least it is not likely that he differs very radically with the doctrinal position of his Church. Now Bishop Dahle has just written a book, entitled " Life after death, and the Future of the Kingdom of God," which has been translated into English and published by the Clarks, of Edinburgh, and which may be had of Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. In this work Bishop Dahle strongly advocates this theory of future probation. He admits, indeed, that there is no direct and positive statement of Scripture in favor of it, but thinks that it is implied in the whole scheme of Christianity as taught in the Bible and apprehended especially in the Lutheran Church.

We have not ourselves seen this book of Bishop Dahle's, but are dependent for our knowledge of it upon a review by Dr. Benjamin B. Warfield in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for October of the present year. But this is of little consequence, as our motive for writing the present note is not derived from anything contained in this book, but, rather, from what Dr. Warfield has to say in relation to it. For Dr. Warfield insists that this very theory of future probation, which Professor Weidner pronounces altogether " unbiblical " and " rationalistic," is the necessary logical outcome of the presuppositions of the Lutheran scheme of salvation. " The Scriptures certainly teach," says Dr. Warfield, " that there is no salvation in any other name than that of Jesus ; and if it is also true that God desires that all should be saved, and, indeed, His very innate sense of justice forbids Him to discriminate between men in the offer of that salvation by which alone they can be saved, it follows very stringently that all must some time have the offer made to them." That is to say, if the doctrine of an absolute double decree of predestination be

rejected, and if it be believed that God loves all men with an equal and impartial love, and that He sincerely desires the salvation of all, then it becomes necessary to go farther and hold that, in order to be consistent, God must also secure the *possibility* and *means* of salvation to all men, either in this or in a future life ; for we cannot think of God as willing the end without also willing the means by which it may be reached. Now the Lutheran Church has rejected the doctrine of a double predestination. In Article XI. of the *Formula of Concord*, after some considerable juggling with the subject, it is at last affirmed, in Section IX., that “the true opinion concerning predestination” is that “God has concluded all under unbelief that He might have mercy upon all,” and that “God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should be converted and believe in Christ ;” and further on, in Section XIV., it is declared to be an error to say that “God is unwilling that all men should repent and believe the Gospel,” or to say that “when He calls us He does not earnestly wish that all men should come unto Him,” or to say that “God is not willing that all men should be saved, but that some men are destined to destruction, not on account of their sins, but by the mere counsel, purpose and will of God, so that they cannot in any wise attain to salvation.” It is true that in a preceding part of the article the salvation of “the good and beloved children of God” is ascribed to God’s eternal election as its only ground, and it may be difficult to reconcile that with what is said in regard to the universality of God’s saving grace ; but there is no doubt that the Lutheran Church has distinctly rejected the doctrine of divine decree of reprobation.

Now, says Dr. Warfield, that being the doctrine of the Lutheran Church, no consistent Lutheran can do otherwise than accept the theory of future probation. For, if God has not predestinated any soul unto perdition, if He really desires the salvation of all, and if salvation is possible only in Christ, then it follows with logical necessity that somewhere and sometime Christ must be offered to all ; and as He is manifestly not offered to all in this life, He must be offered after this life ; and thus

the doctrine of future probation is established. The old Lutheran claim that Christ is really offered to all men in this world is very properly pronounced "absurd" both by Bishop Dahle and by his reviewer. With our present knowledge of geography it is no longer possible to accept the story, once told with a naïve conviction of the supremacy of dogmatics over history, that the Gospel was once preached by the apostles on the banks of the Missouri and of the Amazon. To use the language of Dr. Warfield, "it just has not been done." But even if it had been done, that would not prove that the Gospel has been preached to every creature in this world. To say that the Gospel has been preached to a people when a few missionary stations have been planted in its territory, either in ancient or in modern times, and that this may be considered a sufficient Christian probation for the individuals belonging to it, is, to put it mildly, the height of nonsense. The Gospel has not been preached to the Hindoo people because Thomas once labored in India—if indeed there be any truth in that story. Nor could it be said that the light of reason and conscience—the essential Christ immanent in all men—is sufficient to afford the conditions of Christian probation; for, if it were, it would have to be sufficient also to salvation, and the Gospel would be superfluous; which is a proposition that few would be willing to affirm. It is plain, then, that in this world Christ is not presented to all men in such way as to make their salvation possible; hence we are bound to conclude that He will be offered to them after this life. For to hold that God wills the salvation of all men, but that He is either unwilling or unable to afford them the means of salvation, would involve a contradiction of the very idea of the Godhead. Hence we must either accept the theory of future probation, or we must adopt the doctrine of absolute predestination, and hold that God does not seriously will the salvation of all men, but rather has foreordained some to perdition for the manifestation of His glory. Thus argues Dr. Warfield, and holds, accordingly, that Lutheranism, which rejects the latter doctrine, must of necessity adopt the former.

This contention of Dr. Warfield's, we think, is correct: we

are bound to believe either that a Christian chance of salvation must be assured to every soul, or that God does not will the salvation of every soul. This opinion is confirmed by an authority which, we are sure, will be respected by the majority of our readers. Dr. Schaff, in his *Creeds of Christendom*, Vol. I., p. 451, after saying that all the Reformers, "under a controlling sense of human depravity and saving grace, and in extreme antagonism to Palagianism and self-righteousness, came to the same doctrine of a double predestination which decides the eternal destiny of all men," then continues to write as follows: "Nor is it possible to evade this conclusion on the two acknowledged premises of Protestant orthodoxy—namely, the wholesale condemnation of men in Adam, and the limitation of saving grace to the present world. If the Lutheran theology, after the Formula of Concord (1577) rejected Synergism and Calvinism alike, and yet continued to teach the total depravity of all men and the unconditional election of some, it could only be done at the expense of logical consistency." To the same effect Dr. Schaff then quotes Alexander Schweizer, who says that the harshness of the dualistic particularism which characterizes the Reformed Confessions belongs in fact to all the confessions of the Reformation age, and "follows necessarily from the idea that men's eternal destiny is fixed in this world when they die, and that only those are saved who become Christians here, while all others remain damned."

It will be seen from these quotations that, on this subject, Dr. Schaff is of the same opinion as Dr. Warfield, only his way of presenting the matter is the converse of Dr. Warfield's. Dr. Warfield says, in effect, if you deny the dualistic particularism and partiality which the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination implies, then you are bound to assume that for those who have not the chance of being saved in this life there must be a chance hereafter; and thus you have the doctrine of future probation, with all which that implies. "It will not do to take refuge in generalities," says Dr. Warfield, further "and to affirm that it is all a mystery;" that is to say, you are bound to accept the con-

clusion involved in your own premises, and may not seek to escape from it by averring that the subject is too deep for your understanding. Dr. Schaff, on the other hand, says, if you accept the doctrine of total depravity and of the sole efficiency of the divine grace in the work of conversion, and if you suppose the possibility of conversion and salvation to be limited to the present life, then, seeing that the majority of men have no chance of being saved here and must therefore be doomed to perish everlastingly, you are bound to assume the doctrine of predestination and reprobation, with all which that implies. Either the doctrine of future probation, or the doctrine of eternal divine reprobation: that is the dilemma to which, according to Schaff, theological thought on this subject is reduced. It will be observed that Dr. Schaff does not state on which side of the dilemma he supposes the stronger arguments to be; nor do we propose to do so, as that is a point which each one will want to decide for himself. Dr. Schaff merely says that those who hold the orthodox Protestant doctrines of total depravity and of the decisiveness of the present life in the determination of eternal destiny, have no right to abuse the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, as has been so much the fashion in the past, for this doctrine really follows with logical necessity from their own premises. A Calvinist who believes in reprobation and rejects the doctrine of future probation, is consistent; but a Lutheran who believes that the love of God is universal, and yet holds that the majority of mankind will never have a real chance of salvation, is not consistent. So say Drs. Schaff and Warfield, and so say we.

The world's history must in the end correspond to the eternal plan of the world, for it is impossible to suppose that the eternal purpose of the Creator can be eternally defeated. If, therefore, we are sure that this history involves as its result an eternal dualism, then we must assume that this dualism was in the plan from the beginning, and supra-lapsarian predestinarianism must be the principle of our theology. We can not reject this principle, and admit the conditions which necessarily involve it. It will thus appear with what propriety the doctrine of future proba-

tion could be set up as the exponent of the revolt against Calvinism within the ranks of Calvinism. There has been surprise expressed at times that the new theology men, especially in New England, should have fastened upon this "unpopular and dangerous doctrine" as the most prominent point of their contention. But, from what has now been said, it will appear that their method was, after all, not unnatural, and that they were led by a truer logic than perhaps their critics are; for future probation and absolute predestination are, in fact, logical alternatives, of which the affirmation of the one implies the negation of the other. Which of these alternative theories now ought one to choose? Of the former it is usually said that it is a dangerous doctrine, that it may be *abused*, and that it may lead to procrastination and to the postponement of conversion to a future life; while of the latter it may be said that for a God of infinite love it gives us an infinite *Diabolos*, who hates the majority of the beings He has made, and is bound to damn them for His glory. Which is the better theory to adopt?

OUR BOOK NOTICES.

We take the liberty of calling the reader's attention to the book notices contained in this issue of the REVIEW. And we want to say in this connection that it is our aim to make the notices of new books a really valuable feature of this publication—valuable, we mean, to the readers of the REVIEW, not merely to the publishers of books. With few exceptions, the books noticed are purchased in the ordinary way, leaving the reviewer entirely free in the expression of his judgment. No book is to be noticed *without being read*; and the notice, instead of being merely a colorless announcement of title and table of contents, will always aim to convey some positive information in regard to the contents and character of a book. The reader will then be in a position to make up his mind intelligently whether he will want to buy the book or not, and, in any case, the notice will be a matter of value to him. To this end we solicit the interest and coöperation of our readers.

X.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE. By G. T. Ladd, Professor in Yale University. Chas. Scribner's Sons. Pages, 607. 1897. Price, \$4.00.

A work distinctly metaphysical, and written by a well-known philosophical author who is neither afraid nor ashamed to avow himself a thorough believer in revealed religion, will be welcomed by many. For genuine agnosticism, if there be such, will desire to know what the advocate of a living faith has to say, that he may either controvert the statements made in defence or modify his own position. The believer, who does not fear for the truth he professes, will be pleased to see a strong presentation of his views by one who is in hearty sympathy with them.

Professor Ladd occupies such a commanding position that he can compel a respectful hearing for all his well considered opinions; and there is a naïve confession by the author in his preface that he thinks this the best of all the works he has published. Though an author is not always a proper judge of the comparative value of his own work, yet we are inclined to think that Professor Ladd's estimation is correct.

This book is an examination of the foundations of all knowledge, dealing with the first principles which are common to every department of thought, whether physical, mathematical, historical, religious or speculative. This is a large undertaking, one which demands a wide acquaintance with the facts of universal culture, and the methods by which these facts are systematized into sciences. The amount and diversity of the author's reading gives him abundant material. The patience and logical acumen which he displays throughout shows him capable of grappling with this formidable task. He sees clearly what he wishes to do and how to effect his purpose both by an analysis of principles and a synthesis of facts in the elaboration of new and original views. The thought is preferable to the style. The latter is often careless, and sometimes obscure; there are little infelicities which occur so often that they seem to be pets, *e. g.*, "work-a-day," "feeling-full," etc. But these do not obscure the meaning, and are only trifling blemishes. Again, there are long and unbalanced sentences, which form what the French critics call *construction louche*, *vide*, page 226, the sentence beginning, "Thus a course," etc.; page 431, "Shall we then," etc. In truth, the general style of this book is difficult. And the fact that so many works on philosophy, especially those written in modern times, have been expressed in obscure, involved sentences and barbarous nomen-

clature, has done much to bring the study into disrepute. "The Children of the Mist," as Whately so aptly called the German metaphysicians, are forbidding, at least in their external garb, to most clear-headed men, who cannot help questioning whether they understand themselves, when they are so difficult for any one else. For the dictum of Aristotle: "The test of knowledge is the ability to teach," will be applied. Perhaps it is impossible to express recondite principles in obvious language; but we do not believe it. Schopenhauer is clearness itself, though he grappled with all the problems which occupied the attention of Kant and Hegel. There is no difficulty in understanding Hume except where we attempt to grasp his meaning through Green's elucidations. Hamilton is never obscure, though it may be said he is neither original nor profound. The perfection of style is found in Plato, who started, or at least gave definite forms to, all the questions in philosophy over which thinkers have since labored, and if in any place there is obscurity it is only such as arises from the abstract nature of the subject treated. But though the shell of the book is sometimes difficult to break, the kernel concealed will always repay the labor of reaching it.

While the aim of Professor Ladd is a severely scientific search for the universally accepted principles of all knowledge, this naturally brings him in conflict with those who deny, *in theory*, that there are any such that can be certified and who therefore render a controversial style necessary. The challenge thrown down by doubters or agnostics is readily accepted, and fools are answered according to their folly and out of their own mouths! For their inconsistencies are mercilessly exposed, and if the author were not known to be an amiable man, we would be forced to conclude that he takes a malicious pleasure in the torture of his victims. For he shows at every turn that the fundamental principles of all knowledge, while denied to those who have a living and working faith, are tacitly assumed by these very doubters in the constructing of their systems of agnosticism. We can see the author, as he draws his vivid picture of the doubter deliberately engaged in cutting off the limb on which he unconsciously rests while wielding his destructive criticism. What can be more exquisite than the following bit of sarcasm, p. 390: "Moreover, there is assumed a positive and conclusive knowledge that the common mental representation of the reality of the world of things is *not* indeed what it claims to be, namely, cognition; it is mere sensation, mere ideation, mere abstract thinking and cannot be the truth in the sense which men usually attach to that word. But who does not see that so much nescience as this involves a vast amount of the most positive and comprehensive propositions, which, instead of confessing a skeptical attitude of mind toward truth and reality, the rather manifest an attitude of extreme dogmatism concealed under agnostic guise." Or the following, page 389: "Now, this 'I-do-not-know' may mean also

‘ You do not know ’ and even ‘ Nobody knows or ever will know, or ever can know.’ This is nescience venturing into the field of epistemological philosophy and laying down a universal proposition. But it requires no critical insight or work of analysis in order to show that such nescience is the most confident and comprehensive kind of knowledge, if only it be regarded from a perfectly unprejudiced point of view.” It will not do for the materialist, the doubter, the agnostic—the rose by any of these names emits the same odor—to lay down this book of Professor Ladd with contempt, or pooh pooh its method of dealing with them. The mirror is held up to nature, and if they turn their backs and refuse, like the crook in the rogues’ gallery, to have their photograph taken, other people will behold their true likeness and recognize the inconsistencies of their work. And the readers who honestly believe something in the sciences of Nature will gladly accept the contribution to Philosophy which tends to show that there is both Design and a Designer, both in and above Nature.

JACOB COOPER.

THE OLD TESTAMENT UNDER FIRE. By A. J. F. Behrends, D.D., S.T.D. Pastor of the Central Congregational Church, Brooklyn, N. Y. Published by Funk & Wagnalls Company, N. Y.

This is a book of 246 pages. Its contents are divided into seven chapters as follows: *Our Lord’s use of the Old Testament; Christ and the Old Testament; Criticism and the Old Testament; Criticism and Common Sense; The Historic Faith; The Integrity of the New Testament;* to which is added a note on Professor Adolph Harnack’s last work. The papers were originally prepared for public audiences, and afterwards, yielding to the pressure of friends, the author has had them published. They do not, however, appear in the form of dissertations. They constitute a book. The several chapters are written in a clear, somewhat conversational style. The reader has no difficulty in understanding the author’s meaning. The work is intended for “intelligent and thoughtful men” rather than for learned specialists, and hence is free of technical terms and phrases.

The aim of the book is to defend the traditional view of the Old Testament over against the Higher Criticism. For the most part, the work is an arraignment of the positions and arguments of Old Testament critics. As a consequence, it is negative rather than positive, setting forth more fully what the author does not believe than what he does believe. It is in fact itself a criticism on the views of the critics. Of course, his own opinions and views are given too throughout the book. He belongs to the conservative school of theology and yet there are indications and intimations here and there that he does not hold strictly to all traditional conceptions, as for example, the little importance he attaches to the inspiration of the Scriptures and the following

statements: "The traditional views of the origin of the present pentateuch may require modification;" and "It may be assumed that the biblical history must be complete and absolutely inerrant in every slightest detail. But the assumption is contradicted by the facts. There are incomplete and variant accounts, and thus far the differences have refused to melt together in the critical crucible. General credibility is all that we can claim." The author insists that in treating the various questions that may be raised in regard to the Scriptures a great deal of "downright common sense" ought to be brought into exercise, and he must be given credit for expressing many common sense views in this book.

Dr Behrends's contention is that the criticism on the Old Testament is largely conjectural; that the problems raised are insoluble; that unwarrantable assumptions are made by destructive criticism; that the charges of literary forgery are monstrous and intolerable; that literary criticism must be subordinated to the historical; that "the crucial question is whether the Old Testament is substantially correct in the account it gives of the rise and development of the true religion;" that the real difficulties are connected with the minor details and the fragmentary character of the Old Testament Scriptures; that all that can be claimed for them is general credibility. He lays great stress on the Lord's use of the Scriptures. Jesus referred to the Scriptures, based His teaching largely on them, quoted from them and appealed to them as witnessing to Him as the Messiah. And the Scriptures in His day and for several hundred years before were the Old Testament as we have it to-day. This is established by the Septuagint and the writings of Josephus. And all that we can do and the least we can do is to accept the Old Testament and use it as our Lord did without raising the questions of date, authorship and the like.

Our author further holds that the field opened by Higher Criticism is a fruitless and hopeless one; that no definite results can be reached; that the processes are too full of assumptions and suppositions; that different conclusions are consequently reached by different writers; that if our current literature were subjected to the same kind of treatment hopeless confusion would be created. All the foregoing and many other topics are enlarged upon by the author. He gives examples of analyses made of Genesis with the view of showing the unreliability and worthlessness of such procedures. He does not object to the researches of the critics, but he does protest against the promulgation of doubtful propositions as fixed and authoritative. "The intolerance of Ewald and Graf are as offensive and unbearable as the tyranny of Hildebrand and Boniface."

Dr. Behrends is an earnest writer; his words are born of his own experience; he believes what he says; and, hence, is very readable. But it seems to us that in many of his arguments he is

unfair in this, that he sets forth the opposite view in its worst light. It is a book that can be read with profit especially by those who are inclined to the radical way of thinking on the subjects treated.

We wish to call attention yet to the author's note at the end of the book in which he exults in the fact, as he thinks, that Professor Harnack in his last work, which has just appeared, has sounded the death-knell for radicalism. According to this "foremost scholar of Europe" there must be a return to conservatism, for "tradition speaks with authority." Dr. Behrends thinks that Wellhausen is about ready for burial.

But the New York *Independent* of August 26, 1897, in reviewing Professor Harnack's book seriously questions our author's representations. It says that in this work "not simply the accuracy of tradition at this or that point, but also its incorrectness at other points is demonstrated far more conclusively than ever before. It is certainly right in many, possibly in the majority of cases, but it does not speak with authority ' (Harnack would be the last man to utter such a sentiment) ' and that it is frequently wrong * * * is being shown ever more plainly."

The weakness in many of Dr. Behrends's positions is that he invariably assails the extreme views of Higher Criticism and gives no place to moderate positions. In fact, he does not believe that there can be any intermediate stopping place; logically, the critics must all arrive eventually at the conclusions of the extremists. Here to our mind he is in error. We can much more readily accept the position of the writer in the *Independent* when he says: "The change that has taken place does not mean the approaching rehabilitation of tradition, it means rather the approaching rehabilitation of the truth, which lies, as in so many cases, between the two extremes."

A. E. T.

THE THEOLOGY OF LUTHER, in Its Historical Development and Inner Harmony. Dr. Julius Köstlin, Professor and Consistorialrath at Halle. Translated from the Second German Edition, by Rev. Charles E. Hays, A.M. Complete in two volumes. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. 1897. Price of two volumes, \$4.50, *net*.

Luther was undoubtedly the greatest of the reformers of the sixteenth century. Though there were others of his time who possessed greater learning and excelled him in certain special gifts, yet there was none who equalled him in "rugged sterling sense and strength," in intensity and force of character, and as a spiritual leader. Carlyle not unaptly designates him, "a right spiritual hero and prophet, a true son of nature and fact, for whom these centuries, and many that are to come, will be thankful to heaven." The theology of Luther, therefore, is something of more than denominational interest and requires to be studied

by all those who would thoroughly acquaint themselves with, and understand rightly, the progress of the world's religious thought.

In the two volumes before us the theology of Luther is presented to us in a very complete and satisfactory manner. The author of them, Dr. Köstlin, is generally acknowledged to be the foremost Lutheran scholar of our times, which, in itself, is a guarantee of their superior value.

The work itself is divided into four parts or books. Of these the *first* treats of the inner life and the doctrine of Luther before the indulgence controversy; the *second*, of the great reformatory testimony of Luther from the promulgation of the ninety-five theses until the Diet of Worms: A. D., 1517 to A. D., 1521; the *third*, of the principal points in which an advance is manifest in the doctrine of Luther after his retirement at the Wartburg, developed in opposition not only to Catholicism, but particularly to tendencies which appeared upon the territory of the Reformation itself; and the *fourth*, of the doctrinal views of Luther presented in systematic order. The treatment throughout is masterly and, also, highly interesting and instructive. The author does not merely give us his own opinions, but illustrates his assertions by abundant quotations from the entire range of the reformer's writings.

The translation of the work into English has, also, been admirably done. If it were not stated in the title page that it is a translation, one might naturally suppose that the work was originally written in English, so clear and smooth is the style of the translation. One cannot but wish that all translations from the German were equally meritorious.

The work deserves a wide circulation not only in the Lutheran church, but among Christians of all denominations. The careful reader of it cannot fail to gain much valuable information from it and to be spiritually benefited.

J. M. T.

A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY. By Leonard Woolsey Bacon. New York: The Christian Literature Company. Pages, x and 429. Price, \$2.00. 1897.

This is the last volume of the series of American Church History, which has been published by the Christian Literature Company. It is, however, sold also separately. The mechanical execution of the work is all that could be desired. The paper and printing make it a real luxury to the eye, as its contents are a delight to the mind. The author is a son of Dr. Leonard Bacon, of New Haven, Conn., and from such a source one would only expect a work of the highest order of merit, which expectation is not disappointed in the case before us. Dr. Bacon seems to be well qualified for historical composition. His style is accurate and stately, his grasp of historical material clear and strong and

his judgment well balanced and cultivated, and they made no mistake, accordingly, who imposed upon him the task of writing this history of American Christianity.

The task thus imposed, however, was not an easy one. It was not to write a history of the American Church, for as yet there is no American Church, and it is doubtful if there will ever be one. Christianity exists in America in a number of independent *denominations* or *churches*—their total at present being 143, including Mormons and Spiritualists—the leading ones of which are of European origin, and present striking differences of national and religious character. Still, there is a fundamental unity of religion in all of them. And here in America, moreover, in consequence of the mutual attrition and influence upon each other of the various denominations, something of a common religious life has been formed, which, together with its expression in the way of practical and intellectual activity, may not unfitly be called American Christianity. And to present a living picture of this American Christianity, involving only so much of the history of the various Christian denominations as serves to give body and color to the general outlines of the picture, was the task proposed to the author of this volume. It can easily be seen how the very abundance of the material presenting itself and the diversity of its nature and character must have combined to make that task a difficult one. Nevertheless, the result is a volume of exceedingly interesting historical writing, whose general accuracy and fairness, we presume, will hardly be questioned by the adherents of any one of the denominations.

In chaste and stately language, befitting a work of the historic muse, the author briefly relates the story of the discovery and early colonization of America by Spaniards and Frenchmen, and then shows how North America was irretrievably lost to the Spanish and French Churches, and how it fell to the possession of various branches of the great Teutonic stock of peoples, who had lately thrown off the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, and adopted a form of Christianity more in harmony with their national taste and genius. The various chapters recounting the settlement of various European colonists, with their diverse ecclesiastical establishments, in different parts of the North American continent, will be read with intense interest. The German immigration into Pennsylvania, the work of Schlatter, and the foundation of the Reformed Church are here described with sufficient fulness of details to make it inexcusable hereafter for intelligent people to be ignorant of the existence of such a Church as the Reformed; and in answer to the question, What is the Reformed Church, it will be enough hereafter to refer to this volume of Dr. Bacon's. The origin of other Churches, of course, receives equally satisfactory notice. And then we have an account of the leading events in the history of American Christianity. The great awakening in the time of Edwards, of Wesley and of

Whitfield ; the decline of all church life and religion during the war of the Revolution, and afterwards ; the restoration of the Churches subsequently, and the foundation of colleges, theological schools, missionary societies, Sunday-schools and similar institutions, during the early part of the present century ; the divisive movements within the Churches, and the tendency to sectism during the first half of the century ; the conflict of the Churches with public wrongs, such as dueling, negro slavery and intemperance—all these themes are eloquently discussed in the volume before us.

One of the most interesting chapters of this interesting volume is on "The Church in Theology and Literature," in which a rapid review is given of the most important theological movements and controversies that have taken place in the American Churches up to the present time. We quote entire the following paragraph on "The Mercersburg Theology," in which we are sure our readers will be interested. After speaking of the controversy occasioned by the writings of Dr. Horace Bushnell, the author continues : "Another wholesome and edifying debate was occasioned by the publications that went forth from the College and Theological Seminary of the German Reformed Church situated at Mercersburg in Pennsylvania. At this institution was effected a fruitful union of American and German theology ; the result was to commend to the general attention aspects of truth, philosophical, theological, and historical, not previously current among American Protestants. The book of Dr. John Williamson Nevin, entitled 'The Mystical Presence: A Vindication of the Reformed or Calvinistic Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist,' revealed to the vast multitude of churches and ministers that gloried in the name of Calvinist the fact that on the most distinctive article of Calvinism, they were not Calvinists at all, but Zwinglians. The enunciation of the standard doctrine of the various Presbyterian Churches excited among themselves a clamor of 'Heresy!' and the doctrine of Calvin was put upon trial before the Calvinists. The outcome of a discussion that extended itself far beyond the boundaries of the comparatively small and uninfluential German Reformed Church was to elevate the point of view and broaden the horizon of American students of the constitution and history of the Church. Later generations of students owe no light obligation to the fidelity and courage of Dr. Nevin, as well as to the erudition and immense productive diligence of his associate, Dr. Philip Schaff," p. 377.

The quotation of the above paragraph will at once serve the double purpose of enabling us "to see ourselves as others see us," and of affording us a fair sample of our author's style of writing. With a view to the latter end we shall quote one more paragraph. After having given a brief account of the origin of the higher criticism, and of the agitations and troubles which it has occasioned, the author continues as follows : "The undeniably grave

theological difficulties occasioned by the results of critical study have given rise to a novel dogma concerning the Scriptures, which, if it may justly be claimed as a product of the Princeton Seminary, would seem to discredit the modest boast of the venerated Dr. Charles Hodge, that 'Princeton has never originated a new idea.' It consists in the hypothesis of an 'original autograph' of the Scriptures, the precise contents of which are now undiscoverable, but which differed from any existing text in being absolutely free from error of any kind. The hypothesis has no small advantage in this, that if it is not susceptible of proof, it is equally secure from refutation. If not practically useful, it is at least novel, and on this ground entitled to mention in recounting the contributions of the American Church to theology at a really perilous point in the progress of Biblical study." Pages 380-1. We should like to quote what our author says on the liturgical literature of the American Churches, and on the advancement of public worship, but our space forbids. Besides, we have said enough to give our readers a fair idea of what the work before us is like. We cordially commend this work to all who are interested in Church history, and who want a single volume for the purpose of *Orientation* in the history of American Christianity.

THE GERMAN EXODUS TO ENGLAND IN 1709. Prepared at the request of the Pennsylvania German Society by Frank Ried Diffenderffer, member of the Pennsylvania German Society, etc. Lancaster, Pa. Pages, 156. 1897.

The main portion of this elegant volume consists of a paper read before the annual meeting of the Pennsylvania German Society, in Philadelphia, 1896. There are, however, numerous appendices, consisting of letters and documents never before published and serving to throw light upon the subject with which they are connected. The volume is also profusely illustrated by portraits of noted men and women of the period with which it has to do and by views of famous places. A fine portrait of the genial and gifted author fronts the title-page, which will serve greatly to enhance the value of the book to his friends.

The event treated in this volume forms one of the strangest episodes in all history. It was nothing less than a *Massenauswanderung der Pfälzer*—a migration *en masse* of Palatines, into England, in the year 1709, for the sake of physical subsistence and religious security and peace. The movement began in the spring of the year, and before the autumn there were more than 14,000 (some put the figures much higher) Germans from the Palatinate of the Rhine, mostly members of the Reformed Church, encamped in and about London; and still they were coming. What was the cause of this strange movement? Mr. Diffenderffer shows that a variety of causes coöperated. The country of the Palatinate, naturally one of the fairest and richest provinces of

Europe, had been devastated by many years of war. The inhabitants had been plundered and impoverished. Their cities had been burned and their homes desolated. Then came the cold winter of 1708-9, whose severity was unexampled in all previous as well as subsequent time. During that winter thousands of men, women and children died of hunger and cold. The Government, which was then in the hands of a Catholic Elector, John William of Newburg, cared not for the sufferings of Protestants. The Elector claimed that he was not persecuting his Protestant subjects. The fact was, however, that these subjects felt safer in England than they did on their own native soil, and to England they fled as fast as provision could be made for their transportation. In England, whose throne was then occupied by Queen Anne, there was much sympathy felt for the suffering Palatines, and their migration was encouraged in various ways by the Queen herself and by men high in authority. These men were influenced by the highest motives. There were, however, others encouraging the movement whose motives were not so pure. They were men interested in American colonization schemes. Among these was William Penn himself. And there is reason to believe that many of the migrating Palatines themselves had their eyes set upon America as the ultimate goal of their wandering. They pressed into England only because from England they expected to get to America, where no French swords, no starvation and no religious oppression would await them. But the movement thus at first encouraged by English statesmen, philanthropists and speculators grew to such proportions that, ere long, it became alarming. The Palatines came faster than they could be cared for, and it became a serious problem what to do with them. It is said that 3,800 were sent to Ireland, 650 to North Carolina and 3,200 to New York. Many of the latter, after much suffering, finally made their way into Pennsylvania, and their descendants are now among the most substantial citizens of this noble commonwealth. Of those who were sent to Ireland, many afterwards returned to England, and about 2,000 of the wanderers were subsequently returned to Germany, while the balance died in England. This German migration cost the English government £135,775, which would be equivalent now to nearly three-fourths of a million dollars.

The above is but a brief synopsis of the story so well told by Mr. Diffenderffer in the eloquent pages of this volume. It is a story of the trials and sufferings of the ancestors of that German race which now constitutes so large and influential a part of the population of certain portions of the union. Mr. Diffenderffer's volume shows how much labor it cost to establish this race here on American soil. We quote in this connection the following paragraph from his conclusion: "The silver-tipped tongue of the orator, the pencil of the artist and the lyre of the poet can not adequately tell the tale, and while the divine hand of Clio shall

guide the eloquent pen of history, she will find no theme more worthy of her mission than this story of our ancestors, staking their all upon an uncertain venture into the new world. Bearing aloft that grand motto of their race, *ohne hast, ohne rast*, they pressed onward toward the goal of their hopes with the same energy, determination and unflinching courage with which their ancestors seventeen centuries before had defied the power of Rome and hurled back the legions of Cæsar."

OUTLINES OF SPECIAL INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT : with an Introductory Statement upon Old Testament Philology. By J. G. Lansing, D.D., Gardner A. Sage, Professor of Old Testament Languages and Exegesis in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. Publisher, J. Heidingsfeld, New Brunswick, N. J. Pages, 236. 1897.

No other theological discipline has suffered so many changes within the present generation as that of Old Testament Introduction. Within this time the traditional view of the origin of the books of the Old Testament, inherited by the Christian Church from the Synagogue, has been thoroughly shaken and in many respects discredited. Without any loss of faith in the Old Testament as a record of divine revelation, such scholars as Davidson, Cheyne, Driver, Briggs and many others have studied the books of the Old Testament from a literary point of view, and have come to the conclusion that in regard to the date and manner of their composition the received tradition must in many cases be given up. This literary study of the books of Scripture constitutes what has been called the *higher criticism* of the Bible.

To the conclusions of this higher criticism the attitude of the volume before us is entirely negative and hostile. The author, of course, knows this criticism, at least through the representations of its opponents, but he is determined that he will have none of it. In a single case only does he yield to the arguments of the critics, namely, in the case of the book of Ecclesiastes, which he admits was not written by Solomon, but by some unknown writer at a much later date. In all other respects the received tradition stands as it has always stood. The Pentateuch, as we now have it, is a *whole* which Moses wrote in the wilderness, although he may have had before him various written sources from which to draw his material. (How about the last chapter of Deuteronomy?) The books of Chronicles were not written after the time of Alexander, as the critics maintain on the basis of 1 Chron. 3 : 19-24, which brings down the genealogy of Zerubbald to the *sixth* generation, but in the time of Ezra, and shortly after the proclamation of Cyrus. The book of Job is not a religious drama dating from the time after the Exile, but a veritable history *written most likely by Moses*, at any rate by some one who lived in the time of Moses; and its theme is not the question, *Why do the righteous suffer?*—but the proposition that *the righteous can suffer and still endure steadfast in their piety*. Of the Psalms,

some are erroneously ascribed to David, but the majority of those attributed to him are "unquestionably" his. This is true notably of Ps. 110, because it is referred to by Christ as a Psalm of David; which settles the question, although most of the critics maintain that this particular Psalm *must* date from the Maccabean age. It is a fixed canon for our author that any reference by Christ or the apostles to any book in the Old Testament by any particular title, settles the question of authorship. For this reason the book of Isaiah must be regarded from beginning to end as the work of the son of Amoz; for in the New Testament quotations are contained from what the critics now call the deutero-Isaianic part of the book, under the general name of Isaiah. For the same reason also the book of Jonah must be regarded as a book of real history. "Christ affixes the seal of His authority to the book," and that settles the question of its origin and character. "It is not fiction, allegory, myth, or legend, but an account of that which actually took place, genuine history, of deep prophetic-symbolic and typical significance."

But we have said enough to show that the author of this volume is one upon whom the waves of critical theory have beaten in vain. He stands as firmly against the anti-traditional theories as the rock of Gibraltar stands against the billows of the Atlantic. As for analysis and arrangement of contents of the various books of the Old Testament, the volume before us is most admirable. In brief compass the author gives an analysis of each book, and then a summary of its theology and of its Messianic teaching. In regard to the substance of these summaries, of course, many will differ with him; but the plan is certainly a most excellent one, and well calculated to meet the wants of theological professors and students. The clear and compact style of composition also fits it well for use in theological seminaries. In fact, it seems to us that institutions determined to fortify their students against all conclusions reached by the methods of the higher criticism, could do no better than to introduce this volume for class-room purposes. And even those of an opposite tendency might use it profitably as a guide by means of which to work out their own conclusions; for which its brevity and distinctness of plan fit it very well.

A MANUAL OF ETHICS. By John S. Mackenzie, M.A., Professor of Logic and Philosophy in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire. Third Edition. Revised, enlarged, and in part re-written. *University Tutorial Series*. Pages, 456. Price, \$1.50. 1897. University Correspondence College Press. London: W. B. Clive, 13 Booksellers' Row. New York: Hinds & Noble, 4 Cooper Institute.

The second edition of this work was noticed in this REVIEW a few years ago. The fact that a work of this kind goes through three editions inside of the space of five years, may be regarded as a sufficient guarantee of its general excellence and usefulness. The public knows a good thing of this kind, when it sees it, and

appreciates it. Besides the fact that in a comparatively short time the work has gone through three editions, reference may be made also to the fact that it has been introduced as a text-book into *forty-five* American colleges and universities, among which are Yale College, Brown University, Lafayette College, University of Virginia, Heidelberg College, etc. It has now been largely rewritten, increased in size by one hundred pages, and made still more worthy of the generous reception which has been accorded to it in the previous editions. In this revision the original spirit and tendency of the book have not been changed.

In a treatise on ethics very much depends upon the metaphysical standpoint that is adopted. It may be possible to produce a system of ethics without a formal discussion of metaphysical principles; but such principles will be present after all and will exercise a determinative influence upon ethical thought. In the work before us this truth is clearly recognized, and the author avows himself as belonging to the school of *Idealism*, *i. e.*, the school founded by Kant and developed by Hegel, Green and others. The influence of Professor Green is especially recognizable throughout the volume, as it is in fact in all the ethical thought of the English race in modern times. And this fact is the more gratifying in view of the strongly materialistic tendency which has prevailed for some time, owing to the influence of the theory of evolution. Mr. Herbert Spencer, though not himself a consistent materialist, has written ethics on the assumption of pure materialism. Ethical ideas, on this theory, are merely transformed and transmitted sensations, and volition is only a transformation of physical energy. In view of such theories it is a relief to turn to a work like that of Professor Mackenzie's, in which the ideal element in human nature is so clearly recognized, without the faults, however, that have usually adhered to idealism. The special merit which belongs to this work, and, indeed, in some measure, to all English ethical writings influenced by the thinking of Professor Green, is that it recognizes both the spiritual or ideal and the natural elements in the constitution of human nature and in the determination of human conduct. A work on ethics thus comes to be very much more than a discussion of the principle of the moral law, the origin of conscience, and the question of freedom.

The work before us, after an introduction treating, in three chapters, of the scope of ethics, of the relation of ethics to other sciences and of the divisions of the subject, is divided into three books. The first book consists of prolegomena, chiefly psychological. Here we have discussions of such themes as *desire* and *will*, *motive* and *intention*, *character* and *conduct*, *evolution of conduct*, *growth of the moral judgment*, *significance of the moral judgment*. The second book discusses *theories of the moral standard*. Its subordinate topics are *the development of ethical thought*, *the types of ethical thought*, *the standard as law*, *the stan-*

dard as happiness and the standard of perfection. Self-perfection, or the harmonious adjustment of the various elements of our lives within an ideal unity, together with the feeling of happiness accompanying this adjustment, according to Professor Mackenzie, constitutes the highest good or the supreme end of moral action. The general subject of the last book is *the moral life*. This is discussed in seven chapters treating respectively of *the social unity, moral institutions, the duties, the virtues, the individual life, moral pathology and moral progress*. A concluding chapter treats on *ethics and metaphysics*. We do not hesitate to commend this volume to all who are interested in the most recent ethical thought. They may not agree with all the positions of the author, but the careful perusal of his work cannot fail to be profitable.

KARMA: A Story of Early Buddhism. By Paul Carus. Third edition. Illustrated and printed by T. Hasegawa, Tokyo, Japan, for the Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, Ills.

This brief story is intended to illustrate that a man's Karma—character and destiny combined—consists of all the deeds which he has done. "We are what we have done. Our Karma constitutes our nature." This story has been translated into Russian by Count Tolstoi, who commends it to his countrymen, and says that it sheds light on two fundamental truths of Christianity, namely, that life consists only in renunciation of self, and that the good of men is in union with God, and through Him with each other.

OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION BASED ON PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY. By August Sabatier. James Pott & Company, Fourth Avenue and 22d Street, New York. 1897. Pages 348.

The author of this work is a Frenchman and a Huguenot, who was formerly connected with the Protestant Faculty of Theology at Strasburg, and is now a Professor in the Faculty of Protestant Theology in Paris. He is in the fifty-ninth year of his age, and is a man of mature mind, as well as of thorough and accomplished scholarship, whose opinions in his particular sphere of thought must be received with respect. He has written a good deal on religious subjects; and his work on "The Apostle Paul," which also exists in an English dress, forms one of the most interesting treatises in the great mass of recent Pauline literature. And we are sure the work here brought to the attention of our readers will take equally high rank on the subject with which it is connected. The translation has been well done, and is clear and smooth. We have noticed a few infelicities of style, which must be set to the account of the translator, and which will doubtless be corrected in a future edition. For instance, in the middle of page 270 we have "on" for "concerning," and in the last sentence of the first paragraph on page 275, confusion is created

by the unnecessary insertion of the pronoun "it." But these are only trifles; and the reader has no difficulty in understanding the thought of the author in the English garb in which it is presented. We cannot help, however, expressing our regret at the omission from the translation of two sections of the original, acknowledged on page 122. It is said, indeed, that these "sections are non-essential;" but in a work of this kind we should prefer to have all that the author has written.

In order to write a philosophy of religion a man must himself be religious; just as a man would have to be an artist in order to produce a satisfactory theory of art; for religion is something subjective and personal, which only he can understand who has the experience of it in his own consciousness; and a philosophy of religion must largely be an analysis of the religious consciousness. M. Sabatier, according to his own declaration, fulfills this condition. He is a religious man; and this treatise on the philosophy of religion may be regarded as in some sense a confession of his religious faith. This, indeed, seems to be his own conception of it; for on page 222 he writes as follows: "In sketching the broad outlines of the religious history of humanity, I have had but one object; I have wished to show the men of my generation why I remain religious, Christian and Protestant. I am religious because I am a man and do not desire to be less than human, and because humanity, in me and in my race, commences and completes itself in religion and by religion. I am Christian because I cannot be religious in any other way, and because Christianity is the perfect and supreme form of religion in this world. Lastly, I am Protestant, not from any confessional zeal, nor from racial attachment to the family of Huguenots, although I thank God daily that I was born in that family, but because in Protestantism alone can I enjoy the heritage of Christ—that is to say, because in it I can be a Christian without placing my conscience under any external yoke, and because I can fortify myself in communion with and in adoration of an immanent Deity by consecrating to Him the activity of my intellect, the natural affections of my heart, and find in this moral consecration the free expansion and development of my whole being."

In addition to this confession of our author's faith, we quote a few sentences from the preface of this book, as showing the purpose of its preparation and publication: "It is of the young that I have thought, while preparing these pages, and it is to them that I dedicate them. To a generation that believed it could repose in Positivism in philosophy, utilitarianism in morals, and naturalism in art and poetry, has succeeded a generation that torments itself more than ever with the mystery of things, that is attracted by the ideal, that dreams of social fraternity, of self-renunciation, of devotion to the lowly, to the miserable, to the oppressed—devotion like the heroism of Christian love." For this young generation, then, with its idealistic and mystic ten-

dencies, and its generous impulses—a generation that *must be religious* although it cannot be such in the dogmatic fashion of an earlier time—this treatise on the philosophy of religion was composed; and we shall be surprised if the younger generation of thinking men and women in America do not give to it an equally hearty reception with that which it may receive in France.

The work before us is divided into three books, whose respective titles are *Religion*, *Christianity*, and *Dogma*. In the first book the author treats of *the psychological origin and nature of religion*, of *religion and revelation*, of *miracle and inspiration*, and of *the religious development of humanity*. Religion, our author holds, arises necessarily out of the conflict of self-consciousness and world-consciousness in the evolution of the life of humanity. Hence, all men are of necessity religious. Religion is the free and conscious intercourse of the soul with the Being upon whom it feels itself to be dependent. Religion, therefore, necessarily presupposes revelation. Religion and revelation are correlative; for to the religious act on the part of man must correspond an act of self-manifestation on the part of Deity; but both acts must take place within the consciousness of the human subject. Divine revelation, accordingly, belongs to all religions, and is supernatural as well as natural: supernatural because it proceeds from the impression of a being which is other than man, and natural because it is accomplished in the natural conditions of the human mind. This divine revelation does not consist in the communication of ready-made religious ideas, but in divine impressions, in the excitation of sentiments and feelings, that may be interpreted by the reason. This interpretation will be conditioned by the general state of intellectual culture; and so there come to be different religious systems in different times and among different races of men. In the religious development of humanity a “special vocation” belonged to the people of Israel. Their mission was to mediate the realization of the absolute religion, in which God becomes internal to the human consciousness, and manifests Himself as the principle of justification and salvation.

In the second book, under the general title of *Christianity*, we have, in three chapters, a discussion of *Hebraism*, or *the origins of the Gospel*, of *the essence of Christianity*, and of *the great historical forms of Christianity*. Christianity grew out of Judaism, though it has roots also in the general religious life of humanity, but especially in the soil of Greek culture. In the history of Israel it was *prophetism*, which served as the force by which Christianity was evolved. Christianity is an *evolution*, because there is an organic continuity between it and the religious life of the world that preceded it; but it is also a new moral creation transcending anything that existed before it—it is the crown of the religious evolution of humanity. Its perfection consists in the perfect realization of the oneness of God and man

first in the consciousness of Jesus and thence in the consciousness of His followers. This oneness of God and man, which, however, must not be understood in the sense of *identity*, is the essence of Christianity. And it is the distinction of Jesus Christ to have been the first man to realize this union in His consciousness. The experience of the consciousness of Christ has become a force in history that can never be lost. *This is Christianity.*

Of course, it is hardly necessary to say that this is not orthodox Christianity; at least it is not orthodox Christianity in its completeness. The author does not put it forward as such. He does not accept the traditional Christology, which, he says, makes Jesus "only a deity walking in the midst of His contemporaries hidden beneath a human figure." This Christology, he thinks, is incurably Docetic. "The traditional Christology," he says, "has been so incurably Docetic that it has been practically impossible, from this point of view, to write a serious life of Jesus without falling into the heresy, at once modern and semi-pagan, of *Kenosis*, the theory according to which the pre-existent and eternal deity commits suicide by incarnating Himself in order gradually to be re-born and find Himself God again at the end of His human life," p. 142. Jesus was a man; but He was without sin; and He was a perfect man, and, therefore, a perfect manifestation of Deity. M. Sabatier rejects Strauss's dictum that the finite cannot represent the infinite, if the idea of the infinite is taken, not in a quantitative, but in a synthetic or qualitative sense. But this conception of the character of Jesus does not remove the record of His life above the reach of criticism. It is in this way that M. Sabatier gets rid of the nimbus of miracles, which surrounds the life of Jesus, and which creates so much difficulty in modern religious thought. "If prodigy has penetrated into the life of Jesus at one or two points," he says, "the explanation is to be found in the mistakes, or in the legendary corruptions for which His biographers alone are responsible, and which criticism may eliminate without violence," page 73. Of course, this cannot be regarded as a satisfactory account of the character of Christ. Whatever difficulties there may be connected with the traditional Christology—and they are confessedly great—yet no theory of Christ's person can be accepted which robs Him of His Divinity, and takes Him from the Church as an object of worship. We do not think, then, that on this point M. Sabatier has solved the difficulty which he has so trenchantly uncovered; and here there is room for still further thought.

The last book of the work under notice treats of *Dogma*. Under this general heading the author discusses, in four chapters, the following subjects: *What is dogma? The life of dogmas and their historical evolution; The science of dogmas; and The critical theory of religious knowledge.* The author does not regard dogmas as something superfluous in the life of religion. The idea of dogma is inseparable from the idea of a Church, as the idea of a

Church is inseparable from the idea of a perfect religion. "A dogma is a doctrine of which the Church has made a law." This is all right. No religious community can exist without common doctrines; but common doctrines can only be maintained by authority, that is by their being made into *dogmas* or *legalized opinions*. Dogmas are not revealed from heaven. Nor are they fabricated out of ready-made ideas and propositions derived from some formal code of revelation. They are a necessary product of religious life and piety in the bosom of a community, just as sacred scriptures are; but they are no more immutable than is the community itself. Only a Church that claims to be infallible can issue immutable dogmas. Protestantism cannot do so because Protestantism is progressive; and for it to claim the right of setting forth dogmas binding upon the reason and conscience of all men in all times, would be to fall into a radical contradiction with its own principle. Immutable dogmas are dead dogmas; for only dead things never change. A dogma that shall be alive and worth anything, must be in a state of constant flux. It can easily be seen what havoc the acceptance of such a view would make of the science of dogmatics, which pretends to accurate knowledge on a great variety of unknowable things.

The most interesting and also the most difficult chapter in the book before us is that which treats of the *theory of religious knowledge*. Here we have first a discussion of the general principles of knowledge, the author adopting as his own theory a kind of modified Kantianism, which is then applied to the knowledge of religious truth. But we have no space for any further remarks; and we commend the book itself to the careful study of our readers, being sure that, though they will not adopt all its views, they will find in it much to make them think, and not a little which they will be glad to accept.

THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW.

NO. 2.—APRIL, 1898.

I.

THE RITSCHLIAN THEOLOGY.

BY THE REV. A. S. WEBER, A.M.

The system of religious thought known to the theological world by this title is at once an interesting and profitable study. Within recent years no system has attracted wider attention, none perhaps has wielded so strong an influence. To the profound scholar whose name is identified with the theology which he taught belongs the distinction of being the only theologian who since Schleiermacher has succeeded in founding a separate and clearly defined "school." As professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Göttingen to which upon Dorner's transfer to Berlin, Ritschl in 1864 was called as his successor, he developed those courses of remarkable lectures, the sum and substance of which afterwards came to be embodied in his two epoch-making books. Of these one is "Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung," and the other "Unterricht in der Christlichen Religion."*

* Besides the four volumes in which these works of Ritschl appear, the following books were used in the preparation of this article: "Dorner's System of Christian Doctrine," Vol. IV; "Lichtenberger's History of German Theology in the Nineteenth Century;" "Denney's Studies in Theology;" "Stählin's Kant, Lotze and Ritschl," "The Life of Ritschl," by his son; "The Christian View of God and the World," and "The Ritschlian Theology," by James Orr. To the latter author special indebtedness is hereby gratefully acknowledged.

The first editions of these books were published about a quarter of a century ago. In their finally revised and substantially modified form, however, they were given to the public considerably later, the former during the year of their author's death in 1889, the latter a few years earlier.

Prior to the publication of these works the name of Albrecht Ritschl was comparatively unknown. At the age of twenty-eight he had written a volume on "Die Entstehung der Altkatholische Kirche" in which a small number of discerning and sympathetic readers at once recognized an originality, penetration and power, promising much for the author's theological future. Written under the dominating influence of one of his teachers, the book was the more remarkable and surprising on account of the bold and independent course which at critical points it pursued in its effort to solve the problem of the development of the Old Catholic Church, and for the confidence and enthusiasm with which it insisted upon the new positions that had been taken. But it required a long while for those positions to justify themselves, though now, according to Harnack, in an article on "The Present State of Research in Early Church History" they have "found acceptance, if not with all, yet with a majority of the independent critics"* who in more recent years have been restudying the progress and development of early Christianity.

When the results of Ritschl's subsequent and maturer thought were announced in his greater books the previous characteristics of boldness and independence, confidence and enthusiasm reappeared in even more emphatic form. And now it was no longer necessary for him to wait with patience for the reception of his ideas. The "fit audience though few" which had welcomed and adopted the principles and theories of his first message, both as to number and importance, had been vastly increased. His large and impressive personality had meanwhile been engaged in creating a growing constituency for his methods and ideas. For ten years and more this man whom even one of his acutest adverse critics feels constrained to speak of us as "by

* *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 50, p. 252.

far the most influential, most interesting, and in some ways, most inspiring of modern theologians,"* had now been occupying his professorial chair in the university. His splendid gifts as an historian, exegete, critic and systematic theologian were recognized, and large numbers of the most brilliant students were constantly crowding his class-room. All the while during these years he wielded a great power, and made lasting impressions upon many who were to become preachers and teachers in pulpits and seats of learning, and contributors to the theological thought and literature of our times. Many of the ablest of these disciples, in not a few instances, it is alleged through the personal effort and intervention of their teacher, soon came to fill chairs in nearly all the leading universities of Germany. Thence under the inspiration of the fundamental aims and tendencies of their master's system they promulgated its peculiar principles, and wrought out with characteristic ardor and zeal its distinctive ideas in the several departments of theological science.

Thus within a very few years after the publication of the great books into whose teaching we are to inquire, Ritschlian methods and ideas are found to have won for themselves a dominant place in the land of their birth, and to be pressing their claims upon the recognition of thinkers in other countries. The intellectual impulse given by them, as seen in the vast proportions to which Ritschlian literature has grown, is second only to that which has been prompted by the evolutionary hypothesis in the realm of the physical sciences. One who has not consulted the Ritschlian bibliography will be simply amazed at the length of the lists of its catalogued publications. Some of the most widely read of the theological books of the last decade are exponents of one or another phase of this system. Among others of this class may be mentioned Hermann's "Communion of the Christian with God," Schultz's "Teaching Concerning the Deity of Christ," Wendt's "Teaching of Jesus," Harnack's "History of Christian Dogma," Kähler's "Reconciliation through Christ," McGiffert's "History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age," Kaftan's

* Denney's "Studies in Theology," p. 2.

“Truth of the Christian Religion,” and “Need We Another Dogma?” (of which latter book a late and lamented contributor to earlier numbers of this REVIEW furnished such an able and admirable estimate for these pages).* Kidd’s “Social Evolution,” and Balfour’s “Foundations of Belief” from some source have caught something of the Ritschlian spirit, and Watson’s “Mind of the Master” is likewise colored with certain of its ideas. Some of the ablest and most enthusiastic followers of Ritschl are conducting theological journals† for the purpose of propagating the views of his system, and scores of scholars dissenting from those views have been equally busy with their pens, writing in opposition to certain aspects of its teaching.‡

All this will indicate in a measure how vigorously and effectively the fundamental principles of the Ritschlian system have been maintained, how loyally its original aims and tendencies have been pursued, and how truly wonderful the success which has been achieved by this comparatively recent theological movement, “a movement,” says Professor Orr, “the rapid rise, extensive spread and dominant influence of which admittedly constitute it the most remarkable phenomenon in the recent history of religious thought.”§ There are those who think that the vigor of the movement has been spent and that its influence is destined now to a speedy decline. One writer discovers an evidence of this in the wide and apparently irreconcilable divergencies shown by his followers in their “varying theological standpoints and modes of apprehending Christian truth.”|| Another sees it in the fact that “its once-aggressive self-confidence, glorying in a revolutionary theological method, has been compelled more recently to act upon the defensive.”¶ And a third, to whose

*The Rev. William M. Reily, REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW, Vol. 38, pp. 5-45.

†*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Christliche Welt, Theologische Literaturzeitung.*

‡ Among these the following are eminently worth consulting: Stählin, Nippold, von Frank, Pfeiderer and Scott. The last in “Nicene Theology” (Chicago, 1896).

§ “The Ritschlian Theology and The Evangelical Faith” (London, 1897)

|| *The Thinker*, London, August, 1892, p. 418.

¶ *The Independent*, N. Y., October 7, 1897, p. (1305) 17.

calm, discriminating and preëminently able survey of the present trend and condition of German thought one must attach great weight, comes to the conclusion that the two factors developing in the school, the one antagonistic to the other, "make it possible to believe what is averred by independent thinkers, namely, that Ritschlianism has already passed its most flourishing period and is in the beginnings of its decay."*

Such general estimates of the progress and success, the influence and present condition of the system of theology expounded in Ritschl's monumental books are well calculated to arouse interest and stimulate inquiry concerning the nature of that system in its particular characteristics and bearings. What are the controlling ideas and principles which give it so strong a hold upon many of the prominent theological thinkers of our day? What particular aspects of truth are emphasized by it, what wants does it supply, through which it enlists the interest of so many earnest and thoughtful students of church history and theology? What are its theories and methods, what the aims and purposes under the pursuit of which it has succeeded in giving, as it must be acknowledged to have given, a new enthusiasm not only to theological inquiry, but likewise to personal religious effort? In other words, what is the Ritschlian Theology? What are its distinctive features? An answer to such questions, partial and imperfect though it must be made within the limits prescribed for this article, will, it is believed, be of interest and service to many of the readers of the REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW, the pages of which have hitherto made only incidental references to the system in a general way, or criticised such particular phases of its teaching as seemed specially open to attack. The Ritschlian system of thought, for what it is, and for what it has achieved, seems sufficiently noteworthy to merit the somewhat more comprehensive notice which it is proposed here to give to it. In this way alone the true and the good there must be in it can be discovered; in this way alone its errors and defects, which in my

* The Rev. D. B. Schneder, REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW, October, 1897, p. 483.

judgment are neither few in number nor insignificant in character, can be duly pointed out; and in this way alone an intelligent conception can be gotten as to the true inwardness of this system of theological thought for which so much has been claimed, against which such violent opposition has been aroused. For these reasons I have been able, the less reluctantly, to yield to the Editor's request to prepare this paper.

At the outset of our attempt to come to an understanding of the Ritschlian Theology it is necessary to know something of its philosophical and theological antecedents. Whilst claiming to be new, this system of thought, it must be said to its credit, does not announce itself as having broken entirely with the past. Ritschl no doubt did contribute ideas that were new, and wrought some that were old into new and original combinations. Among such we shall by and by meet for instance with his theory of religion, his theory of "value-judgments," and his theory of the distinction between the respective realms occupied and ends aimed at by religion and ethics. But his writings afford abundant evidence that after assimilating the results of others' thinking, he freely appropriated them to his own use and pressed them often with masterly logical consistency to different ends. Without pausing here to point out the directions in which his doctrines of God and His Kingdom, of Christ and His Church relate themselves to earlier systems, a moment must be taken to indicate the extent of his indebtedness to the Philosophy of Kant for his theory of knowledge, and to the Theology of Schleiermacher for certain doctrinal conceptions and theological methods.

Ritschl's theory of knowledge plays an important part in the development of his system of thought, just as some theory of knowledge in his view must do in that of every theologian. "As a scientific man," he argues, "every theologian is under the necessity or duty of proceeding in accordance with a definite theory of cognition whose nature he distinctly knows, and whose validity he must be prepared to justify."* He acknowledges that the

* Ritschl's "Theologie und Metaphysik" quoted by Stählin. Cf. "R. und V.," Vol. 3, p. 13.

specific character of his theology hinges upon the particular theory of knowledge he has adopted, and in accordance with which the process of its development has been carried forward. It was the philosophy of Kant which furnished him the rule in this respect by which he was guided ; or, as Ritschl himself preferred to think, the philosophy of Lotze did this, which really amounts to the same thing. Kant's theory, as is well known, is that our knowledge is confined wholly to the phenomenal, that the thing in itself (*das Ding an sich*) can not be known. Lotze's views, whilst a modification of Kant's in some respects, insist likewise, " that our empirical knowledge is confined within the bounds of the phenomenal and that the unavoidable and thorough-going subjectivity of our cognition is beyond question."* According to the theory as phrased by Ritschl, " We know the thing *in* the phenonena," but how this differs from the unknowableness of the thing in itself of Kant, or how it is in nearer agreement with that of Lotze must be left for others to explain.†

This theory of knowledge does not preclude, in our author's view, the possibility of knowing supernatural, religious facts and truths, but necessitates rather the making of a clear distinction between " theoretic " knowledge, so-called, and " religious " knowledge. The former, as has been seen, is restricted to the phenomenal, the latter is grounded in the moral consciousness. In this, Kantian influences are again manifest. Kant's theoretical philosophy aimed to limit reason to the bounds prescribed by purely subjective conditions ; his practical philosophy aimed to show that conviction of the existence of God and knowledge of religious truth rest on a " practical " not a " theoretic " judgment, on a postulate of the moral nature, not on an outward demonstration. This two-fold theory of knowledge, so thoroughly adapted to the requirements of Ritschl's system was appropriated from the philosophy of Kant and the real, vital bearings of it, we shall see presently, are definitely impressed upon his teachings at every point.

* Lotze's " Outlines of Metaphysics," p. 143.

† Cf. Stählin's observations, " K. L. and R," p. 184.

In connection with this theory of knowledge and closely identified with it, there emerges also his theory of "value judgments"* (Werthurtheile) concerning which, a word should be here said in passing. The whole of "religious" knowledge lives and moves and has its being in so-called "value-judgments,"—judgments, that is, which express not the truth of things in their objective reality, but the value of them for us in the practical needs and experiences of our religious life. What this actually imports will become plainer when its application to some of the specific doctrines of the Christian faith shall come under consideration. Meanwhile it will be sufficient to remark that students of Ritschl generally find it difficult to decide what precisely the notion is which by "value-judgments" he wishes to convey. Taken literally his language affirming that "in religion it is not objective truth we have to deal with, but conceptions in a form adapted to meet and satisfy our religious needs,"† would appear to commit him to the purest subjectivism, but elsewhere he makes it certain that such is not his intention. "One may spend months over his distinctions between 'theoretic' judgments and 'value' judgments," says one of his English critics, "and in the fluctuation and vagueness of his expressions not be sure that he understands them all."‡

When we pass from the philosophical side of his system to the specifically theological, Ritschl's obligations to Schleiermacher are seen to be as great in the latter as to Kant in the former. According to a custom prevalent in his student days, Ritschl worked his way through Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, and thence carried with him not a few of the ideas which in a more or less modified or wrought over form, are made to reappear in his own system. "In respect of method" we find him declaring

* Kaftan and Hermann, disciples of Ritschl, are credited with the introduction of the word into theology. From them later editions of Ritschl's books adopted it in explanation of the idea present in his writings from the beginning. His son, O. Ritschl, has written, "Über Werthurtheile" and Scheibe, "Die Bedeutung der Werthurtheile."

† "R. und V.," Vol. 3, p. 195.

‡ *The Thinker*, London, August, 1892.

“Schleiermacher is my predecessor.”* Some things in the *Glaubenslehre* repel, others attract him. He rejects the “mystical” element of its theology and the defective view of God “as revealed only in feeling,” to which it stands committed. He accepts its view of “dependence” as the ultimate expression of the religious relation, and also its contentions against “natural religion.” He adopts, moreover, its theory of religion as “the sense of the whole in things,” as well as its “idea of fellowship in religion,” whereby Ritschl says, “Schleiermacher has given a new aspect primarily to ethics and secondarily to theology, and has risen above the field of vision alike of the Wolfian and Kantian schools.”†

Out of the philosophic and theologic background which the names of Kant and Schleiermacher suggest and the new results to which Ritschl pressed their theories, there came three of the peculiarities in which his theology diverges at the greatest angle from ordinary types of Christian thought. First, it denies the right of metaphysics in the realm of theology. Secondly, it views religion as the outgrowth of man’s relation to the world, rather than of his relation to God. And thirdly, it draws a distinction between the ends aimed at respectively by religion and ethics. It would carry us too far afield to discuss at any length these several points. All that can be done is to offer such brief observations upon them as seem indispensable to the understanding of the system in which their determinative power is so constantly recognized. With reference to the necessity of excluding metaphysics from theology it is held that thus alone Christian thought can be freed from the foreign influences, with which in the course of its history it has become entangled—Greek thought in the early stages of its development, Aristotelianism during the Middle Ages, a new scholasticism after the Reformation, Rationalism, Hegelianism and so forth in more recent times—a freedom from which is necessary for Christianity to vindicate its right and ability to develop itself from the only true, positive principle, namely, the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

* “Theologie und Metaphysik,” p. 54.

† “R. und V.,” Vol. 1, p. 469.

That there are some important elements of truth in this demand will of course be readily conceded. But in the application of the principle it seems recognition should be given to the fact also that in the discussion of its own problems Christianity is bound to come in contact with metaphysical questions with reference to which religious thought must not only assume an attitude but offer some solution. Von Ranke has pointed out the fact that "when the ancient philosophers ceased to be studied, the great Christian theologians, the Fathers of the Church disappeared, the extinction of Greek philosophy was followed by the stagnation of original developments in Christian theology."* Accepting the observation of Sir William Hamilton that "no difficulties of a speculative sort arise in theology which have not previously emerged in philosophy,"† we believe it to be impossible to understand religion adequately without some knowledge and use of philosophy. And unconsciously Ritschl himself proves this. Whilst fairly shrieking at times for "theology without metaphysics," he nevertheless commits himself to a metaphysical theory of knowledge which, to say the least, seems as dangerous as any of the philosophical speculations that are assailed or ruled out of court by him.

Ritschl's view that religion is the outgrowth of man's relation to the world rather than to God is a corollary, it will be observed of his theory of knowledge. To his mind the ordinary conception of religion as a bond of union between the soul and God, such as involves an original and immediate relation between them is based upon an intuitive "mysticism" which can be verified neither by experience or revelation. Accordingly, it must be rejected, and the ideas of God and religious life accounted for on the ground of man's relation to the world. This is done along lines which can not now be indicated.‡ The conclusion reached is that the idea of God is not an intuition, not an inference of the reason, but a "postulate" which the soul makes

* "World-History," Vol. 4, p. 21.

† Quoted in Craufurd's "Christian Instincts," p. 121.

‡ See "R. und V.," Vol. 3, pp. 212-214, also 585.

for its own satisfaction, and for the acquisition of moral supremacy over the world and of spiritual freedom. But one is tempted to ask, Is such a theory of religion proposing to account for man's religious notions and beliefs from natural, world-related causes, adequate? Does it correspond with the deepest general testimony of human experience and religious consciousness? Ritschlianism here seems quite as unsatisfactory as other theories which in a more vulgar way attempt the solution of the same problem on the basis of hopes and fears, ghosts and superstitions of various kinds.*

The distinction drawn between the ends of religion and ethics, whilst somewhat obscure in Christianity, is nevertheless real, Ritschl thinks, and its recognition important for the correct apprehension of Christian truth. The figure by which he illustrates the distinction is the foci of an ellipse, which, near though they may stand together, are never one as is the centre of a circle.† As has just been seen, in the Ritschlian conception religion aims to secure for man moral supremacy and spiritual freedom. The ethical end, on the other hand, as suggested by our moral consciousness implies a moral kingdom, or community of agents acting under the laws of virtue and love, righteousness and truth. The function of religion has to do with our position relative to God and the world, the function of ethics refers directly to men, and only indirectly to God whose end in the world men fulfil through moral service in His kingdom.‡

What bearing this distinction has upon his system of thought is shown by the classification Ritschl makes in calling redemption and justification, for instance, religious notions, and the kingdom of God and reconciliation, for example, ethical notions. The same is true with reference to "the unusual collocation and order of ideas"§ presented by the title "Justification and Reconciliation," which is designedly chosen to indicate the specific nature of his most important and comprehensive work. As respects the sinner

* Cf. Orr's "Christian View of God and the World," pp. 134-137.

† See "R. und V.," Vol. 3, p. 11.

‡ "R. und V.," Vol. 3, pp. 15-28.

§ "R. und V.," Vol. 1, p. 1.

there is a religious effect and an ethical effect accomplished through the redeeming work of Christ. The religious effect is the Divine act of forgiveness and adoption through which there is conveyed to the sinner on condition of faith, the assurance that his guilt forms no barrier to his access to God and fellowship with Him. This is justification. The ethical effect is the removal of the sinner's active enmity to God and the acceptance of the Divine end as his own. This is reconciliation.* Justification is the necessary condition to holy living, and yet it has to do only indirectly with the attainment of moral results, being in itself a purely moral notion.† This, according to our author, must be emphasized if the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone is to be successfully maintained.

For these somewhat extended observations upon the general principles and theories underlying the Ritschlian Theology, a knowledge of which is so essential to the intelligent consideration of the constructive portion of the system, I venture to think no apology need be offered, the less so because at the same time they reveal, at least, something of the secret upon which the strength and influence of it rest and by which its success can be explained. That secret lies in the manner in which Ritschl's ideas and avowed methods accommodated themselves to, or rather perhaps unconsciously, fell in with and reflected the general spirit and tendency of his age. Pfleiderer, who has subjected Ritschlianism to the most searching examination, attributes their significance to and accounts for their power by the fact that "they are the theological expression and mirror of the general consciousness of the time according to its strong and legitimate, but also to its weak and dangerous side."‡ The age was wearied and disappointed by the undue claims of reason and the metaphysical speculations of vain philosophy; it was dominated by the methods of the exact sciences which confined themselves to the investigation of phenomena and it was yearning for relief from doubt and uncertainty in religion and theology.

* Cf. "Unterricht," p. 32, and "R. und V.," Vol. 3, p. 83.

† Cf. Orr's "Ritschlian Theology," pp. 103-5.

‡ Quoted by Nippold.

To those who had come under the power of this *Zeitgeist*, one can easily see, the Ritschlian theories must have appealed with peculiar power. Living, as they had been, in conscious distrust and confusion of opinion, they must have hailed with joy the offer of a ground of certitude for their religious faith which Ritschl held out to them. And indeed added power must have been given to the attractiveness of this offer by the apparent ease and simplicity with which, according to this new theological teacher, doubt might be dispelled and certainty obtained. Apart from all critical and metaphysical knowledge and culture, without the necessity of doing violence to the recognized theory of cognition, upon which physicists in the realm of the natural sciences proceeded in reaching their reliable conclusions, this religious certainty is to be drawn directly from the Gospel page. The impression (*Eindruck*) which Christ there makes upon the soul historically confronted by Him is of the nature of an irresistible compulsion (*Zwang*). In addition to this offer of certainty attention has been called, by one of the reviewers of his system, to the fact that Ritschlian thought "harmonized at the same time with the social tendencies of the age by giving prominence to the practical and ethical ideas of the Kingdom of God, by conciliating the ecclesiastical tendency in laying stress upon the Church and by appealing to philosophical and scientific interests in its claim to furnish a solution of the world problem." * The extent to which these promises and pretensions were justified will appear in the course of the examination of certain specific doctrines of the Christian faith, to which examination we now turn.

The Ritschlian Theology, as already observed, professes to derive its entire content from the historical revelation of God in Christ. With this statement in its unqualified and unapplied form, the most scrupulously orthodox of evangelical Christians will feel inclined to agree. To go back to the Gospels and put ourselves as closely and directly as possible into communion with Christ in order that He may make His personal impress upon us, is our duty as Christians, our duty as theologians as well. In

* The "Ritschlian Theology and the Evangelical Faith," pp. 7, 8.

recalling the Church to a clear consciousness upon this point Ritschl rendered important service to the religious thought and life of our time. And it is one of the great merits of his system that insistence is placed upon this with an emphasis that is likely ever to be remembered. Recognizing in Christ a Person standing in unique relation to God, revealing Him perfectly, and identifying Himself thoroughly with the Divine will and purpose, Ritschl came to regard His mind, His life, His character, as affording the great determining ideas by whose aid God and man, sin and redemption, life and death, the whole round of Christian truths, were to be interpreted.

But it does not seem legitimate to apply this positive principle of Christian theology in such a manner as to make it a denial of what is called "natural theology," and to the exclusion of reason and nature as affording no knowledge of God. According to the writer of the Acts (14: 17) God has not left Himself without witness among the heathen, and according to Paul (Rom. 1: 20) even "His everlasting power and divinity are clearly seen by them." And when the question is pressed whether this unique Person (*einzig in seiner Art*)* was really of a supernatural character the answer to be gotten is apt to disturb still more one's complacent attitude toward this positive principle as employed by the late Göttingen theologian. Upon the ground that theology has nothing to do with metaphysics Ritschl declines to discuss the *nature* of Christ's revelation and casts himself simply upon the *fact* of it. The fact of the revelation He makes to us, the personal impress He leaves upon us, the experimental knowledge we have of His power to give spiritual deliverance and moral freedom,—these we know, they are religious and ethical certainties, but to go beyond these is to enter the domain of the metaphysical, the transcendental, where certainty is unattainable. Upon the theory of value judgments it is explained that "Christ has for the Christian consciousness the religious value of God" and that that is all that is necessary. In His human life there is to be seen in highest perfection and utmost purity all that is meant

* Cf. "Unterricht," Chapter 22.

when God is spoken of. He reveals to men their highest thought of God, who not only speaks to them about God, but in Christ's person actually visits His people.* Such utterances have a scriptural ring about them which is pleasing to the ear. But it must be remembered that they are all confessedly based simply upon the subjective impression which Christ makes upon the human mind. Beyond that impression Ritschl in the spirit of a religious positivist announces himself as unwilling to go.† He knows nothing of the Godhead of Christ in its objective character as ascribed to Him by John and Paul. He does not admit His preëxistence, rejects the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Son of God, is extremely vague in his position as to Christ's resurrection, has no place for the instructions as to baptism, the preaching of the Gospel to every creature and so on, which are attributed to the risen Saviour, and brushes totally aside His exaltation, His heavenly reign and future advent, of all which we hear so much, not only in the New Testament Epistles, but as well also in the several Gospels.‡

The last remark makes it evident that the Ritschlian view of the Holy Scriptures is not of the exalted nature one might have been led to suppose from the power ascribed to them as the instrument through which Christ makes His impression on the human soul. Whilst one reads at the beginning of his "Unterricht" that "the Christian doctrine is to be drawn alone from Holy Scripture," or in another place that an "authentic knowledge of the Christian revelation can be drawn only from documents which stand near the foundation epoch of the Church and from no others," one is soon made aware that his conception of the Scriptures is widely different from that which is generally received. Their value lies entirely in their truthfulness as his-

* "Unterricht," Chapters 22-24.

† R. and V., Vol. 3, pp. 426-7.

‡ Professor Orr says: "Ritschlianism cuts off the miraculous birth of Jesus at one end of the history and His bodily resurrection at the other, and practically surrenders to a rationalistic criticism all the wonders of the ministry that lie between." Frank quotes Dr. P. J. Lange as facetiously saying that in Ritschl's theology "the eschatological bureau has been closed."

torical documents aside from any quality of inspiration, the various theories of which he calls precarious (*misslich*). He shows a strong dislike to the view of a *testimonium spiritus sancti*. He regards the Old Testament as important only because from it the historical presuppositions of the Christian revelation are rightly understood. Books of the New Testament must prove their genuineness and authenticity by their agreement with the religious conceptions of the Hebrew Scriptures. Measured by this standard the generally accepted books of the Canon, excepting Ephesians, the Pastoral Letters and Revelation are retained by him, but all under a treatment of free criticism which robs them wholly of value as "a rule of faith."

As already seen, when considering Ritschl's view of the Person of Christ, whenever the Scriptures contradict his preconceived theories of knowledge and religion, it is not these theories he feels called upon to modify. His mind seems to be their willing slave. The miracles of the Gospel are set aside, the recorded sayings of Jesus modified, the Logos-doctrine of the Fourth Gospel rejected.* The conspicuous line drawn by certain other scholars between the Gospels and Epistles strangely enough is not recognized by Ritschl. The true "theological terminology leans directly upon the representations made by the Apostles, and it would be a falsely understood purism should the intimations of Jesus, which are less complete, be preferred to the formulas of the Apostles.† Notwithstanding this, however, the writings of Paul seem to find less considerate treatment at his hands than do the Gospels. Their author, he thinks, misapprehended the Old Testament doctrine of the law, erred in his views of retribution and in those also relating to the connection between sin and death. In consequence, those large portions of his Epistles which deal with doctrines that stand connected with law and sin and death, show in Ritschl's judgment, a wide divergence from the original and fundamental teachings of Christ Himself. And yet one of his apologists has the assurance of telling us that

* See "Zeitschrift für T. und K.," 1897.

† Quoted in *Methodist Review*, Vol. 73, p. 200.

“in his treatment of the Bible Ritschl is always reverent. He does not explain passages away but, when they do not suit his case, avoids their force by declaring that they are not of the essence of Christianity or do not even belong to the truth of religion at all.”*

In his treatment of the doctrine of God Ritschl departs even at greater lengths from the usual paths of theologians. Adhering closely to his governing principles he rejects the so-called cosmological, teleological, and ontological arguments not only as invalid, but wholly foreign and vitiating to the true development of the doctrine of God. Just as in the case of Christ and on the same grounds of course, he declines to inquire what the essential nature of God is. The theologian has to do only with God's acts and manifestations. In Christ He has revealed Himself as “love,” and the various attributes of His being are to be regarded only as differing aspects of that single revelation of His character. Love is the absolute, the all-comprehensive element which sums up all that we know of God. “The complete name of God and that which corresponds to the Christian revelation is: ‘The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.’”† But the Sonship of Christ implied in this name is not an eternal, only an ideal relation based simply on the historical personality of Jesus. Nor is God the Father of all men. He is the Father of Christ only and of those united with Him in the membership of His Kingdom. “In the first instance God is the Father of Jesus Christ and through His mediation the Father of believers. All men assuredly are not children of God, but only the members of the community who through Christ are already reconciled to God.”‡ This view of the Fatherhood of God in Ritschl's thought is surprising, not only because it is so directly opposed to one of the most characteristic affirmations of the broader theology of our day with which in other respects he is often in sympathy, but also because it is difficult to reconcile such a restricted conception

* Rishell's *Methodist Review*, Vol. 73, p. 202.

† “Unterricht,” Chapter 9.

‡ Quoted in “Leben,” Vol. 1, p. 223.

of the Divine Fatherhood with the all-determining element of love upon which he lays such great stress. The chapter on "Illogical Limitations" in Gordon's *New Theodicy* points out with far more consistency, and to greater satisfaction, what is involved in the revelation which Christ has made of God as "the Father whose name is love," and it is confidently believed that in the light of it, Ritschl's view upon this point needs to be corrected.

Of the triune nature of God it need hardly be added after that which has been said, Ritschl knows nothing. The Deity of Christ as an objective verity, we have seen, was for him beyond the reach of human knowledge, and the unity of God and Christ in respect to nature and being, therefore, beyond the possibility of being established. So with reference also to the Holy Spirit. Plainly, the Spirit, in Ritschl's thought is not a Person. "In relation to God Himself, the Holy Ghost is the knowledge which God has of His own end"*—a vague something which, whatever it really may mean or be intended to mean, can by no legitimate methods of exegesis be made to harmonize with the Scriptural teachings concerning the Third Person of the Holy Trinity.

To the Ritschlian conception of the Kingdom of God (the correlate of his notion of God as love) in distinction from that of the Church, large numbers, it is evident, have been favorably inclined. He defines, or perhaps better, describes the Kingdom of God as "the highest good of those united in it."† It is a moral organization in which all the members are acting under the motive of love. So important is this thought of the Kingdom, so far-reaching in its significance, that other doctrines must constantly be studied under a recognition of its supreme claims. To bring in and establish this Kingdom was the great end to which Christ devoted the efforts of His life, and for which He made Himself a willing sacrifice. But the Church also is a community of believers. How do the two differ? Possibly it can be made plainest by Ritschl's own language. He says "the com-

* Quoted in "Leben," Vol. 1, p. 232.

† "Unterricht," Chap. 6, "R. und V.," Vol. 3, p. 13.

munity of believers, as subject of the worship of God and of the juristic institutions and organs which minister to that worship is the Church; as subject of the reciprocal action of its members, springing from the motive of love, it is the Kingdom of God.”* The two “foci” of the system, the religious and the ethical here make their reappearance. Is the distinction as applied to Kingdom and Church to be regarded as valid? Does it correspond with the teachings of the Gospels and Epistles of the New Testament? We believe it does not. With reference to the Kingdom the description may be accepted, but so far as its application to the Church is concerned it would be difficult to make the theory agree with either the words attributed to Christ in the Gospels, or with those used by Paul when writing to the churches at Ephesus and Colosse.

By way of transition to the doctrine of redemption and the results consequent upon it, which in our plan remain to be noticed, a glance must be given to Ritschl’s notion of sin and guilt. Theologians are agreed that a correct conception of sin and guilt is necessary to an adequate doctrine of redemption. Ordinarily the Scriptures are taken to teach very clearly that sin involves not simply the violation of one’s individual ideal of right or standard of duty, but also an absolute moral law, and that on account of the violation of this absolute law there is an interruption or abolishment of the right relation of men to God, who is the Source of that law. In this view sin is a condition or state referable not to actions but to persons, a condition or state making men think not simply of their conduct, but rather of themselves whose inward character only comes to outward expression in the conduct of life. “In the earlier and lower stages of men’s moral development,” it has been forcibly declared by a theologian, whom we have before quoted, “they feel that they must make amends, but when they come to know themselves they feel that they must be born again. ‘O, for a

* Quoted from Stead by Denney to whose “*Studies in Theology*” (pp. 180–186) the reader is referred for an interesting discussion on the distinction between Church and Kingdom, Cf. also Fairbairn’s “*Christ in Modern Theology*,” pp. 513–549.

man to arise in me, that the man that I am may cease to be'—that is the prayer which answers to a true consciousness of the extent of human depravity, and it is justified by the words of our Lord Himself about the necessity of the new birth." *

Now the Ritschlian view of sin and guilt does not conform at all to this Biblical standard. Because it seems to our theologian that the idea of an absolute law, as the expression of an essential righteousness of God is "bad metaphysics," the idea must be abandoned. By making his notion of the determining power of the kingdom of God above adverted to, the law of judgment with reference to sin, he comes in the course of lengthy discussions† to several significant conclusions: God views sin not as a contradiction of His will, but as acts of ignorance (*Sinde wird von Gott nicht als die endgiltige Absicht des Widerspruchs gegen den erkannten Willen Gottes, sondern als Unwissenheit betrachtet*); God can forgive sin because it is the result of ignorance, and being the result of ignorance such a thing as "in-born," "original" or "inherited" sin is an impossibility—all children are born without any bias to sin. The notion of guilt corresponding to this conception resolves itself into self-reproach for not having lived fully up to the requirements of duty, into self-dissatisfaction for having forfeited through self-will some of the higher achievements, and into a consciousness that communion with God is interrupted—a consciousness which afterwards comes to regard as objectively real in God, that which is actual only in a subjective sense. Ritschl does not seem to think that God is displeased with sin, nor that it has been necessary on account of sin to effect any change whatever in God's disposition towards the sinner. God does not feel called upon to deal punitively with sin, and in the Christian revelation has "superseded the scheme of retribution in the last judgment, by the analogy of the seed and harvest."‡ All of which means that instead of really touching the relation of God to man, sin only arouses a subjec-

* "Studies in Theology," pp. 83, 84.

† See "R. und V.," Vol. 3, Chapter 5; and "Unterricht," Chapters 26–33

‡ "Unterricht," Chapter 17.

tive suspicion that it does so. Debased and degraded in life and character, the sinner is haunted by a distrust as to God's character of love, is never free from misgivings respecting God's attitude towards him, and thus in the end yields to entire estrangement from God.

In its relation to sin and guilt under this one-sided and manifestly superficial conception of them, Christ's redemptive work must necessarily be undervalued. The doctrine of it, as set forth in Ritschl's books, can hardly be expected to make any pretense even to square itself with the teachings of the New Testament as ordinarily interpreted by earlier theology. Christ's work, he of course grants, does have the power of exercising a regenerating and restorative influence upon men's sinful nature; it does overcome the sinner's dislike and suspicions of God; it does disabuse the heart of wrong feelings and thoughts ignorantly entertained about God, and it does succeed in bringing men to renewed trust in, and love for God. But it does all this in the way of enlightenment through the revelation He makes of God as love. That is Ritschl's position. He is certain that there is no need for such atonement as has generally been supposed. The simple revelation of God as a faithful and loving Father, willing and ready to forgive and restore—a revelation which, of course, necessarily involved Christ's humiliation, sufferings and death—this is the redemption which the Saviour has accomplished for the sinner. Ritschl illustrates his meaning by a reference to the sinful woman who was brought into Christ's presence: "Jesus removes the hindrance which sin had caused, to her fellowship with God, in the degree to which the impression of His personality overcame the natural distrust and frivolity of that sinner."*

This deliverance does not mean, however, that forgiveness or restoration to fellowship implies the cancelling of the sense of guilt. That, in Ritschl's opinion, is an impossibility. "The Gospel of forgiveness does not remove the feeling of guilt for past sins, or of guilt-consciousness, since to do so would necessitate the contradiction of the rule of truth for God, as well as for the con-

* "R. und V.," Vol. 3, p. 507.

science of the sinner.”* This assurance of pardon (implying necessarily, Ritschl holds, the ideas of sonship and eternal life) conveyed to men through the personal impress of Christ, is what is meant by justification, and entrance through faith upon this new relationship is the voluntary self-identification of the sinner with the moral order of the kingdom of God and the personal appropriation of the Divine end as his own—this, if the somewhat obscure paths along which Ritschl is here leading have been correctly traced, is what he means by reconciliation—these two, justification and reconciliation, which he wishes to be regarded the focal tenets of his entire system, sum up what is meant by eternal life. With reference to the origin, the nature, or the method of the bestowal of this life, no one can be unprepared to hear him say, “nothing can be known.” If any one is to be finally lost to this eternal life, it will be because he refuses to make the principle of love ruling in the kingdom of God, his own; because he will not be reconciled on the ground of the justification made by Christ. The condemning deadly sin is unbelief in Christ issuing in refusal to act in harmony with the moral purposes of His Kingdom. Christ’s redeeming work accordingly when summed up into one work does not mean the taking away of sin in the ordinarily accepted sense, but to take away its root in self-will by bringing the human soul through the Kingdom and in it into harmony with God.

Should these results of our examination of the Ritschlian view of Christ’s saving work appear vague, indefinite, and at times self-contradictory, we believe it may be justly regarded as an evidence of faithfulness in reporting the impression which a study of Ritschl’s chapters upon the subject must necessarily leave on one’s mind. Here and there in his treatment of the doctrine of redemption, as elsewhere in his system, he has no doubt caught glimpses of truth which are too important any longer to suffer neglect, or to be treated with indifference. But it cannot be granted that with reference to justification, and reconciliation, or with reference to other attempted reconstructions

* “Unterricht,” Chapter 32.

of theological tenets, the Ritschlian theories have superseded the more generally accepted, though admittedly imperfect solution offered by other theologians.

The merits of the Ritschlian Theology lie in promises, rather than in fulfillment, in principles, rather than in their application, in certain broad foundations, rather than in the superstructure erected upon them. This explains why his theology, meeting at first with such enthusiastic and favorable reception, should so soon afterwards have met with disapproval and opposition. Not because Ritschl founded a "new school of theology," as Schultz, one of his disciples, suggested, but because the *Tendenz*, as the German put it, of his promises and principles, was not at once perceived, did the storm of antagonism so soon break over the head of our author and his followers. The development of his principles, partly by himself, partly afterwards by his disciples, revealed the real spirit and bearings of his methods and principles, and after that, opposition was inevitable.

Ritschl is deserving of much credit for his insistence that theology must no longer be in bondage to the metaphysical speculations of scholastic philosophy; for raising anew and with increased emphasis the cry "Back to Christ;" for helping the Church in this way to a deeper realization of the historical character of His Person, and of the vitally essential significance of that historical Life for every succeeding age in Christian history; for emphasizing with great force the long-neglected idea of the Kingdom of God which figures so prominently in the Gospels and through which as a moral organization the "world-end" is to be accomplished; for calling attention to important aspects of truth constantly overlooked in the doctrine of redemption; for pressing home to the heart and conscience of men a clearer conception of the ethical character of Christianity; and for the deliverance thus wrought for our faith in freeing it from dependence upon *ex opere operato* functions and performances of ecclesiastical officers and dignitaries. True, in achieving these results, which in the aggregate constitute a large and honorable contribution for one man to make to religious thought and life,

Ritschl pushed his principles to unwarranted issues in almost every instance. And that accounts for the numerous doctrinal defects which mar and so seriously impair the value of this system of thought.

It is a great fault to deny as he does, that there are truth and light in natural theology and to distinguish in his manner the ends of religion and ethics. It is a greivous error to separate faith and reason as he does by his theories of knowledge and value-judgments. He is lamentably deficient in his estimate of the Person of Christ, and in his views of the nature and being of God. He seems lawless in the exegetical methods with which he deals with parts of Scripture, and unconscionable in the liberty with which he tosses aside other parts or entire Books when not suited to his purposes. He falls far short in his proposed doctrines of sin and guilt, and in consequence also of the redemption wrought out by Christ Jesus. He greatly disappoints the yearning agony of interest with which the Christian heart has always dwelt upon the Biblical teachings concerning "the last things," by declining to discuss the subject at all; and he is equally unsatisfactory upon other points that space has prevented us from noticing.

It may be possible, however, that even these errors and defects may yet be made to serve the cause of truth in the progress of Christian thought. To the coming theologian they may point out the limitations of those broad principles of recognized truth which Ritschl has enunciated, and upon which he proceeded in his work, and thus open the way leading to theological results more satisfying than those which have as yet been achieved. That way will be found to lie, it is believed, in the application of the Ritschlian principles which under due restrictions are valid and true, in such a manner as not to do violence to the teachings of the inspired writers of the Old and New Testament Scriptures.

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II.

THE INCONSISTENCY OF DOUBT.

BY PROFESSOR JACOB COOPER, D.D.

Faith is less credulous than unbelief. This seeming paradox is proved by the course of all who oppose a direct revelation on the ground of insufficient evidence, and assert that they will accept nothing which cannot be established by demonstration. For in their chosen fields of investigation they must proceed on hypotheses not yet verified ; and in their action in the common affairs of life on future contingencies which cannot be known. If the doubter were true to his creed he could make no progress in any science since every species of knowledge rests ultimately on data which cannot be proven.* For, if they could be, the proof of these must rest on some anterior data, and these in turn on others, even to infinity.† But if he can have no trustworthy knowledge, then, on his own theory, he should attempt nothing ; and if there is no connection between his purpose and any specific result, his action can avail nothing. He must sit still in the Egyptian darkness with which he has surrounded himself. He has no power for voluntary action because he acts merely as he is acted upon ; and the instincts of his nature must not be followed, because being blind, they are weapons for his own destruction. In practice, however, he proceeds as other men ; and it will be the purpose to show that in whatever knowledge he professes to accept he uses precisely the same data that those do who believe in a rational system of Nature directed by Supreme Intelligence. And he shows unutterable credulity. For while confessedly actuated by design in the attempt, he thinks

* Anst. Top., 8, 3, 1. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα διὰ τούτων δείκνυνται, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δι' ἑτέρων.

† Aristotle's Met., III., IV., 2. ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξεν εἶναι εἰς ἀπείρον γὰρ ἂν βαδίζοι, ὥστε μηδ' οὕτως εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν.

himself able to prove that there is none required for the creation and government of the universe !

The view has been held by many able thinkers that all departments of knowledge are amenable to the same laws, and the facts in each susceptible of the same kind of proof. Others, and these the great majority, hold that there are certain sciences which may properly be called *exact*, and these only are susceptible of demonstration. The history of intellectual progress appears to support this view. For in Mathematics and Pure Logic, which rest upon assumptions directly and where the terms are agreed upon and so can be employed uniformly in the same sense, the reasonings have attained a certainty which is unquestioned. But in other sciences which do not admit of these accurate definitions of terms, or where all are not agreed about their employment, the contentions have been endless, as witnessed in most departments of speculative truth. Of the former Euclid's Geometry and Aristotle's Organon may be cited as examples in point. There the mind appears to have reached a degree of certainty which may be regarded as absolute, and an amount of progress which cannot be transcended. But is this really the fact? If we confine ourselves to the axioms alone on which these sciences are built, progress seems at first sight impossible. But the application of these axioms by which we get a further and more thorough understanding of their logical content is not exhausted, and indeed never can be. And, in this connection, it should be kept in mind that the full argument as to the meaning of the first principles of these sciences does not depend upon their intrinsic nature so much as the fact that they deal with subjects about which our prejudices cannot come in play; since the conclusions to which the reasonings founded upon them can, in no way, affect our interests, being purely abstract truth. It has been well said by a profound thinker: "If geometry were as much opposed to our passions and present interests as is ethics, we should contest it and violate it but little less, notwithstanding all the demonstrations of Euclid and Archimedes, which you would call dreams and believe full of paralogisms." *

* Leibnitz, Nouveaux Ess. Book, I. c. II. § 12.

Now the discovery and use of axioms depends upon the mental progress of the individual and the race. For what is difficult or even impossible for a bright child to comprehend becomes so easy that it is known intuitively at an advanced stage of his culture; and this truth finds its parallel in the growth of any nation, or the whole race. And so, every branch of knowledge, nay every handicraft and occupation, depends upon ultimate data which must be assumed, and so postulated because they approve themselves at once to the intelligence.* There appears to be valid reason for the view so earnestly advocated by some philosophers in all ages that it is possible to use demonstration alike everywhere; and so render all sciences and branches of inquiry amenable to this decisive test.† There is undoubtedly a tendency in that direction commensurate with human progress. That such was Aristotle's view is clear to any one who will carefully weigh his utterances in the *Organon* and *Metaphysics* where he discusses First Principles or Axioms and Demonstration. Leibnitz entertained this theory throughout his life, and recurred to it repeatedly in his various philosophical writings. Spinoza distinctly professed this doctrine, and showed the mode of its employment in nearly all his writings. This tendency has been conspicuous since the great awakening in philosophic speculation. Descartes, justly called the Father of Modern Philosophy, held this idea, which was embodied by his disciple Wolf in a system of universal knowledge in which he demonstrated the whole *more geometrico*; and this view has been fully accepted in our day by Comte and Spencer. And it is worthy of remark that these authors represent every variety of attitude toward revealed truth.

But when this doctrine is held the meaning of Demonstration must be qualified, and understood to denote, not absolute truth which cannot be attained by the finite intellect, but certainty as far as our powers can reach. Hence we hold that the certainty

* Arist. Met., III., III., 1. ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ γένοιτι νενῶς ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων.

† Ibid., II., II., 8, 9.

in pure mathematics can be no more than relative, either in itself or its application by man. For all cannot be demonstrated there, nor the extent to which the truths apply be discerned. A point must be reached where the axioms and definitions are assumed;* and another barrier in the opposite direction, beyond which we cannot follow any truth in relation to others with which it is connected. These barriers are becoming wider apart all the time. The increase of knowledge enables us to penetrate further into the unknown in both directions. If we take the infinitely small as one extremity astonishing progress may be seen since Ehrenberg began his work. Entomology now recognizes forms of life smaller and lower than were even conceived of until the glass of the microscope disclosed the minute structures. Still, there is no reason to believe that we will ever be able to exhaust Nature in that direction. So, by multiplying the power of the telescope for peering into the depths of space, we see further at each improvement of the lens but arrive at no end. So Nature in her material domain has her counterpart in the intellectual by which the same principle holds good in every line of inquiry. For we can advance from the immediate facts of intuition, and by deductions generalize these until we discover that an unlimited number of individual truths can be expressed by these principles which approve themselves as data to consciousness. These which have now become axiomatic can be resolved into others more universal, until they get so near us that the mind loses itself in the obscurity of generalization. The same thing takes place when the mind sweeps over a wide stretch of country. The objects discerned multiply but, at the same time, become indistinct until at last even the outlines of the mountain tops fade into mists.

The axioms and principles of thought may be so generalized that in their wide comprehensions they cease to define any individual thing. But by sharper discrimination in thought, and greater precision in language, as well as a firmer grasp of the subject

* Pascal: *De L'Esprit Geometrique*, II., 282, Ed. Havet Aussien poussant les recherches de plus en plus, on arrive necessariment à des mots primitives, qu' en ne pent plus definir.

matter through careful study, the most general axioms become clearly significant when applied in a concrete case. By bringing an object, which is distinct in its general features when held at the proper distance, closer to the eye it becomes quite as indistinct as when held a great way off. But by the enlarging power of the microscope it grows clear again as the field of vision is diminished and the diameter magnified. The eye is blinded even by excessive light and so an object is made dim by its brilliancy as much as it is obscured by darkness. But by the advance of science both the distance and the amount of light may be so regulated that the object may be viewed at the proper focus and in suitable brightness. Now as each science depends upon the accuracy of particulars and the extent of range embraced, the axioms which measure the amount of knowledge both *en gros* and *en detail* will be more accurately determined by investigation, while at the same time growing more numerous. Hence, as the sciences make more accurate progress they will wax richer in these data and their processes become more like demonstration, while insuring a larger amount of reasoned truth.

It may be more difficult to apply the severe tests of axiomatic reasoning to some sciences than others, but every one that deserves the name must rest upon principles which are so clear that they are intuitive to the mind at its present progress. And if the mind guard itself by strict definition and the rules of the syllogism it can erect an unshaken superstructure of systematized truth, unless intuitive beliefs are false and the reasoning process delusive. For the ultimate data being accepted because they are instinctively true to the mind that employs them and the process of deduction being the same, the result in every species of inquiry must be as true as the correspondence between nature and man's conception thereof. Scientific knowledge finds its perfection in the combination of thought into a whole which in its form and content is a transcript of objective reality.*

Hence we assert that every branch of knowledge, every subject of vital interest to man's welfare is susceptible of a demon-

* Ueberweg's Logic, p. 540. Eng. Trans

stration which is alike in all essential factors ; since, in its last analysis, it depends upon self-evident axioms and first principles which arise from the correspondence between the inner and outer realms, the subjective and objective in our dealing with Nature. No science can possibly exist without this correlation, and all advance in their capacity for demonstrative accuracy *pari passu* with the amount of patient investigation bestowed upon them in accordance with their regulative principles. And so far can their first principles be established as they represent our intuitions, and are consonant with themselves. For, according to the constitution of the mind, there can be no room for doubt of any fact that is clearly apprehended in all points where it touches our consciousness, while it fully agrees with all the facts of Nature which submit to our knowledge* on the same subject. For if there were a possibility for honest doubt where the mind clearly grasped its subject, then its processes would be false to each factor, that is to Nature and itself, and no confidence could be placed in either.† Here Doubt would swallow itself, and man's nature be annihilated. But we are so constituted that we fix upon facts as they are presented to us, and they by uniting with our reason become a part of ourselves. For we cannot separate a clearly apprehended fact from our knowledge and assent by any internal will power, nor be made to do so by any external force which did not at the same time destroy the structure of the mind itself. The relations between the constituent parts of Nature exist before we see them, and are independent of our perception. We, therefore, have no power to reverse their existence, or the impression they are adapted to make on us. Nor have we any more ability to destroy the knowledge of a fact which has been clearly apprehended, than any other reality in Nature. Nay more, we cannot disbelieve a truth of any sort which offers fair evidence, such as we

* Descartes, Princip. Phil., I., 45.

† Kant's Krit. of Pure Reason, Supplement VI. If Hume had grasped the problem of knowledge in all its universality, he would never have thought of an assertion which destroys all pure philosophy, because he would have perceived that according to his argument no pure mathematical science was possible either, on account of its containing synthetical propositions *a priori*.

are accustomed to accept in common life and is indispensable if we act at all—unless by persistent rebellion against our convictions we derange our nature so as to love a lie for its own sake ; and so give ourselves voluntarily over to strong delusions.

The degrees of clearness with which a fact is apprehended vary according to the evidence afforded and the vigor put forth in mastering it. So if demonstration is possible in any department of knowledge in our present progress it will be in all alike, subject to the same conditions. But we may admit demonstration without thereby granting that a truth so certified is comprehended in all its bearings. It is no doubt true that the most rigid methods and conclusions of Pure Geometry or the Calculus are thoroughly understood in only a part of their proof and applications. For, as our knowledge of these sciences advances, man will discover still more clearly, if not their abstract certainty, their wider applications in regulating the laws of material nature. This is equally true in the employment of the syllogistic methods for the establishment of ethical and speculative truth. The ultimate facts are as certain, and can be apprehended as clearly, if we free ourselves from prejudice, as the truths of mathematics. In both cases it is the mind working upon intuitive truths according to its own processes, and nothing can be more certain to it than these, whatever be the department of knowledge where they may be employed. And it may be seen continually that those who are most rigidly scientific will accept, and act upon data in their own departments of investigation, which are certified by less proof than are the facts that transgression of the laws of man's moral nature secures its own punishment by its influence on his character, and that the external revelation of God's will in the Scriptures agrees with His utterances through the conscience.

But while we maintain that in all the sciences it is possible to apply logical proof until this practically amounts to a demonstration, it is also asserted that this demonstration may be more or less complete according to the progress in a given science and the general culture of the race. But there is yet confessedly little truth, even in the exact sciences, which may be considered infallible and

unchangeable. Most of these are in their infancy, and constantly fluctuate even in their fundamental theories. This may be seen especially in those which make the most pretense to certitude, such as geology and palæontology. In botany and zoölogy new systems of classification succeed each other as the scenes in a drama, and the advances already made are only stepping stones to that wider knowledge which is to follow. And still the materialist believes in his own infallibility with a credulity which he would ridicule in the advocates of religion. Yet every man is justified in his belief in the unchanging veracity of his first principles, and the trustworthy nature of his mental processes. For he puts two notions together which he has reason to think are true, and from these deduces a third which is verified by application wherein it invariably produces the results which are called for by his reasoning. And he may vary his experiments with these two data until by an *experimentum crucis* he excludes the possibility of deception. After this his unvarying result proves that the premises and the process of deduction accord with the laws of nature, and have in fact become a part of her own processes. The veracity of nature must be accepted by every one as a first principle, else no reasoning would be possible. So when the result is a consequence of the premises and the identical one looked for two things are established: These are the data on which he reasoned, and his share in drawing the inference.

Such is the formation of our philosophical trust after we have acquired habits of reflection and introspection so as to test the process or thought itself. We proceed then by induction and elicit further results from a great number of instances; each new truth confirming more and more, if that were possible, the certainty of our facts, and methods of using them. But from the necessity of the case with those who possess only partial knowledge there will be apparent objections to any truth however obvious. The preponderance of proof is always decisive in directing our action as long as it continues to preponderate. It is our business to eliminate opposing facts, if we can, where they seem to make against a probable theory, but no man in science

or every day life pretends to wait until every objection which could be suggested has been removed. If he did it would be impossible to make any progress save in purely abstract science. And even here doubt might suggest objections based on the veracity of the mental processes and the possibility of minds existing to which the direct reverse of our conceptions might seem true. This objection would appear at first thought to be wholly irrelevant. For until we became changed *in toto* and have to act in a world where what we call the laws of Nature are reversed, the supposition could not be entertained and hence this objection might well bide its time. But when we are confronted with the fact that the doubter requires entirely different evidences for the support of a Divine Revelation from those on which he is compelled to act in science and daily life, we see not only the possibility, but the certainty that minds can be so constituted that what is true in itself appears to be false and, if their views prevailed, the world, both material and spiritual, would be turned upside down!

The objections made by Mill* and Jevons† that no amount of inductions could prove a truth infallibly, rest upon a misapprehension of the end of scientific knowledge, and the means of attaining to it. For if induction proves true without an exception, as far as we have ever carried this process in a given case, we have no right to argue from our ignorance, and say that beyond where we have gone already, or ever can go, there is a place where the principle will not hold good. Let it suffice for us to maintain that up to the utmost verge of human experience a fact has been found to be invariable, and to conclude from the tendency that the same truth will hold good forever. The intellect cannot transcend itself, even to satisfy the Doubter, nor even conceive what would be the condition if the order of Nature should be changed. If we reason at all it must be within limits short of this absurdity. But where as fair men as Mill and Jevons are

* Logic, p. 176, § 6 ; p. 368, § 4, 8th Am. ed.

† Principles of Science ; On the Inductive Process ; with Fowler's answers in Preface to Inductive Logic, 8th ed.

driven to such straits to prove that the mind possesses no innate or *a priori* power to transcend experience, we cannot wonder that the crass Agnostic allows no sphere for the exercise of faith. Yet this very contention that absolute truth is unattainable, even in physical science, is an admission which may be turned against materialists because it is an estoppel to the claim that physical science rests upon a firmer basis than religious truth. We hold that the ultimate data, the axioms and the methods of their correct use, are the same in all subjects of human interest ; or, if there be a difference, it is in favor of that species of truth which is paramount to man, his moral discipline and growth in character.

But, granting that the proofs in the two spheres of man's existence, the physical and the spiritual, are on a par, then it follows that our knowledge can be but partial. Nothing short of absolute knowledge could attain to infallible truth in any department of inquiry, even if it were wholly free from exceptions. But the doubter demands just this impossibility when he chooses to disbelieve the claims of revealed truth while he confessedly cannot ask for such knowledge in any of the departments of science which he accepts. Moreover, if this infallibility could be attained in any one subject of inquiry this would at once place it beyond the sphere of human knowledge. It is the prerogative of a perfect Being to possess this omniscience ; but this cannot possibly fall to the lot of any one whose condition is that of progress and consequent imperfection. That there is a constant progress in the human race, at least in culture and knowledge, is tacitly assumed even by the pessimist. And how the world can rise in the scale of being and at the same time become more miserable, is for those to explain who hold to this absurd doctrine. This steady progress by which man has risen through constant gradations from the lowest forms of organized life, and these in their turn from inorganic matter, is thought by many to be a philosophical explanation for all that we know of the earth and man without recourse to a personal creator. The development theory when it assumes the "survival of the fittest" is a *petitio*

principii, unless it also postulates intelligence to determine which is fittest. Who shall decide, and by what principle do we say that one thing is more fit than another ; or that this ought to survive ? Who gave to such thing its fitness, or imposed the obligation for its survival ? Unless there be an intelligence somewhere to discriminate them there can be no fittest ; for all would be indifferent. Darwin and Haeckel think they know, and this is because they possess intelligence ; so that this quality exists now and in a personal form. It must, therefore, have existed eternally in this way, or else have created itself at some time out of nothing.

It is a cardinal principle of philosophy that there can be nothing in the effect which was not contained potentially in the cause.* And it goes without saying that there can be no effect without some cause to produce it. The advocate of evolution, while arguing against the idea of an intelligent mind working by means toward a definite end, covertly claims for senseless matter all that the theist demands in a superintending providence.† He will get rid of a personality in creation at all hazards. He admits only blind unconscious and impersonal forces, developing themselves as they integrate their materials, until at last they culminate in man, whose distinguishing characteristic is that he always acts from rational motives and according to a preconceived plan. Hence in his endeavor to banish a personal God he is inconsistent with his own action. For while striving to annihilate every vestige of creative purpose he does this by a clearly defined purpose in himself. There can be no question what he designs when he strives to banish design from the formation of the universe. He approaches his subject with a fixed determination, in fact with a purpose so unalterably fixed that he will be influenced by no counter arguments and so definite that no obstacle, even the crudest absurdity, *that he can act rationally himself*, can turn him away. Hence he never will rest until he has proven to his own satisfaction that there is no ra-

* Hamilton Met., p. 533.

† Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, V., 197-200.

tional action except in those who deny it everywhere else save in themselves! Yet it is indisputable that all civilization, science and philosophy, are the effects of mind acting on matter *ab extra*, and therefore this factor has existed in all antecedent causes as far back as the history of the world reaches, and hence we know intuitively that it does not stop there. So, if the doubter has a purpose in trying to establish his doubt, why should the universe be denied a controlling intelligence adequate to the great works of creation and Providence?

The existence of something organized in definite form shows that there must have been a predetermining purpose in its construction, whatever that purpose be called—whether Nature,* as the sum total of materials and forces, or a personal Creator wielding them. We are compelled to believe this from the analogy apparent in the action of our own minds upon the external world. If we make no effort we effect nothing. We must set in motion some energy and bring it into connection with surrounding powers and materials, else there is no result achieved. Nor is it enough merely to set in motion these energies to accomplish a specific work, for this will not be done at haphazard. It is ridiculous to say that the absence of thought produces thought; or that the external world is operated upon by our thought when this is not exercised. In all our experience there has been both thought and the conscious exercise of thought upon matter before there can be any effect produced. For matter does not act upon itself unless power be applied either internally or from without. Our experience further teaches us that we must embody a purpose by the expenditure of energy upon matter before any phenomena can occur. If it can arise without any such action on our part it does not come within the limits of *a posteriori* knowledge, and hence on the cardinal principle of the materialist does not exist at all. For all his theories of knowledge are built upon the dogma that he will believe nothing which does not submit to the testimony of the senses. Hence he maintains that life is immanent in matter, and can be evolved from it. The efforts of the Naturalist have

* Schopenhauer, *Zur Teleologie*, Eng. Translation, Vol. III. p. 77.

long been directed to this task, but Büchner and Hartmann have come no nearer to the production of spontaneous generation than did Anaxagoras or Democritus. And even if such generation should be realized in the future by the combined efforts of Scientists, this does not dispense with the necessity of prearranging Intelligence. For if the purpose be achieved, the materials necessary to produce life must have been furnished in advance, and possessed of such adaptation as to cause their action to be creative rather than destructive. It is not enough that they be neutral, or independent of each other; but they must have such relations among themselves that they will act in concert. There must be a "preëstablished harmony,"* so that underneath these forces which the materials possess *per se*, and which the scientist thinks will enable him to produce spontaneous generation, there is already implanted this adaptation to the proposed end. That is, *he produces* spontaneous evolution when the materials already involved not only the potentiality but the tendency; which leaves him but a small part of the work.

The real question at issue is: How did this fitness of materials and appetency for each other so as to integrate not only into organisms but to generate life, get there? It could not get there by accident. That a *rencontre* which involves intelligence should take place by *chance*, is a contradiction in terms. Even a fortuitous jumble, which happened to be the right one, would avail nothing unless the materials were previously endowed with an adaptation to some specific purpose. We see in all the works of man, when products of his best designs, that the introduction of a force or obstacle which does not act in concert, or which impedes the movement already begun, will eventually destroy the whole mechanism, unless intelligence interfere for its removal. For though by superior strength the mechanism may overcome the resistance or obstacle, yet the tendency of a foreign substance or hostile power is to stop the movement, and is prevented from doing so only by the controlling energy which intelligence has

* Leibnitz, *Nouveau Syst.*, p. 127: Ed. Erd., § 12-14.

impressed upon it. Nor does it avail anything to assume an infinite time in the past for the work of Evolution to begin. Materialists are fond of this recourse to hide the falsity of their hypotheses. Give us time enough and our material elements can have enough combinations of chance to develop any system. But it seems to be overlooked entirely that the longer the time occupied in the action of the materials, the greater the confusion they would make unless some Intelligence controlled their movements ; selecting constantly the proper adjustments, and eliminating the derangements. Hence in applying this reasoning to the creation of a world we see that even if the primordial star dust be furnished ready for its skilled artificer Chance, this dust could not continue at random to produce organized beings ; or endow them with life. For if the first two particles *ictibus cæcis impulsa*,* by mere accident combined harmoniously, and the next in like manner, and so on, *presto !* we have, not the work of chance or accident, but a predetermining factor already in full operation. Nor does it avail materialism anything to say that this factor is immanent. For it must be something different from the matter itself, else all our experience—the only mode of knowing admitted by the scientist—is contradicted. Here, again ; it is necessary to make another assumption. The particles of primordial matter must combine in some definite mode ; for unless they did not even an eternity could bring about a creation or organize a system. But, says the evolutionist, the particles of matter had to assume some form or order, and this is the one they hit upon. Others were possible, and, perhaps, in the illimitable ages were tried, and found themselves failures. And so the process was, Try, try again ! until the lucky *rencontre* was found. Here we have surreptitiously introduced another assumption, viz., that the particles of matter possessed motion, and that of tendency toward each other rather than repulsion. So after begging the whole question, matter with force and design thrown in, he can go on nicely. Though protesting all the while that he assumes nothing, yet in practice he is like the horseleech's

* Lucretius, II., 135.

two daughters, crying, Give, Give ! until he has all the factors necessary, and then coolly says, There is no need of a creator or of design to form a cosmos. My "whirling motion" has driven out a personal God and reigns supreme* over all the material universe ; and well it may, for have I not demonstrated that there is no mind, nothing but matter anywhere ? To this hideous image he introduces us and says : These be thy gods, O Agnostics, who have brought you out of Egyptian darkness of superstition and priestly intolerance !

We have had the spectacle of men possessed of first rate ability in science, such as Haeckel and Büchner, laboring with intensity and singleness of purpose to produce spontaneous generation. They select their materials—already furnished for them, and their properties understood—with the utmost care ; they place them under the most favorable conditions for combination ; they remove every supposed hindrance ; they vary their experiments, and rival the alchemists in the intensity of their zeal. They know what they are in quest of, the new elixir of life which is to be the creation of the world. This shall combine material cause, power, design, intelligence, all impersonal, but doing the work which we never see done except by a person. For the nonce they depart from their own rule that they will believe nothing but what is in the testimony of experience. Yet what is the purpose underlying this tremendous effort which these scientists are making ? It is not the love of science exclusively though their boasted profession, that actuates them, but a hatred of God which they ill conceal under an affected indifference and contempt for religion. We have the strange spectacle of men laboring their life long with their energies concentrated on a definite object, that is, to prove that life can be produced without design. They proceed according to the strictest methods of the inductive philosophy, which assumes as a cardinal principle, the uniformity of nature ; they carefully arrange their materials and sedulously exclude every thing which they know to be either neutral in its nature or hostile in its tendency, and give all the help to the

* Aristophanes' *Clouds*, 828 : Δῖνος βασιλεύς τον Δε' ἐξεληλακώς.

movement which their ingenuity can devise. If they should succeed at any time in the future in producing life, then, to be consistent, they must turn around and say, This result was all the work of chance. We had no design, no plan; made no attempt to produce this or any other result. It came of itself. It would have come equally well, perhaps sooner, if there had been no man of science in the world. It is neither the outcome of preconceived combination of materials, nor a designed application of powers. For we had no design to prove that there is no design in nature, nor to prove anything else. We had no intelligence in our efforts to prove that there is no intelligence in the universe. We did not believe—our theory would not permit this—in the prearrangement of materials in nature, by which those influencing each other must act in concert. These materials were lying around loosely or floating in space, chance brought them together. Chance united them in wedlock, and as they were the proper sexes, the universe was born by natural generation. We do not believe that they had any purpose, for they are mere matter. We are sure we had no purpose, for we are only material ourselves. We do not know why we acted as we did. We were not moved by hostility against God, for it would be absurd for a philosopher to be hostile to that which does not exist. As we do not believe in design, we deny that we had any. We do not believe in any external energy guiding the universe, for there is no power but a modification of matter which is moved at random, and could as easily bring about one result as another. True, we have been laboring all our lives to produce this particular consummation. But now that it is achieved, we do not believe it, for the senses are deceptive, and it is better to believe that their testimony in this case is false than that our pet theory should be overthrown. They tell us that life has been produced spontaneously, but we know that this is not true, for we have been laboring since we can remember to effect this very object. Therefore it cannot be spontaneous if we have produced it. And yet if it is not so then our experiments are false, and our labor has been thrown away. So, in either case, we are not

justified in accepting the testimony of our senses; and we have unconsciously, by our design, demonstrated that it is impossible for design to be the principle which controls nature.

But stay! We have not yet sufficiently established our consistency in opposing those who believe in a personal God as the creator and ruler of the universe. If we have actually originated life after our persistent efforts to that end—and we are forced to admit that we have expended unmeasured ingenuity to attain that object—what have we gained towards proving that this same principle did not guide in the evolutions of the universe? For it teems with life. The air, the earth and the seas are full of it. It glows in the spring flower; it twitters in the grove; it swarms in the waters, and crawls on the sands. Possibly this exuberance of life was produced by design. Who knows but that there is a power which directs all other power; a fountain which has overflowed into this boundless wealth of life? We had materials to begin with. We found these materials were controlled by laws whose movements we could learn, and which we were compelled to respect in our manipulations if we would accomplish any definite result. We could not take these materials and work arbitrarily with them. This thing we call nature kept her mouth very close when we failed to interrogate her in her own way. We were compelled in all our experiments to bring together such materials as would act in concert, and eliminate all adverse forces, or they would nullify our efforts. In fact, nature seemed to act in an entirely rational manner, and withal to have a mind of her own—in truth very much like ourselves. She is very communicative when not crossed, but obstinately immovable when we attempt to go counter to her purposes.

This higher power “beset us behind and before and laid an irresistible hand upon us.”* It mocked our puny efforts by producing life in infinite variety in every domain of nature. It invaded our witches’ caldron in which we had mingled our simples and in such subtle forms that we were often deceived into the belief that we had discovered our elixir. But when we thought we had succeeded and were dancing our *eureka* fling in the ful-

* Ps. 139. 5.

ness of our joy that we had shown life to be spontaneous and requiring no creative energy, we discovered to our confusion that this life was not evolved *out of*, but had crawled *into* our alembic. It flaunted its productions in our faces. The meanest insect, the pismire, the mosquito and the black midge could multiply life before our eyes with calm indifference at our distress over our failure. Moreover, we were compelled to adapt our methods of action most closely to those of the so-called nature around us before we could accomplish anything. We had to supply heat and moisture to our materials. We had to put our ingredients in motion—in a word, copy as nearly as possible after the models we had ready furnished. We did not give our chance a fair showing. It had only the star dust or gaseous vapor—only by a violent assumption did it have that much—to begin with. It had no model to copy. It had no laws as yet, according to which its primordial materials combined and developed. It had no design to guide it in producing definite organisms. It had no power by which it could place its materials in the most favorable positions for them to begin their spontaneous action upon each other. It had no choice by which to make a selection among possible modes of procedure. Nor yet had it any will to enforce a choice when made. And still, with all these disadvantages, we expected it, working entirely in the dark, to do infinitely more than we with all our intelligence, design and will, working upon materials already organized, furnished ready at hand with laws which are understood, to aid us in our set purpose to produce life. Not only have we the laws of combination to guide our actions, but countless models of every conceivable variety and mode of action before our eyes to show how chance has worked uniformly from the beginning in effecting the cosmos. These laws and methods we followed systematically as far as our minds could comprehend them and our mechanical skill could manipulate them. We looked on the models of Mother Nature while we tried to follow her copy with limping gait and 'prentice hand, and then we turned her out of doors declaring that she did not exist, that we had no mother; that we and all things were produced spontaneously.

“We expect we grewed.” And as we cannot believe there is design in the work we have tried to copy we cannot believe we had any ourselves. So, if we had no purpose, though life were generated by the processes we inaugurated, the result is not ours and we did not effect it. The life we have seen produced is truly spontaneous, without cause to act or materials to be acted upon—for our senses give us only phenomena—a fortuitous appearance like all others, disconnected alike from what preceded and what follows. The Agnostic can believe in nothing and doubt swallows itself. It is annihilated in the crazy endeavor to prove that there is no creator to fashion all things according to his wise designs. To this complexion of folly does unbelief come at last. Can any credulity go beyond that of the professed unbelievers?*

There is nothing which shows the strength and grandeur of man more than his ability to master and utilize the laws of this universe where he passes this life. He possesses the power to investigate the phenomena of matter and spirit and reduce them to scientific system as the counterpart of the system of nature. He can apply the laws which regulate and by so doing gain the mastery over those forces by which he is environed and make them subservient to his will to an extent only limited by his knowledge and obedience. Thus, though in himself a feeble creature he can, by allying himself to the laws of the universe, become “the minister and interpreter of nature.”† And in this character he shows his greatness more than in establishing empires and swaying the nations of the earth. He becomes strong by what he knows, for knowledge is the true measure of his power. But his knowledge must have some external reality to

* No writers have been, on the whole, more crudely dogmatic in respect of their noëtic and ontological conceptions and assumptions than have those whose avowed aim has been to treat psychical phenomena from the standpoint of a science which is skeptical as to all ultimate problems. * * * The imagination of the most myth-making of the ancients, or the untrained fancy of the most superstitious of the savages, has never resulted in so marvellous and surprising picture of the “misused” reality of things. Ladd’s *Phil. of Knowledge*, p. 378.

† Bacon, *Nov. Org.*, I., 1.

which it refers and of which it is the counterpart.* For if there was not this counterpart, this knowledge could not be applied and so man would have no control of nature through its exercise. This insight is obtained by natural sagacity, by patient thought and by a prudent questioning applied to all phenomena, mental and physical, which present themselves spontaneously or are elicited by experiment. We measure the intellectual vigor of a man by his ability to look deeply into the workings of nature and discern the secret forces by which the cosmos is controlled. There can be no dispute that this mastery is gained by intelligence and that in the application of his knowledge he is guided by design. The question is raised by doubt whether there be a counterpart of this in objective nature and it is maintained that this reality which makes our knowledge possible is the result of chance.

Now, there is in astronomy what is known as the "Problem of the Three Bodies,"† which may be concisely stated as follows: When two bodies alone attract each other their mutual influence may be calculated easily, no matter what may be their size, direction of their movement, or velocity. But when a third body is added the elements which must be considered are many, and present the utmost difficulty. For example: The sun, earth, and moon affect each other by forces which cannot be accurately estimated nor expressed by any formula known to science. From the days of Newton, who caught a distant glimpse of the difficulty, to the days of Bernoulli and La Place the utmost resources of celestial mechanics have been brought to bear, without solving the problem. There are only three bodies involved in this problem; and their size, weight, direction and velocity are accurately known; but the precise effect which they have mutually in shaping their respective orbits cannot be determined, though the problem has been distinctly before the minds of astronomers

* Scientific knowledge finds its perfection in the combination of thoughts, one with another, into a whole, which in its contents and form represents the objective reality. Ueberweg's *Logic*, Eng. Tr., p. 540.

† Loomis' *Astronomy*, Art. 263. Herschell's *Ast.*, § 603. Mill's *Logic*, 8th Ed., p. 329.

for more than a century. This problem, be it noted, only involves *three* bodies. But there are in the solar system, according to Arago, forty-three motions caused by the mutual influences of the sun and planets already known, to say nothing of those not yet discovered, and of the swarms of asteroids. What calculus or quaternions can devise an equation which will include the problem not of the three bodies which baffles the keenest analytical skill of man—but the problem of all the bodies of the solar system? And, added to this the innumerable solar systems, made up of fixed stars as we call them, but which are in reality central suns, with their countless planets and satellites. These whirl on through the immensity of space, circling along their ceaseless courses in their intricate orbits from age to age, in mazes so involved that the head swims in trying to grasp the outline. But still they move on evermore with perfect regularity—for it has been shown in the case of Neptune's influence upon Uranus that what seemed to be a perturbation, was in reality a part of a more complete regularity—each keeping to its own path without interference; each affecting all others, and being affected in turn. These motions must all have been provided for in the far-off ages ere time began, and the adjustment of the veritable “Celestial Mechanics” made with such inconceivable skill that the universe, according to La Place shall move on forever without collision or interference! Was this adjustment the work of chance? Unbelief with its utmost resources confesses itself unable to calculate the problem of the three bodies: Shall it dare to say that the adjustment of the countless millions arose fortuitously, and required no superintending wisdom to devise the scheme and start it in its everlasting movements? “I had rather,” says Bacon,* “believe all the fables in the Legend and the Talmud and the Alcoran than that this universal frame is without a mind; and, therefore, God never wrought a miracle to convince atheism, because His ordinary works convince it.”

The spirit with which the doubter approaches his subject unfits him for receiving and impartially weighing the evidence presented

* Essays, XVI.

by revelation. Each subject of inquiry, as we have seen, has first principles or axioms which are common to all. But, besides, it has those which are peculiar to its own subject matter. Every one must be in sufficient sympathy with these to have mastered their import before he is in a position to speak authoritatively for or against it. Should a person who has no taste for numbers and could not master the elements of arithmetic, undertake to pronounce dictatorially on the merits of the "*Système du Monde*," we can imagine but faintly the contempt with which its author would have regarded such criticism. But they who are confessedly hostile to revealed truth are the ones who pronounce most authoritatively the impossibility of any revelation, and the absurdity of the Christian in particular. Their investigations in other departments of truth should teach them that such is the exuberance of nature that nothing can be deemed impossible which does not involve a contradiction, and everything is to be deemed probable that looks to the widening of her dominions and the prevalence of her beneficence. Here the seen vouches for the unseen, that which we can understand for that which is beyond our present attainments. But though time, space, power point to the infinite in material things, yet this whole frame of nature is held together by no corresponding intelligence and there is no infinite in spiritual things. The individual man may have capacities whose action as yet eludes our grasp; but the whole universe is directed by no agencies beyond those of matter operated on by mechanical causation, and which we can fully comprehend. Though goodness and mercy, purity and love, were seen in their fruits here, yet there are no such principles above us to which we can become allied in character by their exercise. Though we can do nothing with material forces unless we obey their laws and so avail ourselves of their action, yet there are no forces regulative in the moral world, and therefore we cannot assimilate ourselves to them and become stronger through obedience. There are, in reality, no fixed principles of universal sanction; for all justice and morality are merely conventional, and therefore can have no relations with anything immutable beyond. All the good in the world is only

apparent, having no basis of reality. The doubter feigns it himself and therefore concludes that all others do likewise; and hence there is no truth or goodness anywhere. If the universe were fashioned according to his character then he would be consistent, though not so voluntarily!

Such is the inconsistency of doubt. It deals in objections rather than weighs the facts adduced for truth. It points to those who fail to obey the doctrine of Revelation to prove the doctrine untrue. As well might the prisoner when found guilty and awaiting sentence face about and berate the law which condemns him and calls for his punishment. As well arraign the principles of political economy for falsehood when a nation by reckless extravagance and idleness had reduced itself to poverty. Fancy Adam Smith berating industry and thrift as the cause of Spain's decadence and poverty. Had she kept down her civil list; had she maintained a smaller standing army and engaged in fewer wars; had she encouraged manufactures and agriculture; had every man labored with his hands instead of playing the cavalier—No! but had all the people, from the King on the throne to the peasant on his acre, been less industrious, less frugal, more quarrelsome with their neighbors, more given to bull fighting and other idle shows, then might Spain have been the richest nation in Europe. Imagine Gibbon, in his attacks on Christianity, saying, The trouble with the Christian Church was that it always followed in the footsteps of its Founder. It cultivated the arts of peace as He ordered. It cared for the sick, the outcast, the poor; not occasionally, but all the time. It allowed no controversies among its members, and healed all divisions among its neighbors. Its whole mission in practice, as well as theory, was to heal the miseries of mankind by drying up all the sources of sin. But because the doctrine of Jesus and His Apostles proved a cure for all human woe, as they said it would if strictly followed, therefore it must be false. And because the results from failure to obey were precisely such as the Lord declared would follow disobedience, therefore the doctrine cannot be true. But, on the other hand, all the wrongs which

were perpetrated by bad Christian Emperors ; all the licentiousness of wicked bishops and priests ; all the corruptions of monastic orders—things which are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of Christianity—are charged upon it to prove that it cannot be true when such hideous consequences follow, its obediences, shall we say ? No ; but the failure to obey its doctrines. The tree is not to be known by its fruits but by what it does not and cannot produce.

Thus the doubter always shows his inconsistency no matter from what point of view he approaches those questions which belong to moral and revealed truth. For all his researches in science have consisted in the careful search for facts, the patient weighing and balancing of evidence, the sagacious selection of incontestable proofs in support of his hypothesis. These are all industriously sifted so that nothing but the pure grains of truth may remain ; and when the facts established are corroborative of each other and preponderate over all that can be adduced in opposition, his decision is reached. The hypothesis has become a theory, and if the theory in turn will account for the majority of the facts with which he has to deal, his faith therein is not shaken because objections remain unanswered. Nay, if no objection could be offered there would be no delay required for study and investigation, nor impediments in practical application. At once he would open up all the secrets of Nature. His mind would expand in its power of search and capacity for action until he would be in reality omniscient.

But the fact that he has obstacles to overcome increases his strength. Because he has perplexities to meet and is compelled to account for them, his moral nature, through choosing, and his discernment and fairness in estimating, facts are continually improved. But if he demands more, or a different kind of evidence in moral questions from what he is accustomed to use in his scientific investigations he is evidently inconsistent. If he does this through unwillingness to be persuaded, he is dishonest. If he labors to disprove that to which he is indifferent when the weight of evidence is in its favor, he is absurd and irrational.

But if he shows hostility in advance and contemptuously rejects that which he has not investigated and declares it to be beneath a man of science to examine, and, therefore, will not trouble himself about it except to seek arguments to overthrow it, he sits for the picture; "Men love darkness rather than light because their deeds are evil. They will not come to the light lest their deeds be reproved."

III.

THE FIVE RELATIONS OF CONFUCIANISM AND CHRISTIANITY.

BY REV. D. B. SCHNEDER.

Very early in its history Christianity was brought face to face with the Neo-Platonic and the Platonic forms of philosophy. Questions as to the worth of these philosophic systems and the proper attitude to be taken toward them soon came to form one of the important problems of the early Church. Eighteen centuries have now elapsed and the question whether Christianity was not unduly influenced or even vitiated by Platonic and Neo-Platonic speculation is at this very time one of the liveliest topics of theological discussion. This fact furnishes ample reason why Christian scholars should turn their attention also toward the Far East, where the religion of Christ to-day stands confronted by another system of ideas, which is older than Platonism and which has for twenty-three centuries remained the chief moulding power of a people that constitutes at the same time the most significant nation of the Orient and the largest aggregation of human beings upon the face of the globe. This system is Confucianism, the national ethics of China. In the degree in which Christianity will progress in China and also in Japan (which country has borrowed its national ethics from China), in that degree will it become a problem to determine how much of worth for humanity this ancient system possesses, how much of it, therefore, may be properly assimilated by Christianity and how much must be resisted and rejected.

Confucius is a distinct historical personage. He was born in the year 551, B. C., in the state of Lu, situated in the modern province of Shantung. He held public office during a part of his life and during the whole of his career he had pupils around

him with whom he conversed much in the same manner as did that other sage of antiquity, Socrates. He also used his pen, editing the writings of his predecessors and producing several original works, although he did not profess to set forth any new ideas. He died in the year 478, B. C. The Confucian classics consist of the "Four Books" and the "Five Canons." The Four Books are the Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Sayings of Mencius. The Five Canons are the Book of Changes, the Book of Chronicles, the Book of Odes, Spring and Autumn Annals, and the Book of Rites.

Confucianism is preëminently a social and political teaching. It has both a philosophical and a religious element, but neither of these is sufficiently pronounced to entitle the system to the name of either a philosophy or a religion in the strict sense of these terms. Its religious effect has been to reduce the pre-Confucian approach to monotheism to an attitude toward the Divine of comparative indifference. The term Heaven, indeed, plays an important rôle in the system, but is prevailingly regarded as an impersonal moral order, a sort of divine providence without a God behind it. No claim is made to divine revelation, even the possibility of it being denied. The emphasis upon the duties toward man is at the expense of duties toward God. Said Confucius: "To give one's self to the duties due to men and while respecting spiritual beings to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom." Duties toward men, however, does not mean duties toward men as individuals. The development of the individual is neither the aim, nor has it been the effect, of Confucianism. It is well ordered human society that is aimed at in the Confucian teaching.

As a social and political teaching Confucianism is naturalistic in principle. The ethical laws are implanted in man. The observance of them is denominated by the term propriety rather than virtue. Their violation may bring injury and a sense of shame, but not a sense of guilt before a Supreme Being. Duties arise from relations between men and men. The chief of these relations are five in number, namely: 1. Between sovereign and minister; 2. Between father and son; 3. Between husband and

wife ; 4. Between elder brother and younger brother ; 5. Between friends. Out of these five relations arise the five duties of universal obligation. Each of these duties is in essence the manifestation of reverence on the part of the inferior toward the superior. For, as the ethics of Christianity make love the soul of all righteousness, so Confucianism places reverence at the foundation of all good action. From reverence toward sovereign, father, husband, elder brother or friend emanate the appropriate virtues in each case. Out of reverence for the sovereign grow loyalty and patriotism ; out of reverence for the father, filial piety ; out of reverence for the husband, chastity and faithfulness ; out of reverence for the elder brother, obedience and devotion ; out of reverence for friends, faithfulness and courtesy. The opposite of reverence is benevolence, the feeling that is proper on the part of the superior toward the inferior. But this is not a duty. Duties exist only upwards, not downwards—only toward superiors, not toward inferiors. Feelings and acts of benevolence come rather under the category of works of supererogation—things to be admired in themselves, but not to be regarded as fulfilments of obligation.

This gives us, so to speak, the bare framework of the Confucian system. Of the marvelous wealth of worldly wisdom, of discernment of the deepest motives of the heart, of perception of much of the true outline of a beautiful character, and of a grasp of many profound truths, both human and divine, which is built into this framework there is no room here to speak. The Confucian classics, when studied in the light of Christian revelation, furnish their own explanation of the tremendous influence which, in the absence of Christianity alone, they have been able to wield over so large a portion of the human family for so long a succession of centuries.

It is, however, about Confucianism in Japan that this article is more particularly intended to give information ; for it is in Japan that this hoary figure of antiquity most directly confronts Christianity at the present day. A knowledge of Confucianism in general is not sufficient to furnish an understanding of the particular

form of influence which this system has exerted in Japan. It is often said that the Japanese are a nation of borrowers, that they possess little originality. It must be confessed that their history to a large extent bears out this statement. But it is also true that most of the things borrowed by Japan have been modified in the process. Japan adopted the Chinese ideographs, but gives them a pronunciation peculiar to herself. When Shintoism failed to satisfy the religious needs of the people any longer, Buddhism was accepted, but reshaped to such a degree that Japanese Buddhism is almost an independent product. And now that Buddhism is found wanting, there is a readiness to accept Christianity in its place, but already the call for a Japanized Christianity has been heard far and wide. In like manner when early in the Christian era Confucianism, together with other elements of Chinese civilization was brought over, it underwent a gradual change until it became in several important respects essentially different from Chinese Confucianism. One process of modification consisted in a further toning down of the religious element. "Honor the gods and keep them far from you," became one of the favorite mottoes of Japanese Confucianists, and the materialists and agnostics among the educated Japanese of to-day are conscious of no inconsistency when they profess to be Confucianists at the same time. They mean that in their moral life they are governed by the principles of the Confucian ethics, while as to matters of religion they are entirely unbelieving. Whether this process of modification is to be ascribed to a secular bent of the Japanese mind itself, or whether it is to be accounted for by the explanation that the Japanese felt no need of the religious element of Confucianism, seeing that they had Shintoism and afterwards also Buddhism to satisfy their distinctively religious instincts, is a matter of question.

Another modification which the Confucian system has experienced in Japan is a change of emphasis among the five relations. Chinese Confucianism lays the chief stress upon the relation of father and son, in other words, upon the family idea. Filial piety, reverence for fathers and forefathers, is the ruling

principle of the Chinese social and political order, and accounts at once for the long life and the stagnation of the Chinese empire. Japan changed the emphasis, laid it upon the first relation, namely, upon that of sovereign and minister. To understand this change of emphasis it is necessary to inquire what the Japanese were when Confucianism found them. The force that exercised the chief moulding power over the Japanese mind and spirit previous to the introduction of Confucianism was Shintoism. Shintoism is a cult which it has been found difficult to define, but one of its undoubted effects has been the cultivation among the Japanese people of an intensely loyal, patriotic and nationalistic spirit. The *Yamato damashii*, that is, the spirit of Yamato (the name of the conquering tribe of ancient Japan) is a striking phenomenon of the Japanese national life, and to Shintoism it owes its existence. When, therefore, Japan accepted the Confucian system she recast it into the mould of her own mind. She accepted the doctrine of the five relations, but it was in harmony with her spirit to give the first one the decided preëminence.

Thus did Japan come to stand possessed of an ethical system whose substance was comprised by the duties of the five relations named, the religious side of it being weakened and the five relations emphasized in the order in which they are usually written. That is, that the Japanese came to be taught that reverence first of all toward the sovereign, then toward the father, the husband, the elder brother, the friend, was substantially the fulfilment of all righteousness.

It is next in order to glance at the manner in which this system of ethical teaching realized itself in the life of the Japanese people. Taking the five relations in their order, we find the extraordinary emphasis placed upon the first resulting in a form of national life that has made Japan peculiar among the peoples of the earth. The strong spirit of loyalty and patriotism fostered for centuries by Shintoism and now greatly intensified by that exalted appreciation of the ethical which is one of the glories of Confucianism, served to infuse into the Japanese a strength of

national feeling that is well nigh incomprehensible to a member of a different nationality. The duty arising out of the relation of minister to sovereign was so widened as to include, under the name of *kunshin*, loyalty of subject to ruler, of retainer to his feudal lord, of servant to master. In comparison with this duty of loyalty, parents, wife, children, houses, lands, life itself, were less than nothing, and were to be sacrificed without a moment's hesitation for the emperor or the feudal lord. If there were a Westminster Abbey in Japan for the reception of the ashes and the monuments of those whom the nation honors most, instead of being filled with philanthropists, reformers, statesmen, poets and scholars, its sacred confines would be occupied by suicides, committers of *hara-kiri*. For of all men whom the Japanese heart delights to honor those stand first who, at the behest of loyalty, or for the vindication of honor, or for the welfare or good name of a master, died by their own hands. The most popular of all performances upon the Japanese stage for many years has been the drama of the forty-seven retainers who dehumanized themselves in order to become the instruments of Heaven's vengeance toward the slayer of their master, and who, when their purpose was accomplished, joyfully turned to the expected task of shedding their own blood. The incense scarcely ever ceases to burn before their graves near the Bay of Tokyo, and many thousands of admirers visit the place every year. On a hill overlooking the city of Sendai lies buried one of Japan's greatest feudal lords. Surrounding his tomb are to be seen the graves of fifteen of his most trusted retainers upon whom the dying chieftain conferred the inestimable honor of inviting them to accompany him to the spirit world by disembowelling themselves at the moment of his death. Like a crimson thread does the story of self-slaughter and vengeful assassination for the master's sake run through the course of Japanese history. Women and children share in the bloody feelings and deeds of their fathers, husbands and brothers. Horrible and yet beautiful is the picture, horrible on account of its bloodshed and barbarity, beautiful by virtue of the spirit of extreme devotion and self-sacrifice displayed.

How this spirit of loyalty would naturally contribute to the strength of the government under which it prevailed it is not difficult to see. The feudal government of Japan during the two centuries and a half that Confucianism was the chief inspiration of the warrior class, was a strong government. When, thirty years ago, the nation awakened to the consciousness that the emperor was not in possession of his full rights, it was nothing other than an extraordinary spirit of loyalty that carried through the Restoration movement, which, while it restored the emperor to his rightful position, deprived the rich and powerful feudal lords of their title, their authority and their income, and reduced many thousands of their devoted retainers to helpless penury. Finally, it was this spirit of loyalty produced by Japan's modification of the ethical system borrowed from China, that, more than any other one thing, gave her the advantage over her ancient neighbor and benefactor in the recent Chino-Japanese war.

No less easy, however, is it also to understand how such a feeling of unquestioning loyalty may play into the hands of rulers animated by motives of ambition or tyranny. While the Confucian system as it has existed in Japan places the maximum of emphasis on loyalty, it exercises little restraint upon the ruler, and the consequent possibility of the abuse of power also finds many sad illustrations in Japanese history.

The second relation is that of father and son, and the correlative duty is that of filial piety. As the entity of first importance in the Japanese social structure is the nation, so that of second importance is the family, or, more exactly, the lineal house. And as the preservation of the national life is an end in itself so the perpetuation of the family or house is an end in itself second in importance only to the perpetuation of the national existence itself. The bearer of the responsibility for this perpetuation of the family, or rather he in whom the family line is incarnate, so to speak, is the head of the house, that is, the father. Toward him, therefore, all things must bend. In feudal days he possessed absolute authority over his house, including the power of life and death over his children. But to every family must necessarily belong

at least one son, the prospective perpetuator of the family line. If there is no male issue by marriage, one of three courses may be followed: the wife may be divorced and another taken; or a concubine may be taken into the house, or a son may be adopted from another family. The imperial line of Japan, known as the oldest unbroken dynasty in the world, has been kept up by recourse to all of these three devices. The virtues appropriate to the son, and to the daughter as well, standing in relation to a parent possessed of such absolute authority, are, of course, reverence, obedience and devotion. Love is excluded; that is a feeling which the father may cherish toward the child, but the manifestation of it on the part of the child towards the father would be a shocking exhibition of familiarity, and a dangerous breach of etiquette. The children must not eat with the father. If one of them die he must not compromise his position of authority and dignity by attending the funeral.

The extent to which the virtue of filial piety has been practiced, especially in pre-Restoration days, is one of the many surprises of Oriental life, and is another evidence of the marvellous power which the Confucian system has undoubtedly wielded over human society. The custom of ministering to the needs and welfare of parents has the force of strict law. That children should support their parents in old age is taken as a matter of course. Cases where sons exchanged the prospect of a promising career for a life of servile toil, or where daughters entered upon lives of shame in order to relieve the distress of their parents, are unnumbered.

The effect of the perpetuation of the family line, as made possible by the practice of filial piety, was, of course, most salutary upon the disordered state of society into which Confucianism entered in Japan. It served to impart stability to the national institutions and to inspire the people with that self-consciousness and calm complacency which a sense of extended time relations always confers, while at the same time a very important element of the Japanese moral nature became highly developed.

But here again the one-sidedness of the Confucian system has

manifested itself. The unlimited authority of the parent over the child has been abused. One of the grossest features of the civilization produced by the Confucian morality has been the sale of daughters for purposes of immorality—a procedure which only recently became illegal. Filial piety required cheerful obedience in such cases, and Japanese literature contains many passages in which this form of filial devotion is extolled and enshrined. Another form of abuse is the unnecessarily early retirement of the parent from active life and the consequent over-burdening of the child. Far too often has it happened that parents at the age of fifty, or still earlier, with the possibility of from ten to twenty years of activity still before them, have retired from the business of bread winning and become dependent upon their children, whom the duty of filial piety compelled to shoulder the burden. What the American finds in the accumulation of fortune, in life insurance, or in beneficial organizations, the Japanese has found in the filial devotion of his children, and an undue leaning upon this resource has produced on the part of the Japanese people a state of contentment with the course of circumstances that, from our modern standpoint, betrays a woful lack of enterprise.

The position of the third relation, that between husband and wife, is significant. Christian ethics would place this relation before that of father and son; the Confucian ethics places it after, and with design. The position of the mother is beneath that of at least her eldest son, the heir of the house. The wife is not first of all the dearest companion and the most confidential friend of her husband. She, too, must reverence and stand in awe of her husband and be faithful to him in all things. She must not love, for that also in her case would show undue familiarity. The wife is *for* the husband, and for him less as an individual than as the perpetuator of the family line, for the family line overshadows every individual. She is, therefore, first and foremost a child-bearer. In the second place she is the faithful servant of her husband, attending to his personal comforts, rearing his children and keeping the house. Her peculiar virtues are those of obedience, faithfulness, patience and meekness. The greatest crime

she can commit is that of unchastity. Jealousy is considered one of her ugliest vices. Anger toward her husband is never excusable, even under the most grievous provocation, and all manifestation of disobedience, disrespect or discontentment is looked upon as a heinous offense. Obediently, faithfully, patiently and meekly, without complaint, without ado, pursuing the even tenor of her way, keeping to her husband, her children and her house, not occupying her hands or her mind with anything outside of her contracted sphere—this is the ideal Japanese woman's life under the Confucian teaching. It is to be added that the number of Japanese women who have fairly realized this ideal is remarkably great.

But it is probable that the one-sidedness of the Confucian system reaches its extreme point in this relation of husband and wife. It is not difficult to understand this when it is remembered that in the abasement of woman Confucianism has in its favor the combined influence of Buddhism and Shintoism, together with almost the whole trend of non-Christian thought. The Japanese term for chastity both in its etymology and its present use has reference to the wife only, not to the husband. Jealousy is an exclusively female vice, "an exhibition of folly and weakness," and is justified by no course of conduct on the part of her husband. While the wife is most strictly bound, the husband is free. Whatever influences to the contrary may be found here and there in the Confucian teachings, they have not sufficed to prevent the husband from using his freedom to an appalling extent. It is a dark blot that the prevalence of concubinage and prostitution have made upon the pages of Japanese history.

The fourth relation, that between elder and younger brother, has its explanation in the fact that the elder brother is the heir of the house and the perpetuator of the family line. He, too, must therefore be regarded with reverence, not only by younger brothers and sisters, but also by the mother. Obedience must be rendered to him by his younger brothers and sisters, while he may command, instruct and reprove. How deeply this relation is ingrained in the structure of Japanese society is revealed by the fact that the Japanese seldom use the words for "brother"

and "sister" only; it is always the "older brother" or the "younger brother," the "older sister" or the "younger sister" that is spoken of. It is never the idea of equality, but always that of gradation that has most rigidly controlled all Japanese thought concerning society, as moulded by the Confucian system.

The fifth relation is that between friend and friend. It is to be noted that it does not read "between man and man." The relation has no reference to strangers or enemies. As for enemies, once when a disciple of Confucius reported that Lao-tse taught that men should return good for evil, the master replied, "What then will you return for good? Recompense injury with justice, and return good for good." It might be asked in the words of the Sermon on the Mount, "Do not the publicans the same?" And as to the stranger, although both Chinese and Japanese interpreters of the classics refer to the subject, it is evident that there is at least no conception of obligation to foreigners. At the World's Parliament of Religions held at Chicago, where the idea of universal love and brotherhood was lauded so highly, it was from a Chinese Confucianist that the only voice of dissent was heard. The gem of Confucius' teaching concerning the fifth relation is embodied in what is sometimes called the silver rule. A disciple inquired of the sage: "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" The master replied: "Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself do not do to others." In distinction from the golden rule of Christ it is negative, and signifies, therefore, far less. Its aim moreover seems to be, not the establishment of blessed relations of the heart between man and man, but the preservation of the good order of society. The virtues arising out of the relation of friend and friend are those of respect, propriety and courtesy. It might be supposed that in this relation at least the idea of equality must prevail. But this at once is seen to be a mistake when the language used by friends in addressing one another is examined. A man in speaking with his friend, by word and manner constantly ascribes superiority to the latter. This is the necessary basis of all right treatment of friends. The idea of

gradation is so inseparably present that it is habitually relied upon to take the place of the use of the personal pronouns. To give an example, the expression "Came early" means, "I came early," while the words, "Augustly condescended to come early," mean, "You (my friend) came early."

In concluding this discussion of the manner in which the doctrine of the five relations has taken form in the history of the Japanese people, it is necessary to add that much of what has been said applies with full force only to the state of Japanese society previous to the Restoration of 1868. Since the Restoration there has been much change. Many of the old ideas and customs have given way to new influences. Confucianism itself as a system of moral teaching for the schools has been successively rejected, readopted and again practically set aside. Ethical conceptions have been widely unsettled and some of them much modified.

Looking at the general subject of the Confucian ethics in Japan, it is to be remarked, first, that Japan *has* an ethical standard, a standard that has in the main retained its identity for over two thousand years. It is a standard that has not only impressed itself most profoundly upon the people over whom it has reigned, but it has also cultivated such a keen sense of the ethical as to enable the Confucian system to retain its hold, and to produce such a widespread and noble practice of the virtues it inculcates as to challenge unbounded admiration. This is a matter of immense importance to the prospective entrance of Christianity into this Confucian country. The fact that a people has for centuries been ruled—ruled almost tyrannically—by a force higher than the material and the carnal, and has learned to prize the ethically exalted as it sees the ethical, is a preparation for the acceptance of the spiritual religion of Christ, together with its lofty morality, that is of unspeakable value.

Secondly, the fact that Confucianism bases duties upon personal relations is a feature of it that is both theoretically correct and that also brings Confucianism and Christianity at this point into close affinity. Confucianism opposes the principle of self-

ishness ; it throws the tremendous weight of its influence on the side of altruism among men. Christ said : " He that loseth his life "—loseth it by giving it for his God and his fellowmen—" shall save it." Confucianism says : Let a man lose his life by giving it for his sovereign, for his parent, for the social order with which he stands connected. Confucianism only falls short of Christianity by limiting the scope of its altruism ; the principle of altruism is there. Not the individual, the selfish, but the common, weal is the great aim of the Confucian ethics and the noblest man is he who lives not in seclusion, but in the current of society. While Buddhism is essentially monastic in its tendencies, Confucianism is the direct opposite. The words of Confucius in reference to the subject were : " It is impossible to withdraw from the world and associate with birds and beasts that have no affinity with us. With whom should I associate but with suffering man ? The disorder that prevails is what requires my efforts." Professor James Legge's comment upon this quotation is : " We must recognize in these words a brave heart and a noble sympathy. Confucius would not abandon the cause of the people. He would hold on his way to the end. Defeated he might be, but he would be true to his humane and righteous mission." It is not a waste of words to repeat that Confucianism is a social and political system of teaching. Its precepts might be summed up in the words : Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself by devoting thyself to bringing about a right social order. When Ieyasu, the greatest of Japan's ancient statesmen, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, undertook the task of bringing order out of the state of comparative chaos that had hitherto prevailed, he showed the greatness of his wisdom by laying unparalleled stress upon the teaching of Confucianism to the people. If there is any point where Confucianism may be able in the future to make any contribution to practical Christianity as existing in Europe and America, it seems to me that it will be right here in the way of giving the Church a deeper sense of her responsibility for the social condition of humanity.

The transition from this second to the third point is not difficult, namely, that Confucianism is a form of optimism. It is an optimism, indeed, that both rests upon an inadequate foundation and looks toward a pitifully imperfect ideal. Its foundation is not the divine power in history, but the good sense of humanity. Its ideal is far from that of an Isaiah, farther still from that of Christ. Instead of looking forward to a picture more glorious than any yet realized by man, it looks backward to the state of society which prevailed in the pre-Confucian ages, and which it seeks to restore. It is an optimism that fixes its eye only upon the earthly condition of man, upon the mere restoration of good social order. But the fact that it is an optimism at all is the significant thing. Outside of Confucianism nearly the whole current of life and thought in the Orient for over two thousand years has been pessimistic. Buddhism, with its hundreds of millions of adherents, is above all things pessimism. That Confucianism should exist and wield during all these ages an optimistic influence has been a vast gain to humanity.

Taking, in the fourth place, some of the particulars of the Confucian morality as it has existed in Japan, it is possible to find here, too, features which give promise for the acceptance of the still higher morality of Christianity. The spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice which has been so deeply inculcated into, and so nobly exemplified by, the Japanese people has already proven a most helpful preparation for the religion of Him who died for the sins of the world. The spirit of self-sacrifice is there; only the objects of it need to be in part supplanted. And even for this supplanting there seems to be going forward an interesting providential preparation. Though Confucianism has not been a religion in Japan, the warrior class, who have been the most thorough-going Confucianists, were not without a deity; the emperor, being looked upon as divine, was virtually their deity. But since the recent advancement of education and the inflow of Western ideas the inevitable consequence has been the gradual deposition of the Mikado from his divine place, thus leaving the religious instincts of the people in search of a Being more per-

manently worthy of religious adoration and service. Again, the duty of filial piety is well attuned to the teachings of the Gospel. It needs to be read more broadly so as to include the mother. In practical Confucianism, however, it can not be said that the mother has been quite without honor. Confucius mourned three years for his mother and then wept upon resuming his usual activities, though it gave him little concern when his wife died. In Japan, also, the mother has not been neglected, though this is due perhaps more to natural instinct than to the Confucian teaching. Neither can it be said that the Japanese ideal of the wife is utterly false. Much of the discipline under which the Japanese woman has for centuries been will help her, when once touched by the power of divine spirit, to bloom into the "true glory of woman." Altogether, the fact that the family idea, though imperfect, has existed at all and has been emphasized so strongly has conferred a blessing upon the life of the Japanese people that is immeasurable. The fifth relation, that is, the relation between friend and friend, while it falls far short of Christian brotherhood, nevertheless contains a preparation for it and facilitates its coming.

The picture of this ancient teaching would be far from complete, however, without a reference to its grave defects. From what has been said it is evident that the Confucian system covers only a part of the field of human duty. It is a giant torso, the head and limbs being missing. While professing to be all-sufficient, it fails to include in its "relations" the highest of them all, namely, the relation between God and man. That the religious instincts of the Japanese nation have not suffered atrophy is not the fault of Confucianism. One of the four things of which Confucius rarely spoke, according to the *Analects*, was spiritual beings, of whose existence itself he was not certain. He died a prayerless death. This is, of course, a matter of fundamental significance, which has had its profound effect upon the Japanese mind. If it can be said that Confucianism has thrown the weight of its influence on the side of altruism in human relations, it must also be said that in reference to the whole sphere

of the supersensible, its voice has been steadily through the ages for agnosticism and scepticism. One of the common experiences of Christianity in its contact with the Confucianism of Japan is a ready appreciation and acceptance of the ethical teachings of Christianity, coupled with a tendency to tone down or deny its dogmatic truths.

As Confucianism has neglected God, so has it neglected the individual man. Though there is much in the Confucian classics that is helpful to the formation of a beautiful personal character, yet, after all is said, it still remains true that over twenty centuries of Confucianism have failed to develop that sense of personality which has been the making of the great historical nations of the Occident. Christian history is largely the history of great men ; Confucian history is the dead level of generality. Confucius did not grasp the truth that in order to the strong social organization is the well-developed individual. Whether it be called pantheism or not, it is true that in both China and Japan, the general has been emphasized at the expense of the particular. The true nature of an organism has not been understood. And it is precisely here that Christianity both meets one of its greatest difficulties and touches one of the points where it will do the greatest good.

A third short-coming of the Confucian system has been its lamentable failure to develop some of the most important features of a right moral life. Its great emphasis upon the duties of the five relations has had the effect of consigning to comparative neglect what little is said in the classics about such virtues as truthfulness, honesty, faithfulness (except to superiors), chastity (except on the part of the wife) and benevolence. The character of the people has been shaped accordingly. Outrageously harsh are those judgments which pronounce the Japanese tricky, treacherous, "a nation of liars and libertines." Yet, there is enough truth in these charges to fill the heart of every friend of Japan with sadness ; and the feeling of deep regret that a large and gifted portion of humanity should have fallen heir to the influence of such an ethical system can only be alleviated by

thankfulness that these Oriental peoples have had an ethical system at all, and that it is a system which in other respects also contains very much of good.

Still another defect of Confucianism, one already touched upon in the course of this article, is its pronounced one-sidedness. It teaches the duties of inferiors to superiors, but neglects the duties of the opposite character. There is, indeed, much in the classics that depicts the beauty of kindness and love on the part of superiors to inferiors, and there is much in Japanese history and life to show that this side of the teaching has not gone entirely unheeded. Yet, on the other hand, history testifies with equal clearness that whenever it comes to a question of duty, the duty lies on the side of the inferior only.

Finally, a word must be devoted to the effect of the feeling of intense nationalism that has grown up under Confucian, combined with Shinto, influence. This strong nationalism has been an undoubted blessing. In the community of nations it has served to make Japan a strong individual. It has fostered a national self-consciousness. It has inspired the Japanese people with a national ambition sufficient to sustain the country in the taking on of the elements of Western civilization with phenomenal rapidity and success. But, on the other hand, now, this very nationalism is in danger of presenting a barrier to the entrance of Christianity, which alone can confer the highest good and, at the same time, confirm the lesser blessings of the Occidental civilization now in such rapid process of adoption. Between the acceptance of everything else that Japan has adopted from abroad, and the acceptance of Christianity there is a distinct difference. The difference is this, that while all other things thus far adopted—Buddhism and Chinese ideographs, as well as Western systems of education, government, military and naval organization—have all yielded themselves to a relation of subordination to the national interests and ambitions, Christianity is something that can occupy no subordinate place. It requires faith in, and obedience to, one who is King of kings and Lord of lords, and who thus occupies a place above that of the sacred emperor. It seeks

to make every earthly kingdom a member of, and, therefore, a subordinate in, the higher kingdom of God. In the way of the full and unreserved acceptance of this new and highest faith the Japanese feeling of nationalism, at least in its older form, undoubtedly stands as a hindrance. There is not absent even to-day a tendency to accept Christianity with reserve, for the sake of its moral benefits, while refusing to it that supreme place in the heart which alone enables it to fulfil its saving mission. Only as this feeling of nationalism is displaced by a broader conception of the mission of a nation can the entrance of Christianity become free and rapid.

To sum up the whole, now, as thus imperfectly presented, it is possible to see that this ancient system of precepts for the guidance of man's life presents a number of features that are a preparation for, and a number of others that constitute barriers to, the Christian faith. On the whole, however, it is a striking monument of the fact that the "true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world" has not been absent from the life of the teeming millions of the Far East. Christianity is now meeting the great Oriental nations. In Japan the conflict of spiritual forces has already assumed advanced and earnest form. The outcome, if it be a victory for Christ's kingdom, as we certainly believe it will be, will form an epoch in Church history ranking in importance with the conversion of the Roman empire and the Reformation of the sixteenth century. And towards that great consummation Confucianism has been more of a preparation than a hindrance.

IV.

MEDIÆVAL LATIN HYMNOLOGY.

BY REV. A. R. KREMER, D.D.

It is not intended here to present a critical essay on this subject as a whole, but rather, and chiefly, to consider the sacred Latin poetry of the Middle Ages in its prosodical aspect, in which it differs so widely and fundamentally from classic verse.

It is said that an association of Latin scholars, organized for the purpose of cultivating the language and literature of the ancient Romans, after careful investigation and study, came to the unanimous conclusion that the mediæval Latin poetry is fatally defective *in form* and scarcely deserving a place in Latin literature, and that the ancient classic verse alone is to be regarded as worthy the name and title of Latin poetry.

Classical scholars are familiar with the fact that classic Latin (and Greek) versification differs from that in modern languages and mediæval Latin in this, that rhythm and meter in the former are based on *quantity* and in the latter on *accent*, that is, on the common or prose accent of the words. The difference is of course very great. The ancient Latin poet had to select and arrange his words with great care, not only that he might express thoughts of poetic beauty and wisdom, but also, such words as would meet the requirements of Latin prosody. A certain word might be the very best in the language to express the poet's sublime thought, and yet it must be rejected if its syllables have not the quantity which the meter demands. In dactylic hexameter any word containing in itself, or being itself, the foot called *amphimacrus*, could not be employed. So that Virgil and Ovid were barred from the use of such excellent words as *veritas*, *sanctitas* and many others. Sometimes the poets cut the Gordian knot by forcing contraband words into service, notably the

word *religio*, whose syllables form a double Pyrrhic or a fourth pœon, either one being forbidden fruit—and they did it right bravely by lengthening the first syllable, modern editors improving on it and easing their consciences by doubling the *l*, and so lengthening the first syllable according to law. The ancients were not sharp enough for that. So also a short final syllable was sometimes conveniently lengthened and made the arsis of a foot. But, with few exceptions, words, however useful and desirable, were rejected if they could not meet the prosodial demands of the verse. As a natural consequence, we find in classic Latin poetry in many places arrangements of words that are simply nondescript. In this respect the difference between the prose of classic Latin and that of modern English, though very considerable, is not to be compared with the difference between them in poetry. The rules that apply to Latin prose arrangement the poet largely ignores, if the rules fail to suit his purpose. He follows as closely as possible the laws of versification ; but those laws are very apt to play fast and loose with arrangement, though now and then, as if by accident, or smart engineering, they coincide. As an example of such coincidence, see *Æn.*, 2 : 189 : “*Nam si vestra manus violasset dona Minervæ.*” The structure of this verse is modern ; it is downright English. In rendering it—*For if your hand should violate the offering to Minerva*—we place the words precisely as they stand in the original, and we call it the natural order, corresponding to the natural flow and succession of thought. If that Latin sentence, or verse, had been written by a modern English writer, scores of voices would probably have been raised against him for the literary crime of writing English with Latin words. But, to be fair and honest, is not that verse smooth, beautiful and rhythmical ? There are three cæsuras in it, two of the foot and one of the rhythm, which last is also the cæsura of the verse, and occurring after the arsis of the third foot is specially approved. Here every word but one is pronounced with the proper accent ; that is, with a single exception, the proper and the rhythmical accent coincide. Tastes differ, but I venture

the assertion that a Latin verse so constructed is more harmonious and more agreeable to the ear and mind than one of mixed arrangement, and weighted with a succession of cæsuras of the rhythm—as, “Hic Ithacus vatem magno” (*Æn.*, 2: 122), one example of a number whose name is legion.

The classic Latin rule of poetic accent is, no doubt, largely responsible for what President Andrews, of Brown University, justly styles “awkward structure of sentences.” In many places it is worse than awkward. A railroad wreck, or raided china shop, may afford some illustration of the havoc frequently made by Latin poets. There seems to be no name for it; adjectives and nouns separated by immense distances, relatives and their antecedents placed as if no relation existed between them, and what not? All easy enough to penetrate by means of grammatical instruments, but defying the mind’s effort to catch the sense through the ear. It seems evident that the Latin poets were often hard pressed by the rigid canons that were held to be inviolable, as witness the number of places in which the order of words differs but little from the modern order, wherever that could be under the reigning laws of versification; all which seems to show that, however much the poets loved their hard master, they were glad that his rule permitted them at times to breathe more freely and to sing more joyously.

Such questions as the following may have occurred to many: Why the great difference between the classic Latin poetry and the mediæval and modern? Did the classic poets expect to be understood if their poems were read to a promiscuous audience? Or, was the popular spoken Latin materially different from the learned and written language? If delivered orally, could those artistic productions be fully and readily understood even by the educated? Or, were they, like ourselves, obliged to search and dig in order to find? Or, were the ancient Romans so gifted by the Muses, or the gods, that they could think backwards as well as forwards, or in any other direction? Some would answer that the literary language of Rome, especially in poetry, was highly artificial and that the writers delighted in a style that only the

most cultured could appreciate ; that what we moderns call perspicuity and directness, of which we make so much account, was little regarded by them ; that the æsthetic effect on the minds of the few was esteemed of more value than the instruction of the many. Be that as it may, the old Roman conscience was not the modern or the Christian conscience. Learned as were many of the Romans, they were still ignorant of the most important truths and doctrines. Virgil and Horace were certainly great poets, who will never cease to be read and admired ; and yet, if modern poets would attempt their style, they would probably be denounced as lunatics. Let them be honored and cherished to-day for what they were and what they wrote nearly two thousand years ago—and let them be judged from the standpoint of their own and not our time. Or, if classic mania so turns some people's heads that they can see nothing to praise in literature except the Greek and Latin classics, there are still others bold enough to assert that, much as the moderns owe to the pagans, the latter are to the former as children with their fairy tales are to men and women with their Milton, Shakespeare and Bible. There is more music and more philosophy in Goethe's and in Longfellow's hexameters than there is in Virgil's, and no torturing of sentences into shapeless forms under stress of a law which the Church—the pillar and ground of the truth—completely annulled. There is more poetry, in form and substance, in Tennyson's "In Memoriam" and "Enoch Arden" than in Horace's best odes. And this is by no means belittling the Latin classics ; it is only asserting the high advance in the poetic art in modern times. The hymns of the middle ages surpass the ancient Roman songs ; and in like manner the mediæval hymns, on which scholars are still writing volumes of praise, are not equal to the standard English and German hymns of our time.

Another feature of classic Latin verse is not to be overlooked as bearing on this subject—the elisions. In English verse they are very rare and unimportant, and few occur in the mediæval Latin hymns. They are painfully numerous in the Latin poetry of the classic period. In many cases they obscure the meaning of a

sentence, if the words reach the mind by the ear route. This fact has constrained modern grammarians to say that the vowels elided by us in scanning were probably pronounced by the ancients. If so, they must have had a hard time of it and rough sailing, especially when as many as three such snags were encountered in a single line. It does not speak well for the ancient Romans that they could not, or did not, produce their poetic measures without grievously marring them with words whose last syllables or letters had to be suppressed. The mediæval hymnologists would none of it, and their system of versification did not require it.

Now, may it not be fairly suggested that those great Latin poets expressed their thoughts as they did because they were pagans in the darkness and ignorance of refined and learned heathenism? If Virgil and Ovid had been enlightened like Moses, David and the Hebrew prophets, would *the form* of their poetry be as it is? As to the substance, we know how different that would have been, while indeed, it must be acknowledged that much in their works is worthy of Jewish or Christian authorship. But the form, the versification and unspeakable arrangement as a frequent and necessary consequence—would it not all have been different if those men had not been under the influence and power of pagan idolatry and false religion?

It may help to answer the question affirmatively if we compare their poetry with that of God's people, the Israelites. The Hebrew language is older than Greek and Latin; and yet its structure is simple and natural, both in prose and poetry. We look there in vain for sentences twisted out of all shape and revealing their meaning only, or chiefly, by word accidents. We moderns cannot conceive of any right order, in general, except that which prevails in the languages spoken by people of Christian nations. And it was the order, with but slight difference, from Moses to Leo XIII. (if you please), and very likely from Adam to Moses, among the "sons of God," however otherwise it might have been among the sons and "daughters of men." The language of the spiritual Canaan is not the artificial language of

pagan Greece and Rome, though these, especially the former, furnished the Church of Christ with linguistic material for which she will never cease to be in debt. As the Christian ages advanced the Israelite simplicity and directness of speech appeared more and more to distinguish Christianity from paganism—until in the middle ages when Christian hymnology had a way of its own.

And what did the mediæval Church produce in this line? How did the Christian Church of that day write her Latin hymns? Not by imitating the style and observing the ancient laws of versification. Of course not, for, if otherwise, the sentence pronounced by that coterie of classical students, already referred to, against the hymnologists of the middle ages, would not have been uttered. They used the Latin language very much as the ancient prophets used the Hebrew. Their object was not to produce exhilaration of the mind simply, but rather to satisfy the soul's deep spiritual needs and aspirations. Their hymns were intended for the Christian people of all grades and mental capacities and were, therefore, not constructed, in thought or linguistic art, to produce a momentary æsthetic effect, but to enter the inner spirit to abide there permanently, and that too without respect of persons from the learned sage to the simple minded peasant. The simplicity of style in the mediæval hymns accords with the sacred forms in which divine revelation from the beginning to the end is conveyed to the human intellect. It is a testimony to the declaration of Holy Scripture that the wisdom of the unsanctified learned world is foolishness with God. Here, as universally, the casket corresponds to the treasure which it enshrines.

If what has now been said is in the main true, what becomes of the dictum that the mediæval hymns are not worthy of a place in Latin poetry? That the Christian poets of what is called the Iron Age of Roman literature wrote as they did because they knew only a barbarous Latin, is an unwarranted supposition. And to say that even the best of their hymns could command the universal praise of modern scholars only on account of their

substance is equally wide of the mark. Sentiment and form of expression are well nigh inseparable as bases of judgment on a poem. No doubt a rare unlettered genius might produce flashes of poetic lightning now and then that would astonish the intellectual world ; but it could scarcely be imagined that a host of hymn writers would be able, with corrupt speech and unorthodox prosody, to hold spell bound a nineteenth century audience of the most learned men in all lands. The Germans call “*Dies Iræ*” the “giant hymn,” and we have yet to learn that they do so with any reservation, such as—notwithstanding the wretched garments in which the hymn is clothed. There is abundant internal evidence that the most of those hymn writers understood classic Latin. The author of “*Dies Iræ*” became a noted dignitary in the Church, and was a scholarly man. His famous hymn shows that he not only rejected the stiff artificial prosody of the classic period, but that he could also have conformed to it if he had so willed. The structure of sentences is in harmony with grammatical principles. The words used are classic, and there is nothing in the hymn that is contrary to pure Latinity. It differs widely from the standards of the Golden Age, but for reasons that need not be repeated. Thomas de Celano shows in this wonderful lyric, in a negative way though it be, that he was familiar with the peculiarities of ancient Latin versification. For instance, he never employs a word that ends with a vowel if the following word begins with one, or *vice versa*—except in the last stanza of two lines, which are generally regarded as spurious. He evidently wished to avoid the necessity of what was so common in classic verse, *elision*, and, at the same time, his classic training led him to avoid the supposed disagreeable sound which would have resulted from such clashing of vowels. As to *ecthlipsis* he was not so careful ; and yet the fact that he disregarded it in but three of his lines (stanzas 1 and 13), seems to show that he purposely avoided the necessity of violating that figure of prosody, while at the same time he appears to have considered it of less importance than the other, as well he might ; for it is not clear as day, to moderns at least, why the letter *m*

and a vowel before it should be cut off (in reading) before the initial vowel of the following word.

It is questionable whether the "Dies Iræ" merits all the praise that has been showered upon it for centuries. If certain writers are to be believed, it has not its equal in the whole list of sacred lyrics. Only fifty-five short lines, and yet admiration of it has kept on increasing with the ages. One writer (and he a thorough scholar and theologian) says of this venerable hymn, that it "sounds the litany of a world. * * * Like the tolling of a midnight bell, like the beating of thunder among the mountains, like the sound of many waters, like the very voice of the archangelic trumpet, this penitent yet believing cry throbs out of the past. Its roll and tread haunts the memory like the sway and rumbling of a catafalque. * * * As if with the strokes of a heavy hammer, its iterations, whose very sounds suggest the scene they portray, stagger and break the spirit of mortal pride. * * * Its glooms are shot with that unapproachable light, in which, brooding above the weltering chaos of fear, the Holy Ghost commands day out of the dark, and shows the glories of forgiveness in the face of Jesus Christ"—and much more by the same brilliant writer.

It is doubtful whether anything of all that has ever been written on Virgil, Ovid or Horace, exceeds that. We know, of course, that enthusiasts affirm of this or that passage in one or other of those classics, that it is unrivalled in all the poetic literature of the ages; but the praise lavished upon "Dies Iræ" is intended for the whole piece, every stanza and verse being regarded as possessing supreme merit. It is not likely that any one has said of the great Latin hymn what a certain learned professor of Latin has said of the *Æneid*—that there is "a great amount of trash in it." On the contrary, nothing but laudation, so far as I know, has ever been expressed concerning this mediæval hymn. It may be excessive, overdone; but the fact remains that no unfavorable criticism on this honored Christian poem could ever command a respectful hearing. This alone should be a sufficient answer to the classical scholars who assert that there is no real Latin poetry except the ancient classic.

It is well known that Mr. Gladstone is a thorough Latin scholar, and devotes many of his spare hours to translating from Horace and others. Yet that great man evidently has never been scandalized by the mediæval versification, for he adopted it himself in rendering Toplady's English hymn, "Rock of Ages"—*Jesus pro me perforatus*. It will be noticed that he strictly follows the rule of *accent*, and not of quantity, in his trochaic measures, and departs from it only when convenient, as in the verse, "Tu per sanguinem tepentem," where, as in classic poetry, there is a cæsura of the rhythm. In the third stanza the same occurs, only that a *short* syllable is cut off and made the arsis of a foot, according to exceptional classic usage. Then, in the same stanza, there must be an elision of a vowel in order to preserve the meter. So the mediæval prosody has the great advantage of using the rhythmic as well as the proper accent, and while it is chary of elisions, yet occasionally so employs and arranges words as to make them necessary.

It is to be noted here that the most ancient of our Latin hymns are the least far removed, in form, from classic models. Prudentius, born in the middle of the fourth century, followed them right loyally, as we see in the few hymns of his that have come down to us, with variations, however, just enough to mark the beginning of a general rebellion against the whole ancient system of prosody. Prudentius and St. Ambrose may be said to represent the early dawn of the radical breaking away from the traces in which Latin poets were formerly held, until in the heart of the middle ages where we can find scarcely a sign of the prosodial scheme of the Augustan age, as, for example, in *Dies Iræ*, in which the versification is based strictly on prose accent. In two places only, in the fifteenth and sixteenth stanzas, is the last syllable of a word accented and made the arsis of a foot, but, the meter being trochaic, the change is scarcely noticeable.

It is worthy of remark also that *rhymes* here reach their perfection. In *Dies Iræ* there is scarcely a false rhyme, unless it be held that in the third stanza the short *o* in "sonum" and "thronum" does not perfectly rhyme with the long *o* in "re-

gionum ;” and where the rhyming terminations, having the same letters, are not modified by a different letter before each, as, *dicturus*, *rogaturus* ; as against the perfect rhyme, *venturus*, *discussurus*, etc. The same can be said of Bonaventura’s “*Sanctæ Crucis*,” and that gem of the middle ages, “*Stabat Mater*,” both as near perfection as to rhyme as almost any modern hymn. Say what we will about “jingling rhymes,” the modern literary world, while freely acknowledging a high place for blank verse, will have the rhymes. The mediæval lyric poetry *rhymed*, and that kind has been doing it ever since. This feature had its beginning and growth, like other things ; and so we find something of it in Prudentius and others of his day, as well as indications of it at a much earlier period. The “*Vexilla Regis*” of Venantius Fortunatus, written in the sixth century, the most celebrated of the earlier hymns, shows an advance in the matter of rhyme, and he may, in some sense, be regarded as the father of it. As the centuries advanced the new forms became more and more fixed, and what was for a while mere assonance became gradually the finished rhyme in the hymns of a later period.

Thus the hymns of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries have these characteristics : (1) They were not drawn up in the artificial meters of the old Roman poets, but usually in the plain trochaic and iambic, the most prevalent in modern poetry to the present time. (2) Their poetic forms are based exclusively on accent, every accented syllable being regarded as long, the unaccented as short, and varying from this rule only when convenience dictated. For example, take a line in the fifteenth stanza of *Dies Iræ*, already referred to,

“*Statuens in parte dextra,*”

and compares it with one in “*Vexilla Regis*,” written 600 years earlier, when the Christian poets were not entirely free from the literary bondage of Rome : “*Fulget crucis mysterium.*” The difference is very marked, though it must be considered that the harshness of quantity accent is much greater in iambic than in

trochaic meter, and more difficult to avoid in the former ; and yet the iambic verses of the later middle ages are as free as possible from transference of accent. (3) Elisions are avoided as much as possible. Either no attention is paid to the classic rules on the subject, or else they make elision necessary only if the sense of the passage is thereby not obscured, and if it does not create an unpleasant jar in the reading. Take as an example a line from Mr. Gladstone's Latin version of "Rock of Ages" (though "The Grand Old Man" wrote some time *after* the middle ages): "Fontem Christi quæro immundus;" and such can be found here and there in the old Latin hymns. But they are smooth as glass, if compared with this in Virgil, "Postquam introgressi et," or "te hinc comitem asportare," and hundreds of others. All such breakers are carefully avoided by our Latin hymnologists.

But it may be asserted that very few Latin meters were available for sacred Christian poetry based on accent. It can be shown to be otherwise—supposing that classic meters generally were suitable for such purpose, which they are not, though the most objectionable may be better than certain outlandish meters we sometimes find in hymn books. If dactylic hexameters can be made in Latin with the proper accent maintained, the same is true as to all other meters. Of course, in such verses there could be no cæsura of the rhythm, that which makes almost the whole difference between classic and mediæval verse. There is a line in Ennius, a stock example given by pretty nearly all writers on Latin prosody, that has no cæsura of any kind, every word being itself a foot ; and there seems to have been a conventional agreement that it is devoid of poetic quality on that account :

"Romæ moenia terruit impiger Hannibal armis ;"

though it certainly shows up in vigorous style the African general before the walls of Rome. No doubt a verse whose words are linked together in an unbroken chain, or nearly so, is more musical and rhythmical ; for example, one of modern date :

"Milite nunc constante, puella nurusque recedunt."

Both lines are classic in form, the second having the much approved

feminine cæsural pause and several cæsuras of the foot, yet in both every word is pronounced according to the true accent, the classic and the modern method coinciding. Still this does not settle the question ; for we want to know whether dactylic hexameters could be made if all accented syllables were treated as long and the unaccented as short, as in modern poetry and mediæval Latin. It can be done ; for example :

“ Omnes sunt in cavernis, curruntve per atra deserta ; ”

which being read according to the proper accent of each word, we have substantially all that is in the classic hexameter verse. The cæsural pause occurs between *cavernis* and *currunt*, that is, in the thesis of the third foot, the long syllables, *is* and *curr*, being pronounced in one-eighth time, as short syllables, a feat far more easily accomplished than stumbling and dragging over the rough places in classic verse. So all the ancient meters could have been utilized, had it been desirable to do so, under the laws established by the mediæval Latin poets. And who will say that the laws governing the pagan Romans in making verse are absolutely inseparable from pure Latinity ? It has been so affirmed, but is it true ?

And even if it may be allowed that classic Latin versification is founded on high and rational principles ; that the amazing permutations and involutions, so frequently occurring, are real artistic excellencies ; that there is nothing in construction and arrangement forced by the inexorable demands of prosody ; that the sensitive ear of the Romans was so responsive to the numerous inflections of their own vernacular that they could with but little mental effort instantly straighten and comprehend the most tangled sentence ; still it remains all the same true, that the brightest lights in the Church of the middle ages repudiated the whole thing, refusing to make it *their own* rule and law. It was only in the period of the greatest corruption in Christian faith and morals, when pagan ideas were rampant in the Church, that attempts were made to imitate Horace in the composition of hymns. But the devout Christian sense of what was left of the true Israel—the holy remnant—would not long endure the musical rendi-

tion of such relics of heathenism in the house of God. It was scarcely a decade before the new wine burst the old bottles.

All true scholars admire the literary works of the Greeks and Romans. These will live while the world stands, and will probably even survive the general wreck. Homer and Virgil will be read *rhythmically*, and not as if they were prose, with as much delight as ever; and the students who simply dig out the meaning, without paying attention to the structure of the verses and their rhythmic movement, are losing at least half their labor. The prosody (however ill suited for Christian hymnology), and the great variety in the structure of sentences, are worthy of careful study; and the mental discipline acquired from such study is of vast account. Some of the classic meters are grand; and the heroic epic especially is too majestic to be lightly esteemed by diggers in ancient mines of literary wealth. The so-called Horatian stanza is beautiful, as well as some others of Horace's numerous meters; and the Sapphic is charming. Dr. T. C. Porter has clearly demonstrated the fitness of this meter for sacred Christian song in a delightful poem of six stanzas, in Sapphic verse. "All things are yours," St. Paul says, yours to receive, adopt, change, remold, or to reject whatever is unfit for Christian use.

So the Church, in composing hymns for her people, kept this steadily in view: That she was in spiritual and moral authority and would be bound or dictated to neither by secular princes, nor by pedants in the world of letters, and would use the monuments of ancient pagan learning as she saw to be fit and wise. From the beginning the Church grasped the new and true situation and drew the line between the forms themselves in which heathen ideas were clothed and such as should contain and express the offices of the only true religion. For as the body without the spirit is dead, so the spirit without a body in all respects corresponding to itself is in the wrong place and in poor condition to perform its proper functions. The early Church struck the keynote of Zion; the mediæval hymns were the result; and the Church of to-day can testify that with them a thousand years is as one day, new and fresh now as when they first saw the light.

Modern Christianity has added immensely to the hymnology of the past and has greatly improved on it, and yet the Latin hymns that have come down to us have lost nothing by comparison. Rather, every century has added luster to their excellence and worth.

Then, on what premises will any one base the affirmation that the sacred poetry of the middle ages is mean and barbarous? On what authority is the decision made that “*Stabat Mater*” is not as good Latin poetry as Horace’s “*O matre pulchra?*” Is not the former grammatically correct and poetical? “Yes, but its rhythm, if it has any, is based on accent, and not on quantity: therefore it is all wrong.” But that is mere assertion; others have an equal right to say the former is an improvement on the latter; that the Christian poet, seeing the unadaptedness of the classic rigid rules of prosody to Christian hymnology, resorted to the direct and simple method of making verse—preserving as far as possible the true accent of each word, thus avoiding the necessity of holding the mind in severe suspense by constructions and word arrangements that, in classic verse, so frequently mock the natural and logical order and continuity of thought. To sum up all: The classic Latin poetry is pagan; the mediæval is Christian. Each has its proper place. The one exhibits a truly wonderful development of the mental and moral powers in men under a system of merely human culture; the other, besides all that, shows what men are and what they can accomplish under the guidance of the Divine Spirit, and under the nurture of man’s true *Alma Mater*, the Church, whose head is the Son of God, the Truth and Light of the world. Then is it not in perfect order to say, that the Latin poetry of Christian saints is of a higher order, considered from whatever point of view, than that of the most gifted Roman who knew not the true God?

V.

TITHES *VERSUS* APPORTIONMENTS.

BY REV. J. G. NOSS.

Tithing was the old way, apportionment is the new, of procuring means to carry forward the work of God in the sphere of the Church. Some persons can see no antagonism between them, holding that the system of apportionment only indicates the amount needed and the objects to which the tithe-offerings are to be devoted; and that they both can be made use of together, without inconsistency or confusion. They differ, however, in principle, and it may be well to direct attention to this difference at a time when our Boards of Missions are in financial embarrassment because the apportionments are not paid by the churches.

The *Tenth* is declared to be holy unto the Lord (Lev. 27 : 30) —holy, not as the result of a subjective vow like that of Jacob at Bethel, but rather in the sense in which the seventh day is holy, objectively hallowed by God Himself. For tithing is older than Moses and Jacob (Abraham gave tithes to Melchizedek) and seems to have been the universal recognition and expression in all ancient religions of the obligation due by the beneficiary to the Benefactor. It is not probable that such a uniform and universal observance could have been of merely human origin, but must have been based on the expression, in some form, of the will of God. The very nature and purpose of the visible creation would seem to demand such consecration of a regular portion of it to holy ends. As time is in order to eternity God sanctified the seventh day to be for man the type and foretaste of the eternal Sabbath; and as the visible creation is in order to the invisible the tenth of the perishable increase of the flock and the field is to be so used as to awaken and keep active in man hunger

and thirst for the imperishable meat and drink of the Kingdom of Heaven. From the human standpoint the temporal and natural are first, the eternal and spiritual afterwards, but from the divine, the eternal and spiritual are first and last. Under the law of God, therefore, the whole world of nature must bear witness not only to the fact that the hand that made it is divine, but that the Divine is never absent from it; and although under the law of death and decay now, its issue must be the realization of God's eternal purpose. It were strange, then, and an evidence that God either had no everlasting purpose in the natural creation, or had given it up after man's fall, if He did not sanctify to Himself the first-born of man and beast, the first-fruits of the earth and a definite proportion of all the increase, as well as of time, in order to keep alive His name and purpose in the world. The whole creation—man, the animal, the vegetable and the earth itself (Canaan, the Holy Land)—is to witness to all generations its coming glorification.

It is on this line of thought, it would seem, that the question whether the law of tithes is binding upon the Christian Church can be best answered. It is self-evident that until the eternal Sabbath is at hand the fourth commandment is obligatory on Christian and Jew alike. It should be equally clear that until the corruptible creation shall have put on incorruption the law of tithing will remain, for God's purpose has not changed, nor do the Church and the world cease to need the ministry of the eternal and spiritual things of God. It has, however, often been said that the obligation of the Christian to give is entirely moral and not legal, as in the case of the Jew. But this is a distinction without a difference. Every commandment of God is moral, whether under the Law or under the Gospel. His demanding the tenth is no less purely moral than the injunction of Christ to His disciples to lay up their treasures in Heaven. Neither Jew nor Christian is physically compelled to observe these precepts, but the neglect of them brings temporal and spiritual poverty upon both.

But does Christ in His teaching enjoin the observance of the

law of tithing upon His followers? Not in so many words. Indeed this question could hardly have arisen at the time; for none of His disciples, being Jews, could have had any doubt as to the obligation in this direction. But the principle which underlies tithing He very clearly emphasizes. He not only glorifies the human by actualizing the divine Ideal in His own person and life, but in all His teaching He also glorifies the whole natural order (not the tenth merely) by using it to show forth the holy and eternal purpose and wisdom of God. His conduct in another direction also justifies this conclusion; for, although not a Levite, He was supported during the time of His public ministry by those to whom He ministered. And when He sent out the Twelve to teach and to work miracles He forbade them to take purse and scrip. They were also to be supported by those to whom they preached and who, as Jews, were at the same time paying tithes at Jerusalem. They afterwards reported to the Master that they lacked nothing while engaged in this work. Paul, after discussing this question from the standpoint of the Law refers to this command of Christ as conclusive in the matter: "Even so hath the Lord ordained that they which preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel" (1. Cor. 9: 4-14). But it is also not probable that the binding obligation to give the tenth became a serious question in the Apostolic Church. The full glow of the new love and the consciousness of their inheritance in the Kingdom of Heaven moved the early Christians, at first, to regard all their earthly possessions as common property, and afterwards to give even "beyond their power."

It was only after the condition of the Church had changed from poverty to a growing accumulation of earthly goods that brought this question into serious debate. The majority of the fathers answered it in the affirmative, claiming that Christians should give even more than this law demands, because of the exceeding greatness of their calling. But, as the wealth and power of the Church increased, the willingness to give the tenth decreased, until at the beginning of the fifth century we find St. Augustine complaining in these words: "Our forefathers

abounded in all things because they gave tithes to God and tribute to Cæsar ; but now, because our devotion to God is sunk, the taxes of the state are raised upon us." ("Bingham's Antiquities," Book V.)

But the authorities of the Church were largely to blame for this condition of things. No sooner had persecution ceased and the property of the individual Christians and of the congregations was secure than endowments of churches were sought both from the state and the members of the Church. This it was that, in the opinion of men like Chrysostom and Augustine, occasioned the growing indifference to the payment of tithes. For "they seem to say," says Bingham, "that the Church was never better provided than when her maintenance was raised chiefly from them. For then men's zeal prompted them to be very liberal in their daily offerings ; but as lands and possessions were settled upon the Church this zeal sensibly abated ; and so the Church came to be worse provided for under the notion of growing richer."

It is needless to follow the history of the evil effects upon the Church by state aid, and endowments, from whatever source derived, from the beginning to our time. All thoughtful men agree in opinion with those who first felt their blight upon the true spirit of benevolence. Church endowments, like church debts, are mortgages on the benevolence of posterity. In this country the Church has had the blessed, untrammelled opportunity to realize the ideal of God in the direction of His demand for the tenth. Especially has this been the case in our own Reformed Church. But history is again repeating itself. We commenced here in poverty caused by persecution in the Fatherland. Out of their poverty the fathers also gave even beyond their power. But the accumulation of property has also proved a hindrance rather than a help toward keeping up the spirit of benevolence. What was to be done ? Should the members be confronted with the moral obligation to give the tenth as part of the gospel ? Or should some other method be introduced as a substitute ? This whole question confronted the Church about fifty years ago. In the

Mercersburg Review of 1851 Dr. Harbaugh has an article on Systematic Benevolence (the substance of a small volume on the same subject published in 1858) in which, though denying the binding obligation of the law of tithes, he makes a noble effort to hold the Church to its duty in this regard. Dr. Schaff followed him, by request of the Synod, in a sermon on the same subject, which is published in the *Review* in 1852. In this sermon Dr. Schaff agrees with the majority of the fathers that the law of tithes is obligatory on the Christian Church and gives very valuable counsel to the Reformed Church. There was considerable spirit aroused on this subject in the Church at that time, and to some effect, too, for the minutes of the Synod show that the contributions for Domestic (now Home) Missions rose from \$361.28½ in 1847 to \$4,114.55 in 1859. Would that the Reformed Church had never resorted to any other method for raising benevolent funds !

But we have *Apportionment* now. That is, because the God-ordained way of raising means for the support of all the interests of the Church, and “which needs not human recommendation and justification,” did not produce the desired revenue, we have ordained a way of our own. For no one will question the statement that the expectation of larger revenue brought in the system of apportionment. The system was first applied to the Contingent Fund and from that has been extended, with a few notable exceptions, to most of the general benevolent interests of the Church.

But this way of raising revenue in the Church is, in principle, the same that underlies taxation in the civil government. The civil government of Pennsylvania, for instance, estimates the amounts needed for its various departments, and on that basis, when such amounts have been appropriated by law, the assessments are made and collected from the citizens, and no county or township has the right to change the rate fixed upon for State requirements. The system of apportionment parallels this order. The Boards of Missions, for instance, make the estimates needed for the work under their care ; the General Synod adopts these

estimates, either with or without amendment, and apportions the amounts upon the members of the Church through the Synods, the Classes and the Consistories. And to parallel the civil principle in still another particular, the Eastern Synod by its action at Milton, last October, denies the right of a lower judicatory to change the apportionment made upon it by the higher. It were pathetic, if it came not so near being ludicrous, to see how strenuously the advocates of the system of apportionment try to complete the parallel by bringing "the apportionment down to the individual member." But a wrong principle applied to anything is sure to be found wanting in the end. So long as we only *legislate*, in imitation of the State, on apportionments, the work is easy, but to attempt to actualize that legislation in a sphere in which giving is a voluntary act dependent on the moral state of the giver—this is labor.

It is not difficult to see what the outcome would be if the State were to combine the legal and moral principles in this way, by determining its expenditures on one and raising its revenues on the other—by entering into legal contracts for salaries, etc., and then, by law, designating how much is required from each voter to meet the amount appropriated, but with only moral agencies for collecting any of it, and with the expectation that the willing will make up the shortcomings of the unwilling and the rich the deficiencies of the poor. The liabilities would soon exceed the assets, and far more so than is the case in our Board of Home Missions. For it is to be conceded that the apportionment, being made upon the communicant membership of the Church, meets with a better response than would be the case in a similar effort by the State upon the citizens in general. Nevertheless, both hypothesis and facts show that such combination of the legal and moral principles cannot bring satisfactory results in the Church in its unglorified state. And it is useless for the advocates of such a system to kick against the pricks. If the preaching of the Gospel does not beget in the members of the Church the moral disposition to give, legislation is in vain. Nor does it do any good, but harm rather, to constantly goad those pastors

whose congregations do not raise the apportionments in full, as if they were as responsible for results as tax-gatherers are in the civil sphere. Pastors are answerable for the faithful preaching of the whole Gospel, but not for its effect either in the salvation of men or the raising of apportionments. We cannot refrain from quoting in this connection a sentence from the sermon (referred to above) of Dr. Schaff: "To make laws which cannot be carried out is very unwise and can only serve to undermine respect for law and authority itself."

But what does all this imply? It does not imply that there is no work for our Boards of Missions to do, much less that our missionary operations must be contracted; but it does imply that if the present embarrassment is to be avoided in the future the legal principle which lies at the basis of the apportionment system must be given up; and given up not merely as a matter of policy, but of principle. For, in the sphere of the Church, no member has the moral right to legally obligate another member for one cent without the authority of such other member. And what one member has not the right to do, no Board or Judicatory can have in this respect. It might seem that such authority is conferred upon the Boards by the Judicatory which appoints them, such Judicatory being constituted by the representatives of the members. But this were a gratuitous assumption. The organic law of the State gives such authority to the representatives of the people in the civil sphere, but the Constitution of the Reformed Church confers no right of this kind upon the representatives in any of its Judicatories. The Consistory, even, has no moral right to legally contract to pay a definite amount as salary to a pastor without the consent of the members of the congregation. And if that portion of the missionary pastor's salary which the Consistory of the mission itself covenants to pay can only be rightly grounded on this basis, what right has the mission to expect and the Board of Missions to make a legal contract to pay the balance without the consent of those who are to pay it? The Board ought not to make its contracts on the basis of the amount apportioned, but on that of the amount con-

tributed. The Boards are the custodians and dispensers of the offerings of the Church, not the creators of them. Paul had no moral right to pledge to the poor Church in Jerusalem any definite amount. He could only bring to their relief what the members of the churches in Europe and Asia gave him for this purpose.

But it may be said that this would leave our missionary work in uncertainty and chaos. The answer might be made by asking the question: What else have we *now*? There is always a way out of the depths, however, if we cry unto the Lord. When Peter, from lack of faith, began to sink into the waves of Genesaret, his very helplessness in consequence of his lack of faith reawakened faith in him. It was not his cry, "Lord, save me," that the Master rebuked, for it marked the beginning of his rising again. So the want of faith in Christ has brought us into deep waters and if our extremity be the turning point to renewed faith, He who promised to be with His Church to the end of the age will be nigh to stretch out His hand for our deliverance. We need faith more than we need money, however, in order to receive the needed help; for if wonderful works are to be wrought through us they will be done according to our faith and not according to our money.

The Church of our time has sadly fallen in with the materialistic spirit of the age, and the Reformed Church has not escaped its influence. What a miserable expression of this materialism in the Church is such a sentence as this: "The conversion of the world is, in my opinion, now reduced to a question of money." ("The Path To Wealth," p. 60). But in what, after all, does this statement differ, except in form and directness, from that which we so often hear in our own Church: "Give us the money and we will furnish the men," for the larger missionary operations at home and abroad? Is not this, however, a reversal of the whole teaching of Christ on this subject? With Him it is first the Kingdom, with the assurance that the material things shall be added; first the men, then the support; and first the forsaking, for His sake and the Gospel's, of all world-relationship

on the basis of the natural life, with the promise of a hundred-fold return on the basis of the higher life in Him. His "*Follow Me*" is to be obeyed without any condition of our making. The minister of the Word who has no faith in the ability and will of Christ to provide for his temporal needs, in and through His disciples, can have but little in His power in and through the Gospel to save them that believe. The two are inseparable. The absence of such faith lowers the ministry to the level of a mere profession. It ought to be the constant aim of the Church to rear men who have not merely the disposition to volunteer to be missionaries under well-defined material conditions, but such men as shall have the spirit and faith which Christ demanded of those whom He first sent as his ambassadors and stewards into the world. When this end is attained, whether such men be called to the pastorate of self-supporting or mission congregations, the first question will no longer be that of money.

The conclusion of the whole matter is, that while the missionaries, or rather the missions, both in the home and foreign fields, should by all means receive the financial support of the whole Church, our missionary administration must be conducted on a higher plane than that of the apportionment system. If the Church believes that the law of tithes is still of binding obligation then the only thing to do is to proclaim it far and wide and to bend all energies toward the realization of this God-ordained principle of giving. Many have all along given in this way and the number would be greater if the Church, instead of bringing in the apportionment system, had steadily held before her membership the demand of God for the tenth of what He gives. For the system of apportionments unquestionably has had the effect of encouraging those to self-complacency who give as little as they can, while it has rather discouraged those who give tithes conscientiously; just as the lowering of the moral standard in any case has such two-sided effect upon the morally weak and the morally strong. When the Jews robbed God of the tithes in the days of Malachi, God confronted them anew with the demands of that law. He did not lower the standard of His law to accom-

moderate their unwillingness to give. And the primary purpose now should not be the raising of more money, but the keeping of this law before the Church as the ideal of God for our giving. This ought to be deemed far more precious than silver and gold. Of course, there are difficulties to be met with in any effort to bring in a general introduction of tithe-giving. But the chief thing is not to shirk the God-ordained law in this direction, and to cultivate a tithe-giving conscience as an end in our system of Christian nurture from the family to the theological seminary. And every one ought to practice what he preaches. If the hearts and the heads, the faith and the knowledge in this direction are once sound, however, the practice cannot be wholly unsound.

VI.

BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.

BY REV. F. A. GAST, D.D.

It is no exaggeration to say that Biblical Theology is a science of fundamental importance. Not only is it the crowning glory of the biblical sciences, presupposing their special, often minute investigations, and gathering up into itself their richest fruits, but it is, at the same time, the starting point of the development of all Christian truth—the basis on which, as on the only true foundation, must rest the doctrines of the Church—and the touch-stone by which must be tested the validity of every dogmatic system. It has a distinct and independent place in theological study, and the results it reaches are so important in their bearings as to demand a clear and definite conception of the object with which it deals, the aim it proposes to itself, the limits within which it moves and the method it pursues.

Yet, strange as it may seem at first sight, the distinctive character of this science is but vaguely apprehended by wide circles of the ministry, especially in this country. To the question, What is Biblical Theology? many could give no satisfactory answer. They may, perhaps, have heard the name, but they have only an obscure perception of its meaning. Generally they confuse Biblical Theology with something wholly different. While one, laying stress on the word “biblical,” regards it as a science relating to the Bible and dealing with its origin and literary history, the collection of its books into the canon, the treatment of its text, the laws of its interpretation, and like matters; another, misled by the word “theology,” identifies it with the system of Christian doctrines viewed as in accord with and proved by the teachings of the Bible. Both conceptions are erroneous. It is true, the term “Biblical Theology” has at times been employed in

a wide sense to denote that department of theology which has to do with the Bible as its object, comprising Biblical Philology, Historico-critical Introduction, Hermeneutics and Exegesis. But these sciences are preliminary to Biblical Theology and lead up to it as their goal. Not until they have severally performed their tasks does the Biblical theologian begin his work. And that work is not exegetical, but strictly historical. For this, among other reasons, Biblical Theology, as designating a distinct theological discipline, must be carefully distinguished from the doctrinal system embodied in the Church's Creeds and Confessions. It is not Christian Dogmatics. It is not even, if such a science were possible, Biblical Dogmatics. It belongs neither to the exegetical nor to the systematic, but to the historical department of the theological sciences.

After all, however, these popular misconceptions are not surprising. Biblical Theology is a comparatively young science. It attained an independent existence barely more than a century ago. At that time the name was indeed not new, but the science now known by that name had not yet been born. The honor of giving it birth is due to John Philip Gabler, who, in an Academic address delivered in 1787, defined it as an historical science and drew the limits between it and Dogmatic Theology.* Ever since it has been diligently cultivated, especially in Germany, the intellectual workshop of the world. Unfortunately, however, through ignorance of the German language—an ignorance more prevalent formerly than to-day—the rich literature on this important subject has been practically inaccessible to large numbers even of scholarly ministers. Few translations have been published. In the Old Testament division of Biblical Theology we have Oehler and Schultz, from the German, and Piepenbring, from the French; in the New Testament division we have Schmid, Van Osterzee, Weiss and Beyschlag. Much has been done in the way of separate treatment of special topics in Biblical Theology, and

* *De justo discrimine theologiæ Biblicæ et dogmaticæ regundisque recte utriusque finibus.* Altdorfii, 1787. The address is published in his "Opuscula Academica," second volume.

some of these monographs have been given to the world in an English dress, such as Riehm's "Messianic Prophecy," Pfleiderer's "Paulinism," and Wendt's "The Teaching of Jesus." Neither England, Scotland nor America, so far as the present writer's knowledge extends, has produced an original treatise covering the whole field, either of the theology of the Old Testament or of that of the New. Duff's "Old Testament Theology" remains a fragment, and Davidson's, though long promised, has not yet been issued. There are not wanting, indeed, able discussions of particular topics, such as Brigg's "Messianic Prophecy" and Stevens' "Pauline Theology," together with numerous articles of greater or less value in the theological reviews; but for a complete systematic treatment of Biblical Theology we are still dependent on Germany. And when we remember that the translations we have were published within a recent period, we ought not to wonder at the erroneous notions so widely prevalent on this important branch of theological study. It is only of late years that it has been taught in our theological seminaries, and consequently our older ministers had no opportunity to pursue the study.

In view of these false impressions, then, it may be of service to many readers of *THE REVIEW*, if we set forth, as clearly as possible, the exact character and aim of this science. In the way of general definition we may say that Biblical Theology is an historico-genetic presentation of the religion of revelation as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament. The object with which it is concerned is a history. It traces the development of the religion mirrored in the Bible, from its origin through its ever-ascending stages, till it reaches its predestined completion in the Christianity of Christ and His immediate disciples.

Yet it has to do only with the internal movement of the religious thought and life. All that relates to the external side of this religion is relegated to the History of Israel and of the Apostolic Church, of which, in fact, Biblical Theology, rightly considered, constitutes one division. Its task is not to describe the outward spread of the religion of the Bible, nor to discuss

questions relating to chronology, geography, ethnology, etc. It confines itself exclusively to the one purpose of presenting the gradual and progressive changes of belief and practice during the Biblical period of its growth, in such a way that, while the external succession of the stages of development is described, their internal connection is at the same time pointed out. The treatment must be genetic.

This holds good especially of the Theology of the Old Testament; it is less necessary in dealing with that of the New Testament. The latter is occupied with a history extending over a brief period of only a few decades, and contents itself mainly with setting forth the several doctrinal types the New Testament exhibits; whereas the Old Testament development covers many centuries and is marked throughout by great and often violent changes, which could not fail to effect a constant alteration of religious ideas, worship and life. The unfolding of the religious life of Israel conditions the origin and growth of its religious beliefs. History and doctrine go hand in hand. The experiences of the nation when it came into new and closer relations to the outlying empires of Assyria, Babylonia and Persia, afforded occasion for its prophets—the true interpreters of this divinely guided history—to enlarge and purify their idea of God in relation to His people and the world. In any full treatment, then, of the Theology of the Old Testament, it is necessary, before presenting the doctrines in systematic form, to point out the main epochs and decisive events in the history of the revelation, and to show how these turning-points in the history occasion the laying aside of old, and the introduction of new forms of religious truth and life.

From what has already been said as to the historical character of this science it will be evident that the term “Biblical Theology” is hardly a fitting designation. It is too vague, and, being ambiguous, it may be easily misunderstood. The word “Theology” is employed in several senses. In the narrowest, it signifies the doctrine of God, in distinction from cosmology, anthropology, christology, etc. In this view it is a division of the science of

Christian Dogmatics. With a broader meaning, it is identified with Dogmatics; for by "Theology" is popularly meant the systematic presentation of the doctrines of Christianity. Taken in its widest sense, the term "Theology" comprehends all those sciences which relate to God and divine things, in distinction from philosophy, natural science, sociology, etc.

And so, also, to the term "Biblical Theology" there have been attached different meanings at different times. Originally it denoted a collection and exegetical discussion of the proof-texts which were adduced in support of the doctrinal-system of the Church. These were gathered together in special works or dealt with apart from the dogmatic presentation of ecclesiastical doctrine, so that the scholastic discussion by way of thesis or anti-thesis might not be constantly interrupted. There were thus two operations: a dogmatic, by which the system of Christian truth was developed dialectically and independently of the Bible; and an exegetical, by which it was attempted to rest the reasoned system on doctrinal statements of the Bible. Of course, such a collection of scriptural proofs could be only a hand-maid to the scholastic system. It had only a relative independence. Its arrangement of the texts would necessarily be determined by the order of the topics discussed in the dogmatic system. And when we remember that, in the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century, when these collections were made, there was but a slight, if any historical distinction drawn between the Old Testament and the New—that, without regard to their connections, proof-texts were taken indifferently from the Old and the New—that, in fact, interpretation was itself dogmatic, a process of reading into the Bible what was in the mind of the interpreter, not as yet historical, a process of ascertaining from the Bible the meaning which was in the mind of the writer—it will be seen that such collections, while they gave an impulse to the study of Biblical doctrine, possess little value and are far removed from what is now meant by Biblical Theology.

A little later, Pietism gave an impulse to a new and deeper spiritual life in the Church; and, as it displayed great zeal in be-

half of the fresh, simple teaching of the Bible, one would naturally suppose that here, if anywhere, a true Biblical Theology would take its rise. Such was not, however, the result of this important religious movement. Spener and his school accepted in all sincerity the traditional theology of the Church. They were simply repelled by what they regarded as an unprofitable, theoretical and speculative treatment of the doctrines of faith. They waged no war against the living substance of the Church's teaching; but they were profoundly dissatisfied with the hard, scholastic, coldly intellectual form of that teaching. Pietism did not aim at a reformation of doctrine; it was designedly a revival of the inward life of religion. As such it turned away from a dry, rigid scholasticism, which was simply for the head, to the ever-living fountain of Scripture, where it found refreshment for the heart. But it had recourse to such contents of Scripture only as are practical in their bearing and edifying to the pious soul. By this criterion it estimated the value of the various portions of the Bible. But a system that viewed the Bible from such a utilitarian standpoint could have but an obscure notion of the historical character of the religion revealed in the Bible. It could cherish no such theoretic interest in the Biblical religion as necessarily conditions the origin of a science of Biblical Theology. Doubtless, Pietism, unintentionally indeed, did much to undermine the scholastic orthodoxy of the age, by making the deviation between it and the simplicity of the Biblical religion felt, and so contributed, indirectly at least, to the rise of a true Biblical Theology; yet for Pietism itself Biblical Theology meant no more than a plain, popular, unsystematic presentation of the teachings of the Bible so far as they might be fruitful for the Christian life.

But through the indirect influence of Pietism on the one hand and the direct assaults of Rationalism on the other, the reigning scholastic theology gradually fell into decay. There was a growing consciousness of the difference, material as well as formal, between the dominant orthodoxy and the theology of the Bible. It was keenly felt that theology needed to be regen-

erated. Indeed, it was the friends of orthodoxy who had the wisdom first to perceive this. They saw the necessity of going back to the Bible, which, after having been opened by the Reformers, was so soon closed again. It was their aim to make an independent study of the Bible, and then to employ the results of such a study in a criticism of the theology of the Church with a view to its purification by eliminating such elements as were not in accord with the theology of the Bible. So Zachariä entitles his work: "Biblical Theology, or an Examination of the Biblical Basis of the Principal Doctrines of Theology." The aim was good, but the method by which it was sought to accomplish this aim was wrong. It was in the main an examination of individual isolated texts, with no sense of the continuous, organic, historical development of the religion of the Bible. Biblical Theology could in this way possess no value—independently of the theology of the Church. It could be only an auxiliary science of secondary importance, whose form must be derived from the dogmatic system. And instead of lending new support to the orthodox faith, it tended strongly, though unintentionally, to its overthrow. It played into the hands of Rationalism, which substituted for the traditional theology a system of general truths derived from the reason, and attempted by exegetical violence to impose these on the Bible as its true teaching. Thus, neither on the side of Supernaturalism nor on that of Rationalism could the science of Biblical Theology, as now understood, come to its birth. Both supernaturalist and rationalist approached the Bible with a definitely-shaped system borrowed from without, and it was only for the support and defense of the system that recourse was had to the Bible. The dogmatic system, whatever its character, was primary; the Bible held only a secondary place. But Biblical Theology, rightly so-called, looks away from all the dogmatic systems which the Post-Apostolic Church has developed, and asks simply, What is the religion revealed in the Bible? It traces it step by step from its origin to its completion, marking the manifold forms it has assumed during the successive ages of its growth. This, as we have already seen, is the conclusion at

which Gabler arrived, and since his day it has been almost universally accepted.

This conception, only slowly and gradually reached, separates Biblical Theology broadly from Dogmatic Theology with which it had generally, and not unnaturally, been identified. The two sciences, however, are altogether unlike, both in content and form.

The dogmatist takes his stand in the living present. His aim is to exhibit, in a fully rounded system, the Church's present consciousness of Christian truth. He does not start immediately from the Bible and set forth its teachings in their Biblical form. That is just the task of the Biblical theologian. The Bible, indeed is, and must ever remain the touch-stone by which the dogmatist is bound to test his system; for whatever conflicts with the germinal truths and principles embodied in the Scriptures can form no legitimate part of Christian Dogmatics. Still, in working out his system he has to do not directly with the Bible, but with the truth as apprehended by the Church of to-day. He presupposes the development of doctrine through the eighteen centuries of Christian history, and begins his work where that development ends. It is no part of his duty to trace the progress of doctrine in the Church's clearer definition of old dogmas and her establishment of new dogmas. That belongs to another and independent science, the History of Christian Doctrine. The dogmatist is immediately concerned, not with the process, but with the last results of the evolution of Christian truth. He has to ask what does the Church of to-day believe as the outcome of her progressive development.

The Biblical theologian, on the other hand, has a different starting point. It is at the beginning, not the end of a development. His task is, then, to exhibit the historical evolution of the religion of the Bible from its origin in the Old Testament to its last and highest manifestation in the New. The dogmatist treats scientifically of the doctrines of Christianity as understood and held in his own age, not as taught in the Patristic, Mediæval, or even the Reformation age. The Biblical theologian delineates

the progress of religious belief in a long succession of ages, as guided by revelation and recorded in the Scriptures. The one limits himself to a single stage of theological thought, forming a self consistent and well rounded whole. The other ranges through many stages of advancing faith widely different in outward form, but inwardly joined together by a common unifying life.

Dogmatic Theology, as the name implies, is a scientific systematic presentation of the dogmas of Christianity, that is, the formulated doctrines authoritative either for the Church at large or for a particular denomination. But dogmas, in this sense, are not found explicitly in the Bible. They are the product of the mind of the Church reflecting on the contents of its faith as given in the Scriptures. The Church has always felt an inward impulse towards an intellectual apprehension of what it believes, a desire to interpret aright the historic facts of salvation and make clear to itself their religious meaning. Faith, if it is to maintain itself, must be rational. Religious experience suggests many problems relating to the objects of faith with which thought cannot do otherwise than earnestly grapple. When, in the solution of any of these problems, the same conclusion is reached and adopted by the Church at large or by a distinct branch of the Church, we have a dogma. Individual opinion can never be authoritative as a dogma. A dogma is the interpretation of the faith arrived at by the general Christian consciousness. Moreover, Christianity has been assailed both from without and from within. It had its early conflicts with heathenism and Judaism, and in self-defense it necessarily attained to a fuller and clearer apprehension of the contents of its faith. And so, too, when within the Church, there arose from time to time heresies which emphasized single phases of the truth to the exclusion of other and equally important phases, the Church, reflecting on all that is involved in its faith, continually advanced to more distinct and more complete definitions of doctrine. Dogmas have a historical origin, and undergo a progressive development. They are subject to greater or less modification as intellectual and moral cul-

ture advances. Every age, if it has received new light, feels the necessity of interpreting them anew. Science and philosophy, history and criticism with every forward movement enlarge the mental horizon of man and afford deeper insight into the realms of nature and mind. Dogmas, if out of accord with the best thought and feeling of the age, cannot remain untouched. The unity of truth demands that they be brought into harmony with all other established truth. And this is just the task of the dogmatic theologian : to exhibit Christianity as a doctrinal system, which, growing out of the experience of faith, is yet logically consistent and truly rational.

The task of the biblical theologian is quite another. He has not before him ready-made Creeds like the so-called Apostles', Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, in which the fundamental facts of the Gospel and the essential beliefs of the early Church are given and arranged in systematic order ; nor has he elaborate Confessions like those produced in such abundance by the Protestant Reformation, in which doctrines, well wrought out, are clearly and sharply defined and systematized according to a determining principle. He deals exclusively with the material furnished by the Scriptures. It is true, indeed, that the dogmas of Christianity are rooted in the Bible ; but in the form in which they have been elaborated by the Church in the course of its history they are not explicitly presented in the Bible. They are the product especially of the speculative Hellenic mind with its long schooling in philosophy and science, of the practical Latin mind, with its ideas of government and law, and of the strong Teutonic mind, which, uniting the best elements of the Greek and Roman, is, at the same time, pervaded by an irrepressible feeling of freedom and individuality.

The Biblical material lying at the basis of the formulated doctrines of the Christianity is not itself exclusively doctrinal. It consists to a large extent of historical narratives. The New Testament contains the four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. The Old Testament, from Genesis to Esther, besides much that is found in the Prophetical books, is given in the form of history. All this mass of matter cannot be without meaning and impor-

tance for the Biblical theologian. That it is not is evident from the Apostles' Creed, which embodies the chief events in the earthly and glorified life of our Lord—His birth, His suffering and death, His resurrection and ascension, and His second advent in glory. These events have a twofold significance; they are at once historical and supernatural, human and divine. The birth of Jesus was an historical event occurring at a certain time and place, but it was also more; it was the incarnation of the preëxistent Logos. Jesus was crucified under Pontius Pilate, as were also the two thieves; but His death was an atoning death in a sense that no other ever was or ever could be. His resurrection was not simply a coming forth from the realm of the dead, as Lazarus came forth; it was also His entrance into the glorified life in the Spirit.

And so as regards the Old Testament, the chief events in the history of Israel—such as the Exodus, the establishment of the monarchy, the building of the Temple, the conflicts with the Assyrians and Chaldees, the Exile, the restoration and the rebuilding of the Temple—were not merely outward occurrences in the life of the nation; they were of decisive significance for the religion of Israel. They reveal the divine guidance and training of the chosen people for its mission of preparing the way for Christ and Christianity.

But the narrative portions of the Scriptures are of value to the Biblical theologian not simply because the events they record were influential in the development of the revealed religion. They also mirror the religious ideas and beliefs, aspirations and hopes of the several ages from which they emanate. The documents, for example, of which the Pentateuch is composed, represent, when placed in right chronological relations, widely differing stages in the movement of the religious thought and life of Israel. And in correspondence with these stages of the history stand the three legislative codes embodied in the Pentateuch. All this historical material, whether of the New Testament or of the Old, is one of the sources which the Biblical theologian must employ. It presents itself to him in the form of history, not of doctrine; yet re-

ligious and ethical beliefs underlie the history and are implied in it ; and it is his task, by a correct historical interpretation, to disengage these from their historical wrappings.

But even the didactic parts of the Bible do not afford us doctrines in a scholastic form. There are no sharp definitions in precise and perspicuous terms, no systematic groupings of religious teachings according to topics. Didactic statements respecting any particular subject are scattered far and wide, and must be gathered from various books and parts of books. The New Testament Epistles, for example, are letters written by the Apostles to the Churches in Rome, Corinth and other places. They are not theological treatises, they were called forth by definite historical occasions, and have a temporal and local coloring. The writers, if we except Paul, were not trained scholars, especially not in philosophy. They were simple-minded men uneducated in the usual sense of that word ; and, writing as they did to simple-minded and unlettered men, they necessarily wrote in a popular, unscholastic style, and clothed their ideas not in the precise technical terms of philosophy, but in the ordinary language of every-day life. Their aim was not theoretical but practical. They address themselves to the moral and spiritual, rather than to the intellectual needs of their readers. They instruct, indeed, but with a view to righteousness of life. They warn against dangers, they correct abuses, they exhort to holy living. Nor do the writers occupy the same religious standpoint. Paul exhibits the Gospel in one aspect, James in another. They represent diverse, though not contradictory, types of religious thought. There is a Johannine and a Petrine, as well as a Pauline theology. Indeed, if we study the Epistles of Paul in the order in which they were given to the Church, we can trace a development of his intellectual conception of Christianity. His theology was not finished when he returned from Arabia. It grew with his experience of the Christian life.

If now we turn to the more didactic parts of the Old Testament, the prophetic books, for instance, we find the case very similar. The prophets do not appear in the rôle of philosophers

or theologians. They are preachers of righteousness. They interpret the Divine will to their age. Their aim is purely practical, and relates to the needs of the present. Even when they disclose future judgment and salvation, it is with a view to the warning or encouragement of their contemporaries. Their discourses grow out of the historical circumstances amid which they stand. The truth they bring is just that which is required by their time. Each prophet has his own way of looking at things. Each discerns the special needs of his age and seeks to meet them. And as these needs are continually changing, the point of view assumed by the prophets must likewise continually change. Hence we rightly speak of the theology of Amos, of Isaiah, of Jeremiah, of Ezekiel and of other prophets, meaning thereby the several varying forms in which they present religious truth. In the Old Testament as in the New, there are doctrinal types, and in Isaiah as in Paul, we can trace stages of development in his teaching.

Such is the nature of the material with which the Biblical theologian has to deal. It does not consist of Creeds and Confessions, in which doctrines are already clearly formulated and systematically arranged. The Bible is not a scientific text-book on religion. It is a body of literature, a whole library of books, written by many authors of every rank and station in life; in different places, as remote from one another as Italy is from Babylonia; and at various times during a period of more than a thousand years. It comprises within its small compass almost every variety of form and style known to literature: poetry and prose, history and prophecy, philosophy and apocalypse, law and proverb, fable and parable, cosmogony and genealogy. And although it is pervaded throughout by one common Spirit, the Spirit of the religion of revelation, yet, growing in volume through a long succession of ages, it could not fail to exhibit great diversities of thought and life. The end of this evolutionary movement is as remote from the beginning in character as it is remote in time.

It must be evident from what has been said that a right use of his documentary sources by the Biblical theologian involves a

complicated process. He cannot employ the books of Scripture indifferently, without regard to the time of their composition. They mirror the religious beliefs, life, worship and institutions of the various ages in which they originated, and if the progressive development of the revealed religion is to be traced out from its earliest beginnings in the Old Testament to its full completion in the New, they must be arranged as nearly as possible in chronological order, or, at least, assigned to the several periods from which they spring.

The Biblical theologian thus presupposes the results of the literary criticism of the Bible. These results are the foundation on which he builds up his science. Uncertainty here means uncertainty as to the religion whose historical evolution he aims to set forth. Biblical Theology cannot evade the great questions in dispute. The authorship and date of the fourth Gospel, its relation to the three Synoptics, the chronology of Paul's Epistles, the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles—these, with other questions, confront the New Testament theologian and he cannot take one sure step forward till he has found some answer to them. His answer will condition his success in giving a scientific presentation of New Testament Theology. And so, too, the Old Testament theologian must assume a decided attitude towards the conclusions reached by critical investigation before he can proceed to his own proper task. For the devotional study of the Bible this is not necessary; for scientific study it is indispensable. If, for example, the Pentateuch is composite, a compilation of documents of various dates, as is now almost universally conceded by Biblical scholars, then to assign the whole Pentateuch, as we have it, to the Mosaic age, as was done by Jewish tradition, would be to jumble together in one confused mass the most heterogeneous elements representing the faith and life of different ages separated by several centuries. Or, if acknowledging the presence of earlier and later documents in the Pentateuch, we should place that first in time, which is in reality last, it would be impossible to exhibit the true historical development of the religion of Israel. Manifestly the books of the Bible, or if they are composite, the several

documents of which they are composed must be arranged in the order of time in which they originated.

But this is not all. The Scriptures need to be interpreted. Biblical Theology presupposes Exegesis as well as a criticism. It deals immediately with the fruits of Exegesis.

Now, the question the interpreter has to ask himself is, What does the author whom he professes to expound mean to say? not What can he, by straining language, or by other artifices, be forced to say? The Roman Church practically exalts tradition above the Bible. It holds that the decrees of the Councils and the decisions of the Popes set forth infallible truth; that to these, therefore, the Bible must be made to conform. And how has it been in the Protestant Church? Its formal principle is, professedly, "the Bible, the sole rule of faith and life." What, in general, has been its practice? Have not the Confessions of the several branches of Protestantism been made to rule the interpretation of the Bible, not, indeed, intentionally or consciously, but yet really? How otherwise shall we explain the remarkable fact that Catholic and Protestant, Trinitarian and Unitarian, Calvinist and Arminian appeal, each of them, to the Bible as supporting his doctrine to the exclusion of the doctrine of all others? Each has naively assumed that the teachings embodied in his Creed, Confession or Catechism are identical with the system of Biblical religion, and has quietly read these teachings into the Scriptures. The ecclesiastical tradition has been practically, though not theoretically, the rule of faith, and with this external rule the Bible has been made somehow to agree. But if we are ever to discover what the religion of the Bible is we must interpret the Bible, not in the light of an outside system, whether dogmatic or philosophic, but in its own light. By a right application of the laws of interpretation we must endeavor to ascertain the meaning which the writers had in their mind and wished to convey to their readers. When this difficult exegetical task has been accomplished the Biblical theologian gathers up and systematizes the results, as far as they bear on the origin and development of the religious beliefs and life mirrored in the books of the Old and New Testament.

It will be seen that Biblical Theology is preëminently a Protestant science. It had its origin in Protestantism. It has been cultivated only by Protestantism. The Roman Catholic Church has not produced a single work on this subject. It is true that Lutterbeck in 1852 published a book on the Doctrinal Types of the New Testament; but he was a liberal-minded Catholic, and at a later time opposed Papal infallibility. When pursued according to a right historical method, the science is one of the highest importance, because it exhibits the fountal sources of Christianity and furnishes the criterion by which the legitimacy of the Church's development of doctrine is always to be judged.

TO OUR CONTRIBUTORS.

A number of articles intended for this issue of the REVIEW had, for want of space, to be kept over for a future issue, including one by the editor himself. For this we beg the indulgence of our contributors. We are glad to see the friends of the REVIEW so willing to contribute to its pages. There is no lack of able writers in the Reformed Church, by whose coöperation an interesting REVIEW can be sustained. Indeed, a much larger publication could easily be supplied with material. Will not the friends of the REVIEW exert themselves to increase its subscription list, so that, without increasing its price, its size may be increased, and thus a chance be given to a larger number of contributors to appear in its pages from quarter to quarter? We sincerely hope that in the near future this may be done.

EDITOR.

VII.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

PERILS OF THE REPUBLIC.

The greatest dangers to which the Republic is exposed at the present moment are not those noted in Washington's farewell address. Foreign entanglements and even sectional divisions are not the gravest perils that threaten the perpetuity of our government at the present time. Serious as these perils always are, they are at present overshadowed by others which have been developed during the last third of a century.

Foremost among the conditions which imperil the peace of the nation and the stability of the government at the present time is the abnormal concentration of wealth and its unscrupulous and ungodly use. It is said that 70 per cent. of the entire wealth of the United States is owned by three-tenths of one per cent. of the population. There are reported to be among us 35,000 millionaires and 1,500,000 tramps. The average annual income of the richest one hundred Americans is said to be not less than \$1,200,000; while the average annual income of the wage-workers, whose number is 15,000,000, does not exceed \$400 per man. The average wages of agricultural laborers in Pennsylvania are \$274.56, and this does not include board. The average annual wages of the coal miners in the anthracite region are \$359.08, when work is regular. These figures, taken in part from *The New Era* by Dr. Josiah Strong, and in part from the American Supplement of the 9th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, are sometimes disputed. There is no doubt, however, that they were substantially correct some eight or ten years ago. And since then the unequalizing process has been steadily going on, so that the present social condition is probably still more unfavorable.

This grossly unequal distribution of wealth, whatever may be its causes, means extravagance and luxury on the one side, and want and discontent on the other. The million-dollar palace means a thousand hovels; and the hovels mean ignorance, intemperance, vice and crime, which can bode no good to the Republic. A large proletariat that has nothing to lose from a revolution of the government, can not be expected to care much for the preservation of the existing order. And the possessors of wealth are not in the habit of using their fortunes in such a way as to gain the friendship of their less fortunate fellow mortals. Indeed their fellow mortals but seldom get to see them. They spend much of their time in foreign lands. When they travel, they are conveyed in special cars which are closed to the public. And when at home, they live in palaces whose mysterious splendors are matters of amazement to the people around them, on whose toil they have grown rich, and with whom they are in continual feud. There are sections of country which are kept in a continual state of disorder by the increasing quarrels between millionaire employers and their starving dependents; and the strikes and disturbances growing out of these quarrels have cost the country many millions of dollars for police and military service, besides causing an untold amount of suffering in all parts of the community.

How long may a patient and long-suffering people be expected to endure this state of things? Evidently the lords of Mammon themselves have no idea that there will ever be a day of judgment. For what can the people do about it? Money is the power that makes the world go; and so long as they have the money in their hands, who will prevent them from making things go as they please? Are not the Jewish bankers in Europe dictating policies to the rulers of empires? What, then, is to hinder the owners of money from doing so here, too? Hence their only concern seems to be to look well to their money bags, expecting that by the use of money they shall be able to perpetuate their power over the industry and life of their fellow men. And here is the peril of Mammonism to the Republic. It undertakes to

control the policies of the government and the politics of the country. "Business in politics," "politics on business principles," "business methods in government"—these are beginning to be favorite phrases. And what do they mean? We have seen enough in recent years to be assured that they mean no good to the country. "Business principles in politics" has come to mean the purchase of nominations for office, of elections, and of legislation by the free expenditure of money. Of course, such transactions are never conducted openly. And yet it is well known always what influences are back of elections and legislatures; and the effect of this knowledge upon the public mind is most pernicious. When the present national administration came into power, a New York journal assured its readers that there would be no change in the government's policy toward Cuba, "because Wall Street would never permit any change." Who then are the "sovereign people," and where are they, and what have they to say?

This money power has no politics, as it has no religion. It is willing to use political parties when it suits its purpose; but political parties and principles are nothing to it. Its interest is above all such concerns. If anyone desires to know with what feelings the lords of Mammon regard the national government, let him read, in the *New York World*, of Thursday, November, 5th, 1896, "How twenty-four millionaires received the news of the election," the night before. For them the election had interest only as it seemed to affect the possession of their millions. They care nothing for the welfare of the common people. And so monstrous is their exhibition of selfishness that sooner or later it must provoke opposition. "The people are with us," shouted one of them on the occasion just referred to; but one need not be much of a prophet in order to foretell that the people will not always "be with them." It is true that by the control of the means of subsistence and by the skillful use of money the people have thus far been kept in a tolerable state of submission. "Give a man power over my subsistence," said Alexander Hamilton, "and he has power over my whole moral being." That princi-

ple is, indeed, verifying itself in the economic and social condition of our time. The owners of capital seem to be the masters of the world, whose right to dominion the masses have generally acknowledged. And besides, the control of the organs of intelligence, especially of the metropolitan press, by the money power, has contributed to the same result. It is a great thing to have one's hand on the organs of public information. It is a shrewd policy on the part of some of our great millionaires to expend a trifle of the gains which they have made off the people in giving them public libraries. Why libraries? Because he who selects the libraries, as he who makes the songs, of a people, may be expected to frame its laws. If the schoolmaster also could be selected by the same influence, that would contribute to the same end; and in a few notable instances it has become manifest that the owners of money have not been unwilling to try the experiment in our higher institutions of learning. But we think, too, that the result in these latter cases has shown that there is a limit here beyond which the people will not endure. The people will not long continue to live in a condition of servitude. The time for that is past. Men have learned to know that they are men, and they will not long allow themselves to be treated as *things*. They will show some day what can be done; and when that day comes there will be a conflict that will shake the fabric of the social order to its foundation. Here, then, there is a peril threatening the life of the Republic that can be averted only by an exercise of patience on the part of the masses, and of self-restraint and self-denial on the part of the classes, far beyond anything that we have yet known.

A second peril of the Republic, connected largely with the former, is the corruption of the judiciary. A pure and independent judiciary, that may be expected to do right to all classes of people without fear or favor, is the palladium of safety for a nation. There was a time when the courts of this country, from the federal supreme court down to the lowest county tribunal, sustained the enviable reputation of being pure and incorruptible seats of justice. But is it so now? The question provokes

laughter. Not that there are not honest men upon the bench and at the bar, whose sincere desire is to do right. The majority of judges and lawyers no doubt are honest men, who would not willingly do wrong. But there is nevertheless so much wrong perpetrated in the name of law and justice, under the corrupting influence of Mammonism, that it has come to be a generally accepted belief that people who have not money enough to *buy justice*, had better suffer wrong than go to law. "Business methods" have not only invaded politics, but they have intruded themselves also into the temple of justice. Not that courts are directly bought and sold as merchandise is bought and sold over the counter. No one supposes that the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States would accept bribes; and yet who does not believe that the late decision on the income-tax law, by which the burdens of taxation are lifted from the shoulders of the rich who could bear them easily, and imposed upon the shoulders of the poor who bear them with difficulty, was influenced by the use of money? Are single lawyer's fees of a quarter of a million dollars paid for nothing? And when we come down to the lower courts, how is it there? If judges of the district courts, before whom railroad suits are tried almost every term, ride over the roads on free passes, like legislators and newspaper editors, what then may be expected of the administration of justice? And, then, think of the tricks and evasions of the law? It is beginning to be pretty well understood that no criminal need to be much afraid of the penalty of the law, provided he has money enough to hire the ablest lawyers, and to drag his case around from one court to another until the energy of the law is spent. It is only the wretches who have no money that are "in danger of judgment."

It is the frequent defeat of justice through the influence of money that brings the administration of justice into contempt and begets disrespect of law in general. Even the manner in which laws are so frequently enacted by legislatures has no tendency to invest them with any solemnity. If it be known that important laws of the National and State Legislatures are procured on

“business principles,” that is to say, procured for valuable considerations granted to the legislators by some interested individual or corporation, what wonder is it that ordinary men do not have a very high regard for law? And when men see how often the forms of law are turned into a solemn farce, and the ends of justice defeated by the liberal use of money, what wonder is it that angry crowds, whose indignation has been aroused by the commission of some fiendish or brutal crime, should sometimes feel like taking the law into their own hands and inflicting punishment by summary process? There is the origin of lynch-law; of which we have had so many startling exhibitions in all parts of the country during the past decade. Unquestionably this is an evidence of an increasing spirit of lawlessness, that bodes no good to the stability of our institutions. But where lies the responsibility for it? Evidently at the doors of those who are charged with the administration of justice and fail honestly to perform their duty. Lynch-law comes to be resorted to only where there is a widespread distrust of the efficiency of the administration of law. Suppose a brutal murder is committed in an interior Pennsylvania town, and suppose the criminal by spending twenty thousand dollars in his defense, gets off with a comparatively light penalty; is it any wonder, then, that when people hear of the verdict, they cry out, Lynch him? In California a fiend kills two women in a church, and there is no doubt of his guilt; but because he has money he is able to defy the law for more than two years, and then succumbs only because he has no more money. What wonder if in these circumstances an outraged community will sometimes execute the law without permission from courts and governors? Lynch-law is lawlessness, doubtless; but there is no use in judges and newspaper editors lecturing the public on this manifestation of barbarism, so long as courts can not be depended upon to execute just and honest judgment.

A third grave peril to the Republic, finally, consists in what may be called a lack of patriotic confidence in the Republic. There is a widespread feeling abroad that the diseases from which the Republic is suffering are mortal diseases, and that the

patient can not survive very much longer. Democracy is supposed to be a failure. Government of the people, by the people, and for the people is a vain dream; and the blood which has been shed for its preservation, has been shed to no purpose. The people are not capable of self-government. They do not understand the principles of government; and how, then, can they wisely select their rulers and dictate the policy of their government? Is not the fact that the people so often allow their government to be administered in the interest of the few instead of the many, and that they so easily permit their State and municipal affairs to be mismanaged, a proof that the people are incompetent of self-government, and that it would be better to go back to some form of aristocracy or monarchy? There are two classes of persons who would give an affirmative answer to this question. There is first the *plutocracy*—the rich who now control elections, shape the policy of legislation, and promote their own interest at the expense of the many. These would be glad to exchange the forms of the Republic for those of a monarchy, and are sometimes heard recommending such change in no uncertain terms. And why? Have they not about everything they could wish for now under the Republic? Yes, but they know that they hold it on an uncertain tenure. They know that the people are not to be relied upon to “be always with them;” and they would rather be in a position in which they could do without the people, than be compelled periodically to reckon with them at the polls. If they could get the government into such shape that they could do without elections, they would much prefer that to the necessity of spending money upon the conduct of elections. This class of persons, therefore, would not be unwilling to have the Republic exchanged for a monarchy. And with them would agree another class, which may be characterized as a *sentimental and æsthetic aristocracy*. This class usually consists of people of some education, and of some money, too, but of small hearts and of no broad human sympathies. They have traveled, perhaps, in foreign lands. They have seen the palaces of the nobility. They have looked upon royalty, at a distance; and they think

that it is all very fine. European manners are much better than American manners. They have finer streets there, finer parks, finer theatres, finer museums, and galleries of art. Their government officials are dressed in finer uniforms; and the administration of government is more firm. There are no scandals ever heard of in connection with the management of State and municipal affairs. And altogether monarchical institutions are more æsthetic than democratic institutions, and therefore more to be desired. Our rude forefathers who founded the Republic, of course, did not think so; but their cultured and æsthetic descendants know that they were mistaken.

There is, however, still left a large class of persons who are rude enough to believe that the mistake is on the side of the descendants, not on the side of the forefathers. The forefathers were not mistaken when they gave us a republican, and not an aristocratic or monarchical form of government. Of course, it was the only form of government possible at the time. At the close of the revolution no other could be thought of. It is, however, as Montesquieu has observed, a form of government which requires a high degree of national education, of national morality, and of social and economic equality, in order to produce its best results. But these conditions being given, it is the best form of government in the world. And even for us, in our circumstances, we hesitate not at all to affirm that it is the best form of government that we could possibly have. Nor do we believe that the governmental machinery works any more smoothly, or any more justly and honestly, in monarchical Europe than in democratic America. And we are sure that the expense of government there is very much greater than here. If, in some respects, European governments are more efficient than ours, they also cost very much more, and the *people* are compelled to pay the bills. It was stated in the English parliament, a few years ago, that the queen and her family receive an annual allowance from the country of \$3,500,000; and to this amount \$180,000 more were added at the close of the debate. Whether this allowance has been increased since then we do not know. But it is said that the recent

queen's jubilee cost the English people money enough to have entirely prevented the famine in India, if it had been applied for that purpose. Would we be willing to exchange our republican simplicity for such "royal splendor?" Why, for far less money we enjoy equal protection to life and property, and far more freedom, than do our English relations across the sea; and we could do much better still, if it were not for the "business methods" which have of late crept into our politics. But if this be true of the best governed country in Europe, what shall be said of the worst? Think of Germany with her brutal "war-lord" and her oppressive military system, of Russia with her absolutism and inhuman cruelty, of Austria—of Spain! Surely we do not think that, with all our drawbacks, we need to shrink from comparison of our civil institutions with those of the old world. And to be disparaging our institutions at this time, when they are seriously threatened by an internal foe, is little short of treason. It is greatly increasing the peril to which the ship of state is exposed.

And in order rightly to appreciate this peril we need to reflect how impossible it would be for this nation at present to change its form of government. Suppose even that the plutocrats and the aristocrats were right, and that monarchical institutions were generally preferable to republican institutions, even then it would be utterly impossible for us to go back to monarchy. History could not thus move backward. As already stated, a republic was a necessity at the beginning, and a republic is a necessity still. The Republic could only be overthrown by a struggle that would cause our soft-handed plutocrats and our soft-minded aristocrats to curse the day when they were born; and these more fortunate classes are the very ones that ought to be most interested in the preservation of the present order. Our government can not be *changed*. To its preservation there is but one alternative, and that is the destruction of the nation. The functions of the government may be extended, and will doubtless have to be extended, in order to meet exigencies which were not foreseen at the time of its foundation; but its essential form can not be changed. Hence the duty of the hour for all good and strong-minded

men, especially ministers, teachers, lawyers, and statesmen, is to discourage all thoughts of revolution, and to labor to correct those abuses which make thoughts of revolution possible, the chief of which is the introduction of "business principles" into politics, legislation, and the administration of law.

RECENT RECONSTRUCTION OF THEOLOGY.

On this subject we find an interesting article from the pen of Dr. B. B. Warfield, of Princeton, in the *Homiletic Review* for March, 1898. According to Dr. Warfield, however, the subject is a misnomer; for, in his opinion, there has really been no reconstruction in theology in modern times, Arminianism being in fact the last system of thought that has any claim to such a title. The modern movements in theological thought have only been passing modifications of the systems which became fixed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, beyond which it would seem that Dr. Warfield can see no possibility of development, Calvinism being for him the ultimate goal of all theological thinking. Christianity is absolutely and infallibly deposited in the Bible, and Calvinism is the final interpretation of the Bible. Hence, beyond this there can only be aberrant tendencies, which must in the end always come to naught. Thus, Dr. Warfield tells us, for example, that the "mediating theology" of Germany, which for a time seemed to promise so much, is now utterly dead. Its candle "has gone out with a splutter" in the land of its birth; while in this country there are only a few notable reflections of its expiring light in such theological systems as that of Dr. Gerhart, of Lancaster, and a still later one of Dr. Clarke, of Hamilton Seminary. Instead of reconstructions of theology, Dr. Warfield, then, can see in the productions of modern theological thought only vicious tendencies in the direction of Socinianism and Arminianism. Of such tendencies, especially three are enumerated in the article referred to, namely, first, a tendency "to cut loose from all external authority," by which latter term we suppose the Bible to be understood; secondly, a ten-

dency "to indefiniteness in doctrinal construction ;" and, thirdly, a tendency to underrate "the idea of the divine Christ." This, according to Dr. Warfield, is all there is in the recent attempts of theological thought to get beyond the systems of the seventeenth century, whether on the part of the representatives of the "mediating theology" of Germany, or of those of the "new theology" in the United States.

Of course, we do not at all agree with Dr. Warfield's view of this subject. In the first place, we do not think that the mediating or Christological theology, advanced and cultivated by such men as Schleiermacher, Neander, Ebrard, Lange, Dorner, Martensen and Schaff, is so entirely dead as Dr. Warfield and others would have us believe. But, secondly, if it be true that the "mediating theology" is dead, we are sure that this does not imply any revival of the theological systems of the seventeenth century. In Germany, for instance, Calvinism, understanding by this term the theology of the Synod of Dort and of the Westminster Assembly, is not only dead, but also buried and that beyond any hope of a resurrection ; while Lutheranism there has shrunk into a mere petrification, into which such men as Luthardt and Philippi are struggling in vain to infuse new life. The orthodox theologies of the seventeenth century, both Lutheran and Reformed, went down forever in the flood of rationalism which swept over Germany in the latter part of the last and beginning of the present century. Pietism had been an effort to galvanize the expiring orthodoxy into new life ; but it had proved a dismal failure. Then came the "mediating theology," so called because it sought to mediate between theology and modern thought and also between the conflicting theological systems themselves, and brought back the German people to the Christian faith. This was its work. The counterpart of the "mediating theology" in this country is the "new theology," which, if we are not greatly mistaken, is not at all dead, but very much alive. It is, in general, the theology for which this REVIEW has stood in the past, and for which it still stands. And even in Germany the "mediating theology" still continues to exert its influence ; for its fundamental principles

are recognized by the now reigning school of Ritschlianism, and when that school shall have completed its development and when it shall have come thoroughly to understand itself, the breach between it and the mediating school will probably be found to be less wide than is now generally believed. At any rate, the Christological principle which is the distinguishing characteristic of the "mediating theology" is held fast also by the leading thinkers of the school of Ritschl, although in some cases it may be held in a different form from that in which it was held before.

By the Christological principle we understand the idea that Christ is the absolute medium of divine revelation, and, therefore, the absolute source, also, of theological knowledge. The ultimate source of divine truth is not the reason, nor the Church, nor the Bible, but Christ. And this means, of course, the historical Christ; not, however, as an isolated phenomenon, which appeared nineteen centuries ago and left nothing behind it save some literary records, somewhat as the appearance of a comet might have done; but it means the historical Christ in His identity with the present Christ of glory, who is an immediate and living object of Christian faith, and as such authenticates Himself to the Christian consciousness. This is taking in earnest the doctrine of Christ's divinity. If, in order to maintain the true humanity of Christ, the mediating theology supposes the historical Christ to have been limited in knowledge and power, and to have been subject therefore to the laws of intellectual and moral development which are common to humanity, it also believes that the present glorified Christ, in virtue of his divinity, is capable of transcending the limitations of humanity, and of being really present with His people always as an object of faith, of inspiration, and of knowledge. Any metaphysical doctrine of the divinity of Christ that supposes Christ to be shut up in heaven now, and a great gulf to be fixed between Himself and His Church, and all that we now have of Him to be deposited in the Bible, would, of course, be of little interest to a theologian of the mediating school, and for ourselves we cannot see that it would be of much interest to any Christian whatsoever. What can it matter to us

whether Jesus was omniscient during the days of His flesh, if we have no means of knowing His mind now? There are ten thousand things in regard to which we have no word of His recorded in the New Testament, and in regard to which we must, on the theory in question, after all be left simply to the light of our own reason. And it is just at this point that the old theologies are most unsatisfactory. In their zeal for the Bible as the only source and rule of Christian faith and knowledge the theologians of the seventeenth century failed to make proper account of the living person and mind of Christ as an immediate source of spiritual life and knowledge for His people; and Christianity, as thus apprehended, comes in the end to be nothing more than a system of abstract conceptions or notions; and that is the *essence of rationalism*.

Here we are bound to take issue with Dr. Warfield's own construction of Christianity. He claims that the present unwillingness of many theological minds to be bound by the Bible as an "external authority" is merely an evidence of a bad Socinianizing and Arminianizing tendency. "For all the Christianity of theology on the one hand," he says, "and all the Christianity in religion on the other, comes from the Bible. Apart from the revelation deposited for us in the Scriptures, there is no Christianity." This, we hold, is putting the Book in place of the Christ, and turning Christianity into an abstract intellectual system, which is not saved from rationalism by the supposition that the Book has had a supernatural origin. But if Christianity is for us wholly deposited in the Scriptures, where was it, we may ask, before the Scriptures were written? St. Paul, we believe, claimed to have gotten his theology, or his gospel, not from men, nor from any book, but from Christ. This may not signify that he got the historical facts of the gospel by direct revelation from heaven, but it doubtless does signify that the meaning of these facts and the sense of their value for his religious life came to him, not from any external source or through any external authority, but through immediate contact with the Spirit of the exalted Christ Himself. And so, we hold, it must ever be. No

Christian mind can ever allow itself to be bound by any merely external authority. The Bible, indeed, must ever be important as the record of the historical revelation of God which reached its highest point in Christ, and must therefore be one of the indispensable conditions of Christian faith and knowledge; but by itself alone it can suffice neither for the one nor for the other. To that end it must be supplemented by Christian experience, that, is by direct touch with the Spirit of Christ in the heart; and the Christian consciousness, therefore, must be the immediate source of Christian knowledge and Christian theology. This may be pronounced "subjectivism" and "rationalism." We do not think, however, that such criticism would have any force. For while this view makes the source of authority subjective in one sense, it also makes it objective; for Christ certainly is an objective reality; and it is Christ within us, the union of subject and object, that, according to the mediating theology, constitutes the source of Christian knowledge. Nor does this view violate the original Protestant principle of the Bible as the formal rule of faith; for since the Christ of glory, or the Christ of the soul, is one with the historical Christ of whom the Scripture bears witness, it follows that the testimony of the soul can not contradict the testimony of the book. The Bible thus becomes a formal rule of faith which Christian thought may not violate in the construction of doctrine, and from which indeed the formal elements of such construction must be derived. This, however, is something different from the ordinary notion of the Bible as the sole source and absolute authority of Christian faith in a merely external view.

But let us, now, for a moment look more closely at the opposite conception. Suppose we say with Dr. Warfield that all Christianity comes from the Bible, and that all Christian doctrine must be drawn immediately from it as the deposit of all divine revelation. But surely the Bible must be interpreted and understood. To any individual reader it can signify only what he understands it to signify. The Bible comes before us as a body of literature, written by different persons, at different times,

in different places, and in different languages. It presents itself in two main divisions, the Old Testament and the New ; the former, besides history, prophecy and poetry, containing a collection of civil and ritual laws for the government of the people of Israel ; and the latter containing “ some things hard to be understood.” Here, then, questions arise, for instance, as to how much of the Old Testament is of binding force for the Christian, and as to the meaning of many of the sayings of Christ and the Apostles. Who shall answer such questions for us ? The Roman Catholic says, the Church. An infallible code of divine revelation, such as the Bible is here supposed to be, the Romanist contends, requires an infallible interpreter, such as the Church claims to be. And from his standpoint it must be admitted that the Romanist is right, and consistent as far as he goes ; only he does not go far enough ; for not even an infallible Church is sufficient to guarantee to the individual an infallible knowledge of an infallible revelation, so long as he himself is not rendered infallible. Or, in opposition to the Catholic idea, it may be said that every reader of the Bible must be his own judge of its meaning. Every Christian must interpret the Bible for himself. This we suppose to be Dr. Warfield’s position, and in a sense it is ours too.

But, then, what becomes of the “ external authority ” of which Dr. Warfield makes so much account ? Suppose I read and interpret my Bible, and thus formulate a system of Christian knowledge for myself. On what authority, then, will that knowledge rest, on the external authority of the Bible, or on the subjective authority of the interpreting mind ? How much of my knowledge will be due to one source, and how much to the other ? How does it come that one man is a Calvinist, another a Lutheran, and another an Arminian ? These differences arose when in Protestantism the external authority of the Bible was regarded as most absolute. Does the Bible, then, mean one thing for one man and another thing for another ? This can not be ; and the mediating theology therefore says that this is not the right way to use the Bible. It is not the human mind as such that can rightly interpret the Bible, but the Christian mind, that is, the

mind in union with the living Spirit of Christ. But, then, we have the idea of the Christian consciousness as a source of Christian knowledge, and the idea of the sole authority of the Bible has received a serious modification. And, besides, on many theological questions the Christian consciousness can not speak with as much definiteness as the Bible was made to speak in the older theologies ; for the Christian consciousness is not infallible.

This conception of the mediating theology will by some be pronounced "mysticism," and that will be considered sufficient to discredit it. But is there not something mystical in religion—something the reality of which we can better feel than express—something that refuses to be formulated in precise definitions? It is doubtless the feeling of this mystical element in religion that accounts for some vagueness of expression in modern theological statements. Religion is not all knowledge, and can not be wholly brought into definite logical propositions. Dr. Warfield, indeed, thinks that one of the evil tendencies of the time is "an indefiniteness in doctrinal construction which seems to be coming in upon us like a flood." Something of this quality of indefiniteness doubtless belongs to the mediating theology, and still more of it belongs to the Ritschlianism of the present day. This may be due in part to the sense of mystery which, as we have just seen, belongs to religion, and in part also to the more cautious habits of mind fostered by the modern scientific spirit. The tendency of modern theology is, no doubt, to less intellectualism, and to more reserve in doctrinal definition. We may not, with Ritschl, repudiate all philosophy and all metaphysics in theology, and yet be convinced that the heart should have as large a function in doctrinal constructions as the head. And that conviction, we think, is gaining ground. Theologians generally are more modest now than formerly. They are not as cocksure of their definitions as they once were ; and hence they are more disposed to contract the sphere of definition. Single texts of Scripture are no longer deemed sufficient to establish a doctrine. And this tendency we do not consider as altogether evil, but rather as

good. For after all, what is the value of the precise definitions which we have in the older systems of theology? There we have very precise and very confident definitions, all drawn from the Bible, of course, on the essence of the divine trinity, on the nature of the angels, on free will and fate, on election and reprobation, on heaven and hell, and on a hundred other things of equal importance. But for every definition in one system there may be found a counter-definition in some other system. Which is right? Practically, with all the professed reverence for the authority of the Bible, men's beliefs are governed by their denominational relations. For the Calvinist Calvinistic definitions are right, and for the Arminian Arminian definitions are right. And yet they are all supposed to be drawn from the Bible. In view of this circumstance we may well ask, what is the use of these definite doctrinal constructions? Their definiteness does not make them the more worthy of confidence. *Klarheit* is not always *Wahrheit*. The modern theologian, therefore, wisely shrinks from such definiteness in regard to many points on which the older theologians did not hesitate to express very definite views. In this respect the men of the "new theology" now are more cautious than were some of the mediating theologians of an earlier day. But all this does not prove that the new theology values precise theological knowledge, where this is attainable, less highly than the old theology did, nor that truth is to it less precious. It is, however, less easily satisfied as to the marks of truth, and insists that doctrines must be proved by something more than isolated texts of Scripture before they can be accepted.

The new theology, moreover, is persuaded that the attainment of truth is possible only through a process of historical development of the Church extending through all the ages, and not through the dialectical or exegetical operation of any one man or age. This theology, accordingly, lays a stress upon history and especially upon the Church, which the older theology could not understand. Theology is now recognized as an historical and progressive science, as much as is physics or philosophy. No one age can ever boast of having brought it to completion. It is a

foolish thing to imagine that the sixteenth century was the ultimate goal of theological thought, and that either Luther or Calvin has spoken the last word on all theological questions. A living pope is bad enough, but to set up a dead pope in this fashion is something still worse. If we deny the historical character of Christian theology, we must suppose the future outlook of Christianity to be desperate, indeed; for on that supposition either the present divided condition of Christendom would have to be perpetual, or else one of the existing theological systems, or denominations, would have to swallow up all the rest. But what sane man can expect either alternative to happen? If it be madness on the part of the Roman Catholic Church to expect ever again to get sole control over the Christian world, is it any less madness for any Protestant denomination to entertain such an expectation? But if we cannot reconcile ourselves to such an outlook, we must suppose a process of development in theological thought, by means of which existing differences and antitheses shall at last be surmounted. And such a process of development is in progress now, and has been in all past ages, moving sometimes with less and sometimes with greater rapidity. At present the movement is rushing forward with tremendous speed. No resistance and no threats of heresy trials can stop it. And to our mind it is mere whistling down the wind to maintain that all this movement has accomplished nothing, and that the world now stands theologically just as it stood three hundred years ago. The man who can seriously maintain such a proposition must be one who *will* not see.

Yes, the world has moved theologically since the time of the Synod of Dort and of the Westminster Assembly, and no man can now stand just where the fathers stood. And no phase of the modern theological movement has been more fruitful of vital germs of development than that of the mediating theology. It has furnished principles of thought which will be of permanent influence and value. Among these are the Christological and the historical principles. No influential theology in the future can be anything else than Christological. As long as men shall have

faith in Christianity so long the idea of Christ must be the ruling principle in theology. The idea of divine sovereignty, or the idea of the divine decrees, can never again be substituted for the idea of Christ; and Christianity can no longer be construed without regard to ethical postulates and principles. And so, as long as Christianity shall be believed to be a *real human* interest, and not a mere abstraction or fiction, so long Christian theology must be viewed historically. At a time when all science has taken on an evolutionary form, theology cannot refuse to admit the principle of development. The admission of these principles in modern theology proves something more than a tendency towards Socinianism or Arminianism; it implies a movement beyond the antithetic systems of the past—beyond Calvinism and Lutheranism as well as beyond Armenianism—and the beginning of a radically new construction of theology which, when completed, will be a more adequate representation of Christianity than any that has yet appeared. Until completed, some defects and shortcomings will be inevitable; but that should not lead us to despair of the success of Christian thought in the future. Meanwhile, two effects of this theological reconstruction are already apparent. In the first place, it has served to bring Christians of different confessions more closely together, and has enabled them to see that there is something more in Christianity than is comprehended in their “little systems.” And, in the second place, it has given the Church a theology *that can be preached* without reservation and without shocking the Christian consciousness of the present age; which is more than can be said of the dead theologies of the past.

VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE STORY OF GLADSTONE'S LIFE. By Justin McCarthy. Pp. 436. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1897.

The life of Gladstone by Justin McCarthy is, without doubt, the most interesting biography that has appeared since Boswell gave Johnson a new and unending lease of life. It is written in a fascinating style, as interesting as a fairy tale; and yet instructive in almost every line. For, while there is no "preaching," one cannot arise from the perusal of this book without being inspired with resolves to do more and better work for the good of the world. The biographer has the historic spirit which has been well displayed in his previous writing, and this power is conspicuous in the work before us. There is no other book which gives as true and interesting a narrative of England's progress and her influence on the destinies of the world since the passage of the Reform Bill in 1832, when Gladstone's public life began. Every event, political, religious, social or educational is touched upon; often briefly as was inevitable from the size of the book and its purpose, yet with a master hand, and in a way to make us desire for more. The great men who were the contemporaries are described, and their share in public measures sketched in such a masterly way that they stand in clear outline before us. And, what adds greatly to the value of this work, is the large number of portraits and photographic views, some 76 in all; so that we have a very valuable album of noted characters in Great Britain who have figured during this century. The book is gotten up in such a dainty style that it looks almost too nice to touch.

Though the book is well written, we must take exception to a few things which betray carelessness or hurry. This is confessedly the Life of Gladstone, but there is assuredly no need for the constant reiteration of his name. It is repeated twice in a sentence of one line; twice in one of two; in at least two cases, twice in one of five lines; and once three times in a sentence of seven lines. In all except one of these instances the pronoun would have made the meaning equally clear, and the sentence more terse. The name could have been omitted more than a thousand times without detriment to the sense, and at least five pages saved for other uses. On page 163 Mr. McCarthy criticises Disraeli, and endeavors to prove his lack of culture by his interpretation of the word "University," and the title of one of Cardinal Newman's books, "*Apologia pro vita mea*." In both cases the critic is wrong and Disraeli right—for a wonder. But these are slight

blemishes, and in no way destroy the wonderful charm of the writer throughout the whole biography.

The time we hope has passed, at least in Christendom, when a man's greatness is measured by his selfishness, or his power to destroy. For the Son of Man came not to destroy men's lives, but to save them; and in this preservation to include every interest of human nature; even so every one who would be truly good must resemble his Master. Judged by this standard William Ewart Gladstone is, next to Abraham Lincoln, the greatest man of this century; we should rather say of modern times. The names of Napoleon, of Bismarck, of Frederick the Great, of Charles the Fifth, of Cromwell or of Bacon, cannot compete, because they either sought personal aggrandizement or achieved their reforms by shedding so much blood that we are at a loss to decide whether the good or evil wrought by them predominated. But in the case of the two greatest men of modern times there is an entire absence of selfishness. "With malice toward none, with charity toward all" there is manifest an overpowering desire for the elevation of the human race through the triumph of truth and righteousness.

Mr. Gladstone is, without doubt, the most cultured man of this century. He was endowed by nature with the choicest gifts of mind and body. He enjoyed the best opportunities that the world could give for culture. He won the highest place as a scholar and debater that any one could at Eton, and took the extraordinary honors of a "Double First" at Oxford when he was barely twenty-two. He entered Parliament before he was twenty-three, and continued there uninterruptedly for sixty-two years. He has been Prime Minister four times, a greater number than has ever fallen to any other man. And now, at 88, nothing could prevent him from being called to kiss the Queen's hand again if he would consent to let his name be mentioned for office.

During two "generations of articulate speaking men" he has been in public life; and in that time has been identified with, and, since the death of Peel in 1847, the real leader in every movement for reform in politics, every question which looked toward advancing the interests of religion that has come before the English people, or was in any way connected with the growth of Christianity throughout the world. His industry, his versatility, his perseverance, have been really superhuman. What were his relaxations from the incessant and onerous duties of First Lord of the Treasury, which he held so often, either nominally or *de facto*, or Leader in the House or Prime Minister? His recreations were: Treatises on Religion, or the Greek Classics (it is said that he knows both the Iliad and the Odyssey by heart in the original Greek); Missions to Bring Reunion Between the Ionian Islands; Refutations of the Vatican Decrees of the last General Council; Replies to the Pope's Encyclical Letter; Editing Butler's Works, with Supplementary Dissertations, the

last undertaken when he was past 84, and of itself enough for a life-time work! Surely, his relaxations from the exhausting labors of Parliament seem like formidable tasks for all other men. His first literary labor was a Treatise on Church and State, written when he was 27, and of sufficient merit to call forth the hearty commendation of such a severe and hostile critic as Macaulay. His last work, a large pamphlet, which laid bare in most scathing language the horrors of the Armenian Massacres, the barbarities of the "Unspeakable Turk," and the connivance of the European Powers at those outrages in order to maintain the "Balance of Power." Such a life is perfectly unique in its length, its versatility and prodigious activity.

Mr. Gladstone is known almost equally well throughout the civilized world. And justly so, because he has given his life to its service. He is honored as much in America as in Britain; and there he is, no doubt, the most popular Commoner which that country has ever possessed. He prefers to remain a Commoner, and has steadily refused a patent of nobility which has been frequently pressed upon him. He is not popular with the Tories, the enemies of progress, because he is the friend of the laboring man. He is not liked by the vicious and unbelieving, because he is emphatically a religious man. But with the cultured, the virtuous, and all friends of the oppressed, he is the most widely known and best beloved Briton that ever lived.

This Life of Mr. Gladstone meets a strongly felt want. It is rare to have a biography of a man while living, except it be for some political purpose; either to aid his popularity or injure his prospects for office. But nothing of this sort is possible here, since the subject has definitely abandoned public life. Hence there are no ends to be gained by a biography either for his political friends or foes. Most elderly statesmen, even those of marked ability, after they have retired from office, are exceedingly dead, whether they know it or not. Mr. Gladstone, however, is very much alive, very much in evidence, despite his voluntary retirement. Perhaps no public man in Europe, not even the cavorting German Emperor, occupies as much of the world's notice as the Grand Old Man who has retired to his Welsh castle.

No person we think is better qualified for writing his life than Mr. McCarthy. He is a very forcible and popular writer; one whose style compels attention, whether you agree with him or not. For that kind of writing which cannot be misunderstood, twist it as you may, will find readers, despite the fact that the public is overwhelmed with new books. The reader becomes impatient with this superabundance, and can be held only by that which is easily comprehended, and whose meaning bears him along with a strong current. The biographer has enjoyed unusual opportunities to fit him for his work. A close friend, a fellow member of Parliament for many years; frequently differing from

his leader in details, sometimes in broad lines of policy; but always convinced of the thorough honesty, clear insight, and practical wisdom of his measures; an admiring, though not servile follower, Mr. McCarthy would be thought of in advance as the most suitable person to write a popular biography of his hero. This expectation is fully met as regards Mr. Gladstone's political, but not his religious and literary services. For either of these fields Mr. McCarthy is evidently not so well qualified. Mr. Gladstone has always been a most devoted Christian. While at Eton and Oxford he was known as thoroughly religious. And his religion was of that hearty, unaffected sort which won credit for being sincere, while it escaped the censure of being straight-laced, so good that it could not consort with sinners through fear of contamination. It requires much good sense as well as sincere piety to hold the just balance between these modes of life while in college. For the average student is censorious; especially of those who are so strict that they will not descend to such mild excesses as many good people deem pardonable during the University course.

A close study of Mr. Gladstone's character reveals moral earnestness as the leading trait. He is, indeed, the personification of conscientiousness. He always desires to do right; in fact, we do not believe that he ever listened to a temptation to do what he thought might be wrong. He has changed many times during his public life, and has, therefore, often been charged with inconsistency. But, every man of progress must change. It is only those who have no reason for their convictions, *i. e.*, those who never learn anything or outgrow their swaddling bands, who do not change their opinions. But he has always been brave enough to acknowledge his errors, and strong enough to forsake them when the onward march of progress and the logic of events opened his eyes to new truths, or new modifications of old ones. A notable instance was his course toward our country in the early years of the Civil War. He made a speech at Newcastle in October, 1862, in which he said: "Jefferson Davis has made an army, has made a navy, and, more than that, has made a nation." But he soon saw his error and made the most frank and hearty acknowledgment of, and sorrow for, his great mistake. Gladstone made his *amende honorable* to the friends of freedom in England and this country whose hearts had been so deeply grieved by his indiscreet utterances, in less than two years.

He began his public life as a pronounced Tory, the pet of Oxford and the landed aristocracy. He changed as the light of progress dawned upon him to a moderate Tory; then a mild Liberal; then through all the grades to a Radical. He extended the franchise gradually until it became, as we in this country think it should be, dependent upon manhood alone. Though always a devout churchman he worshipped with Dissenters, and often when in the Highlands started the Psalm, with his wonderfully melodi-

ous voice, in the Scotch Presbyterian Kirk. Though the champion of Episcopacy in England he disestablished this church in Ireland, and freed the seven-eighths of the population who are Catholics from the odious burden of supporting a church whose doctrines they do not believe in and whose worship they would no attend. He has labored forty years to give justice to the Irish tenantry, who have been oppressed until their cry has reached Heaven as distinctly as that of the slave in America—only to have his cherished policy balked, when he was 85, by the House of Lords, where every reform in England has been temporarily checked. But “his soul will go marching on,” whether he be in this world or the next, until justice is done to Ireland; and the separation of the Church from the State, for which he has so earnestly labored and prayed, shall be made complete.

This conscientiousness has been conspicuous in the many cases where he felt compelled to part company with his colleagues in Parliament and his constituents at home. He was first elected to Parliament from Newark (which was then a borough carried in the vest pocket of the Duke of Newcastle), who, on the recommendation of his son who had known him at Oxford, sent for him while he was traveling in Italy, and secured his election. This Duke was a regular mossback Tory who thought he owned, body and soul, all who lived on his lands or those which bordered on them. His frank motto was: “Shall I not do what I please with mine own?” But Tory as the young Gladstone was, he chose to be at the expense of keeping a conscience, and therefore soon outgrew the straight jacket of the Duke. He became so liberal in his views, though still normally a Tory, that he was defeated in Newark. But another constituency immediately sought him. The method of representation in Great Britain is wholly different from that in the United States. A distinguished candidate frequently does not represent the constituency of the place where he lives; and he may be elected by a dozen districts at the same time, and then choose which seat he may take. So, after his defeat at Newark, he was sought by the University of Oxford, whose alumnus he was and of whom, for his almost unparalleled scholarship and ability, his Alma Mater was justly proud. But his leanings toward universal suffrage and relief of oppressed Ireland became so pronounced that Oxford could no longer endure his advanced ideas, and he was rejected by this venerable constituency. He next was elected by Lancashire, a sort of headquarters of such Liberalism as existed then; and he continued to represent this district until a result similar to the preceding cases followed. His growing Liberalism outran that of even Lancashire; and being rejected there he was sought by Edinburgh (this district is known in English politics as “Midlothian”), which he represented, though with diminishing majorities, because of his Radicalism, which displeased the sprinkling of bitter Tories in the Scotch capital, until his retirement from Parliament in March, 1894.

What was taking place in his various constituencies was paralleled by his relations with his colleagues. Time after time he drifted away from the men of his own party, who thought the chief virtue of a politician is consistency, no matter how the world advances. It was not strange that such men as Disraeli and Palmerston, who did not think a conscience worth bothering themselves about, were amazed at his course. For if they ever had any convictions or principles—except those embodied in the cherished motto, “To be all things to all men, if by any possibility we might gain something”—nobody ever knew what these convictions and principles were; least of all themselves. To part company from his constituencies, and his colleagues in Parliament, cost him many a pang; and some of his saddest complaints were the parting addresses to the boroughs which once sought and afterwards rejected him. But, as between conscience in one end of the balance and political honors, friendships, or, even, the reputation for consistency, in the other, all these and every other worldly consideration would not have the weight of a feather. The Seer of human nature said:

“Set honor in one eye and death i’ the other,
And I will look on both indifferently.”

Substitute “conscience” for “honor,” and this would apply to Gladstone in every part of his life, public or private, even to the minutest action. He was always an enigma to such men as Derby, Cobden, Hartington, Lowe, or even Russell and Bright. It seemed strange to them that a sensible statesman could stickle for such small matters as depended on mere honesty, or a balancing of things in themselves indifferent. With two eyes they believed they saw both ways; but with one, that is, conscience, as the rule of life, he saw more than they. But those who with fancied stereoscopic power try to make the photographs of wirepulling and straightforward dealing blend into one solid picture of righteousness, effect only a blur, and render life not worth living. For this world is under the government of fixed laws, as well in the moral as the physical domain; and these laws are executed by a Supreme Ruler who will, in the end, make truth and righteousness reign and approve themselves to all rational creatures.

Perhaps nothing better illustrates the fixed trend of Mr. Gladstone’s mind than his last great undertaking, the edition of Bishop Butler’s works. This author will be known through all time as the one who brought into clear prominence the doctrine of the “Supremacy of Conscience.” Both the “Sermons” and the “Analogy” teach this more than any other idea; and it is not too much to say that Butler appeals to his editor’s true character more than any other uninspired writer. Hence it is eminently fitting that the greatest statesman, scholar and man of affairs should give his maturest powers to the editing of the noblest work ever written in the English language.

We leave Mr. McCarthy's "story" with profound gratitude to the biographer for giving us such a clear, life-like and, in the main, fair delineation of the life of the most renowned Englishman of any age. We could wish that he had made the religious and literary sides of his subject more prominent. But, from the employments of Mr. McCarthy as a professed politician and a writer somewhat of the Bohemian sort, this was scarcely to be expected. Admirers of Mr. Gladstone's religious character will have to read between the lines of the charming narrative. There is enough given to enable them by a little use of imagination to form a perfect picture of this aspect of his life. The wonder must always be that he can be so great in so many and varied lines of thought and action. For he appears as a man of the highest order in human nature, no matter in what light we view his wonderful personality.

J. C.

December 29, 1897.

THE BOOK OF THE TWELVE PROPHETS, COMMONLY CALLED THE MINOR.
By George Adam Smith. D. D., LL. D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, Free College, Glasgow. In Two Volumes. Vol. II. Zephaniah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Obadiah, Haggai, Zechariah i.-viii., Malachi, Joel, Zechariah ix.-xiv., and Jonah. With Historical and Critical Introductions. New York, A. C. Armstrong and Son, 51 East Tenth Street. 1898. Price, \$1.50.

This volume completes Dr. Smith's Exposition of the Twelve Prophets, commonly called the Minor, and concludes the series known as the "Expositor's Bible." The entire series consists of forty-nine volumes, and gives an exposition of every book in the Old and New Testaments. Although some of these volumes are more interesting and meritorious than others, yet, in the whole series, there is not one really poor book. All of the volumes are replete with instruction, and embody the best and latest results of Biblical criticism and study. As a whole, they are, indeed, the best practical exposition of the Holy Scriptures in the English language. They bring out clearly not only the meaning of the Scriptures, but also show the application of their teachings to our own times. Both ministers and laymen will, therefore, find them a very desirable possession. For our own part, we have nothing in our library that we value more highly as a practical help to the right understanding of the Scriptures and of the proper presentation of their truths to others.

The volume now before us is one of the very best of the series. It is full of matter of historical interest, and furnishes a valuable introduction to Old Testament criticism. Though we are not prepared to agree with the distinguished author on all points, yet we are prepared to say that his exposition throughout is most scholarly, reverent, interesting and edifying. The exposition of Jonah is, in itself, worth the price of the volume.

J. M. T.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY. By J. H. W. Stuckenberg, Member of the Philosophical Society of Berlin, Author of "Introduction to the Study of Philosophy," "The Life of Immanuel Kant," "Tendencies in German Thought," etc. New York, A. C. Armstrong and Son, 51 East Tenth Street, near Broadway. 1898. Price, \$1.50

Sociology is one of the newer studies of our times, but one that every well informed person should have, at least, some general knowledge of. Such knowledge the present volume is admirably adapted to furnish. Its special purpose is "to lay the basis for sociological study, to designate the problems involved, and to aid the beginner in the solution of those problems." The following subjects are treated of: The Genesis of the Idea of Society, Definition and Scope of Sociology, The Relation of Sociology to other Social Disciplines, Division of Sociology, The Principles of Society *per se*, The Historical Evolution of the Principles of Society, Sociological Ethics, or the Progress of Society, The Method in the Study of Sociology, Is Sociology a Science? and The Sociological Study of the Age. The practical value of the volume consists in bringing society definitely before the mind and in furnishing the means for fruitful sociological investigations. It is a book which ought to have a large sale, and which will repay careful study.

J. M. T.

DOES GOD SEND TROUBLE? An Earnest Effort to Discern between Christian Tradition and Christian Truth. By Charles Cuthbert Hall, D. D. Fourth Edition. Pages 93. Houghton, Mifflin and Company, Boston and New York. 1897.

The importance of this work is not to be estimated by its size. The question which it discusses is one whose difficulty must have been felt, at some time, by every thoughtful Christian minister. The minister has more abundant opportunity than most other men have to become acquainted with sorrow. He sees trouble in all its forms; and it is his mission to bring comfort to troubled hearts. Hence he is of necessity led to reflect on the purpose of trouble in the moral government of the world. What have pain, misfortune, sorrow, sickness, death to do with the will of God? What have they to do with human sin and guilt? These are questions which must necessarily force themselves upon the attention of the thoughtful Christian minister as he goes about the discharge of the duties of his office among his people. It was in this way that the book before us came to be written. The author, as pastor of the First Presbyteretian Church of Brooklyn, N. Y., had opportunity to witness trouble in all the variety of forms in which it falls to the lot of men, and to experience also how little real comfort is conveyed by the familiar phrase that "God sends it for a wise purpose." And the results of his reflections are embodied in the book before us.

As is intimated in the title, Dr. Hall rejects the common doctrine that God sends trouble upon men for *punitive* and *disci-*

plinary purposes. The sufferings of this life are not punishments of sin. Punishment, according to Dr. Hall, is not physical, but spiritual suffering. Physical evil is not a direct ordination of God, but the natural sequence merely of the violation of physical laws. Bad drainage and bad ventilation, rather than God's will, are responsible for many of the ills to which human flesh is heir; and it is but questionable piety to charge to the providence of God what ought as a rule to be charged to the greed and folly of men. "If I believed", says Dr. Hall, "that God spreads scarlet fever among little children; if I believed that God sweeps off into their graves so many young wives and mothers; if I believed that God produces idiots, and drives people mad, or makes men murder and steal and blast their families, I would hate Him as other men hate Him," p. 13. But while Dr. Hall holds that physical toil, and especially death, are not the outcome of God's will, he nevertheless believes that they are a consequence of the disordering effect of sin. "Death is the outcome of natural law, the effect of natural causes, in a created order perverted and spoiled by sin," p. 15. God simply maintains the energy of natural law, in the face of human folly and transgression, because law is right and good; and the consequence is human suffering. But then "the laws of nature have not broken humanity. Humanity has broken itself against the laws of nature."

Here, indeed, it might be observed that by admitting a causal relation of any kind between sin and physical suffering, Dr. Hall, after all, admits the presence of a penal element in such suffering. Why might we not say that physical suffering is *indirectly* a divine punishment of sin, even if it is not such directly? Intemperance is a sin which, through the reaction of the physical laws which are violated, entails trouble and sorrow. But since the violated laws are God's laws, and since He maintains them in force, why may not the evils inflicted through the operation of these laws be called *divine punishment*? To this question Dr. Hall fails to make a decisive answer. We would answer that this conception is impossible, just because the physical suffering occasioned by sin so often falls upon others than the guilty persons. Guilt and punishment are correlative. The Christian conscience can no longer admit the idea that the sins of one person may be *punished* in the life of another person. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die," said a prophet of Israel long ago. But then we still have the unquestioned fact of vicarious suffering—the suffering, for instance, of the consequences of the sins of parents by their children—to account for; which forms one of the hard problems in theodicy, or in the justification of the ways of God to men. Dr. Hall maintains that the sufferings of this life can not be punishment for sin, because punishment is something spiritual in its nature and has been suffered by Christ in our stead. "I believe that sin has been judged, condemned, and punished in this world, once for all, in the awful sacrifice of Christ," p. 53. "There is

but one place on earth where man obtains a glimpse of what the punishment of sin is as a crime against God. That place is the Hill of Calvary, where stands the cross of Jesus Christ," p. 49. "Christ has suffered punishment; He has been into that black mystery; He has gone to the bottom of it;" and now for those who accept Christ as their Saviour there is no punishment for sin. This, however, does not involve release from the natural consequences of sin. To suspend these would bring the whole system of natural laws into instant collapse.

We sympathize with the aim and purpose of this book, although we can not accept all its positions. We can not, for instance, accept the author's theory of the atonement. We think that the same objection may be made to this theory that holds to the theory of vicarious punishment generally, namely, that it offends against fundamental ethical principles. If we may say that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins in so far as they are crimes against God, why may we not also say that the little child which dies of scarlet fever suffers the *punishment* of the parents' sins in so far as they are offences against nature? Does the one proposition offend against the principle of justice more than the other? But we perfectly agree with our author that the troubles of this life must not always be interpreted as punishments of sin, nor even as means of discipline. That was the mistake made by Job's comforters. They assured him that he must be suffering the penalty of some secret sins; and against that idea his mind rebelled, as many a mind will now. And many a mind will rebel also against the idea that trouble is sent as a salutary discipline to those whom the Lord loveth. Why, some soul will ask, do I need more of this discipline than others who are no better than I am, and yet are not afflicted as I am afflicted? This is one of the hard questions that will sometimes be presented to the Christian minister, and upon the correct answer to which will often depend the peace and comfort of a soul. Above all things is it important that the minister should not attribute actions and motives to God which are indefensible in the forum of the Christian conscience. To say, for instance, that God sends the fever upon little children, and then to say that we are ignorant of His purposes will not do. It would be better to plead ignorance of the whole case, and simply to maintain that God, in His infinite love, and power, and wisdom, will be able to bring good out of the present evil and make it contribute to the sufferer's greater glory hereafter. But the subject is one which, in our age at least, with the prevailing degree of intelligence concerning the operation of natural law, requires no small amount of thoughtful consideration and wisdom on the part of the Christian ministry; and the careful perusal of the book now under notice can not fail to be helpful.

THE STORY OF JONAH IN THE LIGHT OF THE HIGHER CRITICISM. By Luther Tracy Townsend, D. D. Pages 119. Funk and Wagnall's Company, New York. 1897.

This is quite a small volume, the pages measuring two inches by four and a-half of printed surface. And the title is a misnomer; for the subject is not treated in the *light* of the Higher Criticism at all, but rather, we should say, in *spite* of it. The light of the Higher Criticism has scarcely reached the mind of the author, and he knows neither its methods nor its results, so far as one may be able to judge from the work before us. The Higher Critics come in for an abundant amount of denunciation, but for no degree of intelligent consideration. The historicalness of the story of Jonah is maintained on the following grounds: first, there was a Jonah; secondly, there was a city called Nineveh, and it was a very wicked place; thirdly, it is likely that God would send a prophet to such a place; fourthly, it is likely also that the prophet would be unwilling to go, and would try to escape by sea; fifthly, it is likely that in case of a storm the sailors would throw a stranger overboard, and that, being thrown overboard he would be swallowed by a fish, for there are plenty of fishes in the sea with throats big enough to swallow a man. The only thing that is not so likely is that Jonah should remain alive and retain his consciousness for three days in the belly of the fish, and then be thrown up unharmed, and go on his way to Nineveh and convert that city. But this feat, too, is within the power of God, and therefore, not at all incredible. On this point the author reduces his argument to the following syllogism: "If God could make Adam, he could save Jonah." That God made Adam must be believed in spite of the evolutionists, of whose theories the author of this volume seems to know as much as he knows of those of the Higher Critics. It is true that his argument only establishes the *possibility* of Jonah being kept alive in the belly of the fish, not the *fact*; but the author thinks that the fact must be accepted on the ground of the New Testament, and that the refusal to accept it would be subversive of the Christian faith. We think that this kind of apologetic argumentation has a tendency to bring Christianity into discredit, and to shake the faith of some good people. But that it can cause permanent damage to Christianity we do not hold, for we believe that Christianity rests upon an impregnable foundation as indifferent to the vaporings of ignorant fanaticism as to the arguments of hostile criticism.

DIE LEHRE VON DER ÜBERNATÜRLICHEN GEBURT CHRISTI. Christologische Studie von P. Lobstein, Professor der Theologie in Strassburg. Zweite stark vermehrte Auflage. Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr. Freiburg und Leipzig. 1896. Pages 65.

This small brochure was first published in the French language in 1890, and attracted considerable attention. But as it is con-

nected with a discussion which has for some years been going forward, especially in the theological circles of Germany, it was fitting that it should be published also in the German language, and thus be made accessible to a larger number of readers. The subject with which it deals, namely, the supernatural conception of Christ, has formed the chief point in the controversy which has lately taken place in Germany on the Apostles' Creed, and which will doubtless, sooner or later, claim attention also in this country. It is well known that some of the adherents of the Ritschlian school of theology, while distinctly acknowledging the *divinity* of Christ, deny the story of the supernatural or miraculous conception. Or where a supernatural element in the birth of Christ is acknowledged, it is contended at least that that birth was not without a father. And it is to this class of theologians that our author belongs.

The work before us is divided into six sections, having respectively the following headings: General introduction; the traditional doctrine considered from an exegetical point of view; the traditional doctrine analyzed in its historical origin; the traditional doctrine regarded from a dogmatical point of view; the traditional doctrine traced back to its religious significance; retrospect and conclusion. It is often said that views like those advocated in this treatise have their origin in a disbelief of the supernatural. That, however, could at least not be said of Prof. Lobstein. He begins with an examination of Scripture, and comes to the conclusion that, with the exception of the opening chapters of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke, the idea of a fatherless conception is not recognized anywhere in the New Testament. Unquestionably the Apostle Paul knew nothing of it, and equally unquestionably he believed in the pre-existence of Christ as "the man from heaven." But the chapters in Matthew and Luke relating to the infancy of Jesus, the author contends, are self-contradictory, and show evident marks of being later additions. The genealogical tables of the two Gospels cannot be reconciled with each other; and as both profess to give the descent of Joseph, they must have been intended originally to prove that Jesus *as the son of Joseph* was the Messiah descended from David. Of this circumstance the redactors of our Gospels were aware, and they sought to explain it away by the glosses inserted in Matt. 2:16 and Luke 3:23. The author also claims that these chapters contradict plain statements in other parts of the Gospels, and that they are especially inconsistent with the report of the conduct of Mary and her family towards Jesus during the early years of His ministry. As to the historical origin of the doctrine of a fatherless conception, the author holds that it was the culmination of one of three streams of tradition which flowed through the Apostolic Church, the first finding expression in Paul's theory of pre-existence, and the second in the Logos doctrine of the Johannine writings. Dogmatically, according to our author, the doctrine in

question has its motive in the belief of Christ's sinlessness, but is inconsistent with Paul's view of pre-existence as well as with the Logos theory of John. In the doctrine of the supernatural conception, our author says, "we have to do with the origin of a being which is as yet non-existent, and which owes its existence to a supernatural act of the Spirit of God that comes upon Mary; while the doctrine of the conception of an eternally pre-existent ego in the womb of a virgin, where it either assumes a human nature in addition to the divine, or enters into a form of existence different from the divine, has absolutely nothing in common with the more popular tradition preserved in the first and third Gospels." And in this tradition, or "myth," as the author sometimes calls it, the pious Christian consciousness of the second generation of the Apostolic Church expressed its faith in the divinity of Christ.

The author of this treatise, it will be remembered, does not deny the *divinity* of Christ. He gives the following explanation of what a confession of the divinity of Christ means: "To confess the divinity of Christ means to realize, to feel in oneself, that to those who have surrendered themselves to Him, He has brought the peace of a conscience reconciled to God and the powers of eternal life; that to His own He has communicated a principle of infinite love, of eternal truth, and of perfect holiness; that in the place of all motives of action, which are derived from the world and bear the stamp of the spirit which is from beneath, He has put the light of a life proceeding from God and pervaded by the Spirit which is from above; that to enter into communion with Him is to be united with God; that it is the highest goal and the unclouded bliss of His disciples to be one with Him as He is one with the Father." Such a confession of divinity in Christ is, of course, wholly experimental. It is like the confession of Peter: "Lord to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." It may be a question, however, whether such an experimental confession could long maintain itself without a commensurate dogmatic confession. Christ must be acknowledged as in a most real sense the Son of God. But does that necessarily imply the doctrine of the supernatural conception? This is another question, which must be considered on general Biblical and dogmatic grounds; and for this purpose the little work under notice may be helpful to the careful and honest student of theology.

HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE APOSTOLIC AGE. By Arthur Cushman McGiffert, Ph.D., D. D., Washburn Professor of Church History in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Pages xii and 681. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1897.

This work forms a volume of the International Theological Library, edited by Drs. Briggs and Salmond. That fact itself is a guarantee of its high scholarly character, and raises the highest

expectation of its ability and merit. And this expectation is not disappointed in the perusal of the work. We have in it the production of a scholar who is thoroughly familiar with his subject, thoroughly honest in the treatment of his material, and thoroughly skillful in the presentation of it. The style is easy and natural, and the reader's attention never flags. There are no obscure or heavy sentences, and one is never in doubt as to the author's meaning. Manner and language are dignified and grave, and one's taste is never offended by any lack of congruity with the solemnity of the subject treated. Altogether the work before us, judged from the standpoint of historiography, is one of no ordinary merit; and the intelligent reader who has once taken it up will not willingly lay it down until he has finished the perusal of it.

But why a new history of Christianity in the Apostolic age? Has not the subject long since been exhausted? Have not Neander and Schaff, and other able historians, said all that can be said on the subject? To such questions one need not wait long for an answer. The reader soon discovers that Professor McGiffert has not written over again what others had written before him. He has written a *new* history of the Apostolic age; and the ordinary reader of church history will require some little time to adjust himself to the new points of view. The discovery, since the time of Neander, of much new material, like the *Didache*, for instance, has contributed in part to this change of view. But another and more important circumstance has been the rise of a new *historical spirit*, which studies history, even *sacred* history, not so much in the light of a later age as in the light of the age itself that is to be portrayed, and by means of the sources belonging to that age. The object of such historical study in Christianity is not to justify any subsequent phase of theological development, but to present a picture of the religious thought and life of the age with which the historian is concerned. Dr. McGiffert deals with Christianity in the Apostolic age; and if his picture does not look just like a picture of the Christianity of the Nicene age the fault could hardly be supposed to be his, except on the unreasonable assumption that there was no difference at all between the age of Constantine and the age of the apostles. Many will doubtless miss in Dr. McGiffert's book, for instance, the well-known Nicene and Chalcedonian views of Christ's person. He tells us that the men whom Christ gathered about Him regarded Him neither in the aspect of incarnate deity nor of perfect and ideal humanity, but simply in the character of the Messiah, and upon this conception they founded the Church. He tells us also that Christ did not claim to be omniscient, and did not know the time of His second coming. It would be easy to criticise such statements if they were made in regard to the circle of conceptions current in a later age; but the question before the historian is, what were the facts in the age of the apostles? What was Jesus believed to be by His contemporaries? But if it should

turn out that they had no conception of any doctrine of incarnation—if it should appear that Peter, for example, when he said, “Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God,” meant no more than to acknowledge Jesus as the Messiah—this after all would not prove that He was not essentially more than human, and that the later apostles and later ages were mistaken when they regarded Him as the Son of God in a sense different from that which was at first denoted by this title. Dr. McGiffert himself proves that the New Testament shows progress in the development of Christological thought from the faith of the earlier disciplines to the views of St. Paul and from the views of St. Paul to the Logos doctrine of the Johannean writings.

But, besides the Christology, there are many other points in this volume which will at first startle many a serious reader. In the first place, we observe an independence in the use of Biblical sources which is not usual, and which is not consistent with the doctrine of the inerrancy of Scripture, though quite in harmony with the conception of substantial accuracy. For instance, the author does not hesitate to think that the account of the mission of the apostles to Samaria, and of their imparting the Holy Spirit by the laying on of their hands, Acts 9:14–18, betrays the conception of a later age; or that the Council of Jerusalem, which, by the way, is placed in A. D. 45, instead of A. D. 50, the usual date, never issued such a decree as is attributed to it in Acts 15:28,29. But, perhaps, the author’s most serious departure from traditional beliefs relates to the authorships of the Acts of the Apostles. This book, which is of such vital importance to the historian of the Apostolic age, Professor McGiffert holds, was not written by Luke, “the beloved physician,” but by an unknown author who lived a generation after the time of Paul and used older sources, which he sometimes misunderstood. The so-called “we” passages in the latter part of the book, which imply an eye-witness, may have been written by Luke; and this may have given rise to the subsequent tradition that Luke wrote the book of Acts, as well as that of the Gospel, which in any case is from the same hand. Some other departures from the traditional views concerning the origin of the New Testament writings may be noted in this connection. The First Epistle of Peter was written a generation after the death of Peter by a Paulinist, possibly Barnabus. Second Peter is a pseudonym. The Epistle of James is probably the work of a Hellenistic Jew, *Christian*, of course, who lived in the latter part of the first century. The Pastoral Epistles are, in their present form, not genuine; but they are based upon genuine letters of Paul—this is true especially of Second Timothy and Titus—and were composed as we now have them in the reign of Trajan.

In any history of the Apostolic age large space must necessarily be assigned to St. Paul. It has been said that Paul was the founder of Christianity rather than Christ. This is a proposition,

of course, that can not be entertained for a moment, and to which Professor McGiffert gives no countenance at all. Paul was not the author of Christianity, but only its greatest apostle and exponent—the man who affected the fortunes of the Church more profoundly than any other human agent; and this in spite of the fact that in his own age he was ahead of his time, and his apprehension of the Gospel was too spiritual to suit the temper of his contemporaries, both Jews and Gentiles. In the chronology of the life and work of Paul, Professor McGiffert, like Harnack, pushes the dates about five or six years farther back than has generally been the case. He supposes that Paul's conversion took place in A. D. 31 or 32, and his death in A. D. 58. Within this period of twenty-six or twenty-seven years was accomplished the marvellous work of St. Paul. That work consisted in the planting of the Church throughout the Greek portion of the Roman Empire, and in the writing of a series of letters which must be an inestimable treasure to the Church in all time. These letters, according to our author, are all genuine writings of Paul, with the exception of the Pastoral Epistles, which in their present form can not have come from his hands. In the first place the known history of Paul affords no situation into which these epistles could by any means be made to fit; for the hypothesis of a release from his first Roman imprisonment, and of a subsequent second imprisonment and martyrdom, is without any historical foundation. But, secondly, and what is of more importance, these epistles are not in the spirit of St. Paul. They are in the spirit of the "larger church" of the third Christian generation, which embodies more of the mind of Peter, and of his class of men, than of the mind of Paul, and when the Christian community had begun to become the institution of the Catholic Church. For the difference between Paul's apprehension of Christianity and the more common apprehension which became fixed at last in the Roman Church, probably through Peter's personal influence, who certainly *was* at Rome, we must refer our readers to the work under notice itself. We know nothing finer in theological literature than the chapters in which our author distinguishes the Christianity of Paul, as being of a higher type, from the Christianity of the Church at large. The idea of immediate, vital union of the Christian with Christ by faith is, according to Prof. McGiffert, Paul's fundamental soteriological idea; but the world had to wait for this modern age before that idea could be appreciated at its full value.

This work of Dr McGiffert's will doubtless be widely circulated and read; for theologians and progressive ministers cannot afford to do without it. It will also be much "reviewed," and it will be variously criticised. We hope this will be done in the temper of calm reason and dispassionate judgment. Such criticism the author cannot but court; but there could be nothing gained by another angry debate, and a decision by mere ma-

majorities. Such decisions decide nothing. There is a candor evident in our author's pages which shows that he is in search only of the truth; and a tone of conservative orthodoxy and Christian faith, along with the severest critical habits, that must be reassuring to the most timid Christian. Surely from such a writer Christianity has nothing to fear; although he would doubtless be the first to join in St. Paul's confession, "We now see through a glass darkly, and not yet face to face." If anyone thinks that in Christian theology and in Christian history there is nothing more to be learned, and that all questions are finally settled, then this book is not for him, and he might as well lay it down without reading.

CHRISTIAN INSTITUTIONS. By Alexander V. G. Allen, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge. Pages xxi and 577. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1897.

Professor Allen is known to many of our readers as the author of "The Continuity of Christian Thought," which was published some twelve or fifteen years ago, and obtained such wide circulation. The present volume, which is written in the style and spirit of the work just referred to and which, moreover, also belongs to the "International Theological Library," will doubtless be received with equal favor. Professor Allen is a philosophical historian whose work can always be studied with profit, and who succeeds in shedding light upon many a dark problem in the history of the development of Christian thought. It is the peculiarity of his method to explain existing institutions by showing how they have come to exist; and such a method can never fail to be interesting and instructive.

The object of the work before us can not be better stated than in the language of the preface. "This treatise," the author says, "is a summary of the church's history from the point of view of its institutions. The effort has been made to show how organization, creeds and culture are related to the spiritual life and to the growth of Christian civilization." This indicates the division of the work into three books. In the first book we have an account of the development of the organization of the Church from the first faint beginning in the apostolic age to the completed papacy, and then down to modern episcopacy and presbyterialism. Professor Allen departs somewhat from the theory, first advanced by Jerome and in recent times so ably maintained by Lightfoot, that in the New Testament *presbyter* and *bishop* are convertible terms; but he shows plainly to any who are not blind that there is no particle of authority for the doctrine of a divine institution of episcopacy. In the second book will be found a review of the origin of the Catholic Creeds, and of the development of doctrine. Besides an historical account of the Catholic Creeds we have special discussions of such subjects as the Trinity, atonement,

the person of Christ, the miracle, etc. In a very interesting way the author shows how these doctrines were developed under the influences of national and historical conditions. Nothing here is isolated, nothing disconnected. In the third book, finally, we have a treatment of Christian Worship. This contains an account of the principles of cultus and of the doctrine of the sacraments. The following account is given, p. 525, of the primitive view of the Lord's supper: "In the evening meal, at the close of the day, the first disciples met together, praying over the bread and the cup, eating and drinking in remembrance of the Master. As He had eaten of the food which the earth supplies for human sustenance in a spirit of consecration to the will of His Father, so His disciples had at their command the same food which had nourished the body of Christ. If it were eaten in His spirit, whose meat and drink was to do the Father's will who had sent Him, then the food of common life, the bread and the wine, were transmuted by faith into elements that ministered also to spiritual life, and made them one in body and spirit with Christ." That kind of transubstantiation one can believe in; and one can also understand how from so simple a conception the Roman Catholic dogma could have originated. This is only one illustration of the exceedingly interesting character of the work before us. Numerous other points are elucidated in an equally striking way; and no reader can rise from the study of the work without finding himself greatly benefited.

THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW.

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I.

EARLY BUDDHISM.

BY REV. D. B. SCHNEDER.

Concerning the life of the founder of Buddhism the trouble of scholars is not that too little has been told, but that too large a mass of literature has grown up concerning him, for the amount that is told about him evidently indicates much less the degree of knowledge possessed concerning him than the height of admiration in which he was held by his devoted and imaginative biographers. It has been found an impossible task to separate with any reasonable degree of satisfaction the true from the purely legendary; so that several scholars, among whom are Senart and Kern, have gone so far as to pronounce the whole story of Buddha a sun-myth, and to deny the existence of any one individual as the founder of the Buddhist faith. This, however, is probably an extreme position, and most students of Buddhism to-day agree in accepting certain leading facts in reference to the life of Buddha, and in regarding much more that is written about him as probably trustworthy.

The main facts as accepted by scholars are about as follows: Somewhere between the years 560 and 480 B. C., at Kapilavastu, situated along a branch of the Ganges, there was born to Suddhohana, a chief of the tribe of Sakya, and Maya, his wife,

a son, to whom was given the name of Siddhartha,* a later name, however, being Gautama. Seven days after the birth of the son the mother died and the child was reared under the care of her sister, a second wife of Suddhohana. Suddhohana was possessed of considerable wealth, and he belonged to the warrior caste. The life of young Siddhartha was, therefore, probably one of ease and comfort, while his education no doubt included such parts of the Veda as he, as a member of the warrior caste, was privileged to receive instructions in. At the customarily early age for marriage in India, Siddhartha married at least one wife, Yasodhara, who bore him at least one son, Rahula. At the age of twenty-nine years he took the extraordinary step of exchanging the comforts and pleasures of a luxurious home for the hardships and austerities of the life of a homeless, begging monk. For seven years he lived this life of a Brahman ascetic. They were not years of rest, but years of struggle and search for light as to the true way of life. At the end of the seven years, one night under a fig-tree, known now in Buddhist history as the Bo-tree, came the great enlightenment. In a supreme moment there flashed upon the monk what seemed to him a clear vision of all the errors in which men were wandering, of all the sources from which human misery flows, and of the way to the annihilation of this misery. Thus did Gautama, the ascetic, become Buddha, the enlightened.

For one month Buddha sat in blissful enjoyment of the new light. Then he began to preach, first converting five monks who had been his companions in his ascetic austerities, and whom he met in a grove at the city of Benares. From then on the number of converts grew rapidly, people from the higher classes showing a special readiness to join him. In the course of time the converts were organized into a carefully regulated monastic order. Later an order of nuns was also established. Besides these there were many lay members—people who revered Buddha and believed his teachings, but did not take the monastic vows but re-

* Monier-Williams places this name in the list of those conferred upon him later by his admirers. See his "Buddhism," p. 23.

mained with their families and continued in their occupations. During nine months of the year Buddha and his monks wandered about from place to place, with shaven heads and in yellow garb, preaching the new way, begging their food and living, now under the open sky, now in forests, now in huts or rude buildings erected for them by pious laymen.

After a career of forty-five years, at the ripe age of eighty, at the town of Kusinagara situated about eighty miles east of his birthplace, the great teacher died, surrounded by a host of sorrowing followers. It is probable that his last illness was brought on by eating boar's flesh, an act that failed to harmonize with his own prohibition of the taking of life. His body was burned amid great ceremony.

This is the simple story of the man who has been enthusiastically called the "Light of Asia." Much more that is recorded concerning him may be true, but that it *is* true can not with certainty be affirmed. Some of the legends concerning his life, however, are of interest irrespective of the question of their truth. One of these is the story of his supernatural conception and birth. The story is that when the time came for the Bodhisattva, or Buddha-to-be, to leave the heaven in which he dwelled, he descended in the shape of a white elephant into the womb of Maya, the childless wife of Suddhohana, the descent being accompanied by great signs and wonders. The birth took place under a satin-tree, the god Brahma receiving the child from the side of the mother.*

Another interesting legend is that of the four visions which led Gautama to the great renunciation. It is said that the father of the young Gautama took great pains to keep from his son a knowledge of the world's misery. One day, however, the son persisted in his determination to see what was beyond the narrow confines of his father's gardens. In a chariot he rode out and was over-joyed with the seeing of the sights until

* Oldenberg's "Buddha," p. 88 ; Monier-Williams' "Buddhism," p. 23.

" When midway in the road
 Slow tottering from the hovel where he hid
 Crept forth a wretch in rags, haggard and foul,
 An old, old man, whose shrivelled skin, sun-tanned,
 Clung like a beast's hide to his fleshless bones.
 Bent was his back with load of many days,
 His eye-pits red with rust of ancient tears,
 His dim orbs blear with rheum, his toothless jaws
 Wagging with palsy and the fright to see
 So many and such joy. One skinny hand
 Clutched a worn staff to prop his quavering limbs,
 And one was pressed upon the ridge of ribs
 Whence came in gasps the heavy, painful breath.
 ' Alms ! ' moaned he, ' give, good people, for I die.
 To-morrow or next day ! ' then the cough
 Choked him, but still he stretched his palm and stood
 Blinking and groaning 'mid his spasms, ' Alms ! ' '*

The crowd hastened to hustle away the disgusting spectacle, but young Gautama stopped them and inquired what this creature was, and whether other men ever got like him. He was told that this was an old man, and that all men became like him, if they lived long enough; and the heart of the young man grew sad and meditative. This was the first vision.

In the course of time he made a second visit to the outside world, during which, among other things, his attention was attracted by a voice from the roadside :

" ' Help, masters ! lift me to my feet ; oh, help !
 Or I shall die before I reach my house ! '
 A stricken wretch it was, whose quivering frame,
 Caught by some deadly plague, lay in the dust
 Writhing, with fiery purple blotches specked ;
 The chill sweat beaded on his brow, his mouth
 Was dragged awry with twitchings of sore pain, '
 The wild eyes swam with inward agony.
 Gasping, he clutched the grass to rise, and rose
 Half-way, then sank, with quaking feeble limbs
 And scream of terror, crying, ' Ah, the pain !
 Good people, help ! ' "

Gautama ran to help the wretch, but his attendant warned him against the danger. The young Gautama wondered whether other men, then, might also be taken with such maladies and the

* Arnold's " *Light of Asia*," p. 64.

reply that sickness has its great harvests of thousands plunged his heart into ever deepening sadness. This was the second vision.

The third vision was that of a corpse carried through the streets to a funeral pyre. Gautama inquired :

“ ‘ Is this the end which comes
To all who live ?’

‘ This the end that comes
To all,’ quoth Chauna ; ‘ he upon the pyre—
Whose remnants are so petty that the crows
Caw hungrily, then quit the fruitless feast—
Ate, drank, laughed, loved, and lived, and liked life well,
Then came—who knows ?—some gust of jungle wind,
A stumble on the path, a taint in the tank,
A snake’s nip, half a span of angry steel,
A chill, a fish-bone, or a falling tile,
And life was over and the man is dead.’ ”

Gautama, glowing with a burning passion and a consuming pity, could contain himself no longer, and cried, according to the words of the “ Light of Asia ”:

“ ‘ Oh ! suffering world,
Oh ! known and unknown of my common flesh,
Caught in this common net of death and woe,
And life which binds to both ! I see, I feel
The vastness of the agony of earth,
The vainness of its joys, the mockery
Of all its best, the anguish of its worst ;
Since pleasures end in pain, and youth in age,
And love in loss, and life in hateful death,
And death in unknown lives which will but yoke
Men to their wheel again to whirl the round
Of false delights and woes that are not false,
Me too this lure hath cheated, so it seemed
Lovely to live, and life a sunlit stream
Forever flowing into a changeless peace ;
Whereas the foolish ripple of the flood
Dances so lightly down by bloom and lawn
Only to pour its crystal quicklier
Into the foul salt sea. The veil is rent
Which blinded me ! I am as all these men
Who cry upon their gods and are not heard
Or are not heeded—yet there must be aid,
For them and me and all there must be help!’ ”

Then, after the fourth and last vision, that of a monk with shaven crown, in yellow garb, a religious staff in his right hand and a mendicant's alms-bowl in his left, he resolves that he too will sever the ties of home and friendship, and become an ascetic, in order to seek a way of escape from the ills of worldly existence.

There are, also, a number of legends describing the temptations of Buddha by Mara, the evil one. One occurred immediately after his departure from his home. Another just previous to his enlightenment. Still another immediately after his attainment to victory. When he had found his way into the great light and was in the first bliss of its enjoyment, Mara, the evil one, approached him and tempted him to refrain from proclaiming to others the truth he had found. "With great pains, blessed one," said Mara, "hast thou acquired this doctrine. Why proclaim it? Beings lost in desires and lusts will not understand it. Remain in quietude. Enjoy Nirvana." To counteract these suggestions the god Brahma Sahampati appeared and called to the enlightened one: "Arise, O spotless one, open the gate of Nirvana. Arise, look down upon the world lost in suffering. Arise, wander forth, preach the doctrine."* Buddha heeded the voice of the god and went forth and preached.

The next topic that calls for attention in a systematic study of Buddhism is the *teaching* of Buddha, or the second member of the Buddhist triad. For Buddhism always means three things, namely, Buddha, his doctrine and his order. The source of information concerning the doctrine or teaching of Buddha, as well as concerning his life, is the Buddhist sacred scriptures. These were not Buddha's own product. Buddha wrote nothing. They were written by his followers at various periods after the master's death. Hence here also the difficulty confronts us of sifting out what was substantially Buddha's own teaching from what is purely legendary. The sacred writings of Buddhism, like the teachings of the founder himself, are originally in the vernacular of the section of India where Buddha lived, namely, the Pali language. The general name applied to the Buddhist scriptures

* Monier-Williams' "Buddhism," p. 41.

is the Tripitaka, or three collections, namely, the Vinaya, containing the rules of the order, the Sutra, containing the moral precepts, and the Abhi-dhama, setting forth the philosophical teachings. After Buddha's death three councils were held to collect the sayings of the master and to settle the true canon.

The teachings of original Buddhism are beautifully systematized in the doctrine of "the four noble truths," the first three setting forth the dogmatics and the last one the ethics. The four truths are the following: 1. The truth of suffering; 2. The truth concerning the origin of suffering; 3. The truth concerning the suppression of suffering; 4. The truth concerning the path to the suppression of suffering. In these four so-called truths we have the earliest and most authentic statement of Buddhist teaching. The knowledge contained in these four truths constituted the enlightenment which changed Gautama into Buddha.

Curious as they are, let us take up these four truths one by one. The first is the truth of suffering. What does this mean? In the first sermon at Benares, Buddha says: "This, ye monks, is the sacred truth concerning suffering. Birth is suffering; old age is suffering; sickness is suffering; death is suffering; to be united with those we hate is suffering; to be separated from those we love is suffering; not to attain to what one craves for is suffering; in short, the fivefold clinging to the earthly is suffering." * The sum of all this is that *all life is misery*. This is the inexhaustible theme of Buddhist thought. This is its boundless pessimism. Whether it be in the stern prose of didactic utterance or of controversy, or whether it be in the beautiful garments of poesy, this is the burden of every breath. Buddha proceeds to enlarge on the first truth by explaining how the fivefold clinging to the earthly is suffering. The fivefold clinging is the clinging to corporeity, to perception, to imagination, to forms and to knowing. In all these processes, he says, there is involved instability, and instability involves suffering.

The second truth is about the origin of this universal suffering. "This, ye monks," says Buddha, "is the sacred truth con-

* Oldenberg's "Buddha," p. 227.

cerning the origin of suffering: It is the thirst for existence which leads from re-birth to re-birth, together with lust and desire, the thirst for pleasure, the thirst for greatness, the thirst for power." At the bottom of this second truth lies the doctrine of transmigration, a doctrine that was brought over from Brahmanism. The doctrine, briefly stated, is this: The souls of men after death reappear in another form of life, either higher or lower, according to the moral state of the present life. There are six kinds of existence through which souls may migrate, namely, gods, men, demons, animals, ghosts and beings in hell. But if, as taught by the first truth, all life is misery, then re-birth is misery. How is this re-birth caused? By man's thirst for existence. That is the second truth stated in brief form. We say the desire for existence is one of the native instincts of the soul; Buddha taught that this desire is the source of all misery and all evil. Man's thirst or desire for existence is the origin of his sufferings. But whence comes this thirst or desire? This question is said to have confronted the mind of Buddha already during the third watch of the night of his enlightenment, and that in answer to it he worked out the celebrated chain of causes and effects, which is as follows: "From ignorance come the instincts derived from former births; from these instincts comes consciousness; from consciousness comes individual being; from individual being come the six organs of sense; from the organs of sense comes contact; from contact comes sensation; from sensation, desire; from desire, clinging to life; from clinging to life, continuity of becoming; from continuity of becoming, birth; from birth, decay and death; from decay and death, suffering." * According to this curious chain, suffering sends its root down very far and at the bottom of it is ignorance. Desire is only the immediate origin of suffering; its deep origin is ignorance. But what kind of ignorance? Not that general lack of knowledge which attaches to all states of mind short of omniscience; a much more particular kind of ignorance is meant; it is the ignorance of these four truths of

* Monier-Williams' "Buddhism," p. 102.

Buddhism which we are now considering, namely, that of suffering, that of the origin of suffering, that of the suppression of suffering and that of the way of the suppression of suffering. Ignorance of these truths which Buddha discovered on the night of his enlightenment, this is the ultimate source of all evil. Surely it was a high estimate that Buddha set upon his own teachings.

The third truth is stated by Buddha as follows: "This, ye monks, is the truth concerning the suppression of suffering; It is the suppression of thirst for existence through a total extinction of desires; it is a letting go of desire, a renunciation of it, a freeing one's self of it, a refusal to give it a place in the heart." The suppression of suffering and the suppression of desire are thus made identical; for desire is suffering. One can go even a step further and say that the suppression of suffering is the suppression of life, because desire, which is suffering, is the very ground of life in Buddhist thought. And suppression of life is Nirvana. We must not suppose, however, that the suppression of life here could be accomplished by such a simple device as suicide; that would lead only to another re-birth. This evil, life, is not gotten rid of so easily as that. It is a difficult process, and there are four stages of inner sanctification connected with it. The first stage is that of the man who is just converted. He can only be re-born as a god or a man, but not as one of the four lower kinds of being. The second stage is that of the man who has nearly freed himself from the five fetters. He will have only one more re-birth. The third stage is that of him who has quite freed himself, and can only be re-born as a god. The fourth and last stage is that of the completely freed man, who thus becomes an Arhat, and will at death experience no re-birth. He will enter Nirvana. This is the *summum bonum* of Buddhism. And what is this Nirvana? Etymologically it means "the state of the blown out flame." Is Nirvana annihilation, total extinction? The answer is vague. Buddha, when asked by a visitor about the existence of an enlightened one after death, gave no answer. Upon being asked by a disciple why he did not reply, he answered

that either an affirmative or a negative reply might have led his inquirer into error. Buddha was an agnostic in reference to the subject. One thing, however, is clear beyond peradventure; The Buddhist Nirvana is a state of unconsciousness, a dreamless sleep which knows no waking. This brings us to the end of the dogmatics of Buddhism.

The fourth truth, which now brings us to the ethics, is stated in these words: "This, ye monks, is the path to the suppression of suffering: it is the sacred eightfold path which embraces 1. Right belief; 2. Right resolve; 3. Right speech; 4. Right works; 5. Right livelihood; 6. Right exercise or training; 7. Right mindfulness; 8. Right meditation." This is the sum of Buddhist morality. The true way of the suppression of desire and the conquest of suffering—this is the way of living the true Buddhist moral life. Let us examine this eightfold path a little more closely. The word "right" which occurs in connection with every division of the eightfold path must of course not be interpreted from the standpoint of any general sense of right, but from the particular standpoint of Buddhism. "Right belief" means belief in Buddha and his teaching. "Right resolve" means abandoning one's wife and children and living the life of a monk in order the better to extinguish the fires of passion. "Right speech" is recitation of Buddha's doctrine. "Right work" is that of a monk. "Right livelihood" is living by alms as a monk does. "Right exercise" is the suppression of the individual self. "Right mindfulness" is keeping in mind the impurities and the impermanence of the body. "Right meditation" is trance-like quietude.* This is the meaning and scope of the fundamental ethical precepts of Buddhism. It is a morality exclusively for a monastic order. Other precepts, however, were soon added, and in the course of time the mass of moral conceptions, sayings, commandments and prohibitions became so great and withal so complex that a systematic exposition of them is impossible. It is possible, however, to trace three groups of moral ideas running through the early ethical thought of

* Monier-Williams' "Buddhism," p. 44.

Buddhism, one centering around external righteousness, one around meditation and one around wisdom. For external righteousness five rules are given, namely :

1. Kill no living thing.
2. Do not steal another's goods.
3. Do not commit adultery.
4. Do not lie.
5. Do not drink intoxicating drinks.

In the case of monks the third rule enjoined absolute chastity, and for them a long series of other prohibitions was added. This external righteousness is the presupposition of all higher morality, such as that of meditation and wisdom. Meditation in the Buddhist sense is something of which we can conceive as a virtue when we think of communion with God in the Christian sense. It is the nearest approach to prayer in primitive Buddhism. Buddhist meditation in its earlier forms is a concentration of mind upon the vanity of all objects of human desire, so long continued and absorbing, that at last the spirit becomes freed from its subordinations to all disturbing elements, loosed from the earthy, purified and exalted. It is a kind of virtue or exercise to which superior importance has always been attached in the Orient. Of wisdom as a Buddhist virtue it is said that the soul which is permeated by wisdom is free from all confusion, an idea that reminds one of Leibnitz's theory of clear and confused monads. There are four kinds of confusion, namely, confusion caused by desire, confusion caused by becoming, confusion caused by error, confusion caused by ignorance. There is evidently here a perception of the fact that virtue has the clarifying effect upon the mind which results in true wisdom.

Besides this more formal part of the ethical teachings of Buddhism there are also numerous stories, fables and sayings which inculcate such virtues as benevolence, peaceableness, gentleness and forgiveness. There prevails, moreover, the idea of a personal tempter or devil, Mara, as well as of gods, who occupy in the Buddhist system somewhat the same place as angels do in the Christian system. The idea of merit also runs through the

Buddhist ethical system, the teaching being that all morality produces merit, and that merit helps toward re-birth into higher forms of life and finally to the cessation of re-births. The goal of all is Nirvana.

One more division necessarily follows in this exposition of Buddhism, namely, the monastic order. After gaining his first converts Buddha united them with himself in a brotherhood, and from then on all true followers of Buddha became members of this order. Devotees were first admitted as novices, then as full members of the brotherhood. The ceremony for the admission of a novice could take place in the presence of any responsible member of the order. The candidate presented himself in yellow garb, his right shoulder bared, his head shaved, and he repeated three times the triple formula :

“I go for refuge to Buddha ;
I go for refuge to the doctrine ;
I go for refuge to the order.”

This completed the ceremony. He was then instructed in the ten prohibitions, the first five being the ones already mentioned, as the five rules of external righteousness, and relating to killing, stealing, unchastity, lying and drinking strong drink. The remaining five were as follows : “6. Do not eat at forbidden times; 7. Do not dance, sing, play on musical instruments, or look upon worldly spectacles; 8. Do not use garlands, scents, unguents or ornaments; 9. Do not use a high or broad bed; 10. Do not receive gold or silver.”*

The admission to full monkhood was more formal. The candidate appeared before a conclave of not less than ten monks. The nature of the rite and of the questions he would have to answer was first made plain to him. Then he was required to select a monk who would be his teacher for five years after admission. After these and other preliminaries the novice adjusted his vestments properly, bowed before the conclave, seated himself on the ground and with joined hands, asked three times for admission into full monkhood, in these words : “I entreat the Order

* Monier-Williams' “Buddhism,” p. 75.

for full monkhood ; have compassion on me and uproot me from the world." Thereupon he was asked thus : "Are you free from leprosy, boils, consumption, epilepsy, etc.? Are you a male? Are you a free man and not in the royal service? Are you free from debts? Have you the consent of your parents? Are you full twenty years old? Have you an alms-bowl and vestments? What is your name? What is your teacher's name?" If the answers were satisfactory he was admitted and instructed to trust to only four resources and to abstain from four chief forbidden acts. The four resources were : 1. Broken morsels given in alms for food ; 2. Rags from a dust heap for clothes ; 3. Roots of trees for an abode ; 4. Liquid putrefying excreta of cows for medicine. "Under certain circumstances, however, indulgences in all four cases were allowed. The four prohibitions were : "1. Unchastity and sexual acts of any kind ; 2. Taking anything not given, even a blade of grass ; 3. Killing any living thing ; 4. Falsely claiming the extraordinary powers of a perfected saint." The commandments and prohibitions, however, did not stop with these chief ones. Nearly every act of a monk's life was made subject to the minutest regulation. The monk's round of daily life was simple. It began with meditations, recitations of the doctrine or hearing the doctrine recited. Then the alms-bowl was taken in hand, and a tour was made through the neighboring village or town to gather enough food for the noonday meal, the only meal of the day. The prescribed mode of begging did not allow the making of any verbal request. With downcast eyes the mendicant would stop a few moments before the entrance to a house, and then, whether there was a response or not, pass on. No word of thanks was uttered in case of a response, it being considered a privilege to give, an act that secured merit. After the return from the itinerancy the frugal meal was disposed of, after which there was rest, and then further contemplation and intoning of Buddhist scriptures ; also by the senior monks preaching to laymen. Sins had to be confessed to one another at stated times. Monks could also be expelled from the order, and when once expelled they could never return.*

* Oldenberg's "Buddha," p. 376.

The order of nuns was subject to the instruction and direction of the monks. A nun could not attain to perfection without being born as a man. Lay brothers and lay sisters could, of course, not expect to reach perfection either, but they had the prospect of lessening the number of their future births. Their meritorious works consisted mainly in ministering to the welfare of monks and nuns.

Thus the marrow of Buddhism is the monastic order. True Buddhism is monasticism. Outside of the order there is no salvation. This order, however, is not an ecclesiastical hierarchy. The monks are not priests, not mediators between humanity and divinity. They are rather a communistic body into which any one of whatever caste may be admitted, and in which no one has superior authority beyond what is freely accorded him on the score of age or wisdom. The weakness of the order as a self-perpetuating force in society consisted in its lack of a head, after the death of Buddha, in its lack of any central authority or court of appeal in matters of doctrine or discipline, in its lack of a central place of influence and in its extreme spirit of toleration. In reference to this last point one of the later rules prescribed for monks was: "Never think nor say that your own religion is the best. Never renounce the religion of others." The twelfth of the celebrated edicts of King Asoka, the Constantine of Buddhism, was: "The beloved of the Gods honors all forms of religious faith—there ought to be reverence for one's own faith and no reviling of that of others."*

Having now taken a hurried glance at the chief facts of Buddha's life, his doctrine and his order, let us ask the question, What is Buddhism? What estimate must we form of its fundamental principles, its scope, its merits and its defects?

The conviction that presents itself to one's mind with greatest force after such a survey of the subject as has been attempted, is, that in its original form Buddhism is not a religion. It contains religious elements, but essentially it cannot properly be denominated a religion.

* Monier-Williams' "Buddhism," pp. 90, 126.

It has no God. It speaks of gods, indeed, but these are merely inhabitants of the invisible region called heaven, and members of the sixth or highest class of beings through which there is transmigration. The gods are subject to the law of birth, old age and death like men, and are thus in need of enlightenment no less than men. They are the inferiors of Buddha and of all Arhats. Strictly speaking, Buddhism is atheism.

It has no revelation. Its sacred scriptures do not profess to be a revelation from a superhuman source. They simply consist of the sayings and teachings of Buddha. Buddha, indeed, experienced the great enlightenment; but it was an enlightenment that was entirely self-evolved. It was not the result of prayer nor of communion with a higher being; it was the result of meditation. There never was a claim to anything higher.

Being without a god, Buddhism is of course without worship, without sacrifice, without priest, without prayer, without help or guidance from a higher source. The only help or light that can come from without is the encouragement or advice of a fellow-monk. But even on this Buddha did not dwell much. He taught his followers, not a doctrine of absolute dependence upon God, but of absolute dependence upon self. "Be your own light, your own refuge; seek no other refuge." These were his words even at the very end of his life. There is no Buddhist "Rock of Ages." There is no love of God to vivify and inspire, no will of God to follow, no sense of sin, no atonement, no hope of an everlasting communion with an all-wise, all-powerful, eternally abiding Personality of love.

What there is in Buddhism, therefore, that can claim even a semblance of religion is very limited. A feeling of the need of deliverance, the reverence for Buddha, his doctrine and his order, which soon began to develop, and possibly a few other features may perhaps properly be called religious colorings or tendencies of the system.

Neither is Buddhism a philosophy, though its philosophic features are more conspicuous than its religious ones. Buddhism does not seek to satisfy man's thirst for knowledge. It makes no

profession of unlocking the secrets of the universe, or of setting forth the fundamental principles of all things. Buddhism knows nothing about the origin of the world. It has no original germ of all things, no world-soul, no personal principle. It knows nothing about the end of all things. Buddha did not reveal these things, according to the legends, because they were of no help in suppressing desire and reaching Nirvana. The story is told that on a certain occasion the Enlightened One gathered a handful of leaves. Holding them up before his disciples he asked them whether the leaves in his hand or the leaves on the tree under which he sat were the more numerous. The disciples replied that the leaves on the tree were by far the greater in number. "In like manner," said the master, "are the things I have not told you more numerous than the things I have told you. And why have I withheld from you many things? Because they would not further you in holiness, because they would not incite you to retreat from the worldly, because they would not help you toward the extinction of lusts, toward the cessation of changeableness, toward peace, toward enlightenment, toward Nirvana."

Nevertheless the philosophical elements in this non-philosophic system deserve attention. They are rather in the form of presuppositions more or less definitely enunciated, than of explicit philosophical dogmas. Heraclitus, one of the greatest of pre-Socratic Grecian philosophers, taught that all things are in a state of flux, that nothing is, but that all is becoming. It is a curious coincidence that the Indian sage, a contemporary of Heraclitus, should stand upon this same principle as the philosophical basis of his teaching. All is changeableness, all is flux. This is the most fundamental and foremost philosophical principle of Buddhism. Hence, instead of saying, as some have done, that Buddhism teaches the nothingness of all things, we must rather say that Buddhism teaches the changeableness of all things. The world is not a being, nor a not-being, but a becoming. Man's body is not an abiding substance, but a continuous process of union and disintegration of particles. As regards

man's spiritual nature, over two thousand years before Hume propounded the same theory, did Buddhism teach that the soul is only a continuous grouping of perceptions, imaginations and ideas, which totally and finally dissolves at death, that the soul therefore exists only as a process, not as an entity. What is true of the human soul is true of the gods or divine spirits. An eternal spirit, self-identical and out-living the changes of time cannot exist. The eternity of matter even is denied.* The only eternal is the endless succession of causes and effects, according to the chain of the twelve links already described. It is difficult to understand how the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, which has ever played such a conspicuous rôle in oriental thought, could be held in connection with this doctrine of universal change and especially with the doctrine of the essential non-existence of the soul. But it must be remembered that Buddhism did not originate the doctrine and that the form in which it is held is a modification of the metempsychosis of Brahmanism. Buddha taught that every being is made up of five constituent elements, of which consciousness is most fundamental and although these are dissolved at death, immediately, by virtue of the force of the individual's acts in life, a new combination of five elements is formed, the process of the new creation being so instantaneous as practically to amount to a continuation of the former personality. The link of connection between past, present and future bodies is, therefore, not the soul itself, but an act-force. But however weak this attempt may be to construct a bridge over the inconsistency between Buddhist philosophy and this ancient doctrine of transmigration, the doctrine of transmigration was nevertheless firmly held and the whole Buddhist system, both in its original form and in its later modifications rests squarely upon it.

The consideration of these philosophical elements of Buddhism now has led us very near to the heart of the Buddhist system. The traveller crossing a broad expanse of ocean becomes weary of the ceaseless instability that is above him, around him and be-

* Oldenberg's "Buddha," p. 246.

neath his feet. The voyager sailing over the broader expanse of the ocean of life also sometimes wearily says :

“ Change and decay in all around I see ;
O Thou who changest not ! abide with me.”

Those ancient people living under the clear light of the Indian sky and oppressed with a sense of the changeableness of all things excepting change itself, also grew weary. And they knew of no *terra firma* on which their feet might some time rest ; they had no clear perception of the great One who changes not. The result was the great and deep and far-reaching state of mind expressed in the awful word pessimism. Whether it was the feeling of this transitoriness of all things alone, or whether the result was aggravated by any racial, climatic or other physical peculiarities it is difficult to determine, but that pessimism has a fearful hold upon the Oriental mind is a great historical fact. There have been apostles of pessimism in Occidental countries—Schopenhauer and Hartmann among others ; but nowhere else has this sombre view of things found the universal acceptance which has been accorded it in India, and also in China and Japan. Probably pessimism grows with the progress of enlightenment and civilization where the light and hope of Christianity are lacking to offset the dark side of mundane existence. India, China and Japan have been having a civilization of their own ; they have thought ; and probably it is because their thinking has been unaided by the Gospel of hope that they have thought pessimistically.

All life is misery. All existence is an evil. This was the conclusion of Buddhism. And what now did Buddhism make of the situation as it saw the situation ? What did it do about it ? The answer to this question gives us the essence of Buddhism, and it is not difficult to understand what the answer must necessarily be. Probably many of the thinking minds of the world to-day, if left without the light and the reassuring experiences and promises of the religion of Jesus Christ, would welcome above all things a dreamless, eternal sleep. De Quincey said : “ Death we can face ; but knowing, as some of us do, what is

human life, which of us is it that without shuddering could (if we were summoned) face the hour of birth?" To find, therefore, that the Buddhist remedy for the ills of existence is escape from existence itself, reveals to us how near the core of things this ancient system of belief penetrated. Like Hamlet, Buddha faced the question of "To be or not to be;" but unlike Hamlet, he chose "not to be." He was afraid of no dreams and the voice of his conscience was too faint and indistinct to make him a coward. He chose the way of absolute indifference to the joys and sorrows of life as the surest possible way of escaping from a recurrence of life after death. He made it the sole aim of his life to effect escape from life, the whole vocation of existence to become freed from the ceaseless round of births, deaths and re-births.

Thus it becomes plain that Buddhism resolves itself merely into a sort of humanitarianism, based on pessimism—a something that is eudæmonistic in principle and stoical in method. Its central method is only the reverse side of the Epicurean search for happiness, namely, escape from misery. Its method differs from that of the Stoics only in detail, the features of indifference and the suppression of desires being common to both systems. It is a system that is without a higher law, without a sphere for the play of conscience, without sin in the real sense. The only element in it that bears the semblance of a moral law is the best mode of suppressing desire, and thus of escaping from existence. The only conscience is the feeling of the wisdom of following this best mode of suppressing desire. The only sin is any act which will retard one's progress toward Nirvana. The total negativity of the system is most conspicuous. All its precepts for the regulation of life, all its encouragements to moral effort, all its hedgings about of the individual life by the restraining influences of a monastic order, have for their ultimate aim nothing other than the extinction of the self which they so diligently seek to elevate. Purity is repeatedly and beautifully insisted upon. The inner purity and sanctification of the heart, it is said, is the true Buddhism. Him who speaks and acts with pure thoughts

will joy follow as does his own shadow. But with what promise is purity enjoined? "The pure in heart shall see God" says the Nazarene. "The pure in heart shall become extinct," says Buddha. With Christianity purity means standing in right personal relations; with Buddhism it means mere negative suppression of that which fails to make for merit as a furtherance toward Nirvana. The ethics of personal relations, which constitutes the chief portion of Christian ethics, scarcely has a place in the ethics of Buddhism.

Thus we must conclude that the way of life propounded by the Indian sage is not only not a religion nor a philosophy, but also as a mere humanitarianism profoundly unsatisfactory.

But must we say then that the effect of Buddhism upon human society has been only evil? Must we regard this ancient remedy for human ills discovered through the severe struggle of an earnest man, a curse and only a curse? Not necessarily. In the first place Buddhism in relation to the Brahmanism which preceded it was a Protestantism and a Reformation. It was, indeed, not as decided and thorough-going as the Christian Reformation of the sixteenth century. But it provided an escape from the crushing hierarchy of the Brahmans, it offered relief from the thralldom of caste and opened the way of salvation to all. It was a movement in favor of the people, and to the people as a people Buddhism did the first preaching. It awakened widespread interest in things higher than the things of sense. It inculcated purity and gentleness and mercy. It enhanced refinement and a more general study of letters. Moreover, it was a movement that was sincere. The monk Gautama left home and parents and wife and child, and struggled most earnestly and honestly for light upon the darkened pathway of life. Many millions of people after him left all that was dear and attractive in life and entered upon a career of poverty, celibacy and homelessness in order to further themselves and humanity in a better way. They made sincere sacrifices for their own higher selves and for others, and sincere sacrifice blesses both those who make it and those who are the beneficiaries of it or upon whom its

benign influence falls. And still another and a greater thing that must be said is, that Buddhism was born of compassion. Among the most comforting words that ever fell from the lips of our Saviour are those in the eleventh chapter of St. Matthew: "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." We love to speak of Him as "the infinitely compassionate Saviour." The fact, therefore, that Buddhism is one of the world's great expressions of compassion brings it very near to us and gives it its highest recommendation. Unless the records we have are utterly untrustworthy, it was compassion in great part that impelled Gautama to retire into a life of asceticism in order to find a way of escape from human misery. His enlightenment, indeed, sprang out of his extreme and determined pessimism. But he was led to proclaim his discovery only by his deep sympathy and compassion for suffering humanity. The work of Buddha and his immediate followers, in most marked contrast with Mohammed and his followers, seems to betray no craving for power, no thirst for fame, but only a sincere purpose to extend the blessings of a new-found light.

On the other hand, the manifestly evil effects of Buddhism upon human society cannot be over-looked. As the humanitarianism which Buddhism most distinctively is, although its propagation has sprung from compassion, its teaching that a right mode of life necessitates a man's leaving home and wife and children involves much heartlessness. Moreover, Buddhism is subversive of the normal order of society. Concerning the home, whose integrity is the corner-stone of all good social order, Buddha said: "A wise man should avoid married life as if it were a burning pit of live coals." And again: "Full of hindrance is married life, defiled by passion. How can one who dwells at home live the higher life in all its purity?" The enlightened life also required a man to lay aside all worldly occupations and become a drone and a dependent upon society. When a man became a true follower of Buddha he ceased to add anything to the world's material comfort or well-being. It is true that people could become lay-members of the order and thus remain in their occu-

pations and homes. But they were mere appendages and did not share in the true life of Buddhahood. They were put under several moral precepts, but the chief test of their faithfulness was their readiness to serve the monks, and the chief reason for their existence, from the Buddhist standpoint, seemed to be to perform such service.

So far as the philosophical elements of Buddhism are concerned, inasmuch as their chief influence has been to foster the pessimism of the Orient, they have done immense harm. India, China and Japan are steeped in pessimism, and this fact has contributed vastly to the stagnation, the feebleness and the listlessness of these nations hitherto.

As to the matter of religion, while original Buddhism was not a religion, it displaced a religion, for Brahmanism was a religion. Moreover, because it failed to discard the gods altogether, it presented a semblance of religion and thus in the minds of men stood in the place of a religion ; in this position its influence has been to dwarf or even to atrophy the God-consciousness of untold millions of earth's children. The gods of Buddhism were inferior to Buddha ; yet Buddha was only a man ; he never professed to be more, and his early followers regarded him as such. The result has been that the God-idea has been lowered, the God-perceptive power to a great extent atrophied. The extent and influence of this injury upon the religious life of the people of the Orient is beyond calculation, and is constantly and everywhere manifest. It is of all injuries inflicted upon humanity by this ancient but mistaken teaching the greatest.

Lastly, Buddhism is at war with the moral order of the universe. It pronounces the existing order of things fundamentally and totally wrong and takes up arms against it. It stands as the world's greatest negative next to the kingdom of evil itself. Its tendency is therefore subversive of all that is normal and right, and as such stands as one of the greatest wrongs of human history.

II.

MATTER AND SPIRIT.

BY REV. W. E. KREBS.

TWO THINGS.

To these two things all existences in the universe are capable of being reduced. Two things—no more, no less. They are separate and distinct, yet intimately related.

What is *matter*? It is impossible to tell. We may say it is force, but that would be only changing the question to another. What is force? If we call it electricity, or in fact by any other term, we will find ourselves in the same dilemma.

But there are certain things we may intelligently predicate of matter. We may say it is that which has extension in space and duration in time. To this we may add that matter is that which is impenetrable and inert.

Spirit is something still more incomprehensible. We are not able even to say positively what its attributes are. But as it is the direct opposite of matter, we can negatively affirm that spirit is that which has no extension in space, no duration in time, is not impenetrable and not inert.

Spirit is eternal. This, however, cannot mean existing in the past and in the future countless millions of years, for spirit has no years. Spirit is infinite; which, however, cannot mean filling all space, for spirit has no space. Spirit, eternal and infinite, is God. God is spirit. Though a personal being in the highest sense, He is the all, and so far there is truth in pantheism. Beyond Him, above Him, higher than He, there is nothing.

This absolute spirit projected into existence *matter*, to be a thing so different from spirit and so far beneath spirit, that nothing can be more different or further below. Thus time and space began. And so far back and so widespread we may con-

ceive this matter to be that to us practically, though not theoretically, time is eternal and space infinite. That is, we cannot conceive of the remote past time when matter began, nor the remote place where it does not exist.

Thus there are in existence these two, matter and spirit, no more and no less.

CREATION.

The penetrable produced the impenetrable, the active the inert, that which exists neither in time nor space produced that which can exist only in time and space. What is seen has not been made out of things which do appear. Spirit called for its direct opposite, matter. Matter, which is inert, could not of itself spring into existence, and time beginning when matter was projected, matter could not exist before time was. Thus we have the creation. When created, in order that there might be nothing beyond on its side, as there was nothing beyond spirit on its side, matter was created, we may well suppose, in the most attenuated and simple form. And further, as the projection of active spirit, matter in its attenuated form was likely in rapid motion—as the projection of the highest self-consciousness, it was likely intensely hot.

Thus in creation we may see the fundamental relation existing between the two, matter and spirit, matter is the projection of spirit to this utmost form. Spirit is not the attenuation of matter; neither ought we say that matter is the attenuation of spirit. For spirit before matter was already all-pervading—there was no room, so to speak, for spirit to attenuate itself, all that was to be done was to project itself into an altogether different form absolutely opposite. This absolutely opposite form is matter. Without spirit matter would cease to be. Spirit can exist without matter, but it is inherent in spirit to project itself as matter. Thus the two are absolutely different, yet absolutely related.

But thus viewed there would be a tremendous chasm between matter and spirit—a chasm so tremendous that we cannot conceive a greater. How was this chasm bridged? Gently, not violently; step by step, not all at once. Spirit, without lessening

or impairing itself, projected itself a little more, and matter consequently assumed a higher form. There was a combining of atoms, a concentrating, and worlds sprung into existence one after another. This, of course, not by matter itself, but by additional action or communication of spirit that originally projected it into being. By gravitation, which is nothing else than the activity of spirit within, systems of worlds made their appearance. Not all at once, but, in the universe of matter, matter may be conceived as existing even now in every possible state, that is, matter here in one state, there in another. This planet of ours may be regarded as the type of all others. Some worlds are in the condition of chaos ours once was in, some in its present condition of order peopled with intelligent beings, some in the condition ours will be in when it has undergone its catastrophe by fire.

All of spirit that matter in its first simple and attenuated form possessed was, we may readily conceive, just so much as was necessary for it merely to be. Additional or larger communications of spirit were necessary from period to period to lead matter by degrees up higher. Each act or degree of communication required time to develop itself in matter, or rather to develop matter and bring out to the fullest extent all that was involved in that particular act of spirit-communication. Matter of itself could rise no higher than the power thus given it. Spirit gave itself to matter not in its fullness, but by measure—not all at once, but by degrees. In Revelation we read that God gives to the Son the spirit not by measure, but in all fullness, implying that in other directions it was the divine habit to give the spirit by measure.

THEIR RELATION.

Spirit exists first, matter afterwards. Spirit can exist without matter, but matter cannot exist without spirit. Matter is the form which spirit has been pleased to assume ; and so spirit lies within, or stands under, or pervades, all matter—in eternity potentially in the Son, in time actually in the projection of matter in the Holy Spirit. To reach the extreme point opposite to spirit, spirit projects matter in its most attenuated or atomistic

form. In these atoms spirit appears first perhaps in gravitation, then in crystalization ; in greater fulness in the plant, in still greater in the animal, until greatest of all in man, the image and likeness of God. Thus the chasm is bridged, and the universe of being is a unity. Hence we have in matter the so-called mineral, vegetable, animal and human kingdoms. And in each and every one, as the Scriptures declare, it is spirit that makes things live or exist. Take spirit out of them, and they will cease to be, or rather will return to their original state in the world.

Spirit, being infinitely great, would naturally show itself, or assume forms, in varieties so numerous as to baffle the attempts of human minds to describe them. In the mineral world men have found some seventy elements, and these elements in combinations countless in number. It is spirit that causes these elements to be, and possibly from one original element, and it is spirit that combines them in the definite proportions of chemistry. In the vegetable and animal kingdoms also we need not be surprised when we recognize the spirit that is in them, at the prodigious variety in size, color, shape and number. In this view the hitherto perplexing question, for what good were these things created, need not be asked—they are the natural and necessary outcome or display of the infinite spirit that works in matter. When man is reached, the image of God is reached ; spirit in matter has attained its end and aim, and we should expect but one type—Adam and his counterpart, Eve. Local circumstances may have painted the faces of their children in course of time with different colors, yet are they all of one type, and not divided as birds, beasts, fishes, reptiles and insects. The Scriptures say that spirit gives life and breath to all, but every nation of *men* it hath made of one.

INVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION.

It is by steps or degrees, from the lowest to the highest, that spirit lays hold of matter. It is spirit's prerogative to handle matter in this way ; matter being inert cannot of itself rise higher than itself. Matter can rise by successive stages, only by the

impartation to it of spirit's being in larger and larger measure. The mineral of itself cannot become a plant, the plant a beast, the beast a man. Development or advancement is clearly manifest in the laying hold of matter by spirit, but it is brought about by successive acts or communications of spirit, each time higher or greater. When nothing higher or greater is in view, spirit works by male and female, by stamen and pistil. As the Scriptures say, spirit has given to each of the seeds a body of its own, each plant bearing fruit after its kind, in which is its seed, every fish, too, every fowl and every beast after its kind. Eve says of Cain, I have gotten a man from the Lord.

New kinds are produced *de novo* by spirit alone ; one kind cannot produce another kind ; it can evolve only what spirit first involved. Involution precedes evolution. You can extract the cube root of 8 because the root 2 is rolled or wrapped up in it ; out of 9 you cannot evolve a cube root, for no finite root or number is involved in it.

In one geological age of the world certain genera and species of plants and animals appeared only to become extinct by the convulsions of nature, leaving no seed behind. A new age appearing, new and higher genera and species came into being, created *de novo* from the dust of the ground. All this immense while, spirit, as Inspiration declares, was brooding upon the face of the waters. According to the same authority, in our own age plants and animals sprung not from their predecessors, but from the dry land, earth. Particularly emphatic do the Scriptures make the case when the time came for man to be created. Not simply from the earth, but from the dust of the ground, the same kind of dust to which he afterwards returned, was Adam formed. To throw discredit upon this divine statement, a ludicrous turn is sometimes given to the transaction, by adopting the sentiment of the unlettered negro, according to which God made Adam of mud and stood him up against a fence to dry ! It is to be feared that something like this is the invisible picture in many a mind.

To the contrary, the creation must have been instantaneous. He who made the aeons, the light, the plant, the beast, made man

also by speaking, that is, by the Word, the Son, through the Holy Spirit proceeding from Him, and the work was instantly done. The forming out of dust and the inbreathing of life, by which living creature man came to be, were clearly one simultaneous and instantaneous act. It was spirit taking up matter in the highest form. All preceding acts of spirit, immense in variety, were but preparatory to this; and this was the true and only preparation. In the one human pair in Eden were wrapped up all individuals, and spirit by natural generation brings them into actual existence—evolution preceded by involution.

This is the way things look as seen from the spirit side. Looked at from the matter side, as is generally the way, matter seems to start from lowest condition and rise of itself by degrees laboriously for ages evolving life (a mysterious thing, though, which biology fails to explain). First a protoplasm, then the minute cells forming additional cells, until plant life and animal life are reached, which, the weaker perishing, the stronger surviving, under favorable environs rise higher and higher—a mollusk, a fish, a reptile, a kangaroo, an ape, a man. Seen from the side of matter, things do look that way. So in Plato's cave, the images pursuing each other on the inside wall seem to be doing it all themselves, while according to that philosopher the true causes were the realities on the outside. It may be safely affirmed that science will never reach its aim if it ignores the presence and operation of spirit.

THE INCARNATION.

Since the beginning of the present geological age there has been no new creation as there was then. Spirit's activity in that form ceased; God ended his work and rested. Only what was then involved by spirit has by the same spirit been ever since evolving in the propagation of the various forms of life. But when we come to the time of Jesus Christ we have the first and only act of creation by spirit since the days of Adam. Even in the deluge of Noah a seed was preserved. Christ Jesus is a new creation. The human race of itself, even with the spirit thus far

communicated, could never have produced such offspring. In vain would have been the most favorable environments and the most powerful operation of the law of the survival of the fittest. No evolution because no involution. There had to be a new laying hold of matter by spirit and higher than any hitherto known. The Holy Spirit came upon a Virgin, and the power of the Highest overshadowed her, so that, without knowing man, she conceived in her womb, and in the regular course of time brought forth her son Jesus.

Unto the mineral spirit was imparted by measure, to the plant in larger measure, to the animal still larger, and to Adam the largest of all. But unto Jesus spirit was not given by measure, but all the fulness of divinity dwelt in him. Now, while indeed there had been a preparation going on in the history of the race for this great event, both negative among the Gentiles and positive among the Jews, yet there was nothing in all humanity that could issue in or attain to this wondrous incarnation. There had to be a new direct coming or outpouring—let us not call it interference—from on high, a new laying hold of matter by spirit.

On this impregnable rock we can take a stand and re-survey the ground gone over. If the incarnation is not a new creation, but merely the result of evolution, then may man and every living creature, yea every existing thing, be also the result of evolution; and from the beginning, if there were a beginning, matter, called into being by God, if there be a God, though at first but a very small affair, must yet have had inwrapped within it not only all sorts of minerals and plants and fishes and birds and insects and beasts and man, but also God himself, the very Author of the primitive monad!

No wonder that in certain directions men refuse to let their lips utter their faith in the conception by the Holy Spirit and birth of the Virgin Mary. They at least seem to realize that the doctrines of evolution and the incarnation stand or fall together. If the incarnation is to stand as a new creation, then also must stand as a new creation every divine act by which matter rose to a state higher than it occupied just before; and further, as the

conception of Jesus was as instantaneous as the springing into existence of light after the divine fiat, though preceded by a long period of upward steppings, so also instantaneous must have been the springing into existence of every different form of being.

But perhaps it may be asked, why may not spirit that in the incarnation laid hold of matter highly organized in the womb of the Virgin Mary have laid hold of organized matter also in the womb of a female anthropoid ape instead of unorganized dust and produced by an inbreathing the living creature man? And so on back, or down, to the lowest form of existence? Well, that in each case would at all events be a new creation—a gradually higher communication of spirit, not present in that form or degree before. But in the incarnation the very nature of the case demanded not a creation *de novo*, but a re-creation of degenerate man. God could have utterly destroyed man and called forth from the dust of the ground a new man, but that would have been destruction not salvation. Jesus is a Saviour, true to his name. Therefore the creation of Adam and the incarnation of the Son are parallel, not in the bringing in of a new race, but in the higher laying hold of matter by spirit. A re-creation is still a new creation. Therefore if a re-creation was possible not by humanity itself, but only by spirit, so was the creation of man, beast, bird, fish, plant and stone possible by same spirit, and not by any power previously resident in matter.

REGENERATION.

In the mineral, matter and spirit have mere existence; in the plant, they have attained to life; in the animal, to life and self-feeling; in man, to self-feeling and self-consciousness. Death may be viewed in two aspects. With reference to matter, death is a disturbance with spirit and finally a violent or coercive and more or less painful separation from it. With reference to spirit, it is a disturbance with God and finally a complete antagonism to Him. Man by nature is in both aspects dying, and undelivered will die.

Spirit in its fulness laid hold of humanity in the womb of a

virgin to overcome death and bring life and immortality to light. After developing his human life to perfection, He communicates the Holy Spirit to those who will accept, whose work now is to touch and revivify their spirits by imbuing them with the perfect human life of Christ. This is a being born from above or of the Spirit. Spirit first, later matter. For that which is born of the Spirit is not matter, but spirit.

And just here in this regeneration of man is still further seen the reason why the incarnation cannot be a creation *de novo* from the dust of the ground, for it is the salvation of the old, not the creation of another race that is the aim. Here also from the necessity of the case we have not another laying hold of *matter* by spirit, but a higher laying hold of *spirit* by Spirit. There is nothing in the depraved human spirit capable of developing or evolving into this higher condition of spirit. It is in that sense a new *creation*. Inspiration calls the result a new creature, old things having passed away in the sense of their having become new—the result of being in Christ by the Holy Spirit. So that here we may again affirm, if this is a creation, though principally in the realm of spirit, why may not the appearance of entirely new species be a creation in the lower realm of matter? The impossibility of a thing developing above its own plane and evolving into another thing higher than itself is likely universal in its application.

HADES.

This is the realm of pure spirit, and so far therefore an imperfect state. On the dissolution of an individual, matter is left behind in the world of matter; the spirit goes over into the world of spirit, which is hades, or sheol. If we be not allowed to call the spirit in that state disembodied, we must at least be permitted to call it un-mattered. For even if you persist in ascribing *body* to the spirit in hades, you must concede that it is a *spiritual* body, and the word “body” now so mysterious and inexplicable will become more inexplicable and mysterious still. The clearest way out of the difficulty is to keep steadily in view, not many things, such as body, soul, mind, reason, personality, but *two* things, matter and spirit.

Being pure spirits, that is, separated entirely from matter, the question *Where?* with reference to the departed cannot be asked. It is the same to them as if all suns with their attendant planets and all the matter in them were annihilated, and nothing existed but the spirit-realm and themselves and God.

Into this state the Saviour's spirit went, when with a pang it separated from matter on the cross. It was a descent, because going into an imperfect state; it was and is an imperfect state, because spirit therein is not in right relation with matter. It was spirit going to spirits, as the inspired Peter declares, being put to death indeed as to flesh, but made alive as to spirit. And the same Apostle tells the purpose of His going, which was to preach, especially to the antediluvians, who in the days of their flesh had filled the earth with violence and made it wholly corrupt.

From this we may justly infer that there is work to be done in this lower world. The Gospel must be preached to every creature before the end can come. Millions have gone over who never heard a syllable of the glad-tidings. To them the Gospel must be preached—Christ must be offered. Jesus Christ is the only name under heaven, given among men, in whom there is salvation. But to be saved men must call upon His name, and they will not call unless they believe, nor believe unless they hear, nor hear without a preacher. In the spirit world the field is wider than in this matter world.

Nor must we suppose, as we are likely to do, that men in hades are compelled by their own circumstances to accept salvation when presented; they must be just as free there as here to accept or reject. The inspired Peter informs us that the Gospel was preached to the dead with this end in view that they might be enabled to live according to God in the spirit and be liable to judgment the same as men in the flesh. When the malefactor on the cross called upon Jesus, which was, perhaps, his first opportunity, Jesus promised him that their spirits would that day be together in Paradise. This was not full salvation, as it is commonly taken to be, but a paradisaical, that is a happy, meet-

ing with the Saviour in hades to learn more of Him and partake of His grace. Just as Paul was not in a state of full salvation when Jesus merely appeared and talked to him by the way; not until he went into Damascus and was filled with the Holy Spirit at the laying on of Ananias' hands and was baptized.

Men in Christian lands may, while in this matter world, so perseveringly resist the Holy Spirit, and perhaps men in heathen lands so perversely sin against the light of nature as to render themselves impervious in the spirit world to saving grace. For the Bible says that whosoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven either in the present aeon nor in the one about to be. To those in the flesh, to whom Jesus is offered, the present aeon is the acceptable time and the day of salvation. When by them He is positively and perseveringly rejected, there will be for them in hades no power to cross the great gulf that lies between Lazarus in Abraham's bosom and the rich man in torment, who in his lifetime enjoyed Moses and the prophets.

The true theory of missions to the heathen in this world is externally the positive command of Christ and internally the natural impulse of the Christian heart. If a Christian be derelict in this direction in the world he would be derelict also in the world to come—a state of affairs self-contradictory and inconceivable.

RESURRECTION.

This consists essentially in spirit's acquiring complete harmony with and control over matter—not in resuscitation of corpses. The dead bodies of the widow's son, Jairus's daughter and Lazarus were simply reanimated by their spirits recalled by the mighty voice of Jesus. Jesus was Himself the first of the human race to rise from the dead.

In the days of His flesh, indeed, by virtue of His unique personality, He was able to control the powers of nature. But it was only on the morning of the third day that His spirit manifested supreme harmony with matter; for once there was a violent separation, but now He can die no more; on that au-

spicious morning He got complete control over matter, for once He was burdened with it, but now His spirit was able to take unto itself matter and again dissipate it at will.

Perhaps in His case it was eminently proper for a number of reasons that His spirit should on this first occasion take up the identical matter that was laid in the tomb of Joseph. After that it mattered little whether it was this, that, or other dust, so that it were only real dust. That He could take and just as readily lay aside matter, and not in a Docetic sense, is evident from the facts that He invited His friends to touch Him, that He took bread and meat and ate in their presence, that He instantly vanished out of their sight and came to them through solid walls. Singular and wonderful power! But not more wonderful and singular than one should expect from the incarnate Son of God. He who in the beginning made man and beast from the dust of the ground should be able personally to take dust unto Himself and again lay it aside when, and where, and how He pleases.

Not as an earthly mechanic does spirit go about this work, and we must beware here in resurrection as in creation of giving the procedure a ludicrous appearance by asking ourselves questions like these, where did He procure the dust in His resurrection? Did He gather it up in the streets of Jerusalem? He spake, and it was done—that is, He willed it thus to be. Those who doubt this know neither the Scriptures, as He Himself declares, nor the power of God. Why should it be thought with us a thing incredible that *God* should raise the dead? He has a working by which He is able even to subject all things unto Himself. Spirit in its fulness must have absolute control of matter which it projected.

Such must be the character of the resurrection of those also who are in Christ Jesus. Their spirits, by virtue of their connection with spirit divine, will at the appointed time receive power to take matter unto themselves and to lay it aside again at will. Enoch, and perhaps Moses, and Elijah received no doubt this power in a special way to lay matter aside, though not to take it again, unless indeed in case of the last two it were for a

special occasion and special purpose at the transfiguration of Jesus.

This power, which men did not possess in the flesh nor in the spirit world, constitutes no doubt the essential feature of what is known as their resurrection at the last day. In other words, they will then for the first time come into complete harmony with and control of matter. This is a stupendous power, for matter is a stupendous fact. At the resurrection men become, as the Scriptures declare, equal to the angels and are sons of God. As God Himself did exist when matter was not, and does exist independent of it when matter is, so the children of the resurrection as sons of God will enjoy the same independence and mastery.

The spiritual body spoken of by St. Paul must be a body not of matter, as is the psychical body, but of spirit—and what can a body of spirit mean but spirit existing as a distinct individual? It is a question what becomes of the spirit of a beast when dissolution takes place. Is it absorbed in the general being of spirit, or does it maintain a distinct individual existence in the spirit world? The question is beyond the sphere of science, and all that revelation does is to ask who knows whether the spirit of man goes upward and whether the spirit of the beast goes downward to the earth?

Matter in this world is in a continual state of flux, appearing in one individual, then absorbed into the general world of matter, only to appear again in another individual. Is there anything like flux in the case of spirit? Spirit departs from an individual tree or beast; is it absorbed into the general being of spirit, only to reappear in other beasts or trees? Or does it maintain forever an individual spirit existence? Perhaps a line of demarkation may be drawn at self-consciousness and God-consciousness, all on the one side of the line absorbed only to be reissued, all on the other maintaining forever individual existence.

One thing is certain that the spirit of man, having reached the point of self-consciousness and God-consciousness, preserves its distinct individual existence in the spirit world, which no

doubt constitutes the spiritual body of St. Paul. Such being the case, we can readily conceive how in the present life the spiritual body can be in the psychical body and how at dissolution the latter is sown or buried in the ground while the former maintains its individuality in hades, and how at the resurrection morn the spiritual body can appear clothed with the new power of complete mastery over matter.

Thus the spiritual body, conformed to the body of Christ's glory, will sustain the same relation to matter that His body did and does. Christ's resurrection was a stupendous miracle, conceivable, however, not to him who looks on merely the matter side of being, but only to him who considers both matter and spirit. Now what happened in the case of Christ can by His power happen as easily in the case of His follower, and what can happen in case of one follower can as easily happen in case of ten thousand times ten thousand. This wonderful work the same divine Spirit of hosts is able to work, who in Ezekiel's vision took the very many and very dry bones of the valley, and laid sinews, and brought up flesh upon them, and covered them with skin, and put breath into them, so that they lived and stood up an exceeding great army.

MILLENNIUM.

To become adapted to the new mode or state of existence it will probably be necessary for spirit actually and frequently to take unto itself matter for a certain length of time, though as frequently setting it aside. The end in view seems to be not an everlasting and permanent union of matter and spirit, but higher than that, spirit's harmony with matter and mastery over it. The idea, in other words, is, to attain to the same relation between matter and spirit in case of man the creature as in case of God the Creator.

No doubt this was the principal meaning in our Saviour's repeated appearances and disappearances for the space of forty days after His resurrection. To cheer the hearts and confirm the faith of His devoted followers was only a necessary corollary.

Where was He, and what was He doing in the interims of His visible manifestations? Reasonably in the spiritual world, where He was before, but now developing successively into the heavenly. His wonderful ascension at the end of forty days was but His last disappearance from matter until the time of His second advent. For fear the disciples might regard it as an ordinary disappearance, they had to be expressly informed by two messengers from the heavenly world.

A similar experience may be needed on the part of Christians, and this may be the significance of the millennium. The one thousand years of Christians may correspond to the forty days of Christ. Christ the first fruits, afterwards they that are Christ's at His coming.

Millennium is not a Scriptural word, and perhaps it would be well not to use it; its use has suggested and still suggests many crude and wild notions. The one thousand years are mentioned in but one place in the Bible, and that in the mysterious book Apocalypse. Were it not for the latter feature, once mentioned would be as good as a dozen times; but to interpret the Revelation of St. John is a difficult and risky thing. Still if the passage is to be taken in its plainest sense, the thousand years may denote a complete round period, long enough for the dead in Christ to come forth in regular succession, some after others, in order to get into contact with matter, to become accustomed to it as it were, and obtain the mastery and rule over it—those also who are alive and remain going through a similar experience—unhindered by Satan, who shall be bound all the while this process is going on. To this state of affairs Jesus probably refers when He promises that the twelve and all His people will in the regeneration sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel; and a state of affairs also foretokened as a sort of first fruits by the departed saints referred to by the inspired Matthew alone, whose tombs were opened by the death of Jesus, out of which they came forth by His resurrection, entered into the holy city, and appeared unto many.

To reign and to judge, according to Scripture will be their

employ. To reign, what does it mean, but to become kings over matter ; to judge, what is it, but to show the separation or difference and declare the right between themselves and the world, between angels and demons ?

After the completion of this period, the rest of the dead, the wicked will live again, will have a sort of resurrection, will present themselves with spiritual bodies, but with no power over nature, and Satan will be loosed and gather them together to a final and fierce battle with the saints. Of course, the former will be subdued with the aid of fire from heaven, the devil will be cast into the fiery lake ; and the dead, great and small, shall stand before the judgment throne. All this will take place in the realm of spirit, not of matter, for, according to the inspired vision, there will be found no place for a material earth and heaven. Thus no question can arise in the mind as to what part of the material world the judgment will take place in, nor as to the possibility or impossibility of millions upon millions occupying one place.

Then all who are not found written in the book of life shall be condemned in their state of misery forever, which the inspired record calls being cast into the lake of fire ; while the righteous shall be confirmed in their everlasting mansions of peace and glory, called in the apocalyptic vision inheriting a new heaven and a new earth—new, not in the sense of another material world, or the old one renovated, but in the sense of being entirely different, that is, spiritual. This material earth and heaven, for aught we know, may last forever and in future ages become again the theatre of intelligent beings ; but for the righteous in their heavenly state, this first heaven and first earth shall have passed away, and there shall be no more sea.

ANGELS AND DEMONS.

This world of ours is but a planet in the solar system. There are other systems and planets, countless in number. The history of this planet, as we have a right to judge from analogy, is the history of all planets. Some have finished a course, others are

in process, and still others have not yet begun. There is no reason to suppose that angels and demons were created in any other way than as men were created—created in worlds in all essentials like our own, though larger or smaller, and more or less magnificent—created, too, in similar form and likeness, namely, of God, as potentially and eternally found in the person of His Son. Who will compel us to suppose that God created each one of the myriads separately and independently, with no connection except through a common Maker? As they now are, they neither marry nor are given in marriage; there is no sex among them, though art makes them female and revelation male. But so will it be with us as well in the heavenly world. Therefore we are almost irresistibly led to the conclusion that their being was ordered very much like our own.

There was for each world, where they had their being, a first pair to be proved as Adam and Eve were proved by a forbidden tree or its equivalent. Some perhaps stood the test and were advanced in holiness as to spirit and attained to complete harmony with and mastery over matter. Others, as we may know from the result, fell as our own first parents fell, and needed and, as God is eternally a God of love, received a divine Redeemer.

Or can we, denizens of one of millions of worlds, and that too but a comparatively small one, flatter ourselves that the eternal Son of God would visit us only, take our nature only upon Him, and so far effect a change forever in His own being? On the contrary, inspiration rather assures us that Adam was made in the image of the Son, the eternal divine pattern; that the Son in His incarnation only came under the conditions of a fallen human nature; and that, when in His own person He had accomplished its regeneration, He ascended up where He was before, and where He now is in precisely the same condition as He was before His incarnation. He came forth from the Father and entered into the world; but He again left the world and went to the Father. The Father glorified the Son with Himself with the glory which the Son had with Him before the world was. And to allay the astonishment of His disciples when He told them they must eat

and drink His flesh and blood, he assured them that they would know that those mysterious words, flesh and blood, were not matter, but life and spirit, when they should see Him ascending into the same spiritual state in which He was before.

This being the case, He could repeat such world experience elsewhere as often as circumstances would demand. As He is Himself the eternal spiritual type of humanity, He can materially become man in any world if necessary. All intelligent creatures must live in Him and partake of His life. Thus He was the mysterious tree of life in Eden, which had to be kept from man, after his sin, by cherubim and a flaming sword. But sword and cherub were taken away when the Son took upon Himself fallen human nature and redeemed it, so that now men are invited to come to this Tree and partake of it freely. The idea is the same, the figure being merely changed, when the Scriptures declare that men must eat His flesh and drink His blood in spirit, not in matter, in order to have life, and He will be in them a well of water springing up unto eternal life. Clearly all creatures in the image of God in other worlds must partake of the same Tree, and if there are obstructions in the way they must first be removed.

This Tree, or this Redeemer, as the case may have been, was accepted by some, who finally became angels; rejected by others, who finally became demons. We have only to suppose that some of these beings in the days of their flesh were preëminently good or preëminently bad, and perhaps too from worlds preëminently great, to account for the existence of characters so prominent as Michael and Gabriel on the one hand and Satan on the other.

We read in Jude of angels who did not keep their own principality, but left their proper habitation, whom the Lord hath kept in everlasting bonds under darkness unto a judgment of a great day. Similarly in 2 Peter we read that God did not spare angels that sinned, but in chains of darkness sent them into Tartarus and gave them over reserved unto a judgment. Can this judgment day of theirs be the same as ours? If so, how then can they be represented in other Scripture, not as bound but loose, going abroad in the earth deceiving the nations, Satan

himself attacking Adam and Christ, and generally walking about to and fro in the earth as a roaring lion? There is room then here for the thought that Satan and his hosts, perchance at different times and in different worlds, were created, as we men were, good, which was their first estate and proper place of dwelling, but which they did not keep, and fell, rejected divine help, died, their spirits descending into hades, and in due time, after a judgment of a great day, went into their own awful condition, resolved to fight forever against God and all whom He should create.

What a difference with reference to matter seems to subsist now between angels and demons in their spiritual state. Whilst the former can assume matter apparently with ease and grace and as easily lay it aside, the latter are represented as forcing their way into bodies belonging to other beings.

Witness the three angels who as men came to Abraham and actually ate of his cakes and butter, milk and veal. One of them was the Lord himself, temporarily clothed with matter. Two of them clasped the hands of Lot and his family. The heavenly visitants must have been for the time real flesh and blood. Remarkable too was the angel that appeared to Manoah and his wife; very terrible in countenance indeed, yet he talked with them as a man and wondrously went up and disappeared in the flame of the offering burning on a rock. The spiritual and heavenly being whose name is Gabriel, and who stands in the presence of God, appeared to Zacharias and to the Virgin Mary, and again disappeared. Multitudes of the heavenly host sang with human voices at the birth of Jesus to the shepherds, and again resumed their heavenly state. An angel came in to Peter shut up in prison walls, caused his two chains to fall from his hands and the iron gate to open of its own accord, and forthwith disappeared.

How different is the condition of demons, spiritual beings indeed, but spiritual and hellish, as it may well be called, whilst the condition of angels may be called spiritual and heavenly. They are represented as restless spirits, going through waterless

places, seeking rest, but finding none. In the time of Christ these unclean spirits were permitted, as a temporary relief from torment it seems, to enter for a time and take possession of the bodies of men or beasts. In every instance the effect on the victim was injurious. The Gadarene demoniac was exceedingly fierce, could not be chained, and lived in the tombs and mountains, crying and cutting himself with stones. Jesus was in the act of commanding the legion of demons to come out of the man, when they with one voice begged Him as the Son of God not to send them back again to torment in the abyss before their time was out. But seeing that He was determined, they entreated Him for permission to enter into a neighboring herd of swine as a brief prolongation of their stay in matter. In the synagogue of Capernaum a demon recognized Him as the Holy One of God and exclaimed that He had come down to destroy evil spirits, meaning no doubt, by sending them out of human bodies back to the awful spiritual condition of Gehenna. This is the fearful condition of pain, described under the figure of everlasting fire, into which the devil and his demons have come, the lost of previous worlds, and into which will also come the lost of this world.

The devil himself, head of the demons, is a great spirit out of harmony with matter. He is called in Scripture the prince of the power in the air, the spirit that works in the sons of disobedience, the god of this world. Being a lost spirit, and, therefore, unable to assume matter in the form of man as Gabriel did, he must accomplish his hellish work among men either in spirit only or by forcibly taking possession of some other body. To tempt Eve he made use of the body of a serpent. How he tempted Christ in the wilderness has always been a puzzle to interpreters. He could not become man; to enter into the body of beast or Jew would not further his cause; it must have been a mighty struggle wholly in the realm of spirit. Thus it was possible for Him to be set on the pinnacle of the temple in the holy city, or to ascend an exceedingly high mountain and see all the kingdoms of the world in a moment of time. Satan can pretend to be, but not become, an angel of light. It is in spirit

purely that he now works invisibly on the spirits of the disobedient, blinding the minds of them that do not believe.

HEAVEN AND HELL.

In one respect heaven and hades, and gehenna as well, are one and the same world. That is to say they are spirit, not matter. Such being the case, we cannot speak of them as being here or there, for that would be ascribing to spirit one of the characteristics of matter. As already remarked, if all the material worlds of the universe, with all their contents, were blotted out of existence the spiritual world, that is, heaven and hades and gehenna, would still remain.

These three terms then denote the three different states of the inhabitants of that world. Hades is the state of departed spirits between death and resurrection, some as Lazarus in comfort, others as the rich man in torment. Heaven is the state in which God is, and Christ Jesus the Lord, and the holy angels, and redeemed men after their resurrection—a state of glory. Gehenna is the state of Satan, of demons and of lost men after their resurrection—a state of misery.

In this world, matter and spirit are united in the being of man, but in more or less disharmony. In hades, spirit is absolutely sundered from matter—an experience which it is desirable perhaps for the human spirit to have. In heaven, spirit is in complete harmony with matter; in gehenna, spirit is in absolute disharmony with matter.

The spirits of men departing this life do not go into heaven or into gehenna, but into hades. There the Lord Jesus Christ, although He is Himself in heaven, can be with the happy spirits of those who died in Him; so that with respect to them it may be well said to be absent from the body is to be present with the Lord. There the gospel can be preached to those who in this world never heard it, who will have as much freedom as others in days of their flesh to accept or reject. There the faithful, instead of a time of inglorious ease and folding of the arms in a semi-conscious condition, will have plenty of joyful work to do.

There those who in this life positively rejected Christ will reject Him still, in all their torments still resisting, as Satan himself, the good and the true.

The current view respecting heaven and hell is, to one who comes to think, amazing. It can be accounted for by the too common habit of understanding Scriptural figures of speech in a literal sense.

According to this view heaven is up somewhere and hell is down somewhere. Accordingly the preacher in his gestures points to the sky when referring to the one place, and to the ground when referring to the other. Heaven is regarded as a place—a city—fitted up in some fixed star, with a magnificent throne in the centre on which the Deity sits, winged angels with harps in their hands arranged about it, and surrounded with walls containing a gate for ingress and egress. Hell is a tremendous big hole or abyss, in which a fearful fire of brimstone rages and crackles, and the devil, black, with horns on his head, with cloven feet and a long tail, forks his victims in. Strange that Satan should treat his faithful followers thus! Yet some such view, perhaps, not in every instance just so gross, has come down to our day, the close of the nineteenth century, percolated through the darkness of the Middle Ages, and is fearfully prevalent. Pictures to this effect are still hanging on the walls of many a rural house! They should be ruthlessly torn down and consigned to the material flames the hottest this material world affords.

And further, according to this prevalent view, when a person dies, although he leaves all matter behind in this material world, yet his spirit goes either through the pearly gates into a material heaven, or through the creaking iron doors into a material hell. With many persons this thought or feeling exists merely in embryo, for they are afraid to let it come to the birth of expression in these words. And yet mothers will teach, and preachers will preach, that you must be good to go to heaven when you die, for if you are bad you will go to the bad place. It is necessary to say that such theology is taught neither in the Bible nor in the Creed.

The Heidelberg Catechism says, "My soul, after this life, shall be immediately taken up to Christ, its head," not into heaven. The Bible says, "Narrow is the way that leadeth unto," not heaven, but "*life*;" "broad is the road that leadeth," not to hell, but "*to destruction*." "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him" may escape hell and go to heaven when he dies! but "should have *eternal life*." "These shall go away into (not hell, but) *eternal punishment*; and the righteous (not into heaven, but) into *eternal life*." And so everywhere in Scripture. Is it not high time for preachers to quit preaching a material heaven to saint and a material fire of hell to sinner? It is a way to play into the hands of scoffing infidels.

We may fitly speak of ascending, that is, going up to heaven, as our final home; and of descending, that is, going down to hell, as a place of punishment, but in no material sense. For if we go down in this sense to the centre of the earth we would find no doubt a molten mass of matter, but no devil, nor demons, nor lost spirits, whose spiritual nature could not be burnt or hurt by such a fiery furnace, though as hot as Nebuchadnezzar's; or if we go up to find heaven we might come across many a world thousands of times larger than this, but we would get no nearer the person of God and the holy angels than we do now in our own little planet. Heaven is up, because it is an exalted state; gehenna down, because it is a low state of existence. Gehenna is described as a lake of fire and brimstone, because it is a condition of intense pain and grief; heaven as a city with walls of precious stones and gates of pearl and streets of gold, because it is a condition of unspeakable glory and beauty and joy.

CONCLUSION.

Thus, there seem to be but two things in the universe—matter and spirit—to which all others can be referred. A proper view of the two appears to be a key to unlock many mysteries. The proof mainly lies in the resulting clearness. Light may be thrown on more questions than are written herein.

III.

THE DOCTRINE AND METHOD OF PESTALOZZI.

DR. N. C. SCHAEFFER.

In view of the influence which Pestalozzi exerted upon the educational thought and practice of this century, Palmer assigns him a place in educational history alongside of Luther and Francke. The philosopher Fichte called him a reformer who came to complete what Luther began. From such estimates of his mission and importance one turns to his writings with feelings of great expectation, only to be followed at first by a feeling akin to disappointment. His style abounds in figures of speech; his thinking is continually dominated by his imagination; his enthusiasm never permits him to tarry long enough to give any of his ideas an exhaustive statement or a systematic presentation. Nevertheless there are philosophic elements in the productions of his pen. Of this there is abundant evidence in the fact that Fichte and Herbart studied his writings with a thoroughness and care such as Kant never bestowed upon Basedow. And the feeling of disappointment which springs from the first perusal of his works vanishes as soon as we set his personality in its true perspective and see him starting a movement which is world-wide in its significance.

Two great ideas underlie all his thinking. Between these there is no necessary internal connection. A person might hold either without the other and yet not incur the charge of logical inconsistency. The first of these fundamental ideas is found in his theory of education as it bears upon the condition of the common people. He maintained that a proper education of the poor is sufficient to improve their moral, social and industrial condition; that every human being is endowed with powers and capacities sufficient to secure him an adequate support; that the innate powers of the individual can be roused into activity, stimulated,

strengthened and developed to such a degree that he will find in them a means of support and a source of well-being.

The second fundamental idea is found in his doctrine of method. By studying the nature of man and of instruction he hoped to devise a method that can be applied and followed by every teacher and every mother. He expected his method to yield educational results with the same unerring certainty with which a good machine turns out its finished product.

Without doubt his heart led him to evolve the former of his ideas. The condition of the masses as distinguished from the classes was, to his mind, very unsatisfactory. If he had turned from Switzerland to England he would have seen still more heart-rending sights. These men, working sixteen and eighteen hours a day, earned from a dollar and a quarter to a dollar and three-quarters a week, whilst the benumbing toil of little children brought their parents the merest pittance. High profits were extracted from the labor of little children, and the race was stunted and starved, while millowners, landowners and stock-jobbers collected their millions from the toils of those whose wages they regulated and whose strength they exhausted. The abuse of child labor was not confined to the cotton, silk and wool industries, but spread in every direction. "The report of 1842," says Mr. Hyndman, "is crammed with statements of the fearful overwork of girls and boys in iron and coal mines, which doubtless had been going on since the end of the eighteenth century. Children being small and handy, were particularly convenient for small veins of coal and pits where no great amount of capital was embarked; they could get along where horses and mules could not. Little girls were forced to carry heavy baskets of coal up high ladders, and little boys and girls dragged the coal bunkers along, instead of animals. * * In the iron mines children of four to nine years old were dragged out of bed at four or five o'clock in the morning to undergo sixteen hours' work in the shafts, and if they faltered during their fearful labor were mercilessly flogged with leathern straps by the overseer." Washington Gladden, from whose book on "Tools and The Man" these facts

are taken, says the statements are simply transcripts from the English government reports, and they are but part of a leaf out of volumes of horrors. Pestalozzi never saw pictures of life as dreadful as these, but the pictures of poverty, vice and degradation which he drew show that he realized the tremendous nature of the social and industrial problem; and he looked to industrial education as a possible solution. "I had from my youth," he says, "a high instinctive value of the influence of domestic training in the education of poor children, and likewise a decided preference for field labor, as the most comprehensive and unobjectionable external basis for this training, and also for another reason: As it is the condition of the manufacturing population which is increasing so rapidly among us who, abandoned to the operations of a mercantile and speculating interest, wholly destitute of humanity, are in danger, in case of unforeseen accident, of being able to find within themselves no means of escape from ruin. Full of a love for my fatherland, which hoped for it almost impossible things, and longed to lead it back to its native dignity and power, I sought with the greatest activity not only for the possible, but for the certain means of averting the common evil, and of awakening anew the remainder of the ancient home happiness, home industry, home manners. These designs sank deep into my heart and often made me feel with sorrow what a high and indispensable human duty it is to labor for the poor and miserable, with all the means which our race possesses, in Church, State or individuals, that he may attain to a consciousness of his own dignity through his feeling of the universal powers and endowments which he possesses, awakened within him; that he may not only learn to gabble over by rote the religious maxim that 'man is created in the image of God and is bound to live and die as the child of God,' but may himself experience its truth by virtue of the divine power within him, so that he may be irresistibly and really elevated not only above the ploughing oxen, but above the man in purple and silk, who lives unworthily of his high destiny."

In another place he writes: "The paternal love of the upper and the filial love of the lower classes, in consequence of the in-

crease of the manufacturing interest, is going more and more to ruin under the effects of ignoble wealth. The blinding height of arrogance derived from an eminent position obtained by money, the deceitful cornucopia of an unreliable life of mere pleasure, has drawn all within its destructive influence, even down to the commonest of the people, and carried them into the crooked path of a spiritless and powerless routine life. Truth, honor, sympathy, moderation, are daily vanishing. Pride, insolence, recklessness, contemptuousness, laxity, immorality, the eager pursuit of vain and ostentatious pleasure, the cherishing of boundless selfishness, have taken the place of the ancient simplicity, faith and honor." (Pestalozzi and Pestalozzianism, pages 13 and 14.)

At this point the views of Pestalozzi are in strong contrast to those of Herbert Spencer. "The provision of elementary instruction for the common people at the expense of the State," says Washington Gladden, "is denounced by them (Herbert Spencer and his friends) as a most dangerous encroachment upon liberty. In the eyes of these gentlemen the common school is one of the most startling signs of the loss of our birthright. When a free people submits to be taxed for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for all its children it is taking a long stride, so Mr. Spencer and his friends cry out, in the downward way from freedom to bondage." In Pestalozzi's view every human being is entitled to an education. Not only the well-born child, but the child born in the most abject poverty, has a right to an education that will develop its God-given powers. It is the duty of the home, of society, of the Church, of the State to furnish the opportunity and the facilities. Seeing a great need, Pestalozzi looks about him for means of relief. First of all, he looked to the home for help and sought to devise a method of instruction simple enough to be followed by the humblest mother. Despairing of the solution of the problem through the home and the schools maintained by the Church, he turned to the State as an agency powerful and pervasive enough to reach every child. From a bed of sickness he rose to plead with the King of Prussia for the education of the children. Through the influence exerted

by his writings education became a national affair in Germany and elsewhere, and he became the apostle of universal education.

The nineteenth century has followed his views and proved the correctness of his theory. To us it seems self-evident that universal education is the most efficient means of improving the condition of the individual, of the home, of society and of the nation. The idea is more modern than many suppose. Even so good a man as Dr. Johnson accepts it as a self-evident proposition that if every one were taught to read and write, there would be no one to perform the manual labor. It is the glory of Pestalozzi to have proclaimed to the world the advantages of popular education; to have won for his idea statesmen, rulers, philosophers and philanthropists; to have inspired the teachers with an adequate conception of their exalted mission and work. His fundamental idea has been embodied in the legislative enactments. Systems of public instruction have been put into operation in every civilized country upon the face of the globe. To make ignorance impossible, attendance at school has been made compulsory. Factory legislation has secured to every child its right to grow and know. The idea of industrial education which he sought to realize at Neuhof has been developed and extended in many directions. Industrial and commercial schools have been founded in all the leading countries of Europe. Manual training schools are maintained in the chief cities of America.

Modern history shows that money spent in the right education of the people is the best investment of public funds ever made. The United States Commissioner, W. T. Harris, has shown the effect of education upon the earning capacity of a people by comparing the State which pays teachers the highest salaries and has the longest term with the remaining portion of the United States. In the introduction to Martin's *Evolution of the Massachusetts Public School System* (page 'xv) he says: "I find, by the returns made to the National Bureau of Education, that the total amount of school education that each inhabitant of Massachusetts is receiving on an average—basing the calculation on the attend-

ance in public and private schools and the length of the annual school term—is nearly seven years of two hundred days each, while the average schooling given each citizen in the whole nation is only four and three-tenths of such years. No other State is giving so much education to its people as Massachusetts, and yet all the education given in all its institutions does not amount on an average to so much as seven-eighths of an elementary education of eight years. Even Massachusetts is not over-educating her people. But there would seem to be some connection between the fact that while her citizens get nearly twice the national average amount of education her wealth-producing power as compared with other States stands almost in the same ratio—namely (in 1885), at seventy-three cents per day for each man, woman and child, while the average for the whole nation was only forty cents.” The excess of wages amounts annually for the entire population of that Commonwealth to the magnificent sum of \$250,000,000, or about twenty-five times the amount annually expended upon the public schools.

It has been argued that a superior school system is a result, and not one of the causes of the prosperity of a Commonwealth. More than sixty years ago Horace Mann addressed a circular letter of inquiry to the leading industrial establishments of New England to ascertain the relative wages of the illiterate workmen and of those who have learned to read and write. From Lowell he received a reply to the effect that operatives with enough education to teach school received wages seventeen and three-fourths per cent. above the general average of the mills, and about forty per cent. above the wages of those who cannot read and write. From Boston he received a letter stating that the rudiments of a common-school education are essential to the attainment of skill and expertness as laborers; that very few who have not enjoyed the advantages of a common-school education ever rise above the lowest class of operatives, and that the labor of this class when it is employed in manufacturing operations which require even a moderate degree of manual or mental dexterity is unproductive. The letter further states that a large majority of the overseers,

and others employed in situations which require a good general knowledge of business and always an exceptionable moral character, have made their way up from the condition of common laborers with no other advantage over a large proportion of those they have left behind than that derived from a better education. From these and other replies Horace Mann drew the inference that "in great establishments and among large bodies of laboring men, where all services are rated according to their pecuniary value ; where there are no extrinsic circumstances to bind a man down to a fixed position after he has shown a capacity to rise above it ; where, indeed, men pass by each other ascending or descending in their grades of labor, just as easily and certainly as particles of water of different degrees of temperature glide by each other—there it is found as an almost invariable fact, other things being equal, that those who have been blessed with a good common-school education rise to a higher and higher point in all kinds of labor performed and also in the rate of wages paid, while the ignorant sink like dregs and are always found at the bottom."

Moreover, the principles and ideas of Pestalozzi first took root in Prussia, spreading thence into Germany, whilst England, a much richer country, began as late as 1870 her series of legislative enactments designed to banish illiteracy from the realm. The effect is seen in the greater industrial advance which Germany has made. Said Lord Rosebery at Colchester: "Germany has long been 20, 30 or 40 years ahead of us in technical education. I am afraid of Germany. Why am I afraid of the Germans? Because I admire and esteem so much. They are an industrious nation ; they are, above all, a systematic nation ; they are a scientific nation, and whatever they take up, whether it be the arts of peace or the arts of war, they push them forward to the utmost possible perfection with that industry, that system, that science, which is part of their character. Are we gaining on the Germans? I believe, on the contrary, we are losing ground. The other day one of the greatest authorities on this subject went to Germany, being stirred up by what he had seen

of alarm in the newspapers on this subject. He came and told a friend of mine that he was absolutely appalled by the progress made in the last twenty years by the Germans in technical and commercial education as compared with what was going on in England." This extract is found on the title page of a remarkable book by E. E. Williams entitled: "Made in Germany." The origin of the title is found in an Act of Parliament requiring imported articles to be stamped with the name of the country in which they were made. The result has been different from what was expected. Instead of stopping the sale of foreign goods, it has brought out the fact that from the playthings which the children smash in the nursery up to the paper on which the London editors abuse Bismarck is found the stamp: "Made in Germany." The author shows how in iron, steel, ships, hardware, machines, textiles, chemicals and the lesser trades the educated labor of the Continent has been winning from the English the best markets of the world.

The effect of the education acts in England shows that Pestalozzi was right in another direction. According to Sir John Lubbock, England has been saving annually on her pauper lists a sum equal to eight million pounds sterling, as the result of increasing the earning power of her people by a system of national education. Whilst her population has increased by one-third, the number of criminals had diminished by one-third, so that three buildings, formerly used as prisons, became empty and are now used for other purposes—proving Victor Hugo's maxim: "Open a school and you close a prison."

In the efforts which General Booth and others are putting forth to regenerate life in the slums of London and other great cities, one cannot help seeing how Pestalozzi's theory concerning the value of industrial employment upon land is bearing fruit in unexpected directions. The experience of France further shows that he was right in not desiring to secularize the school to the extent of eliminating from it every trace of religious or Christian influence. Who can be surprised at the growth of crime in France on learning that when Paul Bert was Minister of Instruc-

tion and Public Worship a type of atheism crept into the schools, from which Pestalozzi would have recoiled with feelings of horror. "On the occasion of the annual distribution of prizes," says Lecky, "presidents were appointed at the nomination of the Minister who delivered addresses in the presence of the children, and some of these addresses were of a kind which had scarcely been heard in France in the worst days of the Revolution. 'It is pretended,' said one of these presidents, addressing a number of young children, 'that we wish schools without God. You cannot turn over a page of your book without finding the name of a god—that is of a man of genius, of a benefactor, of a hero of humanity. In this point of view we are all true pagans, for our gods are numberless.' 'Scientific teaching,' said another, 'is the only true teaching, for it gives man certainty of his value, and impels him towards progress and light, whereas religious teaching plunges him fatally into an obscure night and into an abyss of deadly superstitions.' 'It is said,' declared a third, 'that we have expelled God from the schools. It is an error. One can only expel that which exists and God does not exist.' " (Lecky's *Democracy and Liberty*, Vol. II., page 80.)

Although the religious views of Pestalozzi are not altogether in harmony with the doctrinal statements of the orthodox divines, and, although he confesses there was a time when he wavered between feelings which drew him towards religion and opinions which led away from it, he found daily prayer indispensable to the work he was doing. By his example he wielded an influence more potent than verbal religious instruction. He declared that happiness is to be expected from Christianity alone, and his addresses are full of the sweet spirit of the Master. At Burgdorf he exhorted each of the pupils individually to prayers, and saw that some of his pupils said aloud in the bedrooms every evening the prayers which they had learned at home, while he explained that the mere repeating of prayers by rote was worthless, and that every one should pray from the heart (Pestalozzi and Pestalozzianism, page 119). At Yverdun the number of pupils became so large that he lost the power of indi-

vidual attention to each pupil. The necessity of showing visitors the results of the method on which he laid so much stress was upon him and his teachers; hence it was natural for them to aim at intellectual rather than moral culture; for it is easier to show off intellectual attainments than humility of soul and a loving heart.

The second of his fundamental ideas is found in his doctrine of method. His view of the method which he sought to devise reminds one of the expectations which many have on entering a training school for teachers. They expect to learn a method, or set of methods, which will enable a person to succeed in teaching, regardless of sound scholarships or personal qualifications. When Glayre said to Pestalozzi: "*Vous Voulez mécaniser l'instruction,*" the latter exclaimed: "You have hit the nail on the head and given me the expression to indicate the object of my endeavor and of the means which I employ." "I believe," he says, "that we must not dream of making progress in the instruction of the people as long as we have not found the forms of instruction which make of the teacher, at least so far as the completion of the elementary studies is concerned, the simple mechanical instrument of a method which owes its results to the nature of its processes and not to the ability of the one who uses it. I assert that a school book has no value save as it can be employed by a master without instruction as well as by one who has been taught." His own school at Yverdun was destined to show the fallacy of this notion. His own grandson, who was reared according to his method, disappointed all expectation and, because he showed no aptitude for anything higher, was apprenticed to a tanner. Called back to the institution as a teacher, his coarse manners and cruel disposition made sad havoc in the school room. Pestalozzi, on the contrary, often succeeded in spite of his method. Far more important than the method is the Socrates who is back of the method. The school of pedagogy must develop a personality apt at teaching if the instruction in methods is to yield the expected results.

Perhaps Pestalozzi was unjust to himself in acknowledging

that he aimed to mechanize the instruction of the school. He was in reality seeking a foundation for a national method of instruction, and thought he had found it in the three categories of number, form and word. Under number he included every form of arithmetical computation; under form he included writing, drawing, geometry; to the word he attached the instruction in language. The classification is logically objectionable; it does not embrace all the materials of instruction, and the classes do not exclude one another. The instruction in form and number can not be sundered from the word or from indirect instruction in language. He and his colleagues laid undue stress upon mental arithmetic and upon mathematical thinking. Triangles and quadrilaterals were suspended before the eyes of infants in the cradle. Whole hours were spent before the wainscotting of the school room in the examination of the holes and rents, with respect to form, position and color and for the purpose of formulating the observations in sentences. Long lists of names from the geography were copied and memorized. A French critic blames him for giving himself so much trouble to teach children that their nose is in the middle of the face. The severest criticism came from Girard. "I made the remark," he says, "to my old friend Pestalozzi that the mathematics exercised an unjustifiable sway in his establishment, and that I feared the results of this on the education that was given. Whereupon he replied to me with spirit, as was his manner: 'This is because I wish my children to believe nothing which can not be demonstrated as clearly to them as that two and two make four.' My reply was in the same strain: 'In that case, if I had thirty sons, I would not entrust one of them to you, for it would be impossible for you to demonstrate to him, as you can that two and two make four, that I am his father and that I have a right to his obedience.'"

It was Pestalozzi's misfortune that he never developed the power of formulating his theories and the results of his experiments. For thirty years he read very little, hoping to discover everything for himself. Being a man of intention rather than of reasoning, he lacked the power of clear logical statement, and his

method remained an enigma to his immediate followers, even to his colleagues at Yverdun, who at last quarreled among themselves, each claiming to have the method of the master. Ever ready to accept the statements which others gave; he left no clearly wrought-out set of principles or precepts. On the contrary, he never developed the weaknesses of the philosopher, who is satisfied if he has explored an idea in its essence and relations and given it a statement satisfactory to himself. Pestalozzi aimed to get something done for the unfortunate children of mankind, and posterity has recognized the value of his effort to devise a method of instruction in accord with the immutable laws which govern the growth and development of the child. He knew man, but not men. He felt more than he could express, and it was through his heart rather than through his intellect that he moulded the thinking of others and impelled them to revolutionize the school. Under the transforming influence which went forth from this great soul, the school ceased to be the place to which children look forward with dread and became the place to which children long to go. The time came when men could look back to his work and see what he accomplished for elementary instruction. Observation was given its true place in the teaching of number and of the things by which the child is surrounded. Rote teaching gave way to instruction which appeals to the child's intelligence. The discipline of the rod gave way to the educational influences of love, interested activity and the conscious acquisition of useful knowledge. We cannot do Pestalozzi's memory a greater service than by closing with the lucid statement of the maxims and principles which governed consciously and unconsciously his work at Yverdun and elsewhere, as these have been formulated by one of his admirers, the celebrated Diesterweg.

The basis of instruction is not to be constructed, but to be sought; it exists in the nature of man.

The nature of man contains an inborn and active instinct of development; it is an organized nature; and man is an organized being.

True education will find that its chief hindrances are passive

obstructions in the way of development ; its work is more negative than positive.

Its positive work consists in stimulation ; the science of education is a theory of stimulation, or the right application of the best motives.

The development of man commences with natural perceptions through the senses ; its highest attainment is, intellectually, the exercise of reason ; practically, independence.

The means of independence and self maintenance is spontaneous activity.

Practical capacity depends much more upon the possession of intellectual and corporeal power than upon amount of knowledge. The chief aim of all education (instruction) is therefore the development of these powers.

The religious character depends much less upon learning the Scriptures and the catechism than upon the intercourse of the child with a God-fearing mother and an energetic father. Religious education, like all other, must begin with the birth of the child, and it is principally in the hands of the mother.

The chief departments for the development of power are form, number and speech. The idea of elementary education is the notion of laying within the nature of the child, by means of domestic education (the influence of father, mother, brothers and sisters), the foundations of faith, love, of the power of seeing, speaking and reflecting, and by the use of all the means of education, according to the laws and methods of development included within nature itself.

Such is the actual substance of Pestalozzi's principles of education. The consequences follow of themselves. They are these :

The family circle is the best place for education ; the mother's book the best school book.

All instruction must be based upon training the intuitive faculty. The first instruction is altogether instruction in seeing ; the first instruction on any subject must be the same, in order to fruitful, active and real comprehension of it. The opposite of this is the empty and vain mode of mere verbal instruction.

First the thing itself should be taught, and afterward, as far as possible, the form, the representation and the name.

The first portion of instruction consists in naming things and causing the names to be repeated, in describing them and causing them to be described. After this it should be the teacher's prime object to develop spontaneous activity, and for that purpose to use the fore-mentioned progressive and inventive method of teaching.

Nothing should be learnt by rote without being understood; the practice of learning by rote should be confined to mere matters of form. In the method of oral communication with the scholars is to be found an adequate measure for estimating the clearness and activity of the scholar's power of seeing and his knowledge.

The chief inducements to the right and good are not fear and punishment, but kindness and love.

(Barnard's Translation of Diesterweg's Pestalozzi and the Schools of Germany, pages 24 and 25.)

IV.

THE AIM OF PREACHING.

BY REV. D. B. LADY, D.D.

There were preachers before the days of Christ and the Apostles. Noah was a preacher of righteousness. The author of the book of Ecclesiastes calls himself the preacher. Jonah was sent to preach to the inhabitants of Ninevah. "And the word of the Lord came unto Jonah the second time, saying, Arise go unto Ninevah that great city, and preach unto it the preaching that I bid thee," Jon. 3 : 1, 2. The author of the 40th Psalm says : "I have preached righteousness in the great congregation," Ps. 40 : 9. The Old Testament prophets were preachers. Their mission was not only, or mainly, to lift the veil of the future and give men a glimpse of what should take place in after times, but to make known the will and way of God, to point out to the people their sins and to call them to repentance. Isaiah says : "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me ; because the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto the weak, he hath sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captive and the opening of the prison to them that are bound ; to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord and the day of vengeance of our God ; to comfort all that mourn ; to appoint unto them that mourn in Zion ; to give unto them beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mourning, the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness, that they might be called trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord, that he might be glorified," Isa. 61 : 1-3. John the Baptist was a preacher as well as, and just as much as, a baptizer. "In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the wilderness of Judea, and saying, Repent ye ; for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," Matt. 3 : 1, 2. The writer adds : "For this is he that was

spoken of by the prophet Esaias, saying, the voice of one crying in the wilderness, prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight," Matt. 3 : 3.

But with the coming of Christ and especially with His entrance upon His public ministry the work of preaching assumed a place of much more importance than it had held up to this time. After the account of the temptation Matthew says : " From that time Jesus began to preach and to say, Repent : for the kingdom of heaven is at hand," Math. 4:17. Very frequent mention is made in the Gospel narratives of the preaching of Christ in the synagogues and to the assembled multitudes at other places. He also sent his disciples to preach, instructing them to go to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, " and as ye go, preach, saying, the kingdom of heaven is at hand," Math. 10:7. And Christ's final word to His followers immediately before His ascension to the right hand of God was a commission to preach, as recorded by three of the evangelists. In St. Luke it is thus recorded : " Then opened He their understanding, that they might understand the Scriptures, and said unto them, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day : and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem," Luke 24:45-47. In St. Mark it is given in these words : " And He said unto them, Go ye into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved ; but he that believeth not shall be damned," Mark 16:15, 16. In St. Matthew we have it in still another form : " Go ye therefore and teach (or make disciples, or Christians of) all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost ; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you ; and, lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world." Matt. 28 : 19, 20.

This last command of our Lord to His disciples was dilligently obeyed by them during their life-time, and has been obeyed by the Church and the successors of the apostles down to the present

day. For whilst the office of a minister in the church and the pastor of a congregation involves more than preaching, it should never be forgotten that His commission is, first of all, to preach.

It has been often remarked that as there were three great functions among God's ancient people, those of prophet, priest and king, so Christ was anointed to be our prophet, to make known to us the secret counsel and will of God concerning our salvation, and our high priest, who redeems us by the sacrifice of His own life upon the cross, and continually intercedes for us, and our king, who governs us by His word and spirit and defends and preserves us in the possession of the salvation He secured for us. As Christians we share in that anointing, and especially as Christian ministers, for it is the calling of the ministry to carry on the work of Christ to its final completion, in the complete enlightenment, full reconciliation and entire submission of the human family to His authority. The pastor has the spiritual oversight of the people who are under His care. The government of the church is committed to Him in connection with the spiritual council. He has authority to rebuke and command in Christ's name. He is Christ's representative to men. The minister also leads the worship of the people. He goes before them to the throne of divine grace. He confesses their sins and presents their petitions in the name of Christ, the great high priest, to God. He makes intercession for them. Hence we have directories and orders of worship and liturgies and books of common prayer and hymn books, that in the use of them, in the study or in the service or in both, the minister may be able to stand before God as the priest and representative of his people and may bear and present a common offering upon the altar of the gospel to the Most High.

But, if there is any distinction, the minister is called especially to the exercise of the prophetic office. It is his to go into all the world and to preach the gospel to every creature, to christianize all nations. Thus it is said of the first apostles, "after the Lord was received up into heaven, and sat on the right hand of God," "and they went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord work-

ing with them, and confirming the word with signs following," Mark 16 : 20. It may be a question whether Christ was, first of all, a preacher. He preached a great deal, and He made known the will of God concerning our salvation, but most persons would probably say that His great work was to effect an atonement, and to establish a kingdom of grace and salvation among men, to create the conditions for the salvation of the human family. He himself declared the fact that the kingdom of heaven was at hand. It is generally understood that Christ's incarnation, His life of obedience, His sufferings and His death upon the cross, His resurrection from the dead and ascension to heaven and the coming of the Holy Ghost, as well as the instruction given to the disciples during His public ministry and the influence exerted upon them, to say nothing of any effect which His work may have had upon the mind of God, created the conditions for men's salvation. After that had been accomplished the work of salvation was complete, from one point of view. It needed only that this great fact should be made known universally, and that it should be universally accepted to make salvation complete from every point of view. This is only saying what St. John expresses much more beautifully when he says : " God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life," John 3 : 16.

It stands to reason that before this work of Christ upon earth in behalf of man was accomplished it could only be announced by way of anticipation ; and the preaching of John the Baptist, of Christ, and of the Apostles, before the ascension and the event of Pentecost, was of this anticipatory character. Only when Christ had finished the work of our redemption, and when the promise of the gift of the Holy Spirit had been fulfilled, was the first Christian sermon, in the full sense of the word, preached. Then the apostles could preach the gospel ; they could announce the glad tidings ; they could set forth Christ and Him crucified, Jesus and the resurrection ; they could call upon men to repent of their sins, for which the Saviour suffered, " who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree " (1 Pe. 2: 24), and

point them to Christ, and respond to the anxious question, "what must we do?" with the blessed words of direction and assurance, "believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved."

The preaching of the apostles was at first no doubt very simple. The sermon of Peter on the Day of Pentecost consisted of an explanation of the gift of languages, attributing it to the presence of the Holy Ghost, a setting forth of Jesus as the Christ, charging his audience with the rejection and crucifixion of their Messiah, proclaiming His resurrection and calling upon them to repent and be baptized and offering them the gift of the Holy Ghost. And, we are told that as many as "gladly received his word were baptized: and the same day there were added unto them about three thousand souls," Acts 2: 41. The sermon suited the occasion and the audience. It was made up to a large extent of quotations from the Old Testament in its argumentative division, and it closed with the most stirring appeals to the hearers to accept of the mercy offered in Christ and to escape the condemnation about to be visited upon those who persisted in their rejection of the Messiah, for it is said, at the close of the brief synopsis of it given by the author of the Acts, "And with many other words did he testify and exhort, saying, Save yourselves from this untoward generation," Acts 2: 40.

The great subject of the apostolic sermon was Salvation by Jesus Christ. It was their great mission to make this known to all men everywhere. The form in which it was announced depended upon circumstances. The occasion and the audience determined that. Sometimes the starting point of the sermon was a Scripture text or passage, as in Philip's sermon to the Ethiopian eunuch. Sometimes it was an inscription from a heathen altar, as in Paul's sermon on Mars Hill. Before a Jewish congregation the Old Testament was largely quoted in confirmation of the preacher's contention, and the people were at times prompted to "Search the Scriptures, whether those things were so," Acts 17: 11. Before a learned heathen assembly their own poets were quoted. The apostles were wise men, not in the sense of being acquainted with dead traditions and bound by

them, but with a practical wisdom. They knew the truth of Christ's salvation. They understood their age and the human nature of their own times. They were full of zeal and of resources. Their talks were brief or lengthy, a simple statement, or a course of reasoning, as the occasion made most fitting. Undoubtedly the first sermon to a new audience always had for its substance: "Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world," Jno. 1: 36, however great the variety of forms may have been in which it was cast. But the subsequent sermons, where the early converts continued steadfastly in the apostles' doctrine, or where Barnabas and Saul assembled themselves with the Church at Antioch for a whole year and taught much people, or where Paul continued a year and six months at Corinth, teaching the Word of God among them, must have taken a wider range.

That was a new time. It was the greatest turning point of the world's history. There was a freshness and an inspiration about the Gospel then which carried everything before it. Old beliefs and practices and forms went to pieces, and new truth, or a new and fuller apprehension of truth, took their place. There was a revolution in religion and spiritual life. The preaching of the age partook of its character. It shaped itself to the time. It was part of the time to which it belonged.

It was inevitable that order should follow this chaos. That is the nature of things. The new wine succeeds after the old bottles are broken in getting itself into new bottles. The life created for itself and began to flow onward in grooves. The sermon became a feature, if not the chief feature, of every service of the Christian congregation and has so continued to the present day. It took upon it a certain form. It was bound to do that. This form has been preserved for centuries and may continue with variations to the end of time.

The sermon has come to begin with a text or Scriptural statement. Its exposition, a presentation of the truth which it embodies, and the application of this truth in the way of warning, reproof, instruction, encouragement or comfort to the hearers, has

come to constitute the sermon. Here there is room for an infinite variety. Every preacher will preach in a way peculiar to himself. His individuality will assert itself. The character of his mind, his way of looking at things, his spiritual culture, his religious experience and progress will make themselves felt. He will preach as he is able and as he must preach, being true to himself. He should feel with Paul: "Woe is unto me if I preach not the gospel," 1 Cor. 9: 16; and with Luther in his understanding and advocacy of truth and Christian morality: "Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise; God help me." A man who has not tasted and seen that the Lord is gracious, who has not mastered, by experience and by study and meditation, the great truths of the gospel has not been called to preach, whatever other qualifications he may have. Here, as elsewhere, to speak effectively a man must speak out of the abundance of the heart. The apostles could say: "That which we have seen and heard declare we unto you," 1 John 1: 3. If the preacher cannot substantiate his testimony by what he hath seen and heard his preaching will be without life or power.

The preacher ought, besides a rich and full Christian experience and consciousness, which is the most essential, also to have ample preparation of a general and special kind for his pulpit ministration. A liberal education is important. A thorough theological training, much exercise in writing and speaking, and above all a great familiarity with the Bible, are of great advantage to him as aids to his earnestness and devotion to the cause to which he has given himself. Wide reading, travel, intercourse with men and insight into the hearts and minds of men, will help him greatly. Almost every stream will bring water to his mill. Education in the true sense, not that which makes its subject a machine and obliterates his personality, but that which ministers to his originality, he can not well have too much of it. It will give him a stronger grasp of the truth. It will help him to see more clearly what he sees. It will bring him into closer sympathy with his fellowmen and assist him in understanding them, and it will broaden and deepen the channels in which he attempts to convey

to them what he has himself received. "For Christ said, Freely ye have received, freely give," Matt. 10 : 8.

What should be the preacher's aim in the preparation and preaching of the sermon? The first aim, no doubt, should be to make known the truth. This is so overwhelmingly important that we might say that everything else should bend to it. Every human mind and heart should seek the truth. Every teacher, in whatever line of learning he may labor, should teach the truth. Nothing can be plainer. Men go wrong because they are ignorant, because they misapprehend, because they are deceived. Sin is the result of a misunderstanding and a deception. Christ says : "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth," Jno. 18 : 37. He is our chief prophet and teacher. The preacher is a prophet and teacher too. He informs himself and then informs others of the truth with respect to the most essential things which concern men.

Here, again, every stream can convey water to his mill. The sermon may be entertaining, if the preacher has the ability to speak in an entertaining manner. But entertainment must not be the chief object. That would be a monstrous perversion. The preacher may be witty in the pulpit. He may make error ridiculous. He may show the absurdity of folly and sin. Why not? He may provoke the audience to smiles as well as to tears. The ability to do that is also God-given. But to elicit smiles or tears is not to be the aim. That would also be a monstrous perversion. The only aim should be to declare and impress the truth. Anecdote, oratory, logic, satire, denunciation, persuasion, the wrath to come, and the love of God, reproof and exhortation, all are legitimate in the pulpit, when used in the interest of the truth as it is in Jesus Christ.

The second or final aim or result sought to be reached by the preacher should be the conversion, christian growth and final salvation of the auditor. This the truth of the gospel will bring about. But it need not be entirely absent from the mind of the preacher. He may look forward to it, and consciously direct his

efforts to this end, as the result and reward of his labors in and out of the pulpit. Christ's command, according to St. Matthew is: Make Christians of all nations. It is right to preach and pray and look for this result. And yet may not this be safely left in the hands of Him who says to men, go preach? God giveth the increase. To know and proclaim the truth concerning the way of salvation, in every variety of form and impressiveness, is not this the whole duty of the preacher? And does not his responsibility end here? It is certainly enough to employ the powers of the most richly endowed and of the most highly cultivated preacher.

V.

SIN WITHIN THE CHURCH; A SPECIES OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE.

BY REV. S. Z. BEAM, D.D.

The members of the Church are chosen to a life of holiness: "Called to be saints." The Church itself is named the "*holy* Catholic Church." To it have been intrusted the means of grace, whereby its members may be lifted up from a life of sin into the higher life of holiness and true righteousness. But, unhappily in spite of her calling to holiness, she is not, in her outward organization, free from the pollutions of sin and consequent evils.

Dr. Horace Bushnell, in his book on "Nature and the Supernatural," speaks of the principle of evil, "as a bad possibility that environs God from eternity, waiting to become a fact, and certain to become a fact, whenever the opportunity is given." Whether we adopt this theory or not, it is very evident that, soon after the creation of man, sin entered upon a course of development among men, which has continued, with all its consequent evils, till the present day. The creation of man seems to have furnished "the opportunity" for the adversary of God to begin his destructive work. It is also certain that all the efforts of God and man to counteract the evil and destructive activity of sin have been met with the most bitter and determined antagonism. Men and devils seem to have combined in every age and united in every effort, for the purpose of frustrating all movements started to rescue men from evil, and to elevate them into a higher plane of living and enjoyment. Whatever, therefore, has been accomplished for the amelioration of the moral and spiritual condition of our race has been won by the severest struggles. Every good which comes to man is a victory gained by a hard-fought battle.

It is the old warfare which began to be waged already in Eden when the deadly conflict between the seed of the serpent and the seed of the woman had its beginning. This warfare was then made the subject of prophecy. The strife having begun, it was predicted that it should continue until the serpent's head should be bruised. This bruising of the serpent's head we regard as the end of the struggle and the victory for mankind.

Whether God Himself actually spoke the words of Gen. 3: 15, or whether the writer of the book records the conception of his own mind and attributes it to God, is a matter of no consequence for our present purpose. The fact which concerns us is that *the statement is there*. Again, whether it was written by Moses fifteen hundred years before Christ, or by Ezra or some one, after the return from the Captivity, we are sure that it was written many long ages ago. *It is a prophecy*, and the writer must have had a wonderful power of seeing into the future, or else he received his knowledge of the future by divine revelation. For the struggle has continued with unabated and increasing fury ever since. Mankind has suffered the bruising of the heel, while Satan's head has received many severe blows; for man has risen, gained many victories, through Christianity, and, wherever Christianity prevails, man is intellectually, morally and spiritually higher and stronger than ever before.

The conflict, however, continues. The forces for good and the forces for evil are summoning all their energies for the combat. No truce is offered, and none would be accepted. Nothing short of complete victory on one side, and final defeat on the other, can end the strife. The antagonism is mutual and uncompromising. The interests involved for man are vital, infinite and eternal; Christianity, we believe, is destined, ultimately, to gain the victory, and the kingdom of God will put down all foes and reign with a universal dominion.

But it is not within the proposed scope of this paper to follow in order the predictions of the Old Testament concerning the conflict with evil. We must limit the inquiry to the consideration of a few predictions in the New Testament relative to the

evils which afflict the Church from within its own bosom—the *Anti-Christ of Christianity*. And from these we hope to derive a species of evidence for the truth of Christianity. That is, we believe that the existence of sin, *in the Church*, is the fulfilment of specific prophecies, and, therefore, that its presence is a strong evidence of the divinity and truth of our holy religion. And in the endeavor to make this appear we by no means offer an apology or excuse for sin. On the contrary, we lament its existence as a terrible evil; but seeing that it does exist, even in the Church itself, we take that fact as a kind of Christian evidence.

It is, of course, needless to prove that Christianity has been envired, not only with the possibility of sin, but, in fact, with the existence of sin from the beginning. But more than this, the Church of Christ has often been brought into discredit, both by the sins of individual members and also by the iniquities and crimes perpetrated in the name of the Church itself. In her efforts to purge herself of heresies, she has often gone so far in the punishment of heretics as to commit crimes morally more injurious and degrading to religion than heresy itself. Thus she has assumed the authority of an avenger, and, to outward appearance, arrayed herself on the side of Satan against her own members, and committed the unnatural sin of a mother destroying her own children. Thus the spirit of Christianity has been violated and the very purpose of the Church's existence been hindered. The sins she was designed to prevent have thus been committed in her name. And then again by a strange incongruity, at other times, she seems to connive at similar sins and permit the perpetrators to stand outwardly, *rectus in ecclesia*.

Now, in view of these damaging facts which every intelligent Christian must admit and deprecate, what answer can we make to those who accuse us? Can we furnish any evidence that Christianity is not responsible for these things? Can we show that they exist in spite her efforts to put them away? Can we prove that these evils so damaging to the Church are subjects of prophecy, and that, though inexcusable in those who are guilty,

they are nevertheless strong evidences proving the claims of Christ and His religion to be worthy of our confidence? We think we have grounds for answering all these questions in the affirmative.

Let it be remembered here that, while perfection is *the end* to which the kingdom of heaven is directed, that blessed goal can only be reached at the final consummation. At present it is a struggling kingdom. As Jesus Himself became perfect through suffering, so His Church must become perfect through victory over sin, which can not be won without deadly conflict. The Church is environed by a sinful world and is constituted on its human side of sinful men, who are not yet purified from *all* sin. And there is no intimation in the Word of God that it will be freed from the trammels of sin and the snares of Satan until the struggle is ended. On the contrary, the attainment of perfection must be reached through conflict with sin, even within the Church itself. Its present condition, so misunderstood by its enemies, is like that of the Psalmist, who, as a type of Christ, was wounded in the house of his friends.

Another important point to be kept in view is, that members are received into the Church, not *because* they are freed from sin but in order that they may *become* freed from sin. They are lifted from the plane of nature where sin reigns without hindrance to the plane of grace, where the means are at hand to help them in counteracting the power and influence of sin. But while sin has no more dominion over them they must still maintain a life-long struggle against its wiles. A perfect Church is therefore not possible until the great consummation, when the presence of sin will be eliminated, and every thing which offends will be cast out. But, meantime, it is well to remember that the Christian Church is the only institution which openly, and avowedly, and persistently wages war against sin in all its various forms. And the presence of sin in her own constitution is one of the evidences of her divine call to the conflict, which involves the effort on her part to put it away.

Sin is in the Church only because her members are imperfect

sinful beings, whom it is her purpose to save. Sin also is a foreign element in the Church, against which she is constantly maintaining her warfare, so that it does not *reign* in the Church as it does in the world; but in battling for its existence sin inflicts its wounds upon the body of Christ, the serpent thus bruising the heel of the woman's seed. Again, Christ and His Apostles clearly predicted the presence of sin in the Church. They foresaw the difficulties and dangers attending the salvation of men and forewarned their followers that they might not be dismayed or discouraged by the unpromising conditions, which the future history of the kingdom would exhibit. And hence the fact of the existence of sin becomes an evidence of the truth of those predictions and of the divine character of Christ and His mission. And we may further believe that God, in His providence, is at this time making these evils subservient to the interests of His kingdom. And so they serve to prove rather than refute the divine origin and truth of our holy religion. They show the prevision of Him who saw the end from the beginning, and that the credentials of the Apostles must have come to them from a divine source. God is using them to work out His wise designs. He is making the wrath of man to praise Him. Every advance which the Church makes against sin is a new victory over the powers of darkness.

Any one familiar with the history of Israel can see how God made the bad deeds of His own people, as well as those of their enemies, contribute towards the working out of divine providence. The betrayal of Jesus, first to the Jews and then by them to the Gentiles, and His crucifixion by the Roman soldiers, were all most wicked acts in themselves, yet God overruled them to the salvation of mankind. And, however greatly we may abhor and execrate those sinful acts, yet all Christians must rejoice in the salutary results to which they were made tributary.

The neglect of poor widows, in the administration of the affairs of the Church of Jerusalem, was the occasion of improving its organization by the election of deacons to direct its temporal interests. The Judaizing of many of the Christians led to the de-

cree favoring liberty for Gentile converts and freeing Jewish Christians from the burdensome rites of the ceremonial law. And the persecutions of the Christians at Jerusalem, while injurious to them in their temporal relations, were the means of scattering them abroad, and so of carrying the Gospel to other cities and other lands. In all these things God brought good out of evil, and thereby advanced the interests of His kingdom.

But we wish now more especially to point out how wonderfully and clearly the corruptions and failures of Christianity are foreshadowed in the words of Christ and in the writings of the apostles. The Parable of the Sower evidently contains *a prophecy*, which shows the divine prescience of our Saviour, concerning the future successes and failures of the Gospel. According to this parable it was to be preached universally. The seed was to be sown in the great field of the world. It was to be only partially successful. In the first instance, on the wayside, it would prove to be an immediate failure because not received by the hearers. In the second and third, it was to promise well. The hearers would receive it gladly. They would come into the Church and make an apparently good confession. But not counting the cost, they would become offended when disappointed in their worldly expectations. They would grow for a while. But in the end they would wither and die, bringing no fruit to perfection. While members of the Church, they would live like people of the world. How sadly now has this prediction been fulfilled, even in the days of the Apostles and in every succeeding age! How many have professed to be followers of Christ, and afterwards corrupted the Church by their polluting practices, and brought its good name into ill repute! In the last instance, however, we have the encouraging promise that some will bring their fruit to perfection in different degrees, but with honesty and truth. In these last, the goodness of the seed is vindicated, and the good name of the Church is preserved.

The parables of the tares and of the dragnet are equally explicit in their predictions, and the history of the Church proves the accuracy of their statements; and all show the foreknowledge

of Jesus, who thus declared beforehand the evils that would afflict His Church and cast a shadow over the kingdom of heaven.

According to the parable of the tares, the enemy would gain access to the Church, having "crept in unawares," and would scatter tares among the growing wheat, to hinder if possible, its growth towards perfection. Notable examples are already seen in Ananias and Sapphira and Simon Magus, who were veritable tares among the wheat, though, happily for the Church, they were not permitted to grow till the harvest.

In the parable of the dragnet we have a similar prediction, but under a different figure. The Gospel net here gathers into the Church of every kind. It is let down into the sea of human life, and all kinds of people are gathered into the Church. Attracted by the promises of the Gospel, but failing to apprehend their true meaning, they enter the Church for worldly ends. And, not caring for the spiritual elevation which is offered, they misuse the privileges of the Church for secular purposes and corrupt it with their sinful practices. And while their intentions are selfish, they unconsciously become witnesses of the prevision of Jesus by fulfilling His word. Their presence in the Church, though degrading to its character, does not disprove its divine origin, or, in any sense, render it less the kingdom of heaven. But, on the contrary, their false doctrines and glaring inconsistencies prove that Jesus foreknew and foretold of the evils from which His kingdom was destined to suffer.

It is, therefore, easy to see that Jesus was not disappointed in His expectations regarding those who would outwardly confess His name. He knew all men. He knew what was in them. He knew that His church would suffer reproach in its outward organization, through the presence of unworthy and mischief-making members, and even by the mistakes and inconsistencies of those who are worthy. And hence He could say beforehand, "Not every one that saith unto me Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, etc."

Now we may justly affirm that all the evils which have been practiced within the Church, and often in its name, are covered

by these parabolic prophecies. And their very existence is, therefore, an evidence in favor of Christianity. Such evils are to be expected. The abuses of our holy Christianity and the apparent degeneracy of the kingdom of heaven, are no part or work of Christianity itself, but the work of false friends and secret enemies, whom it is constantly struggling to overcome.

If we turn now to the writings of the Apostles, as in the Acts, the Epistles and Revelation, we shall find predictions of a similar import, showing that the Apostles also had prophetic intimations of the evils which were destined to bring reproach upon the Church of Christ. And in addition, they further tell us of those who would accuse the Church on account of these evils. Hence they write words of warning against such things. In Acts 20: 29, 30, we have a prophecy which was afterwards grievously fulfilled, not only at Ephesus, but wherever, in all the world, the Church was established.

A specific prophecy and warning of this kind is recorded in the second chapter of II. Thessalonians. There St. Paul warns the Saints of a future apostasy from the faith, which would take place before the second coming of Christ. Some of the brethren at Thessalonica seem to have become excited, and troubled about the second coming of Christ, as if He was coming in their day; and they feared that those who suffered martyrdom, or died before the Advent, would be deprived of the high privilege of participating in its glory. Hence in this second Epistle, Paul undertakes to quiet their fears by assuring them, among other things, that He would not come, "except there come a falling away first." In the language which follows, he seems to indicate a schism in the Church which would threaten its very existence. But as they were "called by the Gospel, to the obtaining of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ" there was no ground for trouble or fear. God had chosen them "to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth," and in these assurances God gave them everlasting consolation and good hope through grace. Therefore there is no need of discouragement. There will be a falling away. The man of sin will be revealed, who is the son of

perdition. He will exalt himself above all that is called God or that is worshipped. He will even claim that he is God, setting himself in the temple of God. At present this Anti-Christ is withheld that his true character may be fully revealed in his time. The mystery of iniquity doth already work. Now, for a time, he is hindered. But the hindrance will be taken out of the way, when that wicked one will be fully revealed. And then the Lord will consume him with the spirit of His mouth, and destroy him by the brightness of His coming. Then follows a brief, but awful description of the power and deception of the Anti-Christ, and of the strong delusion which God will send on them who believed not the truth, that they should believe a lie, and come into condemnation.

A prophecy by the same Apostle is recorded in 1 Tim. 4 : 1-3. "Now the Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils, etc."

He thus warns Timothy and all preachers against errorists, and exhorts them to be good soldiers of Christ. Many interpreters apply these predictions to the papacy and the Roman Catholic Church. And this application seems just in some particulars, though we think that they admit of a much wider application. The germs of these sinful errors and defections from the truth were already present in the Apostolic age and Church, which was by no means so perfectly pure as many Christians have supposed. And as the centuries continued to come and go, these evil tendencies were developed more and more, the mystery of iniquity continuing to work on the same lines.

The claim of papal infallibility, and of the vicegerency of the pope, make him appear very much like the person described by St. Paul as the man of sin, who sets himself in the temple of God, and desires to be counted as God. And then the forced celibacy of the priesthood, and the prohibition of meats, appear to fulfil the predictions in 1 Timothy about "forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats."

Such false ideas of bodily purity come down from the Essenes

and Therapeutæ of an earlier age ; but they were adopted by many in the Church, and were sanctioned by the Church itself. Doubtless, many of the ascetics were pure in their motives, but all of them lost sight of the true principle of Christian purity and holiness, which was intended to develop the graces of the Spirit of Christ in the saints rather through *contact* with men, than by *running away* from them. But the evils predicted, and afterwards practiced were not all limited to the papacy and the Roman priesthood. Nor is the Church of the middle ages responsible for all the evils growing out of its organization under the papacy.

In estimating the character of that Church, formed during the so-called "dark ages," we ought not to overlook the herculean task, which the Church undertook and performed, in subduing and disciplining the barbarian tribes who destroyed the Roman Empire. These tribes were gathered into the Church, and, under her influence and control, they were formed into the Christian nations of Europe. But the influx of heathenism, with its overwhelming numbers of barbarians, during many ages, became a prolific source of corruption within the bosom of the Church, which she was unable fully to resist. And, in consequence, many of their idolatrous and demoralizing practices insinuated themselves into the life of the Church itself. Thus, while Christ, in the Church, was subduing these fierce peoples to the obedience of the faith, their old heathen ideas and practices were degrading and debauching the Church. This long process of assimilating the barbarians to the Church, resulting in the degeneracy of the Church, led finally, in the sixteenth century, to the Reformation. Premonitions of this great movement can be traced, in the history of the middle ages, for several centuries, prominent among which was that in the days of John Huss, who suffered martyrdom a hundred years before the Reformation. But previous to him we read of Waldo of France, in the latter half of the twelfth century ; Tauler of Strassburg, in the fourteenth century ; Thomas A. Kempis, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries ; John Wessel of Germany, in the fifteenth century ; John Wiclif, in the second

and third quarters of the fourteenth century, and John Oldcastle, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, who are called "Reformers before the Reformation." After Huss we read also of Savonarola, in the last half of the fifteenth century. We mention these eminent Christians and martyrs, some in fact, and some in will, though not in fact, as men in whom the true spirit of Christianity was manifest, even in the darkest days of its history. Zwingli, Luther and the other Reformers of the sixteenth century, became leaders in this great movement, which may be characterized as a new stage in the development of the true life of the Church. It was an onward movement of Christianity, which left the papacy, and that portion of the Church which clung to the papal hierarchy, in a spiritually moribund condition, from which it has not yet recovered. But yet, as that church still holds all the fundamentals of the true Christian faith, we hope that finally God will lead it out of that moral desert of death, into the living pastures of the Gospel of Christ, some signs of which are already discernible wherever it comes in contact with Protestantism, and where religious liberty prevails.

But, following the Reformation, comes the hydra-headed sect system, which has, in the name of Christian Freedom, divided the church into hundreds of schismatic organizations, many of which claim to be the only true successors of the Apostolic Church. And "by reason of these the way of truth is evil spoken of." In all which St. Peter's prophecy (II. Peter 2: 1-3) has been literally fulfilled. It is true, indeed, that only a few of the sects actually deny that "Jesus Christ is come in the flesh," but many of them, in a popish spirit, deny Him in one way or another, by their uncharitable judgment, and unfair treatment, of others equally as good as, if not better than they. This we may properly call the Anti-Christ of Protestantism, for it certainly is opposed to the true spirit of Christianity. But, like other evils within the Church, it unconsciously and unintentionally furnishes its testimony for the truth, thus adding its share to the fulfilment of prophecy.

What is here seen to be true in the history of the Church as a

whole, is equally evident in the case of individuals. False teachers, in their writings, and by their immoral lives lead many astray, who, refusing to believe the truth, are led to believe a lie, God having sent them strong delusion because they reject the truth, and revel in unrighteousness, and give reins to spiritual licentiousness. Unworthy of the Christian name, yet they maintain their membership in the Church, and, in many instances, plume themselves on their pretended holiness and devotion to the cause of Christ. They are fully described in the second chapter of second Peter. In this chapter St. Peter warns "them that have obtained a like precious faith with us in the righteousness of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ," to beware of these "false teachers, who shall privily bring in destructive heresies, etc., by reason of whom the way of truth shall be evil spoken of."

The Anti-Christ of the Revelation, we do not attempt to identify, either from the description of the monsters that come out of the sea and the earth, or by the number of his name. The name may embrace, in the broadest sense, every form of evil which afflicts the Church, including the persecutions of the great world powers; but we believe that it does not exclude the heresies, the unbeliefs, the tyrannies and the schisms, which are described under Christian names, and yet are as hostile to real Christianity as any power outside the Church. It includes, therefore, according to this all-inclusive interpretation, every evil that hinders the completion and perfection of Christ's kingdom. It embraces "the revelation of that lawless one, whom the Lord Jesus shall slay with the breath of His mouth, and bring to naught by the manifestation of His coming" (2 Thes. 2: 8).

In conclusion we may justly affirm that no evil has ever been developed within the Church of Christ, or in the onward progress of His kingdom among men, which was not foreseen, and for which an antidote was not fully provided beforehand. And every advance movement of His Church has transcended and left behind some evil forever, and as a victory over one form of sin, it has gained for her a new advantage for future conflicts and future victories, and become a new and sure promise of final victory over all foes without and within.

Now, if the sins committed within the Church, and in the name of the Church, are subjects of prophecy, as we think we have demonstrated, and the fact of their presence is the fulfilment of prophecy, then it follows that their very existence bears testimony to the truth of Christ and His Apostles; and the divinity and righteousness of the claims of Christ and Christianity are established. Christianity is not responsible for their existence. On the contrary, the Church in its representative capacity is seen to be struggling for the mastery, striving to overcome and destroy sin in all its forms, and thereby purify its members. If the enemies of the Church would honestly ponder the truths herein feebly, but, we trust, honestly enumerated, and at the same time appreciate the sad and sorrowful candor of Christ and His Apostles, so plainly evident in their predictions concerning the heroic struggles of Christianity to deliver men from sin, their prejudice would be disarmed; and they would humbly fall down at the feet of Jesus and plead for permission to join the Christian hosts in their warfare against the very evils of which they now accuse them.

VI.

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH IN OUR CITIES.

BY REV. JOHN H. PRUGH, D.D.

In these last times, in all lands, the currents are sweeping city-ward, and strongly.

The other summer in Glasgow, we were told, that the Scottish glens and highlands had fewer people in them than ten years before, but that Scotland had more sons and daughters than ever, massed in her cities. We match that on this side the Atlantic. Some parts of Pennsylvania have not near the population of three decades ago, but such has been the growth of Pennsylvania's cities, that our great commonwealth has kept fully abreast of the nation in its gigantic growth.

When one elbows one's way through the streets of London, dazed by the city's vastness, one's wonderment ceases somewhat in recalling that London's history goes back twenty centuries. The records of the city of Chicago go back but little more than fifty years.

At the beginning of this century there were in the United States only six cities, with a population of more than six thousand inhabitants. To-day we have over five hundred such cities, many of them having over 500,000 and several over a million of a population.

Our cities are now manufacturing centres. That is the great factor of their growth. Modern invention is pushing our country folk from the rural districts and drawing them city-ward. And the crowds of artisans and laborers from the Old World who migrate to the New stop in our cities, because they are assured of employment there, and at high wages.

We have no one city which is to the whole land what London is to England, or Paris to France. And yet, such is the concentration of power, that with the dawn of the twentieth century,

our twenty largest cities could, if they would, absolutely dominate in national affairs. And it is the imperative duty of the hour, for every American Christian patriot, to aid the Church in keeping her grip on the cities, and in getting even a stronger hold.

The United States still leads the world in the value of its attractions to humanity. And the poor and oppressed of all lands think they can find with us the best possible home. But their coming makes the problem of our cities peculiar. Between 1820 and 1890 fifteen million emigrants came into the United States. Five million of these entered in the decade between 1880 and 1890. Previous to 1880, sixty-seven per cent. of the emigration came from Great Britain and Germany. In the last ten years only twenty-seven per cent. came from those countries. The vast majority of the last five millions were from the southern countries of Europe. There are now in the United States, 17,000 foreign-born persons, to every 100,000 native-born persons. And we had 2,000 more foreign-born persons to every 100,000 native-born in 1890 than in 1880. In the late anniversary of Lincoln's birth, before the Marquette Club in Chicago, Justice David J. Brewer, of the Supreme Court, said, "There are more Poles here in Chicago, than in any city of Poland; more Bohemians than in any city of Bohemia; more Italians than in any city of Italy, save Naples and Rome; more Irish than in any city of Ireland." While all over our land the language of Shakespere is spoken as purely as in England, we are not Englishmen. The blood of many nations courses in our veins. We claim, though, to be heirs of all the illustrious men who have made England's history glorious. And when we witness the large element which is neither Anglo-Saxon in race, tradition or religion, massing in our cities, we who love our land and hearthstones, are concerned about these foreign populations, and we believe it to be our duty to aid in assimilating them into our throbbing, pushing, all-embracing American life.

In the past, in the United States, there has been little of the spirit of caste. It has been our boast that our best social circles are open to all deserving men and women, without distinction

of birth and rank. We rejoice that we have no titled nobility among us. But our wage-workers are more widely separated now from the rest of society than those of Germany, Great Britain or France. In France the capitalist and laborer are both Germans, in Paris they are both Frenchmen, in Glasgow they are both Scotchmen. But almost all those who help us in our homes, and almost all day-laborers in the United States speak with a brogue. Our manufacturers and merchants are, as a rule, native Americans. Those who do the manual labor are, for the most part, the foreigner and his children. Most of our capitalists are not only native Americans, they are also Protestants. The vast majority of our day-laborers, especially the 5,000,000 emigrants of the last decade, are Roman Catholics.

It is encouraging to note, though, that these foreigners are anxious to learn the English language, and that they give their children the advantages of the public schools. And there are gratifying evidences that the Roman Catholic Church, which has had the strongest hold upon our foreign population, is growing in sympathy with our American institutions. We rejoice that the Roman Catholic Church has been enabled, thus far, to hold together this heterogeneous mass of strangers who have sought our shores. But, coming to us with their crude and imperfect notions of religious truth, and with little Christian culture lying behind them, we profoundly believe that the phase of Christianity they need most is Protestantism. And our Protestant churches are now emphasizing more than ever before the importance of Christian character and practical Christian work. Strong stress is being laid upon the idea of Christian fellowship for mutual helpfulness and service. The Protestant Church was never so thoroughly organized as now. And this is more marked in the cities than elsewhere. And, therefore, while between 1880 and 1890, the population in the United States increased 24 per cent., and the Roman Catholic Church increased 30 per cent., and the Protestant Church increased 42 per cent., the increased percentage of the Protestant Church was greater in the cities than in the rest of the country.

We do not view with alarm the bigness of our cities. Rather we rejoice in their wonderful growth. Our cities not only have been, they will continue to be great blessings to the land. It is true, we have not yet solved the great problem of municipal government, but it is being solved. Everywhere the better classes are awakening to a sense of their duty in establishing the best possible government for our cities. If any city has been misgoverned, it has been the Christian people's fault. No organized set of looters can get control of municipal affairs and hold them if the good citizens but exercise their privileges and make their influence felt. And there never was a time in our nation's history when public integrity and popular intelligence were so highly valued and so far-reaching in their effects as now. And as the immigrants in our cities become acquainted with our American institutions and come under the influence of our American type of Christianity, in time—through the practice of industry, economy and temperance on their part—the majority of them, we believe, will undoubtedly pass into the better elements of society. But ere that result is reached the Church has a gigantic work before her.

A book has lately been written to prove "The Failure of Protestantism in New York." It is a sad, pessimistic wail, and uttered, too, by a Protestant clergyman of that city. It seems to be the fashion in some quarters to bemoan the paganism of the metropolis. But what faint-heartedness for a Christian to do it! Our large cities are irreligious, but they have a growing religious force in them that is bound to conquer. If anything has the power to meet the problems of this age it is Protestant Christianity. And it is meeting them, too. It is true, when one is in certain sections of New York one thinks of the intensely black shadow of the electric light, and there is nowhere else a shadow so dark. But there is a brilliancy there also, unsurpassed. According to *The Tribune*, New York has 1,003 places of worship, 863 of them being Protestant. If they were placed side by side on Broadway and the Boulevard they would reach in one unbroken frontage from the Battery to High Bridge, and

possibly as far up as Yonkers. The Church in New York has raised and permanently invested for the evangelization of that city, \$67,516,573. Christian America does not raise annually more than the interest of such a sum for the evangelization of the whole pagan world. Surely Protestantism is not a failure there. Rather the churches in New York must be throbbing centres of living influence, or we could not account for the great variety of benign phenomena. It would take a book to tell of her charitable, philanthropic and distinctively Christian organizations and institutions established and maintained by Protestants. For example, there are 267 church sewing and industrial schools ; 116 free church reading rooms ; 132 free church kindergartens, not to speak of all sorts of missions, refuges, reformatories, rescue-homes, associations, guilds, brotherhoods and clubs of innumerable variety. For eighteen years the writer has been intimately associated with the work of the Church in the city of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, and he does not hesitate to affirm that the Protestant Church here has yearly been making splendid advance, and was never so strong and powerful as she is to-day ; and from correspondence and frequent visits to other large cities we are assured that what is true of the Protestant Church of Pittsburg is true of the Church in all our centres of population. There is only one danger confronting the Church in the cities, and that is faint-heartedness and lack of faith in God.

Yet there is no denying the fact that the Protestant Church has not kept pace with the rapidly growing population in the tenement districts of our cities.

By means of rapid transit in all our cities the rich and well-to-do are finding homes in the suburbs. And as they move out of the down-town districts, a largely increasing number of the poorer classes pour themselves into the places they forsake. How to deal with these down-town districts is the question of questions just now for the Church. In our sixteen largest cities there are, according to a late investigation authorized by Congress, 8,000,000 people. Of these, 800,000 live in the down-town districts, the tenement regions and the slums, the majority

of these 800,000 being of foreign birth. Experience the past few years, has proved that these foreigners can be best reached by giving them wise leaders who can speak their language, who thoroughly understand their nature, and who, at the same time, are in sympathy with our American type of Protestant Christianity and our American institutions. The Reformed Church in the United States has at present in our largest cities eight young missionaries working among the Hungarians, Slavs, Bohemians and Poles. These bright, young missionaries were brought from the other side of the sea not only to preach the Gospel, but also to aid their countrymen in their endeavors to become integral parts of our various commonwealths. It has been confidently affirmed, too, that the promise is for a very rich fruitage if the Church will adopt the "social settlement" feature of work and multiply these "settlements" among our foreign population.

But the multitudes in the down-town districts are not all foreigners, and those who are, very soon become Americanized. And our Protestant churches, whose members move into the suburbs, are not to abandon the old neighborhoods, because those old neighborhoods are now teeming with non-churchgoers. The matter of greatly increased expense and the necessity of holding the children of the congregation, may demand a change of the location of the church-plant. But we are not to desert the old districts, simply because conditions have changed.

And it becomes more and more apparent, that if those who move into the suburbs confine their church-work to the suburban districts, the Christian work in the down-town districts can not be done effectually by the few church-members who are compelled to remain down-town. If our denominations would rally around their down-town churches, and furnish the means by endowment or otherwise, they could then adapt themselves to the changed conditions, and engage in the new work that presses upon them. To do the work effectually we will probably have to adopt the method of the Protestant Church in London, in the matter of freely employing lay-workers. The American city pastor has, as a rule, no paid assistant. With his weekly discourses, bible-classes, young-men's meetings, young people's meetings, prayer-

meetings, coöperating in united church-efforts, counselling with the various church and city charities, funerals, visits to the sick, many of whom are not of his congregation, and regular pastoral visits, the city pastor is expected to maintain a sort of intelligence office, and he must also be errand-boy for the congregation. But this has been a very wasteful method, and utterly unbusiness-like.

It is encouraging to note that the movement is spreading in our cities to return to the parish system in our down-town church work. But this can only be done effectually where there is a hearty coöperation of the churches of the various denominations. And it is cause for great rejoicing that, as our cities are rapidly growing, the denominational fences, in the cities at least, are being lowered. Ay, the fences are being pushed down, as those on both sides are engaged in the same rescue work, reformatory work, hospital work and even distinctively Christian work. He who runs can read the signs, and be assured in his soul that the Holy Ghost is now working against exclusiveness, while those who have differed in definitions of faith and creed are coöperating in Christian effort. Out of the greatest human discord, God is, at last, bringing the richest concord.

The Kingdom of Christ in foreign lands has lately been advancing more rapidly than it otherwise would have done, because of the annual conferences of the great Foreign Boards, and the coöperation of the Protestant churches in those far-away places. And it is imperative, just now, that the organized intelligence and love of our churches be brought to bear upon the material, social, economic, civic, as well as spiritual interests of the city, in order to meet more thoroughly its religious and moral needs.

Nevertheless our churches can not properly accomplish the work of the hour unless there is an ever-deepening of the spiritual life of the members within the churches. Let that come, and not only will there be a more hearty response to the cry from far-off Macedonia, but, above the city's bustle and din and roar, we will hear the cry of the city's poor for help. The cry of the under man in the crowd is the call of God. If we heed it, the heart will be made glad over this modern miracle—the city adding to its immensity, and at the same time growing better.

VII.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

OUR MOTTO,

“Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.”

Truth may be understood in the sense of conformity of thought to being. We have truth when our thinking corresponds with its object. This may be called formal or subjective truth. But truth may be understood also in the sense of reality. In this sense it denotes, in its widest extent, the essential rationality of the universe as constituted by the divine thinking. The divine thinking, or the divine mind, is the truth of things, making them to be what they are. This may be called entitative or objective truth. Something like this, though something more specific, is what we suppose our Lord to have meant when, to certain Jews who believed on Him, He said, “If ye abide in my word, then are ye truly my disciples; and *ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.*” It is doubtless moral and religious truth that is meant in this statement. It is the nature of God, of His character and kingdom, that men must know in order to their complete rational and moral freedom. The truth in this sense is summed up and impersonated in Christ Himself, in whom dwelleth the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and who, therefore, could say, “I am the truth.” Hence to know the truth, in the sense here under consideration, is simply to know Christ.

The truth universally is capable of being known, and man has the capacity for knowing it. Any correct theory of knowledge must assume an essential correspondence between the creative mind and the created mind, so that the latter may know the former not merely in its products but in its own nature and character. This latter knowledge is moral and religious knowledge; and it is this kind of knowledge to which our Lord refers in the

sentence which forms the motto of this REVIEW. The divine medium of this knowledge, or of the truth which forms the content of this knowledge, is Christ. This does not mean that some knowledge of divine truth may not also be gained from other sources. Such knowledge may be gained from the works of nature; for the heavens declare the glory of God, and His eternal power and divinity are perceived through the things that are made. The human soul itself also is a medium or source of divine truth; for God informs the reason and speaks in the conscience. But the most perfect manifestation of divine truth, throwing its light back upon every lower manifestation, we have in Jesus Christ, who is the complete personal embodiment of divinity, and, therefore, through the agency of the divine Spirit, the absolute source of moral and religious illumination for men in all times. "He that hath seen me," says Jesus Himself, "hath seen the Father."

The function of the soul through which this knowledge of divine truth is obtained, is not sense or understanding, but spiritual intuition, or faith. When Peter first recognized the divine character and mission of Jesus, the latter said to him: "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it into thee, but my Father which is in heaven." And when the disciples beheld in Jesus a glory as of the only begotten from the Father, the vision was not by the eye of the body, but by the eye of the spirit. Other men too looked upon the person of Jesus, and saw His works, and heard His words, but they perceived not His divine glory. That could only be perceived by an act of direct spiritual intuition. This does not mean that the other faculties of the soul may not be subservient to this high spiritual operation, but only that this operation is in its own nature distinct from that of the other faculties. As the perception of beauty in nature, for example, is conditioned by the exercise of the bodily senses, but is by no means the sole product of these senses; so the cognition of divine truth may be conditioned by the activities of sense and understanding, but can not be the sole product of these activities. The real apprehension of divine truth, the substantiation for the soul of the invisible

things of God, must ever be an act of spiritual intuition, or of faith. Faith is not merely a state of mind determined by testimony, or by an external authority standing between the truth and the knowing subject, but a state of mind determined by its own immediate contact with the truth in its living personal form. Faith, accordingly, is not mere probability, or doubtful opinion, but certainty. In common life we are in the habit of taking the word *belief* in the sense of more or less uncertain opinion. We say we believe that of which we are not quite sure. But religious faith, in the proper sense of the word, leaves no room for uncertainty. We are as sure of the existence of God and of His character, and of the divinity and saving power of Christ, as we are of our own existence. Such a state of mind, however, is possible only to him who has the will to be in sympathy with the mind of God and to allow himself to be determined by it. Faith, accordingly, is not merely an intellectual, but a moral act of the soul, and one which is itself free and not merely reflex or spontaneous. "If ye *abide in my word*," says Jesus, "ye shall know the truth." And in another place He says, "If any man is willing to do His (the Father's) will, he shall know of the teaching whether it be of God or whether I speak of myself." That means that faith is essentially a moral experience conditioned by an exercise of will, which leaves no room for any feeling of uncertainty or doubt.

This character of immediateness and certainty can, of course, not belong to all knowledge, not even to all religious knowledge. A closer consideration of the passages of Scripture already referred to will show the limitation with which the conception must be taken; and an interrogation of the religious consciousness would lead to the same result. These passages show that the conception of immediate certainty must be limited to strictly fundamental and essential truth, and that it is not applicable to inferences and deductions from such truth. Such deductions may, indeed, be accompanied by a feeling of certainty; but such feeling of certainty will be different from that which accompanies an intuition of fundamental truth; as a feeling of the truth of

the eleventh proposition of the fourth book of Euclid will be different from the feeling which we have of the truth of an axiom. But with the great mass of theological propositions the feeling of immediate and unwavering certainty can not be connected at all. It was an immediate revelation of self-authenticating divine truth that enabled Peter to recognize in Jesus the Christ of God, and of this truth he was sure ; but that did not enlighten him immediately and with equal certainty concerning the precise relation of the personality of Jesus to the Godhead, or concerning the true nature of the Messianic Kingdom. So, to those who are willing to do the Father's will, Jesus gives the promise that they shall know whether His teaching comes from God or whether He speaks of Himself. To a mind in harmony with the will of God Jesus can authenticate directly His own divine character and mission ; and concerning this, then, the believer may be infallibly certain ; but such certainty does not extend to subordinate matters of doctrine lying more or less remote from the heart of the Christian mystery. These are matters of inference and deduction ; and here we may have more or less probable opinion, but in the strict sense of the term we can not have faith. Faith is of things that are certain, like the facts of the Apostles' Creed. No one, for instance, can believe in any theory of the atonement with the same firmness with which he believes in the suffering and death of Christ for our sins. And, so, no one can believe in any theory of election in the same sense in which he believes in the existence of God. The existence of God, of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, and the value of the divine existence for the human soul, are matters of immediate spiritual intuition and certainty ; but such certainty can by no means belong to the details of the theological system. Systems of theology are valuable in their place, and the human mind will never and can never do without them ; but they are not the most valuable thing for the human soul, and they become positive evils when they are confounded with Christian faith itself and allowed to usurp its place. The truth which is certain and saving, is the truth of faith, not that of the speculations of the understanding.

And, now, it is truth in the former, and not in the latter sense, that is the condition of spiritual freedom. The truth which makes free is the absolute and infallible truth of faith. And by freedom is to be understood, in the first place, release from the power of sin, and from the blinding and perverting influence which sin exercises over all the human faculties. When Jesus thus promised the Jews freedom they answered Him, "We are Abraham's seed, and have never been slaves to any one: how sayest thou, ye shall be made free?" Jesus replied, "Every one that committeth sin is the slave of sin. And the slave abideth not in the house forever; but the son abideth forever." Such real, inward and vital knowledge of the truth, then, as results from abiding in the word of Christ, works deliverance from the law of sin, and brings the power of cheerful and childlike obedience to the divine law. The Jews to some extent obeyed the divine law which they found written in their Scriptures, and they could, therefore, lay claim to a certain kind of righteousness. But their obedience was constrained and not free. They obeyed, not because they loved the law, but because they feared the lash of the lawgiver. It was the obedience of the slave, not that of the free son. And so there is in all men a law of sin, more or less developed, which makes obedience to the law of God, whether written in a book or written in their hearts, not indeed impossible, but hard, constrained, unfree—an obedience in which there is more of pain than of bliss. The hardest efforts to work righteousness under the law are always accompanied by a painful sense of uncertainty and doubt in regard to the sufficiency and acceptableness of such righteousness. The slave never knows whether his most faithful efforts to serve his master will not bring blows instead of rewards. From this bondage of sin, and from this legal constraint and anxiety the knowledge of the truth sets the sinner free. It gives him the spirit of a son, who obeys God, not because he fears Him, but because he loves Him, and is sure that his efforts to serve Him, however feeble they may be, will bring smiles of approbation and not frowns of condemnation. The Greek fathers were in the habit of placing the essence of re-

demption mainly in the element of knowledge. Perhaps they did this too exclusively ; but there was reason in their position. For the exchange of the representation of an arbitrary and jealous God for the representation of a God of love, which the Christian truth has effected, has made possible a new attitude of the human soul towards God, namely, an attitude of filial love instead of the old attitude of slavish dread. We can love and obey a God of whom we are sure that He loves us. Once it was said to men, "Ye can not serve the Lord ; for He is a holy God ; He is a jealous God ; He will not forgive your transgressions nor your sins." Now the truth as it is in Christ corrects that old conception of God, and gives us a God whom men can love, and in obeying whom they can be happy. And thus by delivering men from the old fear of God it also delivers them from the old power of sin, and makes them able to serve God in a free, loyal and loving spirit. Let it not be said that in this representation we have forgotten the holiness of God ; for His holiness is maintained by His refusal to make sinners happy in sin, and by maintaining the law that men can be happy only in free and loving obedience to the truth.

But by correcting the old conception of God and giving men a right knowledge of His nature and character, Christian truth, in the second place, makes men free from that blind zeal and fanatical partisanship in religion, which characterized the Jews in the time of our Lord. Those Jews who said they had never been slaves, were in fact the slaves of a dark fanaticism, which kept them in a condition of continual wretchedness, and made them ready for the commission of any crime in the fancied interest of their religion. Fanaticism is the passionate and therefore egoistic endeavor to make the divine, according to one's own conception of it, a triumphant power in the world. Fanaticism in reality is not love of the truth and confidence in it, but rather a passionate love of one's own opinions, or of the opinions of one's party, and a feeling that these opinions are not able to maintain themselves, but must be maintained by the determination of those who hold them. Fanaticism and passionate partisanship, accordingly, al-

ways involve an unconscious doubt of the cause which is to be served and make a real knowledge of the truth impossible. The fanatic is not sure of the cause which he has espoused. All that he is sure of is that *he wants* it to succeed. He has a feeling that it can not take care of itself and that, therefore, *he* must secure its triumph; and this makes him nervous. The man who is sure of his cause, who knows it so thoroughly that he can have absolute confidence in it, will never imagine that he can serve it by violence or passion. This is especially true in matters pertaining to morality and religion. Here we have the reason why all pre-Christian religions were more or less intolerant and fanatical. They were fanatical, not because their adherents were quite sure of their truth, but just because they were not sure. The human mind is so made that it can never be entirely sure and happy in anything but the truth. Had the heathen gods been fully believed to be able to take care of themselves, their worshipers would have been relieved of that fear and anxiety for their safety, which they so often manifested. The same willful fanaticism also appeared more than once in ancient Judaism. The Jews were the partisans of Jehovah; but the Jehovah whom they served was not the true and eternal God, but was, for the most part at least, an idol, a figment of the imagination, as much as was the Zeus of the Greeks. Hence the Jews were fanatical—willing to resort to the most violent means to maintain the honor of their God and the dignity of their religion. They were fanatical, not because they knew God and were sure that they knew Him, but just because they knew Him not. Had they known Him better and more surely, they might have been calm and confident, assured that He would be able to maintain His own cause; and then they would not have killed the Lord of glory. From this their blind partisanship and fanaticism, if they had been willing to do the will of God instead of their own, they might have been delivered by a deeper and more certain knowledge of the truth. But now their own passion had blinded them so that they could not see.

And the case is similar with the Christian or theological parti-

san, whether his partisanship relates to Christianity as a whole, or to some particular denomination of the Church, or to some special school of theology. The partisan is not free. He is the slave of the idol which his own fancy or the fancy of his party has created, and to which he is passionately attached just because it is his own. Such an idol may be a doctrine or an institution. When a doctrine is maintained, not because it is true, but because it is one's own doctrine, or the doctrine of one's party, or when an institution is defended, not because it is right, but because it is old and one feels attached to it, then we have the essence of partisan fanaticism, no matter how much profession of honesty and sincerity of conviction there may be. The theological partisan may be sincere; but that does not prove that his cause is true or right, and that he himself is free and not a slave. The difference between partisan fanaticism and free and loyal devotion to truth may usually be detected in the manner in which men act. When doctrines are maintained and institutions defended by means which are not morally right, then we may be sure that the motive is not love of truth and righteousness, but love of self and self-interest. When Caiaphas said, "It is expedient for you that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not," he proclaimed himself not a lover of truth, but an unscrupulous partisan, who was willing to commit the most stupendous crime in order to serve his cause. And many a churchman has since been guilty of the same crime. When gloomy visaged inquisitors have plied the fagot and the sword in order to exterminate heretics, or when solemn looking theologians have "lied for God" in order to "save the system of doctrine," they have in fact committed the same sin of which Caiaphas was guilty. No matter how honest and sincere they may have believed themselves to be. Their sincerity, if sincere they were, was only in their attachment to themselves and to their own interest. They were not free children of truth, but slaves of self, of pride and of passion. And much of the earnestness of religious sectarianism, in Protestantism as well as in Romanism, and much of the zeal of theological schools, it is to

be feared, has had its origin in this low and selfish motive. There may indeed be, and there are, truths in denominational confessions and in theological schools, which, though perhaps onesidedly apprehended and emphasized, are worthy of earnest and affectionate support, at least until that which is in part shall be done away, and we all shall come unto the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God. But much at least of our denominational zeal, and much of the passion, or "madness," of theologians has not its ground in free and unselfish devotion to truth. It is partisan fanaticism only, which a deeper and more certain knowledge of the truth as it is in Christ would serve to dispel. And if ever the world shall be delivered from the evils of modern sectarianism and from the *rabies theologorum*, the deliverance must come in the way pointed out by the sentence which forms the motto of this REVIEW.

But there is, finally, one more thing from which the knowledge of the truth as it is in Christ will bring deliverance, and this is that *fear for the success of the truth*, which always implies a degree of uncertainty and of distrust of that which is held for truth. This idea of doubt has already been referred to as forming an element in all fanaticism. It deserves, however, to be made the subject of some additional remarks. He who knows the truth and is sure of his knowledge, can have no fear that the truth will not maintain itself in the face of whatever may seem to be adverse or hostile influences. He who is sure, for instance, of the existence of God, of the divinity of Christ and of the saving power of Christianity—sure, that is, in the only way in which, in a matter of this kind, one can be sure, namely, in the way of immediate spiritual intuition or experience—can have no fear that Christianity is going to be overthrown by any development of natural or historical science, or by any advancement of Biblical criticism. He may perceive perhaps that the progress of science or criticism will compel him to modify some of his theological opinions; but to an honest and truth-loving man that will not be a matter of any regret. And such an one will be sure that nothing of this sort can ever rob him of

his Christian faith or of his religion; on the contrary, it can only result in removing obstacles out of the way of real faith. True Christian faith does not stand in conclusions derived either from natural science or from historical and Biblical criticism, and can, therefore, not be overthrown by any influences coming from this quarter. The Christian's faith comes from an immediate intuition of God in Christ, and from a direct experience of the grace of Christ through the spirit; and so long as that rock stands no Christian can be in danger of losing his religion. If religious faith could ever be the result of mere inference and conclusion from external premises, then the case would be different. And that, indeed, is the idea which many have of the origin of faith. It was the idea of many of the Jews and Greeks in the time of St. Paul. "The Jews require a sign," writes the apostle, "and the Greeks seek after wisdom; but we preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling block and to the Greeks foolishness, but to them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." According to Paul, then, Christian faith is not an inference either from miracles or from philosophical principles, but the result of an immediate presentation of the crucified and risen Christ; and where this faith exists in its proper form and energy, there can be no anxiety or fear for the existence of Christianity in view of any circumstances whatsoever.

If the Christian faith were built upon premises outside of itself, then it would be subject to the chances to which such premises might be exposed. If, for instance, the Christian faith were conditioned upon any theory of the Bible, like the doctrine of verbal inspiration and infallibility, or upon any theory of creation, like the doctrine of the instantaneous production of species, then the faith would be endangered whenever these theories might be called in question. And a man whose faith has no stronger foundation than theological theories of this kind must, indeed, always be in anxiety for its perpetuity and stability. If the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch or the Johannean origin of the fourth Gospel were necessary conditions of the truth of Christi-

anity, then the latter would stand or fall with the former ; and one who takes this view can, of course, have no patience with Biblical criticism. He must be trembling for the truth and permanence of his religion whenever he hears or sees anything that conflicts with his hitherto received opinions in science, history, philosophy or theology. This, however, will be due not to the strength, but rather to the weakness of his faith. Were his faith stronger, or his knowledge of the truth surer, he would be much less influenced by what is called "infidel science," and would be a far freer and happier Christian. A nervous fear for the truth of Christianity or for its stability, is not an evidence of much faith, but rather of a radical skepticism. A man who fears to lose his religion because of the prevalence of certain scientific or critical, or even theological views, has, in fact, already lost it, or else has never had any. He may have had theological opinions, founded more or less firmly upon the operation of the senses or of the understanding, but this is not faith—it is not that knowledge of the truth which can make one free from doubt, and from the fear and unhappiness which spring from doubt. If there are among our readers any of those unhappy souls who fear that the independence and boldness of science, the freedom of criticism, and the questioning of some of the cherished dogmas of the traditional theologies are going to undermine men's faith and destroy their confidence in the Christian religion, we would most respectfully recommend to them a serious study of the motto of this REVIEW.

THE CHURCH NOT AN INSTITUTION, BUT AN ORGANISM.

An institution is a thing that is made ; an organism is a thing that grows. An institution is brought to pass externally by a will or power outside of itself ; an organism unfolds from within itself, by an inherent principle of life. An institution may be defined as an entity, composed of parts brought together by a power outside of them, according to a previously existing idea, for the accomplishment of an end external to itself. An organ-

ism, on the other hand, as defined by Mackenzie, is "a whole whose parts are intrinsically related to it, which develops from within, and has reference to an end within itself." The type of an institution is a machine; the type of an organism is a living body. An institution, when once established, has within itself no power of changing. An organism has within itself a principle of change and progress, with the power of producing new organs as new functions come into exercise within its constitution. A banking association, a railroad company or a university of learning is an institution created by law, with offices and powers clearly defined and fixed from the beginning in a written instrument called its charter, and incapable of change except by an act of the power which created it. A family or a nation is an organism, with inherent power of development and change, and having itself for the end of its own activity.

To which of these categories, now, does the Church belong? Until a comparatively recent time the most ready answer would have been, *to the former*. People said that the Church is an institution, and many would say so still. It has been customary to say that the Church is a *divine institution*; and the meaning of this was that she was established by the Lord Jesus Christ, and by other divinely commissioned persons, some eighteen centuries ago, with offices and functions unalterably fixed from the start according to an unchangeable charter laid down in the New Testament. Accordingly, it is only necessary to study the charter in order to know what the Church has always been and now of right ought to be. Unfortunately, however, there grew up in course of time differences of opinion in regard to the interpretation of this charter; and there was no commonly acknowledged tribunal to which such differences of opinion could be brought for adjudication. There was one party, for instance, which claimed that the charter provides for a papal system of government, for seven sacraments, and for the adoration of saints and angels. And if some of these points did not seem to be exactly borne out by the charter as written, it was claimed that there is an unwritten part of the charter called *tradition* in

which authority may be found for everything. There was another party which claimed that episcopacy is the divine form of church polity provided for in the charter, and that the charter sanctions only two sacraments, and restricts worship to the divine Trinity. And there was a third party which, agreeing with the second in the two latter particulars, stoutly maintained that, not episcopacy, but presbyterialism is the divinely instituted form of church government, according to the provisions of the Church's unchangeable charter; although this position has been controverted by a fourth party which has put independency in the place of presbyterialism, and indeed by a fifth party which denies the legitimacy of church offices altogether. The idea which is common to all these parties, except perhaps the last, is that the Church is a divine institution in which all offices, functions, ordinances and rites were clearly defined and fixed from the beginning, and that any departure from the divine establishment must be illegitimate and destructive of the essence of the Church; and even the Quaker has no idea that the Church could ever of right be any thing different from what he conceives it to be. Consequently any community that does not adhere to the papacy, or to episcopacy, or to presbyterialism, or to independency, or to immersion, or to sprinkling, or that does not reject all orders and sacraments, must, from the point of view of one or more parties, be pronounced to be not the Church. The Church is that institution which Christ established eighteen centuries ago, and which has ever since remained as He left it.

Now it would seem that the very absurdity of this conclusion should be regarded as a refutation of the underlying idea. The fact that all parties can appeal with some apparent show of reason to the Bible for confirmation of their view of the original divine constitution of the Church would seem to prove that there must be something radically wrong about this whole conception. Does not this contention show that the Church is not such a divine institution at all, as this theory implies, but something essentially different, namely, a self-evolving organism having within itself a capacity for progression and change and being capable of accom-

modating itself to the ever-varying conditions of its environment, and of producing new organs and functions from time to time as they may become necessary in consequence of changing circumstances? And is not this the view also which prevails in the New Testament and especially in the writings of St. Paul? St. Paul often calls the Church *the body of Christ*. See 1 Cor. 12: 12; Rom. 12: 5; Eph. 1: 23; 4: 12; Col. 1: 18. This designation, of course, is figurative; but the explanation of the figure is not difficult. It means that the Church is an organic and growing society of Christian believers, whose common life-principle and bond of union is the spirit of the living and glorified Christ. Christ is not related to the Church as the founder of a school is related to the institution which he has established, but as the animating principle is related to the body which it creates. The Church is a living constitution whose animating principle is the spirit of Christ and whose law of existence is the universal law of historical development. "In Christ Jesus every building, fitly framed together, *groweth* into an holy temple in the Lord," Eph. 2: 21. *Every building*, that is, every distinct body of believers, for there is more than one, *groweth* into a holy and living temple, that is, a peculiar and marked community in the general communion of saints. The Church, accordingly, in all its parts is subject to the law of growth, of development and progress. The same view is contained in St. Peter's representation of the Church as a spiritual house built up of *living stones* upon Christ the *Living Stone*, rejected of men, but elect and precious with God. The Church then is not an institution of everlasting fixedness, but an organism in perpetual flux and change. And it is significant that it is St. Peter, the apostle who has so unjustly been stamped into the representative of the stiff and unchanging hierarchy of Rome, that in the New Testament stands for the idea of a living, growing and changing Church.

There are two practical ideas resulting from this conception of the Church as a living and progressive organism with Christ as its animating principle. The first is that the Church is not an

arbitrary and contingent element in the constitution of Christianity; for a body is not accidental in relation to the development of the life of spirit. It was not a matter of choice with Christ, then, whether He would found a Church, or whether He would adopt some other method for the perpetuation of His power and influence in the world. Christianity as the highest, the absolute form of religion must be true to the law of social organization and development, which is a universal law of humanity. Man is constitutionally a social being. In all human activities there is an instinctive tendency to social formations. This is true of religious activities as well as of any other. Hence we get religious societies, or religious communities, even in heathenism. In heathenism, indeed, these religious societies are not perfect organizations, and can maintain their existence only by leaning upon the support of the State. This is due to the inherent weakness of the principle of religious life in heathenism. Thus neither heathenism nor Judaism could ever give rise to a *church*. But the spirit of Christ uniting itself with the life of humanity must, in consequence of the social tendency of the latter, necessarily give rise to an independent religious society, that is, it must create a Church, against which the gates of hell shall not prevail. Of this society Christ Himself is the invisible, but ever-present and powerfully energizing Head. Within this society He dispenses His grace and exercises His saving power. "He is the saviour of the body." The question has been debated whether men cannot be saved outside of the Church as well as in it. This is like the question whether a member of an organism can enjoy its proper life as well in separation as in connection with the organism. Salvation is of the Church, because the Church is the body of Christ. But this does not mean that all who belong to an establishment calling itself church are therefore necessarily saved; neither does it mean that all who are not connected with the visible Church are therefore damned. It does mean, however, that salvation is only possible in the fellowship of the spirit of Christ. But the spirit of Christ, whose proper home is in the Church, can also be active beyond; so that Chris-

tian influences may prevail outside of the Church and Christian elements may be met anywhere in humanity, while *Christianity* exists only in the Church. We may say, indeed, that it is not the Church that saves, but Christ; but, then, we should remember also that, according to the saying of Ignatius, where Christ is there is the Catholic Church. And so, after all that may be said in the way of limitation, it remains true that this designation of the Church as the body of Christ, which implies the notion of a living organism, gives to her an exceedingly great importance in relation to human salvation. And the Gospel is, therefore, never truly preached, when it is preached in an unchurchly form, that is, in a form which ignores or under-values the Church as an essential factor in Christianity. The error of this is only equalled by the error which is committed when the *Church* is preached instead of *Christ*.

But another practical idea resulting from the conception of the Church as a living organism rather than a mechanical institution, and one which the present age needs especially to lay to heart, is the idea that the reality of the Church does not depend upon any one particular form of polity, or upon any particular set of ordinances and rites, supposed to be of immediate divine institution. A living organism produces its own organs as they are needed, and when they are no longer useful it allows them to fall into desuetude, and at last to drop out of existence. So any organized society does; and so the church does. This has been the case demonstrably with the office of the ministry. Christ instituted no office of the ministry that perpetuates itself in unbroken succession down through all the Christian ages. On the contrary, He has endowed the Church with power to create her own offices as they are needed; and this power is a form of His own spirit in inseparable union with the energy of human life in the Church. The principle of divine-human life prevailing in the Church is the source of its continuous organization. There existed offices in the Apostolic Church, as we learn from the New Testament (see especially Eph. 4: 11 and Rom. 12: 6-8), which are no longer met with in later ages; and in later ages

offices were developed which had no existence in Apostolic times. Have these latter, therefore, been less divine than those which existed before? No, on the contrary, those offices and that polity are most divine, which are most useful in any particular age because best adapted to its conditions. The fact that an office of the Church has no ground in the New Testament, like that of bishop, or of Sunday-school teacher, is not of itself a proof that it is without divine authority. To the possible objection that on this view divine authority might be claimed for *any* thing, we would answer, in the first place, that the Spirit which rules in the Church must always be supposed to be a *rational* Spirit, and, secondly, that this Spirit cannot lead to anything contrary to the teaching of the New Testament or of the genius of Christianity.

But the idea of adaptation to times and circumstances holds true also of the ordinances and rites of the Church. The 20th article of the Church of England declares that the "Church has power to decree rites and ceremonies, and authority in controversies of faith," but that she may "ordain nothing that is *contrary* to the written word of God." That is undoubtedly true. And in the exercise of this authority different ceremonies have been ordained at different times and in different places. Consider, for instance, the difference of opinion which has prevailed in regard to the number and character of the sacraments. How many sacraments are there in the Christian Church? Two, says the Protestant; seven, says the Catholic. But there have been times when the number was fixed at four, at six, and even at twelve. Indeed, all symbolical and mystical transactions have at times been treated as sacraments. And these have been very differently administered in different ages. What differences have prevailed even in the manner of administering baptism and the Lord's Supper? But who will say that these various "mysteries" and the various manners of celebrating them have not all been efficacious for the salvation of men? Baptism was at first generally administered by immersion; later on the mode came to be sprinkling, which is more agreeable to modern ideas of con-

venience and propriety ; and unquestionably this latter mode has produced as good Christians as did the former. And the same is true of various forms in which the Lord's Supper may be celebrated. But whoever makes this admission thereby gives up the idea of an immediate divine institution of Christian ordinances.

We say the idea of an *immediate* divine institution ; for the idea of a *mediate* divine origination may, and must, still be maintained. The probability is that Christ never uttered a word in regard to the degrees and functions of the Christian ministry ; and yet Paul says that the various ministries in the Apostolic Church were the gift of Christ (Eph. 4 : 11). How were they His gift ? Through the agency of His Spirit in the Church by which they were created. This also makes the minister truly an ambassador of Christ. It is doubtful whether Christ during His earthly life ever spoke a word to His disciples concerning the establishment of sacramental ordinances. After His resurrection He commanded the disciples to baptize the nations, but He gave no directions as to the manner in which they were to carry out this command ; and in regard to this matter we have had interminable controversies that have had no result, all going upon the assumption that Christ *must* have instituted some particular mode of the ordinance which alone can give reality to the ordinance. And now we shall probably witness a controversy concerning the origin of the Lord's supper. A distinguished historian has affirmed that there is no evidence in the Gospel narrative showing that Christ instituted the Lord's supper as a sacramental ordinance to be observed forever by His followers.* This is simply stating an historical fact ; for if any one will look into the Revised Version of the New Testament, he will find that the words, "this do in remembrance of me," which are only found in St. Luke, are not an undoubted part of the original text of the Gospel ; and no historian's orthodoxy, it would seem,

* We refer to Prof. C. A. McGiffert, whose views on this subject have excited not a little attention. They are expressed in a very thoughtful note on pp. 70-72 of his able work on the "History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age."

should be called in question by sane men for making so simple a statement. But, what then? Is the Lord's supper therefore not a divine ordinance, profitable for the edification of the Church and for uniting the hearts of Christian believers with each other and with their Lord? Unquestionably the Lord ate His last supper with His disciples in most solemn circumstances (whether it was the paschal supper, or whether it took place the evening before the passover, can perhaps never be satisfactorily made out), and gave it the character of a sacrificial meal. Afterwards the disciples remembered and from time to time repeated the solemn transaction. The ceremony grew into a sacred ordinance, in the celebration of which the disciples felt their glorified Lord to be present with them, and to enter into the inmost fellowship with their spirits. In eating the bread and drinking the cup afterwards they felt their souls to be flowing together with the soul of the Master—they felt that they were eating His flesh and drinking His blood. Was this an illusion? No, it was a most blessed, a most glorious reality; and so it is still to every believer that approaches the Lord's table in true Christian faith. Is it, then, not a divine ordinance, an ordinance by the will of Christ? Certainly it is, and Paul was therefore profoundly right when he referred its origin to a divine command; but it is a divine ordinance not because of any mechanical institution, but because of an organic creation within the Church, and corresponding to the true nature of the Church itself as a spiritual organism in Christ. It is, indeed, the inmost sanctuary of our whole Christian worship, but there is no longer any room for the debate about transubstantiation, and consubstantiation, which was once of such absorbing interest.*

* Since writing the above there has come to our notice the following paragraph, in the *Expository Times* for June, 1898, in which Prof. A. Robinson sets forth the view of the late Dr. Hort, and which we copy because it expresses exactly our idea of the Church: "What Dr. Hort appears to me to have especially taught us, or, in so far as it was not new to have especially emphasized for us, is that the Church order is from the beginning a sacred growth, directed by the constant presence within of the Holy Spirit, so as to meet the needs of a living and multiplying society; that it is not a scheme delivered by the Lord to the apostles, and by the apostles to the Church; that the body of

THE PRESENT WAR AND ITS PROBABLE RESULTS.

This war has had its origin in the common will of the American people. It is not a cabinet war, into which the people are driven like dumb cattle, as has been the case with most of the wars in the old world. On the contrary, the people themselves have demanded it as the only means of bringing to an end the outrages of an incompetent and semi-barbarous government committed upon an oppressed people struggling for liberty at the very borders of our own country. The national administration is believed to have been unfavorable to it. The wealthy classes and capitalists have been opposed to it, as they were afraid that it would interfere with some of their financial operations. But the popular heart was stirred so profoundly by daily reports of cruel outrages committed in Cuba, and the popular voice spoke so loudly in favor of intervention, that the government was at last reluctantly compelled to heed the popular will. This reluctance of the government to enter into the war should not be blamed, for the reason that war is always an evil that should not be resorted to except in extreme cases, and then only by the general consent of the whole people. In the present case the government did not make, but simply obeyed, the national will.

And as the people demanded the war they will also have to bear its chief burdens. They will not only have to fight its battles, but they will also have to pay the expenses of it. In agreement with past custom the new revenue bill which was lately enacted into law has been so framed as to exempt from taxation the large accumulations of wealth and throw its burdens mainly upon the poor and laboring masses of the nation. This is a wrong which the people of this country have, indeed, long borne, and against which in the present emergency it would be vain to protest, but which we may be sure the people will not always quietly endure. The present would have been a good time the Christ is an organism rather than an organization ; that here as elsewhere, life has its inherent law of orderly evolution ; and that the most fruitful lesson of modern biblical criticism is this—that, in the consideration of these topics we connect more closely than ever before our belief in the Holy Ghost and our belief in the Holy Catholic Church.”

for the wealthy classes, say the millionaires in Congress, to manifest a willingness to bear the burdens of taxation in a degree proportionate to their fortune ; but they have not done it. Every suggestion of an income tax has simply been met by a quotation of the decision of the Supreme Court, obtained by the famous "change of opinion" by one of the judges. This is to be regretted—for the sake of the millionaire classes themselves it is to be regretted ; for the lack of patriotism which it shows will some day be counted against them. But we do not propose to continue the consideration of the subject of taxation any further at present.

The war in which we are engaged, then, is a war of sentiment and of humanity. We have not entered into it because we love war. The American people are indeed a brave, but not a war-like people. They love the arts of peace, and engage in war only when the sentiment of humanity compels them to do so. The object of the war is not conquest or plunder. It is not enlargement of territory that the American people are aiming at. It is true that Cuba lies across the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, and that at the nearest point it is separated from the American coast only by a distance of eighty miles, and geographically therefore belongs to the United States. But the United States has territory enough for the present and for a long time to come, and her people are not casting wistful glances upon the territory of their neighbors. The war has been entered into, then, not because we want the island of Cuba, but because as a free people we sympathize with an oppressed people struggling for liberty under conditions which are intolerable. Spain's colonies have for centuries been kept in the most wretched condition. Spain is essentially a mediæval power. She has rejected modern ideas not only in religion, but also in government and economics. The Inquisition stamped the life out of her three centuries ago. And in consequence she is now a poor and decrepit nation. She was once a nation great and powerful. Now she has nothing left but her pride and cruelty. And these characteristics she has displayed most wantonly in the government of her colonies, thus

causing to exist in them a chronic condition of insurrection and strife, which has always excited the sympathies of our people. When at last the most barbarous methods were adopted to put down the rebellion in Cuba, embracing a systematic process of murder and starvation, the limit of forbearance was reached, and the American people said that this thing must now stop. There were, indeed, also more direct national grievances which had their influence in the case. There was the injury done to American commerce. There was the murder of the lamented Crittenden and his men in 1850 ; and there was the *Virginius* massacre in 1873, when the brave Captain Fry and more than fifty of his men were cruelly shot to death on Cuban soil. In these deplorable cases Spain seems to have had the advantage of the forms of law on her side ; and yet they were grievous outrages, and were due directly to Spain's misgovernment in Cuba. And last of all came the destruction of the *Maine* in the harbor of Havana. That barbarity showed the depth of degradation to which the Spanish people have sunk, and their utter unworthiness to exercise dominion in the modern world. And in consequence of these things America has said that Spain's dominion in the West Indies must cease. To the cynical question, what business was it of ours how Spain governed her provinces, it is sufficient to say that that is the sneer of Cain, which is not worthy of any serious answer. Europe might stand idly by and, because of mutual jealousies, see a nation murdered in cold blood, and even, like the German Emperor, uphold the hands of the murderer ; but America will not be guilty of such a crime.

The cause of this war on our side, then, we believe to be entirely just. And it is reasonable to predict that the victory will in the end be with our arms. There may be disappointments and reverses. Mistakes may be made in the management of the war, which may sometimes counteract the courage and skill of our men in the navy and the army. But scarcely anything could happen, short of a signal display of the divine displeasure, like that which once destroyed a Spanish armada off the coast of England, that could save Spain from a total and crushing

defeat. She is utterly unequal to such a contest as she has entered into. She has courage, and pride, and a conceit that reminds one of the insanity of her own Don Quixote ; but she has no money, no soldiers, no adequate arms and no skill. It is ancient pride and medieval conceit contending against modern intelligence and power, and the result cannot be doubtful, as the events of the war have thus far plainly demonstrated. Moreover, Spain will have no allies in this war. She probably expected the aid of one or more European powers, and the Pope made frantic efforts to secure it for her. But she has been disappointed. The same mutual jealousies which prevented the European powers from doing anything to stop Turkish massacres in Armenia and Turkish outrages in Crete, will also prevent any united action in favor of Spain. The sympathies of the European powers, with one exception, are on her side. England is united with America by ties of blood, language, religion and commercial interests, and her sympathies may be counted on to be with us in the present contest. This is true, perhaps, not so much of the ruling classes, as of the masses of the people who, in England as in America, are the power behind the throne. The sympathies of the other powers are against us. Austria favors Spain in consequence of dynastic relationship and of similarity of national ideas ; France through the influence of her Jewish bankers, and Germany and Russia in consequence of their dislike of free institutions. Russia *can* have no disinterested friendship for the United States. And the German press, doubtless inspired by the government, has been especially bitter against America—a circumstance much to be regretted on account of the many German citizens of the United States, who are true and loyal Americans. In consequence of the attitude of Germany in the present crisis German ideas and German influence in America will hereafter count for much less than heretofore. But, however, willing some of them might be, the European powers will not be able to form any concert of action, that could seriously interfere with the freedom of the United States in the conduct of the war ; and if they were, such concert would doubtless be met

by an English-American alliance that would more than neutralize its effect. But while there is no great danger of European intervention during the progress of the war, there may be more danger of an attempt to rob us of the fruits of victory when the war shall be ended ; and we shall then doubtless have need of firm as well as wise and astute statesmanship.

The United States can never consent to a peace that shall leave Spain in virtual possession of her colonies. Any proposition of peace that shall go upon the assumption that nothing has happened, such as Spain has been talking about, must be indignantly rejected by the United States. It is true, the war was not entered into for conquest ; but it must necessarily result in giving us conquests which we shall not be able to throw off. We may not want Cuba, and Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands ; but when the war shall be ended they will be in our possession, and we will be responsible for their government. We can not give them back to Spain. Nor would it do to declare them independent, and leave them to shift for themselves ; for in that case Spain or some other power might immediately make war upon them again for the purpose of resubjugation. And even if left alone, they might not be able to govern themselves and develop their resources. Besides, it has come to be a custom after the conclusion of a war to exact indemnity from the vanquished power. And there will be no reason why the United States should not demand indemnity from Spain. But after the war Spain will be unable to pay, and we shall therefore be compelled to take her territory and administer its finances at least until the debt shall be paid. Whether we will, therefore, or not, we shall come into possession of countries lying outside of our present territorial limits, and in consequence of this our national habits of thought and action will necessarily have to undergo an important modification.

Thus it can easily be seen that the war will have an important influence upon the future history of our country. We shall not come out of this war just the same as we were when we went into it. No matter how short it may be, it will be for us the com-

mencement of a new national era. It will serve to bury forever the memory of the unhappy conflict between the North and the South a generation ago. It will make us a more united nation than we have ever been before. And it will make us a powerful nation. The United States having distant territory to protect and take care of, must in the future inevitably become a great naval power. The navy and the merchant marine were our glory in the early days of the Republic. For reasons which need not now be stated, but which reflect no credit upon American statesmanship during the past third of a century, the navy has been neglected and the merchant marine suffered to decay. This will be so no longer. The American people will in the future be proud of their navy, and will demand its increase to vastly larger proportions. There can be no fear or jealousy of the navy; for the navy can never become a source of peril to the liberties of the people. In a large standing army on land there is always danger. No country with a large standing army can long preserve its liberties. And seeing with what eagerness the capitalistic classes call for the protection of the army in times of public excitement and with what readiness public officials yield to their demands, it can easily be understood that in this respect our country forms no exception to the rule. Our safety consists in dispensing with a standing army and depending upon the service of volunteers coming from the people in times of national danger. But there can be no such objection to the maintenance of a navy. Its service can never be employed in the interest of a class or party. And its achievements during the present war will so endear it to the popular heart that its increase hereafter will become a popular demand. But this will give an impulse also to the increase of our merchant shipping, until our flag shall again float in every breeze and our commerce penetrate every sea. The prophecy contained in the early history of the nation will thus be fulfilled on a scale of which no one even a few months ago would have dared to think.

But this will bring us into new relations to the world, and call for a new system of politics, as well as for new habits of mind.

In any case the acquisition of maritime possessions will bring us into closer contact with the governments of Europe than has been the case heretofore. The Monroe doctrine was a good doctrine for us so long as we were weak and living in an unoccupied territory of immense extent. But now since we have grown to larger proportions, and have entered into the rank of the great world powers, we can no longer seclude ourselves, or shirk our responsibilities. We must hereafter count for something in the system of the world powers. Heaven has made us great, not that we should be a secluded, a hermit people, but that we should enter into fellowship with the world, and impart to it of our blessings. Our civilization, our material prosperity, our liberty and our religion are not treasures which we may hold in selfish possession, but which we are to communicate to the world. And it may be that providence has forced us into this war with Spain in order to awaken us to a proper sense of the greatness of our destiny. The most advanced people of the modern age contending in deadly conflict with the most belated nation of medieval times and medieval habits—surely there is something grandly significant in this; and what it signifies is that America is hereafter to be the leading power in the world's progress. The old world power, represented by Spain, is engaged in mortal combat with the spirit of a new age, which came in with the Reformation, and finds the fullest embodiment in the nation of the United States. This nation, then, is destined hereafter to move in the van of modern progress, and to be a blessing to all the nations of the earth.

• But shall we prove ourselves adequate to the fulfillment of this high destiny? That will depend upon ourselves; for while there is providence in history, there is in it no fate compelling the nations to be what they are designed to be. We do not believe, for instance, that Greece more than half fulfilled her glorious destiny, and Rome dreadfully perverted hers. But we believe that America will prove herself equal to her calling, although in order to that end many things among us must doubtless change. We shall, for instance, hereafter require a new and higher order

of statesmanship than that to which we have been hitherto accustomed. In the youthful period of the Republic we had statesmen of commanding genius and honor. But then there came, perhaps partly in consequence of our national isolation, and partly in consequence of the spoils system, a race of common politicians whose whole ambition has been to beat each other and to make money out of their positions. These must be sent to the rear again, if we are to fulfill our destiny. Not low politicians, but real statesmen of ability, honor and integrity must fill our presidential chair, our Senate chamber, and our halls of Congress. Politics on "business principles" belong to a decaying people, and from these we must rid ourselves. The low and selfish politician must be remanded to the seclusion of private life. "I would like to be in your place," Senator Hanna is reported to have said to General Merritt, when the latter was appointed commander of the forces in the Philippines. No doubt he would. But it would be a sad day for the Republic when such a man should get into such a place. Only think of such a thing as Senators Hanna and Quay being made governor-generals over distant provinces of the Republic! They could no doubt easily rival the fame of Verres made immortal by the invective of Cicero, and the natives would have little reason to congratulate themselves on their change of masters. Here is where our danger in the future will lie, and our institutions will doubtless be at times put to a severe strain. But we have faith in the intelligence, integrity and patriotism of the American people, and believe that in the new age which is before them they will prove themselves equal to the occasion. *De republica non est desperandum.*

A NEW WAY OF EXTIRPATING HERESY.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, lately convened at Winona, has the honor of having discovered a new method of dealing with supposed heretics. The Assembly's attention was called to the recent work of Professor A. C. McGiffert on *The History of Christianity in the Apostolic*

Age, by an overture from the Presbytery of Pittsburg, in which that work is characterized as "the most daring and thorough-going attack on the New Testament that has ever been made by any accredited teacher of the Presbyterian Church in America." We did not know that accredited teachers of the Presbyterian Church have been in the habit of making attacks on the New Testament, as this language would imply, and we suspect that the Presbytery has been somewhat unguarded in its utterances. Much zeal against heresy made it incautious. It may be added also that in the judgment of many good Presbyterians the Presbytery was clearly in error in regard to Professor McGiffert's book. Dr. Herrick Johnson, for instance, has said that "on all the great evangelical doctrines of the Church the Professor is true to the historic belief of Christendom, and accepts without doubt or question the deity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, His ascension to heaven, and kindred doctrines."

In the Assembly, however, the majority were of one opinion with the Presbytery of Pittsburg. The committee to whom the overture was referred brought in three reports. The majority report condemns Dr. McGiffert's book, and counsels him to reconsider the questionable views contained therein, and if he cannot conform his views to the standards of the Church, then peaceably to withdraw from the Presbyterian ministry. The first minority report recommended a reference of the case to the Presbytery of New York, to be dealt with as the peace and purity of the Church might require, which would probably have meant another heresy trial. The second minority report, signed by one member of the committee only, recommended doing nothing. After half a day's discussion the first, or majority report, was adopted by a very large vote.

The effect of this action is that Professor McGiffert is first condemned without trial by the Assembly, and then advised to try himself and, if he finds himself guilty, to take himself out of the ministry of the Presbyterian Church. There are some things about this action which strike one favorably. Evidently it was

the Assembly's dread of a heresy trial that inspired this action. Heresy trials are not popular proceedings. Nor are they edifying spectacles. They have an unfavorable effect upon the disposition and character of those who engage in them, as Calvin's dealing with Servetus illustrates ; and they always do much damage to the cause of Christianity. This truth was doubtless felt by the Assembly. The Presbyterian Church has had heresy trial enough for the present generation. It is very doubtful whether it could stand any more just now, and the Assembly, therefore, did wisely in refusing to order one in the present case. The Assembly also acted wisely in leaving the ultimate issue of the case with Professor McGiffert himself. It could have selected no more competent or more conscientious tribunal before which the case could be brought for final adjudication. This is well.

But there are some points of view also in which the Assembly's action does not appear in such favorable light. For instance, it seems highly improper that the Assembly should have virtually condemned Professor McGiffert and his book without hearing or trial. In the time which the Assembly allowed itself for the consideration of the case no true judgment could have been reached, even supposing that the members were all sufficiently qualified in point of scholarship for such a task. Moreover, what influence would this snap judgment have upon the Assembly itself, supposing the case should ever come before it in the way of appeal? A jurymen who has expressed his opinion in advance is not supposed to be qualified to sit in the trial of a cause. Would this Assembly, then, be qualified to try the case of Professor McGiffert, if it should ever come before it on appeal? We know the distinction which is sometimes made between the Assembly as the supreme council of the Church and the Assembly as a court of Jesus Christ, and the theory that in condemning Professor McGiffert's book it acted in the former capacity, while, if it should ever try the case on appeal, it would act in the latter capacity. But the distinction is one which, though it may satisfy an ecclesiastical lawyer, can have little weight in the judgment of common sense.

But there are some other points about the Assembly's action which must make an unfavorable impression upon one who is not a Presbyterian. Thus, for instance, Professor McGiffert is counselled to bring his historical views into conformity with the standards of the Presbyterian Church. What, then, do the standards teach in regard to the development of Christian life and thought in the Apostolic age? It was said some years ago that a professor was dismissed from Princeton because he could not teach history Calvinistically. We used to think that was a joke, but we are now ready to believe that it may have been a fact. Evidently Professor McGiffert is expected to bring his historical views into conformity with the traditional views current in the Presbyterian community, whether right or wrong. But what sort of an idea does this imply in regard to the office and responsibility of Christian scholarship? Is a Christian scholar only to see what his denomination or sect wants him to see? That seems to be what the General Assembly is asking Professor McGiffert to do. The question is not, what is true, but what is according to the standards. And yet this Assembly is a Protestant body and every member of it would join in denunciations of "Romish intolerance!" What is the difference, then, between Romish and Presbyterian intolerance? O, the one supports error and the other defends truth, it will be said. But who is to judge of truth and error? These Presbyterians, wrapped in profound dogmatic slumber, talk very confidently of Professor McGiffert's views as "erroneous" and "heretical," as if it were not at all possible for themselves to be mistaken. Well, in *our* judgment they themselves hold much that is *certainly* contrary to Christian truth. Shall we, therefore, declare them heretics, and pronounce upon them judgment of condemnation and refuse them Christian fellowship? What a spectacle before men and angels we should in that case make of ourselves! "Ah," but it is said, "this judgment in the present case relates only to the man's fitness to be in the *Presbyterian* Church and affirms nothing as to his fitness to be in the Church universal. Let him go where his views are wanted; they are not wanted among us. But we give him perfect liberty to think as he pleases, provided he leaves us." Forsooth, what else could they do in this land of religious freedom? But what then? Is the Presbyterian Church only a *theological club*, in which the right of membership is determined by the arbitrary acceptance of some theological theories?

VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

THE SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES. By Professor G. F. Wright, D.D., LL.D. Pp. 350. D. Appleton & Co., New York. 1898.

It is truly refreshing to meet with an author who has both the knowledge and skill to stop the mouths of doubters and agnostics by applying to them their own arguments. Professor Wright meets them on their own grounds, attacks their positions with their chosen weapons, and exposes both their ignorance and their malignity. For in the presence of what the religion of the Gospel has done for the world there is no room to question its adaptation to its professed purpose; while in the light of its historic and scientific proofs—which is every day becoming clearer—there is no room for rational doubt.

After a general discussion of the basis of proof common to all departments of inquiry, whether philosophical, scientific, historical, or of validity in the ordinary business of life, we have a forcible statement that the facts of the Biblical narrative require neither more nor a different kind of evidence to establish their credibility. Following this, which may be considered a general introduction, the author grapples with the theories of Darwin and the evidence of design in Nature. He shows conclusively that Evolution is not an established fact; and, as a theory, is beset with so many difficulties that if in the future it should become a portion of scientific truth it will have to be modified to such an extent that its author would not own his offspring. It is a fact worth noting that Darwin himself makes constant use of special pleading, and would, as he himself admits, be the “prince of wrigglers” were not Spencer a little more skilled in this art. The theory of Pangenesis, which Darwin claims as his true position, the Effort theory of Lamarck (*i. e.*, one’s nose becomes longer and bigger the more he reaches out to sniff the future), the Cell Immortality of Weissman, the Foam theory of Minot and the Plastidule of Haeckel are the most arrant hypotheses; about which the authors themselves are wholly uncertain in every particular save in the matter of their own infallibility. If Darwin could not understand Spencer, and neither the latter, nor anybody else, can be quite sure what the former meant, it is scarcely decent for them or their humble *pedisequi* to parade their conflicting theories as a demonstration of the falsity of the Christian system. For this can be understood both in its theory and in its practice, in its main tenets and in the spirit which actuates its followers.

The story of the Flood is carefully examined in the light of

Science, and the newly discovered Assyrian records. The author shows conclusively that Cataclysms have occurred according to the testimony of geology quite sufficient to account for all the facts involved in the Scriptural narrative. No geologist now questions the reality of such an occurrence. The sudden subsidence of a continent or part of one would cause the water of the sea to rise and effect all the phenomena of the flood. The weight of ice at one time covering Europe and North America would sink the surface, and cause the sea to flow inland and rise over the hills which remained above the sea level. Yet this would be a slow process, dependent upon the gradual accumulation of the snow and ice, which would as slowly exterminate both animal and vegetable life. With diffidence we suggest that this would not be sufficiently rapid to account for such phenomena as the breccia on the surface, or in the caverns along the sides of the mountains; *i. e.*, the hippopotamus bones, etc., in the rock of Gibraltar. For unless the whole surface of the earth was made to sink by the accumulation of ice the fauna would have sufficient time to migrate, which would be the natural effect of a local increase of cold, or their extinction would be so gradual that no great quantity of their bones would be found at one place. And if this subsidence was universal then the same result would follow. They would be diminished in number and scattered, thus preventing an accumulation such as is found in various localities. A more probable cause for a Cataclysm, with such results as are found, would be a sudden rising of a wide area of submarine surface, or the sinking of a wide extent of land by which the waters of the sea could be made to ascend quite as high as the literal statement concerning the Noachic Flood demands. The phenomena of marine shells on high mountains and in wide districts of inland territory, as well as the vast quantities of bones of all sorts, carnivora and herbivora together, with no evidence of gnawing to prove that one had destroyed another for food, but showing clearly that they had died together by a common calamity—all these things point conclusively to such a flood as the Bible tells us did take place. The solid crust of the earth is admitted by all geologists to be thin, and violent seismic changes, which were more common in earlier ages than now, could convulse whole continents as they do limited districts, even yet. And so by the “breaking up of the fountains of the great deep” so much heat would be set free that this would cause immense quantities of water to be turned into vapor. This would ascend till cooled by the upper air and form literal floods, continuing until the equilibrium in the atmosphere was effected, when the rains would cease. Moreover, the independent records in the Babylonian bricks corroborate the Scriptural narrative. For while they differ sufficiently to show that the one was not taken from the other, they undoubtedly refer to the same fact, and their record is plainly that of an eye witness. So our author properly concludes that “Mediate

Miracles " must be accepted by either line of proof; that of the "testimony of the rocks," and that which claims to be Revelation. And it is a noteworthy fact that all the proofs which modern scientific excavations have made are confirmatory both of Scripture and classical records. Not a single discovery yet made has weakened the testimony of those books which for centuries have been the accredited vouchers for early history. The schools of Wolf and Renan have alike been overthrown by the spade and pickaxe. Schliemann at Troy and Mycenæ, and the explorations in Babylon and Egypt, have so thoroughly cut the foundations from under destructive criticism that it will have to take a new departure or be silent. But there is no hope for the fool, even after he has been brayed in a mortar with a pestle, that wisdom will return sufficiently to cause him to hold his peace.

There is only a limited amount of proof to be obtained in any concrete case. Except in the regions of abstraction, demonstration is not possible. For all sense perceptions are partial and constantly changing. A consensus of proof may be attained, both from our own experience and that of others, which, while it is ample for all the concerns of life, falls short of demonstration. Hence in every matter of practical life we must have recourse to probable proof, which is of every degree, from the lowest up to that which approaches, but never can reach, absolute certainty. Socrates announced this principle as the basis of human action throughout life, which he declared to be merely a preparation for death.*

A higher authority says: "We are always in a strait betwixt two." There could be no discipline of character, because no room for conflicting motives and lines of duty, if everything were demonstrated. He that understands a problem in geometry, or a solution in the calculus, has no alternative but to believe. But in the concerns of life, in all that goes to the formation of character, the proof must, of necessity, be only probable. Now, if this probability rises to the degree "beyond a reasonable doubt," as we can get no better proof, we are shut up either to this, or that which is weaker, and act accordingly. Often we must act when there is a reasonable doubt, provided the preponderance of proof is on that side. For we can know but in part. Only infinite knowledge can see all the relations in which each fact is connected with everything else in the universe, whether of matter or spirit. Hence there may be apparent objections which cannot be solved, to any truth, unless we know all its relations. The preponderance of truth must for this reason be our guide until we get more light. Our author, in a most admirable way, shows by a wide induction that the Christian system has been proved "be-

* Plat. Phæd 85, C. D. τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχοῦμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον εἰ μὴ τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιότερον ὀχήματος ἢ λόγου θεοῦ τινὸς διαπορευθῆναι.

yond a reasonable doubt." The case is no longer one where the burden of proof lies on the side of Apologetics. That once was the case, but has ceased to be so long since. Christianity is an established fact, is its own witness by its effect on the character of the individual and the race. By the doctrine of Symptosis † we see that it effects its declared purpose of making the world better and happier just as fast as it is permitted to influence the will of man. But its truth is not proved merely by its effects on human nature, for the proof from extended sources grows *pari passu* with our increase of knowledge. There is no part of the Christian faith that has been weakened by the advance of scientific inquiry. The testimony of paleontology in corroborating the statements of Revelation touching the earth, and of every department of physical science in proving design, the discovery of new and independent records by excavations and ransacking ancient libraries—all these are confirmatory; and the proofs become stronger and more varied in an ever-increasing ratio. From any one of these extensive sources the evidence has surpassed "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Our author elaborates this contention with great force and clearness, and it may be confidently applied to any one of the leading doctrines of the Christian Church. The resurrection of Jesus can no longer be questioned without rejecting every species of proof on which we rest, either in civil history or the common affairs of life. It comes to us substantiated by more evidence than we have for any other single event in history. And so it should. For it is the cardinal fact of Christianity. All the rest of the system confessedly stands or falls with its veracity. St. Paul distinctly hazards his faith, his preaching, the truthfulness of himself and all his brethren, on this fact.* But it cannot, from the nature of the case, be demonstrated. The credibility of testimony in general and of those who knew the man Jesus personally, the character of the system which rests upon it, are all involved. These form a consensus of proof which places it "beyond a reasonable doubt." But there is one aspect of this proof which admits of greater development than it has ever yet received; that is, the *regressive*; from its salutary influence to the necessity of its truthfulness. The resurrection of Jesus was either a fact or not. If not, its assertion maintained by the Church was a falsehood. And not only so, but the whole system founded upon it is a falsehood. We then have the astounding spectacle of the rankest fraud and falsehood that the world ever witnessed, being at the same time the most salutary; the embodiment of the highest morality, the most thoroughgoing justice, and the greatest happiness of any system of doctrine the world ever saw—with its professed followers in the van of all progress and in the control of the world's forces, not by brute violence,

* See REFORMED QUARTERLY for April, 1893, p. 194-203.

† 1 Cor. XV., 14-17.

but by the power of moral ideas. If we take the ground that a lie is the basest thing in the world which undermines a man's character more than any other vice—which even the skeptic Montaigne* would admit—and that only under a pessimistic system, therefore, could falsehood be productive of even temporary good, there follows the alternative: either a lie and a fraudulent system founded thereon must be the cause of the greatest good the world ever experienced, or the resurrection of Jesus and the doctrines involved in it are true. If this is not a demonstration it is as near to it as possible in any concrete matter. It is as cogent as Euclid's *reductio ad impossibile*, or the *reductio ad absurdum* of pure logic; and surely proves its theory "beyond a reasonable doubt."

The author's chapter on "Newly discovered external evidence of Christianity" is a masterly grouping in small compass of a large amount of facts and criticisms on the general subject of the trustworthiness of the Gospel records. This discussion is timely, for destructive criticism has been busy. Reimarus and the Wolfenbüttel Fragments sowed a crop of dragon's teeth. And what made the crop more deadly was the fact that the sowers were the professed friends of Revelation. Nearly all of them started out as accredited heralds of the Gospel, who received and showed uncommon desire—just as the heretics who now vex the Church—to retain the honors and emoluments granted for teaching the faith which they sedulously labored to destroy. And it is worth remembering that nearly all of them ended by abjuring every essential doctrine of that faith in whose interest they professed the search for truth. Meanwhile they had made such a caricature of it that, instead of being a system of truth and holy living, it became a tissue of falsehoods, and its Author and his immediate followers fraudulent pretenders. While most of these rationalistic critics were ashamed to assert such abhorrent teachings, yet they were the legitimate outcome of their destructive criticisms, and that they were so understood was proved by the fact that they furnished the arguments for those who were open blasphemers.

"The Testimony of Textual Criticism" finishes the author's plan, except a kind of *résumé* of his several arguments intended to show the general result of the cumulative evidence. Destructive criticism has aimed to prove that the Gospels were a gradual growth out of tradition, and had no existence till long after the Apostolic age. But it is proven by records of unquestioned validity that the four Gospels were in existence and recognized as the authority of the churches before the close of the first century. There are many references to them in contemporary literature in the first quarter of the second century showing their existence in substantially their present form, and that they were quoted as au-

* Voir. Essais, B. II., Chap. XVIII., Sec. 6, fin. et B. I., Chap. IX., Init.

thoritative in precisely the same way as they are at the present day. From this it is clear that considerable time must have elapsed after they were written before they could be thus referred to as the accepted guides of the whole Church, scattered as it was throughout the Roman Empire, for communication was slow and uncertain, books were rare and expensive. Hence, as the Gospels could be diffused but slowly, it can be assumed as true beyond question that what was received by all the scattered churches and referred to as the ground of doctrine and practice in the beginning of the second century had existed many years before that time in these isolated communities. This argument brings the written Gospels back to the very Apostolic age, for John lived till near the close of the first century. So there is no interval between to be the region for tradition and the formation of myth. And here it should be noted that all the newly discovered manuscripts, either of portions of the Sacred Record or Patristic writings, are, without exception, confirmatory of the orthodox view in regard to the authenticity of the Gospels. And the uniformity of support given by those hitherto discovered furnishes every reason for assurance that future discoverers, should there be such as those of Tischendorf and Harris, they will still further confirm the *Textus Receptus*. Critics like Renan* and Strauss expose their true spirit—which is not an honest search after truth, but hostility and prejudice—only to have their assertions overturned by new discoveries. Hence the only safety such enemies have for their theories is that they are quickly forgotten and have no effect upon fair-minded scholars who can see that the internal evidences of truth are corroborated by the consensus of external testimony. In themselves the Gospel narratives are in a perfectly natural style, to no degree swayed by a tendency to exaggeration, such as found in all mythical stories. For the miraculous is narrated as matter of fact, free from efforts to bolster it up as though considered doubtful, and from judgments passed by the narrator. The style is that of the eye witness, who saw in the events taking place before his eyes, and in the doctrines which were taught, so deep a significance for moral character and the hope of a future life that the means by which these are effected are lost sight of in the magnitude of the results for which the writers labor. It may, therefore, be left to the Providence of God to preserve corroborative records which establish the truths of the Gospel narrative beyond peradventure, while its enemies overreach and expose themselves in their endeavors to destroy that which has the power of an endless life.

J. C.

*Renan pronounced the *Apology of Aristides*, found in an Armenian version at Venice, a forgery. But Harris subsequently found a Greek copy of the original which confirmed all that had been claimed for this work.

CHRISTIANITY AND IDEALISM : By John Watson, Professor in Queen's College, Kingston, Canada. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1897.

This is a small but ambitious book. The author is a well-known writer and lecturer on philosophy, and his success has been such as to justly encourage him for large undertakings. Much of the substance of this work has been delivered in lectures with marked acceptance in the University of California and at the Institution where he is professor. The value of the book is shown by an early demand for a second edition. The author is not deficient in self-assertion, and the promise of the book is certainly quite up to the performance. His treatment of the Jewish and Christian ideals of religion shows more ability than that of the Greek. He does not seem to be at home in the original sources of knowledge here, as he gets his information for the main authorities second-hand, through Jowett's translations. There are evidences of carelessness which should not appear in a second edition. The statement made, *e. g.*, on p. 6, that, "the totem is a being lower than man," is flatly contradicted on p. 17, when it is said: "Early man found in his totem something higher than himself."

The seventh chapter, "Idealism in relation to Agnosticism and the Special Sciences," seems out of place. For it is not germane to the subject as announced on the title page, and the book would be stronger without it. Its substance might well be incorporated in a work on metaphysics; and we feel sure from the author's well-known power, displayed in parts of this book and in other works, that he could make the argument of this chapter more available in a different connection.

The attempt is made to trace the evolution of idealism on the assumption of man's development from lower forms of life, and that his first religious notions were gained by himself. These consisted in ancestral worship and totemism, and their further development owed but little if anything to a direct revelation from a higher power. In fact the author plays fast and loose with such sources of knowledge. When it suits him to use Scriptural ideas he does so, and when not he ignores them. This ideal is traced from the grosser forms of Nature worship and Polytheism up through Judaism until it culminates in Christianity. According to the author's conception, which is expressed with great beauty, perfection seems to be here attained. But whether this ideal is ultimate, or, like all those before it, must give place to another, will depend upon the faithfulness with which men embody this one in their lives. The alternative, however, should not be expressed in that way. For if this ideal is adapted to raise men to the highest grade of virtue and happiness it cannot be transcended. Men may fail to reach this standard, but this does not affect its truths or adaptation to the purpose for which it was given. We must never forget that while it makes no difference to a system of religion any more than to any other truth, whether men accept it or not, it makes all difference to them. If a man

chose to deny Aristotle's law of contradiction, the Euclidian axioms, or the Newtonian law of gravitation, and frame his conduct accordingly, these laws would not be affected, though he might suffer. No one can deny that the religion of the Christian revelation proves to the individual and the community, so far as it is adopted, a cure for every ill, a culture for every power of body and mind, an increase of happiness for all men, and a betterment even for all creatures. Hence we maintain that the ideal of Christ's teaching and life cannot be transcended.

The Greek ideal is unfolded by the author in a rapid sketch from the earliest traces in literature until it found its highest development in Plato. The true conception of the ideal is found in this thinker, who thought for all the philosophic world since, and spoke as the standard of expression for all subsequent literature. With him the Idea was the original and perfect image, after which each thing in its proper sphere was formed. These were the exemplars in the mind of the true monotheistic God, constituting his thoughts which were immanent in him from eternity. Hence creation was simply their evolution and embodiment in a material form. But as the material was in a state of flux, never remaining the same, there could be no science because it was in a perpetual transformation. Hence these material copies could not be perfect, because what is constantly changing is liable either to advance or retrogression. But the more the materials resemble the idea, the more complete they become. While there was much in Plato's doctrines that expressed moral ideas, as well as every species of truth, mathematical, physical, social, philosophical, there was also in him, as the interpreter of his own times, much that was crude. Sometimes his philosophy sounds like a revelation from heaven. He touches the inmost soul of one who is seeking the truth and trying to live a virtuous life. In his doctrines there are ideals which must ever remain an inspiration to a better service for God and man. The early Christians seized on his system with avidity. They saw in Jesus Christ a perfect ideal of character, the form of humanity absolutely faultless, after which each believer should copy. For as the Platonic ideas were the originals, after which all things were created, and as they were complete in proportion to their resemblance to these exemplars, even so the followers of Jesus Christ attained to the standard of perfect men to the degree they copied Him. There was entire accord between this part, which is the chief doctrine of the Platonic philosophy, and the teachings of the Old and New Testaments. For the system of worship, the temple and the sacrifices, were to be fashioned expressly after the image showed to Moses on Mount Sinai. The entire ideal of this worship, particular, varied and tedious in its minutæ and exactitude, had only one purpose; that is, to transform the soul of the worshipper into the character of Him who had been in the bosom of the Divine Father from eternity. No wonder that the learned Christian Fathers, who had been

imbued with the Platonic doctrines, rejoiced when they found this system of philosophy had its counterpart, even its complete realization in the revelation of Jesus Christ, the ideal, *the Second Man*. Here was the Christian ideal, after which every believer is to copy, "that Christ may be found within them the hope of glory." Nor is it strange that the most spiritual and cultured of all Christians in succeeding ages, even to our own time, have been drawn with irresistible impulse to the philosophy of that wonderful Greek who seems to have possessed much of "that true light which lighteneth every man who cometh into the world." All the revelations which have been accepted among men undoubtedly contained something of the truth. Hence *Teste David cum Sibylla* may be admitted without derogating anything from that perfect Revelation made by the Son of God, the Savior of the world.

It is difficult to accept our author's view of the Hebrew ideal without ignoring the Mosaic Legation and the revelations which were preparatory to it, beginning from man's earliest existence on earth. Our author teaches that there was only a gradual evolution of doctrine without any special communication made to the Patriarchs on Sinai. But the influences of an ideal, such as could not be evolved by savages, can be seen during the early ages in the characters of Abraham, Joseph, Moses, Isaiah, Daniel. They were far in advance of their contemporaries among the nations around them, but not of the doctrines of their religion. This fact is set forth clearly by Jesus repeatedly in His condemnation of the interpretation put upon these doctrines by tradition and illustrated in practice. For despite these glosses He says: "From the beginning it was not so." The Jews as a community were continually backsliding and having recourse to the gods of their heathen neighbors. But nothing can be more clear than the monotheism of the revelation made to Adam, Noah, Job; and nothing more distinct than the doctrines of the law on Sinai and its interpretation by priests and prophets touching the personality and character of God. The Jews were required to remain distinct from the surrounding peoples to prevent contamination, and particularly in regard to one God. It is true that the ideal of the Jew was crude, as our author complains. But he could not be transformed into an elevated, religious character at once. During four centuries he had been oppressed in every conceivable way. The monuments corroborate and add to the statements of Holy Writ as to the degrading service to which this people were subject; and it is not strange, if they, as a body, failed to reach a high ideal. This rudeness called for a strict and unyielding discipline. Man cannot be elevated at once. Reform progresses slowly. Undoubtedly the ideal which was entertained by the Jews was one of reward for services. They were the chosen people of God provided they obeyed His law. There is nothing wrong in this if understood in its proper sense. Utilitarianism meets with and kisses the highest ideal of personal holiness. For those who

do the will of God, which is the law of their nature, shall inherit the earth. And this earth was made not for misery, but for happiness. Men are wretched simply because by transgression they harm themselves. They do not get out of life what they should, because they do not obey the laws of life. If God is a loving Father, as the highest type of idealism in Dr. Watson's view teaches, then He desires His children to get all the good possible out of this life; and the more good they get out of it, the more sure they are of being ready for a state of existence such as Revelation unfolds. But the Jewish people did not keep before their eyes the ideal disclosed to them in the Law. They covered up its eternal truths with the glosses of interpreters who gave them a carnal and temporal sense. They boasted of themselves as Abraham's children, but showed by their acts that they were bastards. For those who are His true children do the works which their progenitors, the lawgivers and prophets, in constant succession, taught them. The ideal was there nevertheless, and its beauty shone out again and again through the words of holy seers until the coming of the Great Prophet of Nazareth. He, with the power of the sun, caused the seed truths, which had been sown in the soil of Judaism awaiting the dayshine of his coming, to germinate and bear fruit with a new and brighter life. The author is egregiously mistaken when he says (p. 49) that Jehovah was considered by the Jews only as the greatest of all the gods, for the whole teaching of the Pentateuch, and especially after the giving of the Law, was that the objects worshipped by the heathen were not gods at all. In proof of this they are commonly called "the nothings." So, again, the author makes a bad slip when he says (p. 51) that "there was a change, and a theocratic commonwealth was formed by Ezra and Nehemiah." This had been done at Sinai, certainly it had been perfected under David and Solomon. In these, as so many other places, the author makes the facts bend to a preconceived theory, rather than make his theory conform to the admitted facts.

When we arrive at the professed object of this book we find much to approve, and a few yet cardinal matters to condemn. It may be consistent with the author's view to treat Jesus Christ as simply a man, one exalted incomparably higher than any other, though not a divine being equal with God. But we hold that there can be no compromise as to the position of Him who professes to be the Savior of the world. If He is not that which He declared himself to be—the Son of God, the Atoning Sacrifice for the sins of men, the Messiah of whom the prophets spake—He was an impostor, and the worst impostor that ever deceived the credulous, for He left the impression on His immediate followers, the Apostles, and others including His enemies, that He claimed to be one with the Father, not in a metaphysical sense, in which all might be called one with, because they are the sons of God, but as one with Him in substance and creative energy. Jesus knew

that He had caused such a belief, and if He permitted this to continue when He knew it to be false then the system of Christianity is but a deception and its ideal a falsehood. His doctrine in that case will be no ideal to the Church, and she will be deprived of what Mill thought the greatest advantage over all other systems of religion, a perfect example to follow. We have no patience with those who accept Jesus just as far as suits their convenience, and then by implication make Him a fraud in what constitutes His peculiar claim. If any of our acquaintances recognize us when they wish a favor, and ignore us to suit their convenience, we part company. So we do emphatically with all who admire the character of "*the Nazarene enthusiast*," and thereby make the Son of God a liar. The author, we hope, did not intend such interpretation, and, perhaps, his language to himself will not bear this out. Yet such is the impression which a repeated reading of his book has left upon one who opened it with a feeling of admiration, and who was charmed with the beauty of the ideal of Christianity considered as the working out of a noble character through personal responsibility. But such reasoning as that on page 79, where the author discusses what Jesus hoped to accomplish, the altering of His plans according to advancing knowledge gained through experience, places Him on a par with a human reformer who has no special guidance of the Spirit, and renders it impossible for Him to be a Savior of the world, or even an ideal for the Church.

We can, however, agree heartily with what the author says when he asserts that the ideal of Christianity is the complete union of religion and morality. These two, if genuine, will always move along *pari passu*. For religion does not consist in accepting a formal creed, and in paying the tithes of mint, anise, and cummin of the ceremonial law. The devils believe more doctrines than Pharisee, priest or hypocritical Christian. Faith without works is dead; that is, it has no content, and therefore no real existence. The mistake of Max Müller in saying the Greek morality was superior to their religion is well answered by our author. When we look below the surface through the Greek comedy, or read between the lines of their historians and orators, we see a depth of immorality quite on a par with their degraded notions of their gods. Morality and religion are in truth counterparts of each other, and cannot exist apart. The true ideal of Christianity is one that takes in the whole man, and enables him to receive with thankfulness and use with the highest enjoyment every good creature that his Heavenly Father gives him. This is a good world; only men make it bad by their sins. God, as a Father, wishes all his creatures to be happy and rejoice evermore. He has spread out a universe of beauty from the laws which rule among the worlds to the geometry which divides space, to the biology which watches the tiniest organism with its marvel-

lous construction. There is beauty in the opening flower, the bird's song, the rising sun, the dancing of the restless wave, the gleam of the lightning; but most of all in the moral law within man's conscience. These are adapted to give pleasure to those who have the capacities by nature and by culture to see what is beautiful, both material and spiritual. But the fitness for the enjoyment must be in the man himself. He has the potentiality for development, and the responsibility of success or failure. He has the inclinations to lead him astray. The problem of evil casts its dark shadow across any system of theology that ever has been devised. But man's consciousness tells him that he is endowed with personal responsibility. Therefore no being but himself can make him go astray. None but himself can work out a character for him. The conditions have been made such by a Mediator that he is delivered from the guilt of others' sin, and is not held responsible for the *bar sinister* of heredity. "For Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law being made a curse for us." But we must work out our own salvation. The character which each man has, and his fitness for both this life and the one to come, must depend on his own conscience, his own voluntary action. The relation to God as a Father insures him immortality; but his own actions must decide his fitness for happiness, and therefore his actual happiness, since no one can enjoy that for which he has no adaptation. His fitness is to be effected by the immanency of the Holy Spirit which belongs to man by virtue of his sonship with God, and which abides with him unless he perversely rejects and casts Him out. This idealism perpetually brings to light the distinction between what a man is and what he ought to become. The lack of correspondence between what he has already attained and the measure of duty which he ought to perform creates the standard for better thoughts, better work, better life and a higher plane of enjoyment, giving constant premonition of a more perfect state of existence.

J. C.

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY. By Rev. Josiah Strong, D.D. Pp. 186. The Baker and Taylor Company, New York. 1898. Paper, 25 cents; cloth, 50 cents.

The well-known author of the popular and widely-circulated books, "Our Country" and "The New Era," who is the General Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance for the United States, recently completed another sociological work in the same vein as the above and named it "The Twentieth Century City." The very brief preface sets forth the object of the small volume: "This book attempts both a diagnosis and a prescription. It undertakes to show the essential character of modern civilization, its weakness and its peril, and suggests a treatment which is obviously practicable." Some of the material had appeared in *The*

Christian Advocate and commanded such an interest that the author was encouraged to give it more permanent form as well as to elaborate it. The titles of the eight chapters will give the reader a general idea of the nature of their contents: The Materialism of Modern Civilization, A Nation of Cities, the Materialistic City a Menace to Itself, The Materialistic City a Menace to the State and Nation, Remedies, The New Patriotism, Twentieth Century Christianity, Twentieth Century Churches, Practical Suggestions. Although the author states that he is an optimist, a pessimistic tone seems to pervade the greater part of the book, no doubt due to the stern and discouraging facts he adduces. In the first half of the book he diagnoses the state of our civilization, and casts a prophetic glance into the future. He says that of the many marvels to which the nineteenth century has given birth the greatest and most characteristic wonder has been the unprecedented and disproportionate development of material civilization, and deplores the fact that this has been at the expense of intellectual and spiritual growth. By a number of exceedingly interesting statistical examples he compares the material growth of our nation with that of the leading nations of Europe. In a clear and logical way he shows that materialism is the supreme peril of modern civilization and that the modern city is its best exponent. The movement from country to city is a world-phenomenon, and this is due to causes which are permanent. The problem of the twentieth century will therefore be the city. The city is destined to dominate the nation. Is materialism to dominate the city? It can be saved from the final doom of materialism only by quickening its moral and intellectual life. The second half of the book presents some of the remedies which the author thinks are practicable and will suffice to save the nation. In a very interesting chapter he presents the need of a new patriotism. The twentieth century Christianity, which must be applied by the twentieth century churches, is the hope of our future. The awakening social conscience must be educated. The teachings of Jesus contain the fundamental principles which must be inculcated. The fundamental laws of *service* and *sacrifice*, energized by the law of *love*, must be perfectly obeyed before society can be perfected. "The city is to control the nation; Christianity must control the city, *and it will*." This optimistic climax makes up for most of the darker features of the book. This volume should be in the hands of every American citizen, and the ministers of our country will find in it much that will stimulate them in their work for humanity. The Gospel which Christ preached and which he sent us forth to preach is "not a Gospel for disembodied spirits, but one for men in the flesh; not a gospel for a fraction of the man, but for the whole man, not a gospel for isolated individuals, but one for men in an organized society—a *kingdom* coming in the earth."

THOMAS W. DICKERT.

A TREATISE ON THE PREPARATION AND DELIVERY OF SERMONS. By John A. Broadus, D.D., LL.D., author of "A Harmony of the Gospels," "History of Preaching," "Commentary on Matthew," etc. New (Twenty-third) Edition. Edited by Edwin Charles Dargan, D.D., Professor of Homiletics in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. New York, A. C. Armstrong and Son, 51 East Tenth Street, near Broadway. 1898. Price, \$1.75.

The first edition of this work was published in 1870. Since then twenty-two editions of it have been exhausted. This in itself is proof of its superior character. If it had not been a work of very decided merit so many editions of it would not have been demanded. Moreover, during these twenty and more years it has found favor not only in this country, but also in England. The present edition is the twenty-third. It is not a mere reprint of the earlier editions, but a really new edition revised from the author's own notes, improved, and brought up to date. We commend it to ministers generally as well worthy of their attention. The careful reading of it can scarcely fail to be profitable to all whose work it is to preach the Gospel to their fellowmen. On the preparation and delivery of sermons we, indeed, know of nothing better.

J. M. T.

THEORY OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE. By Borden P. Bowne. Harper & Brother, New York. Pp. 389. \$1.50.

This is the latest and, in many respects, the most satisfactory of Dr. Bowne's series of philosophical works. The scope of inquiry is limited to a definite field, the discussion is thorough and exhaustive, and the statements, both of the problems involved and of the conclusions reached, are clear and forcible. There are, no doubt, many persons who feel no interest in a book of this kind simply because they have never, in their thinking, been confronted with the problems and difficulties contained in the subject which the author here makes his special study; but every thoughtful thinker, every inquirer who has put to himself the question: What is thought? or What is knowledge? will find in these pages a great deal that is intensely interesting as well as permanently helpful and instructive.

In an earlier work entitled *Metaphysics, a Study of First Principles*, the author discussed the general scope of philosophy as including the Science of Being on the one hand, and the Possibility and Nature of Knowledge on the other. In the more recent work *Being and Knowing*, while they cannot be entirely separated and the problems which arise in connection with the one continually involve the other, are held apart, and the inquiry is limited to the nature and contents of thought, that is to the process of thinking and the results of that process as they appear in the form of knowledge.

The author defines thought "as that form of mental activity whose aim is truth or knowledge." The first question that arises

pertains to the nature of the process itself. Is the mind active or passive? Is thought merely the impression made by something external, so that "things" become pictures in the mind, as objects are photographed upon a sensitive plate, and thus take the form of "thoughts?" Or is thought the result of the mind's own creative activity in such form that sense impressions, stimulating the mind into activity, become the occasion and the material for the construction of an inner world of ideas and relations which constitute the proper empire of thought, and which no photographic reproduction of the external world could produce? The author's criticism of the former or empirical theory is keen and effective, and he sets forth his own view that thought is constructive in a way which leaves little to be wished for in thoroughness and clearness. After a discussion of the general conditions of thought, of the objects of thought, and of the categories, he proceeds to consider the traditional forms of thought, the notion, the judgment and the inference. The discussion of the notion, whether it is individual or general, or whether it has an actual or possible metaphysical existence, is especially important and interesting and deserves careful study.

In the second part of the book the author takes up for consideration the Theory of Knowledge. After a careful discussion of philosophic scepticism, or the question: Can we know? which he sets aside as irrational, he proceeds to inquire into the nature of the relation between thought and thing, leading to a criticism of the current theories of monism and dualism, realism and idealism. To our human thinking there must always be a concrete, objective order, distinct and different from the thinking subject. And yet this objective order cannot be what the author calls a "lumpish reality or externality," existing apart from all thought or thinking. Thought and thing, idealism and realism, meet in the divine mind, where thought becomes thing through the mediation of will, or the actualization of the divine thought in the created order, not established once for all by a single act, but established and maintained by a continuous act, so that in the most real sense, the world is and has its being continuously in God. Perhaps the following quotation will set forth the author's view:

"Thought, then, is the supreme condition of any real monism. But this thought must be more than a passive conception in a mirroring consciousness. It must be a complex activity—must be, in fine, a thinker and a doer. Both elements are needed to meet the case. The production of reality cannot be reached by any analysis of conceptions, but only by a free actualization of conceptions. The conception in the understanding must be completed by the energizing in the will. In other words, creation is the only solution of finite existence in which thought can rest. The finite subject and the cosmic object must find their common ground and bond of union, not in some one impersonal substance, but in the absolute thought and will."

J. S. S.

ANNOTATIONS ON THE REVELATION OF ST. JOHN THE DIVINE. By Reverend F. Weidman, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in the Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary. Pages lxx and 365. Christian Literature Company, New York. 1898. Price, \$1.50.

This forms the twelfth volume of the *Lutheran Commentary*, published under the general editorship of Prof. Henry Eyster Jacobs. The general character of the volume is in harmony with that of the previous volumes, which have been noticed in this REVIEW. The purpose of this work is to furnish a plain exposition of the New Testament Scriptures for the benefit of intelligent Christians generally. For Sunday-school teachers, and for busy preachers, as well as for general Bible readers, such a commentary must be of great value. They find in it a guide to the understanding of the Bible without any learned apparatus, and without any extended critical discussions. The object of the different commentators is to give results rather than the methods of obtaining them; and the text adopted for this purpose is that of the Revised English version.

Professor Weidner informs his readers that this "book was written altogether in the inductive way. The author did not begin with any preconceived views as to what the outcome would be." Of course, no commentary ought ever to be written in any other way. No theologian is fit to write a commentary, who cannot rid himself of any denominational or dogmatic bias. It is the commentator's business not to import his own preconceived opinions into the language of the sacred writers, but to discover and express the meaning of those writers. But while Professor Weidner thus declares himself to be entirely receptive in relation to the sense of his author, he has the happy faculty of nearly always coming out in harmony with orthodox exegetical traditions, especially of the Lutheran type. In a Lutheran commentary this could hardly be expected to be otherwise. There is such a thing as exegesis being *unconsciously* influenced by the dogmatic and confessional system of the exegete.

Professor Weidner maintains the traditional view of the authorship of the book of Revelation. It was written by John the Apostle, who also wrote the fourth Gospel, and the three Epistles which go under his name; and the date of composition is the end of the reign of Domitian, A.D. 95 or 96. Of this there can be no doubt. It is true that a powerful school of commentators have in recent times maintained that the book must have been written in the reign of Nero; but for this view there is, according to Professor Weidner, no sound reason. The literary differences between the Gospel of John and the Apocalypse have been relied upon as establishing either a difference of authorship, or at least a very considerable interval of time between the composition of these two works. But this difference is greatly exaggerated and proves nothing, says our commentary.

As to method of interpretation our author generally adopts the

principles of the *Futurist* system; maintaining that the prophecies of the book relate to events which are as yet in the distant future. Not spiritual principles merely, according to the *spiritualist* system, nor incidents in the history of primitive Christian times, according to the *preterist* system, nor a progressive history of the fortunes of the Church from the beginning to the end of its existence, according to the *continuous historical* system, do we find in the Apocalypse, but prophecies relating to the second coming of Christ, which will precede the millenium. As the book of Daniel was the apocalypse of the first advent, so the Revelation of St. John is the apocalypse of the second advent of Christ. The phrase (Chap. I., verse 1), "the things which must *shortly* come to pass," which is frequently quoted in favor of the preterist system, is by our author explained as "referring to the rapidity with which the events prophesied, at the appointed time, shall come to pass." The original term is ἐν τάχει, which according to our commentator does not mean *soon* after the time of writing, but in *swift succession* at some distant epoch. In accordance with this view our commentator rejects all the explanations that have yet been proposed of the mystic number of the beast, in 13:18, namely 666. It was observed as early as the time of Irenæus that the Greek letters involved in this number spell the word *Lateinos*. In recent times it has been claimed with great confidence that the name intended is *Neron Kaisar*, it being supposed that the writer had in view Hebrew letters. These solutions are all brushed aside by our commentator as worthless, and the last one especially is branded as *rationalistic*. Professor Weidner, by the way, has a peculiar habit of denouncing any opposing views as rationalistic, which does probably not strengthen him in the judgment of scholars. In regard to the point now under consideration he says: "We may be pretty certain that it will be impossible to discover the secret before the beast's appearance, and then believers will be able to recognize him by this number." Then he continues as follows: "Deeply significant is the fact, noticed by many commentators, that the number of the name *Jesus*, our Redeemer's personal name, according to the numerical value of the letters in its Greek form, is 888. The number *eight* has a deep significance. It is the number of the resurrection. It has the same relation to the number of Christ, as six has to the number of Antichrist." We confess that to us all this is not very convincing. It looks a good deal like trifling. In general we cannot favor the futurist view of the book of Revelation. We prefer the preterist view, with all the difficulties which it may involve, rather than the view which would make of this book a mere sphinx to its original readers.

HER PLACE ASSIGNED. A Story for Older Sunday-school Scholars. By Walter E. Schutte. Pages vi and 448. Price, \$1.50. Lutheran Publication Society. Philadelphia, Pa. 1898.

This is a work of fiction written with the view of impressing upon the minds of young readers the truths of the Christian religion and of Christian morality. The events of the narrative are taken from every-day home life; and while there is no plot of deep mystery to fascinate the attention of the reader, the interest of the story is well sustained, and young readers will be pleased. The high school, the catechetical class, the church service, the occupations and pleasures of home, the excitement of the street, and the agitations of the labor convention are all made to contribute to the interest of the story. The particular religious atmosphere and spirit pervading the story are those of the Lutheran Church, which, however, is sufficiently like to our own to make the book entirely safe and profitable reading for our own young people. In much of the fiction which is found on the shelves of Sunday-school libraries there breathes a spirit antagonistic both to the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. Much of what is held dear in both these churches is ridiculed in the books which their children read. All this is different in the volume before us. Here catechizing, confirmation, liturgical worship, the observance of Church festivals, and similar things, are spoken of with reverence as valuable Christian institutions. Pastors and Sunday-school superintendents who are increasing their libraries will do well to include this volume in their lists.

GENESIS OF THE SOCIAL CONSCIENCE. *The Relation Between the Establishment of Christianity in Europe and the Social Question.* By H. S. Nash, Professor in the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge. Pages viii and 309. Macmillan Company, New York. 1897.

It is one of the significant signs of the times that works on sociological questions are appearing in great numbers. Indeed, so rapid is the publication of them that one finds it almost impossible to keep pace with it in reading. The meaning of this is, of course, that a great many educated people are thinking on sociological questions. And the cause of this again is the continuous and ever-increasing pressure of social problems. The social world is not at present in a condition of stable equilibrium. There is much unrest and agitation. The pressure of life on certain classes is daily becoming severer. While wealth is increasing, it is continually becoming more difficult for great masses of men to obtain the means of livelihood for themselves and their families. The struggle for existence is bearing with great severity upon the humbler classes of society. The great majority enter this struggle handicapped from the start, and they never have the ghost of a chance to succeed. Until quite recent times, and when the pressure of the struggle was not as heavy as it is now, the problem here presented received but little attention. Preachers, especially, got rid of the difficulty by observing that it is God's will that some people should be rich and others poor; and this, while intended to be comforting to the poor, proved to

be a very flattering doctrine to the rich, who were thus led to believe themselves to be the special favorites of heaven. Those among the clergy who are still preaching the "old-fashioned Gospel" of social predestination to the delectation of the silk-robed and kid-gloved members of their flocks, and, indeed, all who are interested in sociological studies, ought to read this book of Professor Nash on the "Genesis of the Social Conscience." It would at least afford them wholesome food for reflection.

Professor Nash defines the essence of the social problem to be the individualization of the downmost man in society and making him really count as one. He adopts as primary maxims of social ethics, first, the utilitarian rule formulated by Mill, "Each man is to count for one, nobody for more than one," and, secondly, Kant's practical principle, "Always treat humanity, whether in yourself or another, as a person, and never as a thing." This is what he calls the concrete doctrine of equality, and which he defines as the "equal right of every man to be individual." "Divine right is not now the monopoly of kings and aristocrats. All men have divine right, the right to be individual," that is, the right to develop their individual personality and to be happy, in this life, to the utmost measure of their capacity. "A society that refuses to provide the lowest man with the opportunity for self-development, and turns him into a thing, a means to another's self-development, is 'a compact with hell,'" p. 286. This is the dictum of the social conscience of the present Christian world. The social conscience is the conscience which insists that the concrete doctrine of individuality should be a permanent element in the social constitution. And this doctrine "draws after it the moral necessity of undoing political laws which make the individuality of some men a bar to the individuality of any men, and of removing certain economic conditions which make it impossible for masses of mankind to be individual at all." It is our author's purpose to show how this social conscience, the conscience which insists on counting the commonest man as one, and giving to all an equal chance for life, liberty and happiness, was developed among the nationalities of the Mediterranean world. Outside of the circle of these nationalities no such conscience ever existed. There has never been any social problem among the Asiatic peoples. The idea of individual personality has never been recognized there, and hence, of course, the question how the State—society in its organized form—should secure for it the right and the chance of free development could never have arisen. In the early Greek and Roman republics also the idea of individuality did not come to its rights. The polytheistic form of religion among the Greeks and Romans, as among other nations, must have prevented the true doctrine of man and of human society from gaining acceptance. Before the brotherhood of men could be acknowledged, the unity and fatherhood of God must be recognized. Our author, accordingly, shows how the introduction of

Christianity among the Mediterranean peoples first gave rise to the existence of a social question, and how, under the stimulating influence of Christianity through the subsequent centuries the social conscience was gradually developed among the Christian nations. How the process of this development was affected by the development of dogma during the Christological and scholastic periods, how it was affected by the doctrine of the incarnation, by the doctrine of individual immortality, and even by the doctrine of the endless punishment of the wicked in hell, and how it was affected by the evolution of the medieval Church, by the institution of monasticism, and by the work of the Reformers, we can not now indicate in the briefest manner. For these points we must refer the reader to the book under consideration. We allow ourselves only to quote a few sentences in regard to the sociological implications of the dogma of the incarnation. "The democratic ideal, therefore, has a very real interest in the debate between Athanasius and Arius over the iota. The debate between the Christian and the heathen concepts of God involved a warfare of ideals for humanity. The dogma of the incarnation completed the dogma of creation and revelation. It affirmed that there is nothing in God which may not come into relation with mankind. It was all in the interest of the common man. * * * It assured him that he was kith and kin with the highest, that he was in everlasting partnership with the best. * * * When Athanasius contended for the full meaning of the words 'God became man,' he did it in order that he might go on with full power to the words 'in order that man might become divine.' And 'man' as he viewed him took in the saddle-maker on the same terms with Socrates. Yea, 'man' included the lowest slave. He had equal right of entry with Caesar into the holiest," pp. 108-9.

In all this we need scarcely say that we are in full agreement with our author. But there are some points in regard to which we are not so sure that we can agree with him. One of these, for instance, is "the social significance of the predestinarian view of the world." Professor Nash agrees with many others in representing the doctrine of absolute divine sovereignty as being correlated with the doctrine of the absolute human individual, or with the doctrine of civil and religious liberty. Numerous are the attempts made to prove the world's indebtedness for civil and religious liberty to Calvinism. And it is true that Calvinistic peoples have been lovers of liberty, and that through them liberty has been promoted. If this claim made in behalf of Calvinism were entirely true, it would prove nothing in regard to the correctness of Calvinistic doctrine; for in the process of evolution things which in themselves are evil may become factors in the development of that which is good. But we believe that the relation of Calvinism to liberty is rather external and accidental than internal and necessary. The idea of the absolute sovereignty of God, it is usually said, causes men to refuse obedience to any

authority but that of God, that is, to claim for themselves the exercise of the utmost freedom. That is doubtless true; men who are thoroughly possessed of this idea will claim for themselves the liberty of acting as they think God wants them to act; and this may accidentally promote the progress of liberty. But are men thus possessed, ready to allow to others the same liberty which they claim for themselves? History tells another tale. But if Calvinistic predestinarianism is favorable to liberty, why is not Mohammedan predestinarianism alike favorable? We know that in Mohammedanism fatalism has killed every aspiration of liberty. We would, then, be disposed at least to modify somewhat the statements of our author on this subject. But this is not a vital point, and we welcome this book as a whole because we believe that its influence on sociological thought must be beneficial.

This influence of the book will, however, probably be somewhat diminished by the style in which it is written. It is not an easy book to read. It must be read with a constant stretch of attention, and that, according to Herbert Spencer's rule, is not an evidence of a good style. The book, indeed, can be understood by any one who is willing to bestow upon it the necessary amount of attention, but it does not *arrest* and *fascinate* attention and *compel* understanding. The language is often epigrammatic and picturesque, and at times terse even to obscurity. If it had been written in a more easy and fascinating style, it would doubtless have obtained a wider reading and accomplished more good. But as it is we commend it to those among our readers who are interested in sociological studies, as all ministers ought to be, and willing to bestow upon it the necessary amount of attention. To them it will prove a rich mine of thought on a timely and interesting subject.

THE PLACE OF DEATH IN EVOLUTION. By Newman Smyth. Pages xii and 227. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York. 1897.

The subject with which this book deals is an exceedingly interesting one, and one too in regard to which more light than now prevails is greatly to be desired. Until recently our theology treated death simply as an infliction of punishment in consequence of human sin. The fall and disobedience of the first man in Paradise brought death into the world and all our woes. The inference, of course, is that if man had not sinned, disease and death would never have occurred, and the history of the human race, if indeed it would have had any history, would have been entirely different from what it is now. This connection between sin and death was extended even to the animal world beneath man. To the observation that according to the testimony of the rocks death must have reigned over countless generations of animals previous to the appearance of man upon this planet, the answer

was made that the petrifications in the rocks were either created as they now exist, or, if they once belonged to living beings, these must have been visited with death in anticipation of human sin. And, in fact, if we are to suppose their death to have been a punishment of human sin, we may as well suppose them to have been punished before the commission of that sin as after it; for the one view is about as reasonable as the other. This theory was built upon a few texts of Scripture which, being originally intended in a moral and religious sense, were taken in a natural and scientific sense, and made to teach doctrines contradicting all human reason and experience.

This stage of theologizing is now happily past. Perverted texts of Scripture are no longer allowed to rule our science or control our faith. Experience and the facts of nature must be interpreted in their own light before they can be interpreted in the light of moral and religious teaching. Agreeably to this principle the subject of death must be studied in the light of biology and evolution, and the significance which attaches to it in this light must be unreservedly acknowledged, while at the same time we may still continue to view it also in a moral and religious aspect. It is in this way that the subject is treated in the book before us. The author is a believer in evolution, and in the first chapter, entitled "The Entrance and Use of Death in Nature," presents the biological conception of death. Death in this view is not an evil, but a good, and, under the law of natural selection, promotes the process of evolution and the ascent of life. There is a region of life in which death does not exist. It is the realm of unicellular beings in which multiplication takes place by mere division. Death comes in where sexual beings begin, and where multiplication takes place by conjugation of two individuals. And here it is a condition of progressive evolution—a means of advancing the progress of life, and therefore good, rather than an evil. And this law prevails in the human world as well as in the sub-human, showing that the former is originally planned upon the same idea as the latter, and that death is not an accidental or unnatural event coming in in the course of man's history and serving as a punishment of some generic transgression.

But granting that death is an essential factor in the development of the generic life of humanity, serving to raise each successive generation higher than those which have preceded it, how about the individual man? Must the individual perish in order that the type may survive and improve, or is death a benefit to the individual, too? This question our author discusses in the third and fourth chapters of the volume before us, headed respectively "Scientific Presumptions of Immortality," and "The Final Discharge of Death." We cannot here follow the course of our author's argument in detail. He does not claim to *prove* the immortality of the soul; but he claims that the theory of evolution does not weaken, but rather strengthen the presumption of im-

mortality. He mentions "the principle of continuity" as adding strength to this presumption; and he quotes with approbation the remark of John Fiske that belief in the immortality of the soul is a "supreme act of faith in the reasonableness of God's work." The human soul is the final product in the process of evolution, and possesses therefore not merely *selective* but *survival* value. When death shall have accomplished its office in the production of a being of perfect organization and adaptation, then death itself will be done away, and the result will be immortality. Of course, belief in immortality presupposes belief in a personal God, and those who can not reconcile evolution and theism, can not reconcile evolution and immortality. But that is the fault not of the argument, but of their mental constitution. The author of the volume before us, at any rate, is a theist as well as an evolutionist.

In chapter five the author contrasts the "biological and the Biblical view of death." The former makes it a beneficent means of progressive development and happiness, the latter regards it as a means of punishment which could not exist at all if man had not sinned. Are these views irreconcilable? The author thinks not. They are aspects of the same truth viewed from opposite points of view; as a mountain summit would present different aspects when viewed from a point on the plain or from a point directly above it. The object of Biblical teaching is not to give us natural or scientific truth, but to cultivate the religious life within us. It is moral and religious truth which it teaches. And as it would be a mistake to use the story of creation in Genesis in order to teach geological science, so it would be a mistake to accept what the Bible says about death as a natural history of death either in the animal or human world. This is doubtless a valid distinction, although some may not be altogether satisfied with the manner in which the author has wrought it out. We confess that we ourselves have been impressed with some sense of weakness at this point, although we regard the work as a whole as worthy of the highest commendation. It worthily opens up a subject which needs new investigation and thought. The old theological theory of death is no longer tenable, and he who attempts, however imperfectly, to put something better in its place, deserves well of the theological and religious public.

Der Tod Christi, in seiner Bedeutung für die Erlösung, Eine biblisch-theologische Untersuchung, von Alfred Seeberg, Doctor und Professor der Theologie in Dorpat. Pages vi and 384. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Leipzig. 1895.

This work, which has been before the theological public of Germany for several years, is, as the title indicates, a Biblico-theological study on a most important subject. It is a subject, moreover, in regard to which there is by no means unanimity of theological thought in the Church. That the death of Christ has

redeeming influence in humanity is a truth which Christendom has always recognized on the ground of religious experience. But in the explanation of this truth much doctrinal variety has always manifested itself; and there is no present probability that this variety will soon give place to dogmatic agreement. In the view of our author as expressed in the preface to this volume, the theory of vicarious satisfaction, formulated by Anselm and held by the older Protestant dogmaticians, must be regarded as a total perversion of the truth; but so also must Ritschl's construction of the theory of Aberlard, which is by no means adequate to the import attributed to the death of Christ in the primitive proclamation of the Gospel. This statement may serve to indicate the author's own standpoint at least negatively.

It should be observed, however, that what we have before us in this volume is not a dogmatic treatise, but a Biblical study. It is in the line of Biblical theology. The author distinctly disavows the purpose of writing a dogmatic treatise on the atonement. The question which he seeks to answer is not what has the Church believed, or what ought the Church to believe, concerning the significance of the death of Christ, but what did the writers of Scripture believe. That is the primary question for the theologian. The dogmatic question is important too, and deserves careful study; but it can properly be entered upon only after the Biblical question has been answered; and then it requires in the theologian who attempts it a power of combination and of intuitive apprehension of truth, such as is given to but few men. A hodge-podge of Biblical, historical and dogmatic conceptions anybody can write, but to produce a *dogmatic* is not so easy.

Agreeably to his purpose, then, the author of this volume studies the several writings of the New Testament separately with reference to the particularly subject under investigation. This is unquestionably the right method of Biblical study. Whatever we may think of the Bible as an organic whole, its several books, especially in the New Testament, must be acknowledged to possess each an individuality of its own which compels a separate study in order to its proper comprehension. Paul cannot be explained by Peter, or Peter by Paul, but each writer can only be explained by himself; and when this end has been accomplished, then only can the attempt be made to comprehend both in a higher formula. Following this method the author adopts the following order in his study of the New Testament writings. He begins with the Epistle to the Hebrews; not because he considers this the oldest part of the New Testament, but because the death of Christ in its relation to redemption is treated most fully in this Epistle. But he holds that in this Epistle the atoning work of Christ is apprehended mainly, not under the aspect of a suffering sacrifice, but of an officiating high priest. The author passes next to the consideration of the writings of John, in which he thinks that the death of Christ is represented as serving mainly the purpose of

His glorification and exaltation to heaven. The Epistles of Paul are considered next; and here the idea of union with Christ is believed to be the determinative conception. After this the author passes to the Epistles of Peter, the discourses in the Acts of the Apostles, and finally to the teaching of the Synoptists. But we have not room here to indicate even in the briefest manner the results obtained by this investigation.

In the beginning of the chapter on the teaching of the Synoptists the author calls attention to the fact that he does not designate the subject of this chapter as *the teaching of Jesus*, and gives as the reason for this that "the words which the Synoptists put into the mouth of Jesus concerning the redeeming import of His death cannot be proven to have been uttered by Him." As the words were formulated, not by Jesus, but by those who reported them, we can in no case be certain of the thoughts of Jesus Himself, but only of the impression which His words made upon those who first heard them. But it is important to remember that just when He spoke about His death we are told that His disciples understood Him not. It follows, then, that not what Jesus Himself taught concerning His death, but what His disciples understood Him to teach, is what we may properly try to discover. And to this object the author then addresses himself, although it is but fair to observe that he supposes the primitive Christian community after all to have had a substantially accurate conception of the mind of the Master on the subject of His own death. It is important to remember, however, that in the Synoptic Gospels Jesus but seldom comes to speak on this subject. Indeed there are but three passages recorded by the Synoptists in which Jesus speaks of the saving import of His death. The first is that in which He speaks of giving His soul as a ransom for the benefit of many (Mark 20:45; Math. 20:28); the second that in which, at the last supper, He calls the cup the symbol of His blood, by the shedding of which is established the new covenant; and the third that in which He explains the significance of His sufferings to the two disciples on the way to Emaus after His resurrection (Luke 24:44-47). The new covenant spoken of at the last supper, our author argues with much force, refers to such prophecies as that contained in Jer. 31:31 sq. In the new covenant two things will be accomplished. The first is the forgiveness of sins and the second is the internalization of the law in the hearts of the people, so that righteousness may become the spontaneous product of their life. That new covenant with its effects, is now to go into operation in consequence of the death of Christ.

In the last chapter the author sums up the result of his preceding investigation. What, according to this separate study of each individual writer of the New Testament, is the comprehensive result of its teaching as a whole on the subject in hand? At the risk of inadequacy of representation, which must always accompany such an effort, we venture to summarize our author's

views as follows: The writers of the New Testament all agree that it was necessary for Christ, through death, to enter into heavenly glory, in order that He might make effective His saving work among men. After having, by means of his words and works gathered a believing community, which is to maintain itself to the end of time by preaching the word concerning Christ, He was received into heavenly glory to the end that His saving work might attain to universal character. He presents Himself now to the eye of faith, not merely as the exalted Redeemer, but as Redeemer in whom the marks of death are still visible, to the end that he may awaken a sense of the execrable character of sin. Those who come unto Him in this state of mind, the exalted Redeemer receives into the inmost personal and vital communion with himself. Christ and the sinner form a unity which makes it possible that the act of Christ may come to stand for that of the sinner. In virtue of this union God may look upon the Christian as one who has *ideally* suffered all the ills which Christ suffered on account of sin; and thus reconciliation is effected, on the ground of which the sinner is sanctified. It appears thus that the death of Christ, *in itself considered*, has no saving efficacy. It obtains this efficacy only through the activity of the living Christ. But from this it follows that it would be incorrect to say that by the death of Christ God was reconciled to humanity, or to say that in His death He bore the penalty of the world's sin, and appeased the wrath of God. "The theory of substitutionary satisfaction," says Professor Seeberg, "is, in point of fact, totally foreign to the New Testament. The cause of the suffering of Christ was not the *wrath*, but the *love* of God; and the essence of His suffering consisted, not in eternal, but in physical death. In one sense only is it possible to speak of a vicarious suffering of Christ, namely, in the sense that his temporal suffering has freed sinners from the necessity of eternal suffering." From this resumé it can easily be seen that our author does not adhere to the traditional theory of the atonement, but that he is equally far from those modern theories which empty the death of Christ of any really redeeming efficacy. But the book before us must be thoroughly and carefully studied in order that the author's views may be properly appreciated.

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I. ON THE ORIGIN OF LIFE.

BY RICHARD C. SCHIEDT.

The chief criticism with which I was honored by competent judges in reference to my recent article, "On the Origin of Death," emphasized the fact that a preliminary "On the Origin of Life" ought to have preceded the discussion as its proper logical basis. I fully agree with the critics and appreciate the honor of their consideration, however, I have always had a horror of futile speculations preferring well-established facts to all "gray theories;" and a discussion of the origin of life as the logical basis of the origin of death would necessarily involve the introduction of assumptions from which to draw scientific deductions would have been ludicrous. Nevertheless, I have heeded the kind suggestions of my critics and studied the subject from the standpoint of pure science, offering now as a postscript what ought to have been an introduction.

The old question, What is life, has been answered by many thinkers in many ways. A perfect definition would, perhaps, require the summing up of all the views ever expressed on the subject and yet we might never approach in completeness the language of Christ's interpretation of eternal life. For my par-

ticular purpose it suffices to compare the living with the lifeless in order to obtain a definition for *life in its most primitive sense*. In discussing the origin of life we must logically take the environment into consideration within which we find life. The earth is generally supposed to be an unorganized body inhabited by living, organized beings which form a sharp contrast to it. The ultimate elements of matter are the same in both; the properties and changes of living bodies are strictly dependent on the same physico-chemical laws as those of mineral bodies, but there is this difference, that in the former we recognize an organization, a composition of unlike parts, called organs, in which matter exhibits its activity in a fluid and dissolved form, while in the latter we find a more uniform though not always homogeneous mass in which the various parts continue in a state of resting equilibrium, so long as the unity of the body remains undisturbed. Moreover, *living matter which apparently is not organized, i. e., a mere lump of protoplasm, still exhibits the same internal motion, capable of assimilating and secreting food, giving rise to those complex chemical compounds, called albuminoid bodies, never found in this combination in the inorganic substance. This is the essential difference.* The molecular arrangement of the minerals we definitely know, that of the material basis of living organisms we have not yet discovered, nor can we explain the conditions under which they exist. It is merely dealing in terms, when we say that living bodies are distinguished from minerals by the manifestation of certain functions, by the power which they possess of continually using up and renewing the matter composing the body, by the power of irritability, of growth and of reproduction. No one has as yet claimed to have scientifically demonstrated the existence of a vital force which would explain these conditions. But we can demonstrate the nature of the organic substances, *i. e.*, the ternary and quaternary carbon compounds which undergo the exchanges characterizing metabolism; they either decompose under the influence of oxidation into substances of simpler composition—as is the case with animals—or they are built up by substitution from simpler inorganic sub-

stances as is the case with plants. All these elements are found in inorganic nature. A vital element, *i. e.*, an element peculiar to organisms no more exists according to our present knowledge than a vital force working independently of natural and material processes. The fact that many of the so-called organic compounds, viz.: urea, vinegar, sugar, alcohol, etc., can now be artificially built up by synthesis from other elements indicates the probability that many other organic substances will be synthetically produced, especially albumin. We, therefore, find here the suggestion that in the origination of organized bodies the same forces must have been active which are sufficient for the formation of unorganized bodies, so that, from the scientific standpoint, we are compelled to refer the functions peculiar to organisms, viz., metabolism, growth, movement, etc., to the properties of the chemical compounds composing them, particularly to the complicated molecular arrangement of living matter. From this point of view the explanation of the origin of life must be sought in the mode of origin attributed to its environment, the earth, and my definition of life for present purposes would be, that *life is a function of the earth-development in the mathematical sense, i. e.*, “a mathematical quantity whose changes of value depend on those of other quantities called its variables.” It is only upon such a premise that I can discuss the subject at all intelligently, for the ultimate dictum, that all life comes from God permits of no further discussion, unless an enquiry into the probable methods of God is admitted.

It is generally agreed that the Nebular Hypothesis satisfactorily explains the origin of the earth. Astronomy and physics, geology and embryology, mineralogy and chemistry insist all upon this one point. Modern research has demonstrated *ad oculos* by means of the telescope and the spectral apparatus, that the same process of development which our globe passed through can still be witnessed in the universe on other celestial bodies; we find all stages of development from the gaseous nebular spot through the liquid fiery ball to the rigid ice-cold mass, the last phase, which will, in the end, be the fate of our earth, and is now ex-

hibited by our faithful companion the moon. The fact, then, that our earth, many millions of years ago, was a glowing sphere with a temperature which made the existence of organisms impossible must always be reckoned with as an important moment in all speculations on the origin of life, as the various views that have been advanced on this subject actually show. I may be permitted to present some of the most important theories hitherto held, state the objections to which they are exposed and finally give my own view on the subject.

The two theories which above all others have been most ardently discussed by scientific men are concisely stated by Helmholtz's alternative, viz., "organic life either began at some definite time or it has been in existence from eternity." They represent the extreme opposites, the former the theory of spontaneous generation, the latter the cosmozoic theory. According to the first, living matter must have arisen out of lifeless matter some time after the temperature of the earth had considerably decreased. The mode of origin as well as the form of the first organisms were for centuries objects of futile discussion and wild conjecture. Even a man like Aristotle had no particular difficulties in believing that animals, even as high in the scale of life as fish, could originate from the mud. Not until the microscope had reached a comparatively high degree of perfection did the old view give place to the theory that the lowest organisms were spontaneously generated by the infusion of hay or other organic substances in water. But Milne-Edwards, Schwann, Helmholtz and others proved by experiments that the organisms which so rapidly developed and multiplied in these infusions arose from germs already present either in the substances introduced or in the surrounding air. And when in later times with the discovery of the bacteria these speculations were revived, Pasteur and Robert Koch stepped forward and proved, that after the exclusion of all the germs which might come into contact with the preparation from the outside, even the most favorable culture medium would remain free from bacteria; but as soon as exposed to the air for only a few minutes it would be peopled with a

whole world of bacteria. However, experiments in the opposite directions have not yet ceased; men still harp on the idea of Goethe's amanuensis Wagner that it is possible to compose a human being from chemical mixtures in the retort, in spite of the fact that the molecular composition of living matter is still a *terra incognita*. To Haeckel belongs the credit of having pointed out the grain of truth contained in the theory of the spontaneous generation of life. He holds that it is absolutely immaterial whether living substance still arises spontaneously or not. He, however, maintains that there must have been a time when the living arose from the lifeless, because there was a time in the history of the earth when existence of organic life upon it was utterly impossible. When, however, water vapors condensed and fell in the form of drops from the atmosphere, the opportunity was at hand for the formation of the simplest organisms, not consisting of cells, indeed, but of "perfectly homogeneous, structureless, formless lumps of albumin." Yet Haeckel does not tell us how it all came about, because, he says, we cannot have any idea of the conditions of the surface of the earth at that time, and, therefore, do not know the opportunities offered for the autogeny of organisms.

The second theory, called by Preyer the theory of the cosmo-zoëa, has only lately (about thirty years ago) been advanced by H. E. Richter. Proceeding from the supposition that there are everywhere present in the celestial sphere minute particles of solid matter, which are continuously dropped by the celestial bodies in their constant evolution, he maintains that, together with these particles, living germs of micro-organisms are distributed, passing from one inhabited celestial sphere to the other. If perchance they meet conditions favorable to growth they begin to develop and thus become the starting point of a new world of organisms. Richter thinks that life in the form of cells has always existed somewhere in the universe and therefore changes Harvey's old dictum into "*omne vivum ab æternitate e cellula*." According to him life never originated but was always transferred from one planet to the other. The mode of transportation is explained

by his theory of cosmozoëa. Every now and then meteors have been found which contained traces of carbon, even humus and coal-tar substances, proving that in spite of the enormous friction not enough heat was generated to incinerate such organic remains. Therefore Richter thinks it possible that life-bearing germs could pass through the atmosphere without losing their vitality. That they could exist without water or food may be assumed from our observations on hibernating animals. Helmholtz and Sir William Thomson reached the same conclusion independently from Richter, only a few years later. The former has shown that large meteors are only heated on the surface but are cold within while passing through the atmosphere, so that they might be bearers of living germs, as the presence of carbon-hydrogen compounds and the spectrum of the light of comets further prove.

The objections to this theory lie in the composition of living substances themselves. We said above that their chemical elements are the same as those of inorganic matter, they only differ in the mode of molecular union. Albuminoid bodies are, therefore, not principally different from inorganic bodies, the difference is only one of chemical synthesis. A consideration of the origin of living substances must, therefore, be of such a character as to be applicable to minerals. From this point of view the cosmozoic theory becomes untenable. For, if we assume that the albuminoid bodies existed from eternity, we must likewise assume that inorganic bodies, *e. g.*, quartz and feldspar, have always existed somewhere in the universe and have simply come to us from some other planet. If this theory would be carried out for all chemical compounds we would be forced to the conclusion that our earth came into existence somewhat after the fashion of Minerva. No thinking mind would be willing to accept such a theory; on the other hand, all the leading chemists of the present day agree, that even our so-called chemical elements with high atomic weight were formed by condensation from elements with low atomic weight. Furthermore, the cosmozoic theory carried to its last logical conclusion would lead to the com-

plete denial, not only of living substance, but also of the whole earth as such and the idea of development would become an absurdity. I repeat, the principle governing the origin of feldspar is the same as that which determines the origin of albumin. Both are chemical compounds. This is especially well illustrated by the growth of plants. What an enormous mass of inorganic matter is every spring and summer transformed into organic living substance, and how regularly it returns to the inorganic kingdom at the approach of every winter.

Quite different from Richter's method of explanation is that of Preyer, the distinguished physio-psychologist. He also maintains that life has no beginning. He argues, that if spontaneous generation had taken place once in the distant past, it ought to take place to-day, for the same conditions for the maintenance of life must have prevailed then as now, otherwise the new product could not have remained alive. At the same time he cannot accept the cosmozoic theory, since it does not solve the problem, but simply transfers it upon some other planet. He says, our present experience teaches us the "*omne vivum e vivo*;" we also know that the living substance constantly excretes the lifeless or inorganic; why not, then, assume that in the beginning the lifeless originated from living substance; for, if we hold, that there must have been a time, when the living was generated from the lifeless, the "*omne vivum e vivo*" falls to the ground and the continuity of life is denied. What must be the deduction from Preyer's reasoning on the basis of the nebular hypothesis? If the living was before the lifeless, the earth must have contained life at the time when it was still in a glowing condition. This is, indeed, Preyer's conclusion. He looks upon the liquid fiery mass as living substance and advocates the surrender of our present conception of living matter in favor of his new proposition. He argues, that the whole body of the earth in its igneous condition was originally a single gigantic organism. The powerful motion of its substance was its life. In the process of cooling, the heavy metals, no longer capable of motion, were excreted and formed the first inorganic masses. Gradually the igneous mass on the surface of

the earth became cold and rigid, *i. e.*, died and the lightest elements in gas or liquid form finally entered upon new combinations, giving rise to what we now call protoplasm. And, as in the course of time the chemical combinations became steadily more and more complex, the primitive form of our modern plant and animal kingdoms arose. Protoplasm is, therefore, not the result of spontaneous generation nor has it been transmitted from the outside, but it is the necessary resultant of the primeval life of the planets which consisted of intense motion; "their breath was perhaps glowing ferric vapor, their blood liquid metal and their food meteorites."*

It is not difficult to see that the difference between Preyer's theory and the theory of spontaneous generation is merely a difference in the conception of life. To him life is motion in its widest sense. Is such a conception permissible? Our present idea of life has been derived from a careful comparison of our present living organic bodies with the existing inorganic bodies. We said above that the only essential difference between the living and the lifeless consisted in the metabolism of the albuminous bodies. No inorganic substance contains albuminous bodies, and no living organic substance is without them. This is not a principal, but an essential difference, sufficient for the proper definition of living matter. If we drop this difference then we surrender our whole vantage ground and we must recognize the glowing masses of the once igneous globe as living bodies.

However, here the question may be raised from Preyer's standpoint, if living substance is descended uninterruptedly from liquid igneous mixtures, where is that particular point which designates the beginning of living matter? This question presupposes an uninterrupted gradual transmission from the igneous mixtures to the albuminous bodies, a supposition which cannot be maintained. Stress has been laid upon the fact that there is no principal difference between the living and the lifeless that does not prove that there should be an uninterrupted transition from the igneous

* W. Preyer : *Die Hypothesen über den Ursprung des Lebens*. Berlin, 1880.

mixtures to organisms. For, we know, that in the reaction of two chemical compounds the resultants do not in any wise exhibit evidences of transitional steps. So can we hardly know anything about the conditions which existed on the surface of the earth at the time when the first drops of water fell from the atmosphere. Thus there is just as much ground for the assumption that living albumin resulted from the reaction of chemical compounds entirely different from it without transitional steps at the time when the conditions were at hand, as there is for the idea of a gradual uninterrupted descendance.

Preyer, furthermore, tacitly maintains that the glowing masses of which he predicates life exhibited the phenomena of metabolism. Even this assumption cannot be verified. They, indeed, possessed energetic motion, and life is nothing else but a complex of motions to which every other molecular process of motion is principally related. But, nevertheless, living motion is a process which essentially characterizes the living organism; living substance constantly dissociates spontaneously, throws out the products of decomposition and takes in new material for purposes of regeneration and of reformation of similar atomic groups. This characteristic phenomenon of living substance can have hardly been the property of the primeval glowing masses and then passed on to the protoplasm of to-day. The igneous eruptive masses of our volcanoes, however intense in their motion, have never yet been observed to manifest such metabolic changes in the true sense of the term, and therefore do not deserve the name of living substances. Preyer's theory, therefore, reduces itself practically to the claims of the theory of spontaneous generation.

Decidedly the most scientific and thoughtful view on the origin of life has been presented by the eminent German physiologist Pflüger in his essay: "*Ueber die physiologische Verbrennung in den lebendigen Organismen*," published in his *Archives*, Vol. 10, 1875. He starts from a consideration of the chemical properties of albumin, representing the essential basis of all life. There exists a fundamental difference between the dead albumin,

as it exists in the chick's egg and the living albumin as produced by all living substance. All living substance dissociates spontaneously to a limited degree and more profusely in response to external stimuli, while dead albumin remains undecomposed under favorable conditions. The active principle in the dissociation of living albumin is the intramolecular oxygen, *i. e.*, the oxygen which is a part of the living albuminous molecule, being constantly taken in from the air. This is proved by the fact that dissociation implies the constant liberation of carbon dioxide, formed not by the oxidation of the carbon and the subsequent separation of a molecule of carbon dioxide, but by simultaneous separation of the new atom groups constituting the carbon dioxide. The living substance must contain the oxygen already in the living molecule, undergoing in dissociation merely a separation by circumligation, otherwise frogs would not be able to exist for so long a time, even for more than twenty-four hours, in an atmosphere of pure nitrogen and still exhale carbon dioxide, an experiment repeatedly tried by Pflüger. There is no oxygen compound in all organic chemistry which would contain sufficient oxygen in its molecules to oxidize the hydrogen atoms present to water and the carbon atoms to carbon dioxide. This is only possible by the introduction of free oxygen sufficient to produce dissociation by intramolecular circumligation. Of vast importance is the fact disclosed by a comparison between the dissociation products of the dead albumin artificially oxidized and the living albumin; the non-nitrogenous products are the same in both cases, but there is no similarity whatever between the nitrogenous dissociation products. Now we know that the radical of these latter products is CN or cyanogen in living albumin, and that the most important among them all, *i. e.*, urin, can be prepared artificially from cyanides. This proves *that the cyanide radical is likewise the basis of living albumin, whereby it is distinguished from the dead or food albumin.*

Pflüger therefore says, that in the formation of living albumin, *i. e.*, of cell-protoplasm, from food albumin a chemical change takes place accompanied by intense heat absorption, the nitrogen

atoms combining with the carbon atoms, thus producing, together with the cyanogen, intense motion in living matter. Cyanogen being an endothermic compound is naturally unstable and therefore is easily acted upon by the oxygen taken into the body, which causes its carbon atom to pass from the nitrogen-sphere into the oxygen-sphere and thus produce carbon-dioxide. Cyanogen is, therefore, the cause of dissociation, while its condition is the intramolecular introduction of oxygen. Moreover, there are a great many analogous combinations, which induce Pflüger to call cyanic acid a half living molecule. The growth of living substances is the same in its chemical processes as the formation of the polymeric compounds of cyanic acid, *e. g.*, cyamlin has the same formula as protoplasm, viz., $H_n C_n N_n O_n$. Both compounds are, in the presence of water, decomposed into carbon dioxide and ammonia, both furnish urin, not by direct oxidation, but by intramolecular circumligation. From these well-established facts we are compelled to draw the conclusion, that in the scientific consideration of the origin of life we cannot start primarily with ammonia and carbon dioxide, for they are the end of life, but that we must seek the beginning in the cyanogen. The whole problem resolves itself into the question, How does cyanogen arise? The answer is as important as it is interesting. Cyanogen and its compounds only arise at the temperature of white heat. This undoubted chemical fact forces us to the conclusion that they were formed at a time when the earth was still either partially or wholly in a liquid igneous condition. The same high temperature is necessary for the other essential constituents of albumin, viz., carbohydrates, alcohol radicals, etc., so that Pflüger stoutly affirms that fire is the force which has created living albumin through synthesis. "Life," he says, "is the child of fire, its fundamental conditions arose at a time when the earth was still a glowing fire-ball. During the immeasurably long ages required for the gradual cooling of its surface, cyanogen and its compounds had sufficient time to follow their strong inclination towards polymerism and with the aid of oxygen, water and salts to pass over into that self-dissociating albumin, which is living matter. I

would, therefore, say that the first albumin which arose was at once living matter, endowed with the property to attract with great force and inclination in all its radicals chemically similar components, in order to infuse them into the molecule and thus to grow *ad infinitum*. According to this view living albumin does not necessarily require a constant molecular weight, because it is a molecule, constantly forming and dissociating, bearing about the same relation to chemical molecules as the sun does to a small meteor. In the plant then living albumin continues to do what it always has been doing, viz., to regenerate itself, *i. e.*, to grow; wherefore I believe that all the living albumin existing in the world to-day is directly descended from that first albumin. I therefore doubt the theory of spontaneous generation, for comparative biology unerringly leads to the conclusion that all life has only one single root."

However, on close examination, even Pflüger's ingenious view seems to prove an illusion and a snare. Living albumin, even, if accepted as the true basis of life, as that substance which distinguishes the living world from the mineral world, is after all not life as manifested even by the non-nuclear mass of protoplasm. Protoplasm is not a chemical but a morphological concept, it is not a chemical substance of a complex composite character, but it is a mixture of numerous chemical substances united as smallest particles into a wonderfully complicated structure. Chemical compounds exhibit in different conditions of aggregation uniform characteristic properties. Protoplasm cannot be changed into other conditions of aggregation without ceasing to be protoplasm, For, the essential properties by which its life manifests itself, rest upon a definite organization. Just as the properties of a marble statue consist of the form which the artist has given to the marble, ceasing to be a statue if the marble is broken into minute pieces, so also does protoplasm depend upon its organization and ceases to be protoplasm if this organization is destroyed. Chemistry may in the course of time succeed to manufacture by synthesis albuminous bodies exactly like those in protoplasm, but to undertake the manufacture of protoplasm would resemble

Wagner's attempt to concoct a homunculus in a vial. According to all our present experience protoplasm cannot be obtained in any other way than by reproduction from already existing protoplasm. And even though we would accept Pflüger's view as a satisfactory explanation of the living basis of life, we would be forced to go a step farther back and to inquire into the origin of this living basis, until we would finally confront the two great watchwords of the day, "ether" and "force." And here we would be challenged by the presence of immutable laws, which according to all our experience in the human world presuppose a lawgiver, compelling us to fall back upon the old, old story: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."

Nevertheless, the very fact of accepting God as the author of the universe should lead us to respect both Preyer's and Pflüger's ingenious theories on the origin of life. Life is eternal, existing before the lifeless, inasmuch as it started in God. The forces of Nature are but different forms of His energy, principally the same both in the mineral and in the living world. According to our present experience His creations are not abrupt and disconnected, but gradual and harmonious. It is, therefore, likewise true that the mineral substance must have preceded the living. Coming from one author the earth and its inhabitants must be compared to a tree and its fruit. Living substance must be largely a part of earth-material. The combination of this earth-material into living substance must have been just as necessarily the product of His earth-development as the formation of water; an invariable sequence of the progressive cooling of those masses, which constituted the crust of the earth, and the chemical, physical and morphological properties of modern life must likewise have been the necessary results of the effects of present external conditions upon the internal conditions of the living substance of former ages. *Life then is a function of the earth-development in the mathematical sense and God is its author.*

II.

PROPHET AND SCIENTIST.*

GEO. W. RICHARDS.

In the realm of truth we meet two distinct persons—the prophet and the scientist. The achievements of the theologian and the philosopher, the artist and the mechanic, are the result of their respective labors. They represent two modes of mental activity with which men have tried to explore and subdue the universe of being. These functions may, and often do, co-operate in one person. He becomes a member of the prophetic or the scientific school as the one tendency or the other predominates in him. Faust is a type of men in general, when he says,

“Zwei seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner brust,
Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;
Die eine hält, in derber liebeslust,
Sich an die welt, mit klammernden organen;
Die andere hebt gewaltsam sich vom dust
Zu den gefilden hoher ahnen.”

There have been prophets since the world began. Scientists are by no means the boast of this age. Both have fashioned the life of nations and eras. The Hebrews were a prophetic people, though not devoid of scientific power. The Greeks were a scientific nation, yet the light of prophecy glorifies all their productions. “The ‘world unrealized’ of Plato is the counterpart in Hellenic phrase and form of the anticipations of the Hebrew prophets, the world explored of Aristotle is the counterpart on a colossal scale of the boundless knowledge and practical wisdom of Solomon and his followers.” † We may say, the prophet is the scientist of the “world unrealized” and the scientist is the prophet of the world realized.

* The Alumni Oration, delivered in the Chapel of F. & M. College, June 8, 1898.

† History of Jewish Church, Stanley, Vol. III., p. 201.

It is strange, yet true, that these persons have not always been on the best of terms. The prophet has looked upon his brother as an iconoclast, smashing the cherished faiths of mankind. The scientist found pleasure in the old phrase, "The prophet is a fool; the spiritual man is mad." Both, however, have vindicated themselves in the work they have done. If the prophet may be styled Jubal—the father of all such as handle the harp and pipe, of art with pen, brush, or chisel; the scientist may be called Tubal—the forger of every cutting instrument of brass and iron, the father of mechanics in its various forms. Both have won the praise of the ages. It is now felt, if not yet clearly discerned, that there can be no conflict between them. Some day, after they have properly wooed, they will be mutually won, and a richly dowered wedding will follow.

We can better understand their mission by observing their *origin*, their *method*, and their *results*.

I. *The prophet, like Topsy, was not manufactured, but grew.* "A spark disturbed his clod; a god though in the germ." This germ, which unfolds upwards, this spark, which burns skyward, slumbered in primitive man. He was

"A man for aye removed
From the developed brute."*

He felt a power in the air. He heard a voice in the forest. He saw a light in the gloom. "His gods were charioteering in the sun, presiding in the mountain tops and rising out of the foam of the sea." Man was the first denizen of two worlds. He arose above creation and found kinship with his creator. No sooner had the realm of spirit dawned upon him, than he began to grope in darkness for the growing light. The history of this process is the story of the growth of the prophet, and the revelation of God.

The savage, in his forest primeval, had sacred formulas and incantations with which he invoked or repelled the powers of the air. The soothsayer gradually became an officer in the tribe. His soul was in special touch with the mysterious realms beyond.

* Rabbi Ben Ezra, Browning.

Now he was enlightened by immediate communications, when awake, in trance, or in ecstasy. Then he obtained his message by research and study. Omens were given in answer to prayer. The flight of birds, the flash of lightning, the falling star, the entrails of sacrifice would shape the policy of a nation in peace or war. The position of planets decided the fate of the newborn babe. The soothsayer, the diviner and the magician explained the events and determined the activities of individual and social life in the light of a higher world. These were the crude attempts of the early mind to attain celestial guidance.

“Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realized,
High instincts before which our mortal nature
Did tremble like a guilty thing surprised.”

As the gift grew by effort and was strengthened by achievement, the soothsayer and the seer became the prophet. Even among the Hebrews, blessed above others with the prophetic gift, we find a slow process of development. It is difficult to distinguish the Hebrew seer from the Semitic soothsayer. It is not so difficult to distinguish the Hebrew seer from the Hebrew prophet. Between Samuel, Nathan, and Gad, on the one hand, and Hosea, Amos and Isaiah on the other, there is a wide gap. These latter left the plane of the heathen soothsayer, passed over the intervening portion of the Hebrew seer, and were crowned with the dignity of the Israelite prophet.

The prophet is no longer concerned with Kish's asses. He denounces the oracles of Baal. He stands in the presence of God. “Surely the Lord God will do nothing; but He reveals His secrets to His servants the prophets.” His God is no longer confined to a tribe, but has jurisdiction over all tribes. He is the God of heaven and earth. His laws are the laws of the universe. His judgments affect the nations, and His ends involve the world. The prophet became in a profound sense the Man of God—God's mouthpiece in his age. He differed from his predecessors partly in the subjective operations of his mind; but mainly in the objective message which he proclaimed. The dis-

tinguishing characteristic of Hebrew prophecy was the Hebrew God. That determined his inspiration and his message. The message in fact always determines the inspiration. The soothsayer, the seer, the prophet were inspired in the degree the truth worked in them. *For what is inspiration, but the essence and vitality of truth possessing the mind and heart of man?* The question no longer is, have there been men who were inspired, but have there ever been men who were not inspired?*

But even these geniuses of prophecy were a type of one to come. There was still an effort and a sporadicness in their activity. They saw as through a glass darkly. Though their God reveals His secrets to the prophets, He is still a god that hideth himself. They were the forerunners of Him who should come from the bosom of the Father, full of grace and truth. He hath seen God. He was not merely in occasional converse with the divine, but in perpetual communion. The mysteries of heaven are as common to Him as the realities of earth. He spoke of spiritual things with the ease men speak of natural things. He was not limited by times and seasons, ecstasies, dreams and visions. His conversation was in heaven. What was sporadic and occasional in the Hebrew prophet became natural and continuous in the Son of Man. There is no sense of doubt, but positive assurance, when He says, I do nothing of myself, but as the Father taught me I speak these things. All this He affirms with the artlessness and simplicity of a child, who describes the home out of which he has come.

“Thou eye among the blind,
That, deaf and silent, readst the eternal deep,
Haunted forever by the eternal mind,
Mighty prophet! Seer blest!
On whom those truths do rest,
Which we are toiling all our lives to find.” †

Jesus of Nazareth is the realization of the longings of man in the primitive forest, as well as the type of man in the celestial sphere, when all the Lord's people will be prophets.

* See *The Foundations of Belief*, by Balfour, pp. 338-340.

† *Intimations of Immortality*, by Wordsworth.

The scientist, too, is the child of time. He did not spring in full panoply from the head of Jove. He came not like Melchisedeck, without father or mother, beginning of days or end of years. He is born of human effort, as much as the prophet. Both developed in their attempted solution of the world problem from their peculiar standpoints. The prophet plants his feet on the sun and studies the earth; the scientist plants his feet on the earth and studies the sun.

It is a mistake to imprison the scientist in the laboratory and observatory, watching bugs by day and stars by night. These may be the microcosm through which he studies the macrocosm. But the name itself has a broader significance. He is *the man who knows*. From time immemorial men have tried to know. Their knowledge was not, indeed, scientific. Yet they began the movement which culminated in the scientific method, the glory of this age.

Men have, for example, observed the stars in the earliest times. They marked their movements, changes and relative positions. They were baby astronomers, who became the fathers of Copernicus, Newton and Herschel. Astrology became astronomy as men advanced from vague, inaccurate observations to exact and specific investigation, by which they discovered the laws which rule the heavens. No one knows when the phenomena of combustion were first noticed and the changes which followed. These crude observations were the beginnings of chemistry. In the same way we might trace to its sources the science of economics, when men first began to buy and sell; and of psychology, when the world within was studied like the world without.

The story of this growth is graphically described by Æschylus in his "Prometheus Bound."

" But those woes of men,
List ye to them,—how they, before as babes,
By me were roused to reason, and to think ;
* * * * *

For first, though seeing, all in vain they saw,
And hearing, heard not rightly. But, like forms
Of phantom-dreams, throughout their life's whole length

They muddled all at random ; did not know
Houses of brick that catch the sunlight's warmth,
Nor yet the work of carpentry. They dwelt
In hollowed holes, like swarms of tiny ants,
In sunless depth of caverns ; and they had
No certain signs of winter, nor of spring
Flower-laden, nor of summer with her fruits ;
But without counsel fared their whole life long,
Until I showed the risings of the stars,
And settings hard to recognize. And I
Found Number for them, chief device of all,
Groupings of letters, Memory's handmaid that,
And mother of the Muses. * * *
In one short word, then, learn the truth condensed,—
All arts of mortals from Prometheus spring."

Scientists, also, gradually became a distinct class, as their faculties and methods of research improved. They had a special mission in the realm of truth. It took ages before the world was ripe for an Aristotle. In him we have a clearer apprehension of the scientific method. Most of the modern sciences are rooted in the Greek philosopher. His accurate observations in biology and his deductions from the facts obtained are a marvel when compared with some of the latest results of German laboratories. He was the father of a great multitude, who may be called the aristocracy of science—pioneers of the heavens, the earth and the seas. Darwin, Spencer and Huxley have taken into their personality the rich legacy of the past, and in a larger sphere, with finer instruments, they have reproduced a rational system of the universe, expressed in their own language and from their own standpoints.

In man, then, slumbered the infant prophet and scientist. These twins of the mind and heart were rocked by the breeze, kissed by the stars, lulled by the rippling brooks, startled by the lightning and thunderbolts. The mountains wooed them, the meadows called them, the ocean enfolded them. They rose in the vigor of their youth with psalms on their lips and laws in their minds. These children of nature interpret their world. They glorify their God. They utter their heart's message to one another.

Their difference and relations will further appear in the consideration of their methods and fields of labor.

II. "The object of the scientist is the discovery of the rational order which pervades the universe. The method consists of *observation and experiment* (which is observation under artificial conditions) for the determination of the *facts of nature*; of *inductive and deductive reasoning* for the discovery of *their mutual relations and connections*."*

"In the spirit of the prophet the spirit of God awakens an immediate certainty, an inward perception of things, which elude the testimony of the senses, and which can never be known by the meditative or speculative reason, except as approximate probabilities."† He has the power to share God's vision, entertain his design, and behold his plans for mankind. He reads the ethical order of the world. His method is intuitive. He beholds God in the mount, in the lily, in the star.

According to these definitions, the methods of prophet and scientist are totally different. Corresponding to this difference is their field of investigation. We may best understand their methods in the study of the universe, by observing their mental operations in the study of an individual person. Take, for example, a child's knowledge of a mother. It is not scientific; not the result of observation, comparison and reflection. It transcends the scientific method. It is a mysterious communion of soul with soul. It is impossible to trace the steps in the process. The child looks into the heart of the mother and has an immediate knowledge of her nature. *He does not know the woman, save as mother.* Her whole life, words and acts, are interpreted in the light of motherhood. Love is the explanation of every motive.

The scientist finds in the same individual an aggregation of cells, bones, nerves, veins, flesh. The phenomena of the various organs are traced to a vital principle or force, which no one can explain. *He finds and studies the woman; but cannot find the*

* Science of Last Half Century, by Huxley.

† O. T. Theol., by Schultz, Vol. 1, p. 237.

mother. His microscope and his scalpel fail to discover what the son saw and felt—a mother's love. It eludes his eye and escapes his hand.

Both the processes and the results are different, yet equally legitimate. The one may be mystified by the terminology of the other. They may doubt each other's conclusions. *They will not be reconciled before the son becomes scientist and the scientist a son.*

In a similar way men studied the world. The prophet is the son, who looks into the heart; the scientist studies the frame of things. The latter has no ear to hear the Father's voice. He sweeps the heavens with his telescope, and studies the atoms with his microscope, but cannot see God. He sees the operations of an infinite and eternal energy, but cannot break through the bounds of time and space into the throne of Jehovah. The prophet, however, beholds the source of this energy—God. Heaven and earth are full of the majesty of His glory. Whither shall I go from Thy spirit? Or, whither shall I flee from Thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven Thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me and Thy right hand shall hold me. (Ps. 139:7-10.)

The prophet stands at the center of being and studies things towards the circumference. He reads love, justice, and mercy in the cosmical structure. He construes the universe in terms of Fatherhood and Brotherhood. He speaks as a son, and, accordingly, uses the language of the home. The scientist begins at the circumference and studies towards the center. He construes the world through the atom and the molecule. He finds force and motion, order and law. But he cannot find the Father. He is not composed of atoms. Flesh and blood will not reveal Him. "Neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." The one may be altogether ignorant of the wonderful world structure, the system of laws and interaction of forces. He finds the solution of all his problems in the ultimate person, God. The other may be so absorbed

with the frame of things, that he fails to reach the heart. He who observes both will find a rational order in which the physical and ethical blend in the vast system of nature as harmoniously as in the life of a mother ruling her home.

Le Conte says: "Suppose, then, I could remove the brain cap of one of you, and expose the brain to active work—as it doubtless is at this moment. What would I see? Only decomposition and recompositions, molecular agitation and vibrations; in a word physiological phenomena, and nothing else. There is nothing else there to see. But you, the subject of this experiment, what do you perceive? You see nothing of all this; you perceive an entirely different set of phenomena, viz.: consciousness—thought, emotion, will; psychical phenomena; in a word a self, a person. From the outside we see only the physical, from the inside only the psychical phenomena.

"Now take external nature—the cosmos—instead of the brain. The observer from the outside sees and can see only physical phenomena. But must there not be in this case, also, another side—psychical phenomena—consciousness, thought, will? In a word, a person? And if so, we must conclude, an infinite person and therefore the only complete personality that exists."*

In this illustration we find the spheres in which the prophet and scientists labor. The former is in communion with the person. He sees the inner side of the cosmos, and to him it appears in the form of consciousness—thought, emotion and will. The latter sees the outside of the cosmos, decomposition and recompositions, physiological phenomena and nothing else.

Perhaps we find the best expression of these respective methods in the Christ of John and the synthetic philosophy of Spencer. Their conception of God and the world show their limitations. The one lays his ear upon the bosom of things and hears the heart throbs of the eternal love; the other traces with his fingers the reign of eternal law. Robert Browning reconciles their messages when he sings, "All's love; yet all's law."

III. In considering the result of their work we call to mind a

* "God and Connected Outlines in the Light of Evolution," by Le Conte.

statement in Kant's *Traume eines Geistersehers*: "Der gesunde verstand bemerkt oft die wahrheit, eher als er die gründe einsieht, dadurch er sie beweisen oder erläutern kann." The same truth is expressed by Zezschwitz: "This is the way of a spiritual development of man, that what was once consciousness of living possession of nature is found again in the path of science." In comparing the results of their work it becomes clear that the one has often directly seen what the other after patient research has discovered. This constitutes the difference between the poet, the mystic, the prophet on the one hand, and the philosopher and scientist on the other.

Some old prophet speaks of the time when God breathed the breath of life into man and he became a living soul. That was indeed an epoch in the evolution of the race and in the onward movement of life. Then he leaped from the miry clay and broke the bondage of animalism. The earth became a paradise. Divinity flashed into humanity, and men could entertain God. Through the veil of matter gleamed the light of spirit. God walked in the garden in the cool of the day. He whispered in the breeze, He thundered in the sky, He trembled in the earthquake. With soul in man appeared soul in the world. The great person was recognized by his offspring, and the communion of love, the highest relation of the soul, was begun.

When the scientist proclaims the truth he speaks with another tongue. "The mind or psyche of man has developed together with and as the function of the medullary tube. Just as even now the brain and spinal marrow develop in each human individual from the simple medullary tube, so the human mind or the mental capacity of the human race has developed gradually, step by step from the mind of the lower vertebrates. Just as even now in every individual of the human race the wonderful and complex structure of the brain develops step by step from exactly the same five simple brain bladders as in all other skulled animals, so the human race has gradually developed in the course of millions of years, from the mind of the lower skulled animals. And as now the brain of every human embryo differentiates according to

the special type of the ape brain, so also the human psyche has historically differentiated from the ape mind.”* Both proclaim the dawn of mind. The one declares the fact. Ages pass away, when the other is prepared to define the organic process.

Again, some one describes a scene in Arabia. For grandeur of conception, for artistic balance between form and idea, it is unexcelled in literature. The great genius of the Hebrews leaves the multitude on the barren plain. He climbs the rocky peak, cloud-capped and thunder-riven. Hidden from the gaze of man by clouds of glory, he lives in communion with the Eternal. The lightnings flash and the foundations rock, and the multitudes tremble, when a voice thunders in the depths of his being—*Thou shalt*. It was the first glimpse of an ethical order. Out of Egyptian bondage, from the seething flesh pots, man stepped into the inner life of God. Upon barren hills he found the land of promise, a moral world for which he was fashioned, and in which he was to rest forever. The voice of Sinai was the voice of God in the soul of man, spoken and heard as never before.

This process was repeated in a more prosaic way, centuries afterwards, by the sage of Königsburg—Immanuel Kant. Under the influence of Locke and Hume, men regarded all knowledge, as acquired by the senses and by reflection upon what was thus secured. They were going back to Egypt. Kant, however, convinced the thinking world that the mind is endowed with capacities transcending the reach of the senses and reflection. Pure reason is superior in its scope to the speculative reason. In the practical sphere he found something analogous to this. *The sense of duty is an original and native endowment of the Soul*. Moral obligation cannot be explained by referring it to experience, education, or reflection. “*Thou shalt*” is the unconditional imperative from a higher than a sensual sphere, in obedience to which man rises, victorious over the world of matter, into the freedom and life of the spirit. Fichte speaks of him as the Columbus of a new world within us, of the existence of which all deeper minds had a presentiment, which, however, had not yet

*The Evolution of Man, Haeckel, Vol. 2, p. 451.

been proven by science. He found the place where the real, eternal, supersensible world reached down into the phenomenal world of sense and consciousness. The point of union was the voice of conscience—*thou shalt*, which overcomes all sensuous impulses, brings to pass a new disposition, and produces new aims and purposes in man.

Like a new Moses, he ascended Mt. Sinai, and stood at the entrance of the spirit world. The mind of man was again freed from the bondage of sense. Moses and Kant joined hands across the gap of ages and proclaimed the key to the real world to be the will of man in obedience to the will of God. Both might unite in the words of the Deuterronomist; "Oh that there were such a heart in them that they would fear me and keep my commandments always that it might be well with them." * Obedience is the condition of blessing. Prosperity and peace are the children of Law. This is equally taught by Hebrew prophet and modern scientist.

Strange and mysterious was the voice of the peasant Rabbi, who had not learned letters, crying: "I am the light of the world." Men could not understand Him. Some said He was a Samaritan and had a devil. Others said He is beside Himself. Is not this the carpenter, Joseph's son? It has taken the world almost two thousand years to analyze, define and understand the words of the Nazarene. Whenever a principle of a purer and a nobler humanity has been won, whether in the silence of the cloister, or in the noise of the senate chamber; in the solitude of the desert, or in the din of the battle field, brought forth in travail and baptized with blood, it was only the naturalization, the reincarnation of some phase of the life of Jesus. The scientist finds Golgothas in the geologic strata; all nature red in tooth and claw in a struggle for life and the life of others. The cross of Calvary is impressed upon the countless æons as they come and go.

Political economists, turning from the dreams of Plato, More and Bellamy, have by a more rigid method of scientific research sought the ideal state. John Stuart Mill voices their conclusion

* Deut. 5: 29.

when he says : “ Not even now could it be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract to the concrete, than to endeavor so to live that Christ would approve our lives.”

The voice of the age, restless and tumultuous, reaching after a better and truer life will find expression in one of its greatest poets :

'Tis weakness in strength, that I cry for ! my flesh that I seek
In the Godhead ! I seek and find it. O Saul it shall be
A face like my face that receives thee : a man like to me,
Thou shalt love and be loved by, forever : a hand like this hand
Shall throw open the gates of new life !—See the Christ stand !*

We may rejoice in the fact that the prophet and the scientist are returning to reality. They stand face to face with the whole realm of phenomena and are divinely equipped for the exploration of the body and soul of the universe. The scientist is thinking God's thoughts after him. He finds a plan in the structure of the world. Everywhere he is convinced of a reign of law. In short, things are constructed after the scientific plan, or method.

The prophet should gratefully recognize the discoveries of science. His god is not less real because he is a God of law. The child need not love the mother less, when he learns the laws of her physical and moral life. *The prophet must point the scientist to the love that works in the law.* He shares the vision of the divine plan. To-day he can be prophet only as he sees this plan in the constitution of nature, man and history. He can be scientist only as he finds the consummation of things and their source in the great personality, which the laws of his being demand.

One man, however, can not grasp all truth. Each is to deliver his message and live his life accordingly. Then only will his nature be satisfied. All the tendrils of his being will twine around some branch of the tree of life. Not one man, age, or nation, can claim a monopoly of truth. *The organism of humanity, not the individual,* is the recipient of the fulness of God.

* Browning's Saul.

Never in the history of the world have the prospects been brighter than now. Out of the East, the home of primitive prophecy, comes a spirit to the West, the home of modern science. The geniuses of the hemispheres meet and coöperate in the solution of the great world problems. They will write new theologies, more commensurate with the mind of Christ. They will sing new psalms, throbbing with deeper loves. They will paint new pictures, carve new statues, breathing the life of a better age. Out of this great, chaotic movement, so mysterious and profound, will emerge a "humanity bound with golden chains around the feet of God."

ALLENTOWN, PA.

III.

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNCHURCHED.

BY THE EDITOR.

It is generally understood that a very large proportion of the population of the United States is at present without church relations. The precise number of this unchurched population, however, it is not easy to tell. According to the eleventh census of the United States, taken in 1890, the total number of communicant members of all the Christian denominations in the country amounted to 20,437,871, while the total population of the country was 62,622,250. This makes the proportion of communicant church members to the population 32.63 per cent. In this enumeration the Mormons and Spiritualists are counted among Christian denominations; and the total number of denominations is put down at 143. How complete this count is may be seen from the fact that an apology is presented for not counting one denomination of 21 members, because it had no definite organization. Everything entitled to be called Christian was counted. Of the Christian communicants 14,180,000 are Protestants, 6,257,871 Roman Catholics. This leaves 67.27 per cent. of the population, or 42,184,379 persons, who are not communicant church members; and by communicant church members are understood all persons who are so related to some church as to have the right to commune. Since the census was taken the population of the country has probably increased by ten millions; but the relative proportions of church members and non-church members has doubtless remained about the same. Certainly the percentage of church members has not increased.

But, now, these people who are not communicant church members, are not by any means all un-Christian; nor are they even all non-church members. Many of them are baptized members

of the various churches, though not yet in full communion ; and many are adherents of the churches, either by birth or inclination, attending more or less regularly upon their services, without having become regular members. This makes the question as to the precise number of unchurched people in the country a question difficult, if not impossible, of solution. Dr. H. K. Carroll, one of the commissioners of the eleventh census, in "The Religious Forces of the United States," proposes to multiply the number of Protestant communicants by 3.5 in order to get the whole number of Protestant Christians ; that is, he supposes that for every communicant church member there are two and a-half adherents, who will most likely sometime become full members. According to this method of computation we should get 49,630,000 Protestant Christians. Adding to this number the total Catholic population, which is 7,362,000, their unconfirmed membership being 1,103,000, we should have a total Christian population of 56,992,000, leaving 5,630,250 persons without any church relations at all ; and these latter would not by any means be all irreligious persons. That would be a pretty good showing for a land in which religion is entirely free, and in which the non-profession of it entails no civil disabilities.

But is this method of computation trustworthy? Notwithstanding the high authority by which it is commended, we can not think that it is. The assumed proportion of two and a half to one between the adherents and communicants of the various Protestant denominations, we believe to be altogether too large. Take, for instance, the case of our own Church. Our "unconfirmed" members represent substantially our "adherents." But now, in 1890, the year in which the census was taken, our confirmed or communicant membership was 202,833. Multiplying this number by 2.5, we should have 507,082 unconfirmed or adherent members. But in the same year the number of our unconfirmed members was only 111,240 ; while the number of people not connected with any Church habitually worshipping with us was comparatively small—at least nothing like 500,000, as it should have been on the above supposition. The proportion

of unconfirmed to confirmed members in our Church is fifty-four per cent. And we presume that about the same proportion holds in the Lutheran and Episcopal Churches. In the Catholic Church the proportion is only fourteen per cent., owing to the fact that this Church confirms her young people at a much earlier age than is customary in most Protestant Churches. In the various branches of the Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist Churches the proportion of the number of adherents to that of communicants is probably considerably larger. But here also a much larger number of adherents fail ever to connect with the Church. A very considerable number of the members of Methodist and Baptist households, as we know, never become members of the Church; and the case is still worse among the smaller sects, like the Dunkards, Mennonites, etc. It may be said, indeed, that most of the people who are "adherents" of the Church only, and not members, are in some sense Christians, and therefore lose no substantial benefit of Christianity. That, however, is not the question with which we are now concerned. Our question now is, not what is the benefit of church membership, but how many church members are there in this country.

If the proportion which exists in our own Church between unconfirmed and confirmed members, or between adherents and communicants, were universal, then the total number of adherents would be 11,036,450, which, added to the number of communicants, would make a total of 31,474,320 church members in the widest sense, leaving an equal number who are without any Church relations at all. We believe, then, that we shall not be far wrong if we estimate the number of persons in the United States who are not connected with any Church to be at least from 20,000,000 to 25,000,000. Of this unchurched population 132,000 are members of religious bodies that are not Christian—Jews, Buddhists, Ethical Culturists, etc. The balance are, for the most part, people whose ancestors were once members of the Church, and who, from various causes, have drifted away from the Church. The majority of these people, of course, are not infidels or atheists, and many of them may

even not be opposed to Christianity as such, but they are outside of the Church and the Church has no influence over them. And these unchurched masses are found prevailing in our urban population. In the country and in the smaller towns and villages the number of the unchurched is not nearly as large as it is in the larger towns and cities. In 1890 the number of Protestant churches compared to population in seven of the largest cities of the country was as follows: Boston, 1 to 2,581; Brooklyn, 1 to 2,890; Buffalo, 1 to 2,650; Chicago, 1 to 3,601; Cincinnati, 1 to 2,195; St. Louis, 1 to 2,930; New York, 1 to 4,361. Of course, in these places there are Roman Catholic churches, but their influence upon the religious and moral life of the nation is usually not believed to be of the most desirable character, and even if they are counted for all that they are worth, the religious destitution of these cities will still be enormous. And besides all this, it must be remembered that even in Protestant Churches there are many merely nominal members, who never attend church at all, or at least very irregularly. Any one passing through the streets of a city like Lancaster on a Sunday morning or evening, when the church bells are ringing, and looking at the crowds, especially of *men*, who are *not* going to church, may get some idea of the esteem in which the Church is held by a great mass of American people.*

There is no question, then, that the number of the unchurched masses in this country is very large, and that a mission field is here presented to the Churches which is of vast proportions. And it is a field in which both Christian love and patriotism should move us to labor with energy and zeal. Our love to Christ and to the souls of men should inspire us to labor with all our might for the salvation of those who in our own land are out-

* On the religious condition of the United States compare, besides the work already referred to, namely, "The Religious Forces in the United States," especially the two works by Dr. Josiah Strong, "Our Country" and the "New Era." These works depict the condition of things which existed about eight or ten years ago. But there has been no material change since, and what was true ten years ago is substantially true still, while in some respects the condition is worse now than it was ever before.

side of the fold of Christ. But our love to our country and our desire for its future prosperity should be an equally strong motive in the same direction. The perils to which the country is exposed—perils arising from ignorance, from superstition, from intemperance, from the greed of gain and the lust of power, from the discontent of the poor, and from the violence and tyranny of the rich—these perils can be avoided only by the dissemination of the principles of the Gospel, and by securing for these principles sentiments of respect and reverence. The so-called dangerous classes, whether found in the ranks of the proletariat or of the plutocracy, can only be made harmless by converting them into upright and conscientious Christian citizens. The planting of churches, the preaching of the Gospel, and the lifting up of men and women to a higher life, in the crowded cities, will in the end be found to be the only sure method of abolishing the saloon, the sweat-shop, and the low tenement house. As we, therefore, love our country and desire its future prosperity, we should labor earnestly for the evangelization of the unchurched masses around us.

But how shall we reach these masses? That is the problem now before the American churches. All the churches are more or less engaged in doing missionary work among those who are outside; but their success, it must be confessed, has not thus far been very flattering. The reason of this is probably that the work has not been adapted to the condition of those in whose behalf it has been carried on. In order to successful missionary work we need first of all to understand the condition and history of those in whose behalf we would labor. This is true of foreign missionary work. The man who would be successful as a missionary among the heathen must understand their mental, moral and religious condition and be able to sympathize even with their very superstitions and errors. And it is true also of home missionary work. The estranged masses can only be won to the Church by coming into real and earnest sympathy with them; and that is only possible on condition of a thorough understanding of them. In all cases a careful diagnosis must

precede successful treatment. Now there is one circumstance to be considered in relation to our unchurched masses, which differentiates them from the masses of un-Christian lands, and which must condition any Christian work in their behalf; and that is the circumstance that, with few unimportant exceptions, these people are the descendants of persons who were members of the Church either in this country or in Europe. Either they or their ancestors one or two generations back were members of the Church, and for some cause they have ceased to be such. Robert G. Ingersoll is the son of a Congregational clergyman, and his case is a typical one. Among the unchurched masses numerous individuals could be found, whose ancestors once occupied high places in the Church. Now we think that the first question involved in the problem of bringing back to the Church these estranged masses, is the question as to the cause of their estrangement. Manifestly that cause must be removed before anything very important can be accomplished in the way of bringing them back. What is it, then, that has driven out of the Church these masses, whose ancestors for many generations were members thereof, and in whose very blood Christianity might have been supposed to have had an existence?

Now we may not be able perhaps to enumerate all the causes that have contributed to this result, but we think that among them the following have been the most influential: 1. The unbelief of wickedness; 2. Skepticism occasioned by the antagonism of theology and science; 3. The preaching of an unchurchly theology; 4. The economic pressure and social discontent of the times; 5. The divisions of the Church.

First, then, there is the *unbelief of wickedness*, or of mere bad will, that is keeping some people out of the Church. For this we can assign no cause. Sin has no cause other than the self-determination of the created will. If sin could be referred to some cause outside of the will, as a disease may be referred to a sudden change of temperature, or to the presence of a deleterious influence in the atmosphere, then sin would be taken out of the realm of the moral and become merely a physical effect. Least

of all would we dare to refer the origin of sin to a divine ordination or decree ; for in that case God Himself would be the responsible author of it. Any attempt to escape these conclusions, while admitting the principles to which they are related, must be counted among those prevarications of theology, which have themselves done much to make the Church odious to many active minds. Now for people who are out of the Church from mere badness of will the Church can, of course, have no responsibility ; and they form no important element in the problem of the unchurched. Under a State-church system, where civil privileges are connected with church membership, such persons might be in the Church ; but they would not in that case be any better than they are now. But people of this kind are not numerous in a community ; and the assumption which the Christian minister is bound to make, is that all sinners are capable of being saved, if only the Gospel is brought to them in a form adapted to their mental and moral condition. Any Christian minister who assumes that the half of mankind consists of reprobates who are “ ordained to destruction for the glory of God,” has mistaken his calling, and ought to get out of the sacred office through which God commands men that they should *all everywhere* repent.

A second cause that is keeping people out of the Church is *skepticism* as to some of the dogmas of the Church, if not some of the truths of the Bible. The progress of historical and physical science in modern times has made belief in some of the accepted dogmas of Christianity difficult, and the consequence is that there is in some of the noblest minds a degree of doubt that is keeping them out of the Church. But doubt is not unbelief, and it is the business of the Church so to present the Gospel to the doubter as to turn his doubt into belief. Honest doubt, like that of Thomas, will give way when it is shown either that the thing doubted is not an essential part of Christianity, or that, if it is essential, it is of such a nature that doubt in regard to it is irrational. We do not believe that the number of people who are kept out of the Church by this cause is very large ; but among them are included some of the most intelligent and conscientious

men in the country. And the number is large enough to cause the Church at least to consider the question whether she ought not to revise her creeds and her methods of interpreting Scripture in such a way as to bring them into harmony with the critical and scientific thought of the age. The present age is not an age of easy credulity. And yet it is an age of deep seriousness, and an age that wants to believe something and have something to rest in. Mysteries may still be believed, but impossibilities will not. Men are not now willing to say with Tertullian, "I believe, because the thing which I believe is impossible;" and the Church must no longer make such demands upon the credulity of those to whom she preaches the Gospel. The Church, of course, cannot surrender anything essential of her faith. She could not, for instance, give up any of the foundation articles of the Apostles' Creed. But when the confessions teach doctrines which are contrary to common sense or to the best ethical sentiments of the age, and when church membership is made conditional upon subscription to these confessions, then we think the Church is responsible for some, at least, of the skepticism which is keeping people out of her pale. And if that be so, then it is time for her certainly to think of revising her confessions and adapting her Gospel to the conditions of the living mind of the age to which we belong. The fact that some of her best and most conscientious children are falling out of her ranks, and that her ablest and most active-minded young men refuse to enter her ministry, certainly calls for a study of the subject here under consideration; and the Church will not be able to fulfill her destiny until she shall have attended to this duty. It is said of Christ that, when He preached, "the common people heard Him gladly;" and we firmly believe that when Christ shall be preached again in the direct and living way in which He preached Himself, without the lumber of unintelligible scholastic formulas, the same thing may be said again. The people do not doubt Christ so much as they doubt the interpretations of Him to which they have been so often treated.

In the third place, we believe that an *unchurchly theology* is a

cause that keeps out of the church great numbers of people who are not hostile to Christianity. The theology which has reigned in most of the churches of this country for more than a century past, has taught that the Church is not of much account in the "plan of salvation" —that one can be saved quite well without the Church, and that without the conviction of having been saved, or converted, no one ought to think of joining the Church. In this theology salvation is simply a matter of private arrangement between the soul of the sinner and God, and the question of "joining the Church" should never be seriously entertained until that private arrangement has been attended to. Indeed, to join the Church without having "experienced religion" is believed to be an act of the highest kind of sacrilege. And as religion is not a thing that can be experienced at will, but a thing that can only be gotten when it pleases the Holy Spirit and the managers of the Church to get up a revival, and not by everybody even then, it comes to pass that there are numbers of people who are outside of the Church, not because they want to be outside, but because they think they have no right to be within. They would like to be in; and some day, when they have gotten religion, they expect to join. But for great masses of men that day never comes, and they live and die outside of the Church. According to the theory now under consideration this fact in itself, of course, involves no disadvantage; for to have died without the Church is no positive proof that one may not have had religion; and at funerals of outsiders the hope is usually expressed that in some secret way the departed may have experienced religion and be all right. Now we say nothing of the merits of this view. It may be true, or it may not. What we are concerned with now is simply its bearing upon the question of church membership; and that this must be unfavorable can easily be understood.

This unchurchly theory of Christianity came into currency, in Great Britain and America, in connection with the revival which began in the latter part of the last century and continued on into the third quarter of the present. And it came as a reaction against the heartless ecclesiasticism of former times. It was a

protest against the doctrine that church membership and the performance of Church rites secure salvation irrespective of character. The notion was too prevalent that, no matter how a person lives, he will be all right if he has been baptized, has had a bishop's hands laid upon him in confirmation, goes to communion at Easter, and supports the Church. But another equally unhealthy form of ecclesiasticism maintained that salvation depends merely upon the diligent attendance at "Sabbath meetings," upon holding the "sound doctrine," and upon praying much through the nose. Over against these extremes of ecclesiasticism the doctrine was proclaimed that there is no benefit at all in objective Christianity, that the Church is merely an arrangement for the safe-keeping of Christians after they are made—the communion of saints, but not the mother of saints, and that the sacraments are not means of grace but only badges of profession, whose value lies in their being performed according to what was supposed to be a divinely instituted form, and in the pious sentiments which one brings to this performance. Baptism, for instance, does not help a person to become a Christian; but on the contrary one ought to be baptized in order to show that one is a Christian, provided he can find out from the New Testament what is the right form of baptism. So with all the ordinances of the Church: they are not means of grace, but only signs of profession after one has obtained grace; and grace is like the wind which no one can tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth, except that it has usually been supposed to have some connection with the mourner's bench.

It is this theory which, more than anything else, has landed outside of the Church so many of her own children. They are outside because they have been taught to believe that they have no right to be in it. They are not opposed to the Church or to Christianity; they are outside only because they conscientiously believe themselves to be unfit to be within. This kind of conscientious people often present the most serious difficulty to the Christian minister or missionary. To the minister's appeal to enter the Church they will answer perhaps that they can be as

good outside of the Church as in it, that it is not church membership that secures salvation, but conversion, and that there are already too many people in the Church who are not Christians. Now, in order to meet the wants of this class of outsiders, the Gospel must be presented in a more churchly and sacramental form than has been the fashion in a large part of the Protestant Church during a century past. Whatever may be said of the possibility of salvation outside of the Church in a community in which Christianity is known, it is certain that Christianity itself can not exist long except in the form of the Church. And however noble the motive may have been in the preaching of an unchurchly Gospel, the result has been disastrous. That motive was the realization of a pure Church in which there should be no unconverted members. But now, instead of one pure Church, we have a large number of warring sects on the one hand, and a great mass of unchurched people on the other. A certain sect whose preachers we used to hear exhorting the members of the Churches "to come out of Sodom and join the hosts of salvation," was a few years ago rent asunder by internal disputes, and its highest officials were trying to establish each other's mendacity in the civil courts. Their argument for getting members from the other Churches used to be that there is no good in church membership, and that people must come to them to get religion. That argument has been accepted by a great many people and turned even against those who first used it. There is no use in church membership, people say; and hence the masses of the unchurched are growing larger every day.

Now the Gospel that shall be successful in bringing back these masses must be a churchly Gospel; that is to say, it must attach some importance to the Church in the economy of Christianity. This does not mean a repristination of the ecclesiasticism of the middle ages. The time for that is past. This age cannot, to any considerable extent, be made again to believe in priestcraft, or in the efficacy of magic formulas and rituals. Bells, and lighted candles, and incense, and holy water will no longer be believed much to affect the character and fortunes of the soul.

But this age can be made to understand that Christianity is after all something more than subjective feeling and sentiment. Christianity is an organic, vital constitution in the world, having its fountain of regenerative power in Christ, and the sphere of its energy in the Church, which is for this reason called the body of Christ, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all. The Church is not only the organic medium through which the divine life is quickened in the individual soul, but also the appropriate environment under the stimulating influence of which that life is developed. The Church, then, is not merely a voluntary association, but a society created by the spirit and power of Christ, serving as a bosom of gracious influences and operations, in the active presence of which the individual is transformed into the image of Christ. The individual sinner is not required to transform himself, but to allow himself to be transformed by mirroring the glory of the Lord, that is, by receiving into himself and reflecting the ethical and spiritual power of Christ, which dwells in His body the Church. Hence, church membership is not an idle thing in the process of the development of the spiritual life; and the sacraments are not empty ceremonies with which the spiritual life of the Christian has nothing to do. On the contrary, they are efficacious means of grace, stimulating and helping the development of the Christian life. They do not create the Christian life by a mere physical operation. That idea would be no better than the notion which supposes the same result to be accomplished by a mere blow struck by the Holy Spirit out of the universal ether. The sacraments are holy ordinances of the Church in connection with which, or by means of which, the Holy Spirit acts upon men's souls in the way of moral and religious stimulation, helping them, through the spiritual activity thus aroused and maintained in them, to become more and more conformed to the image of Christ. This construction of the Gospel, which makes due account of this agency of the Church and her ordinances in the economy of salvation, is the churchly construction of the Gospel; and this we believe to be the form in which the Gospel is presented in the New Testament.

And it is the form also in which the Gospel was preached by the Reformers, in whatever varying terminology it may have been couched. And if the Gospel were now generally preached in this form, we are sure that the number of the unchurched masses would be very much smaller than it is.

Again, *economic and social depression and dissatisfaction* form one of the causes which in our day contribute to the separation of numbers from the Church. Society is in a ferment of discontent in consequence of what is supposed to be an unequal distribution of the products of industry, and an increasing pressure of the struggle for existence upon the less favored classes. The laboring classes are convinced that they are not getting a fair share of the wealth which they are helping to produce, and that they can not satisfy their daily wants in the highly advanced society of the present day. What were luxuries a century ago are necessities now, and yet they are beyond the reach of a large part of the laboring classes. Hence there is a continual feeling of discontent among them, and a struggle to improve their condition, which frequently rises into conflict with the exploiting capitalists. Now in this struggle to improve their condition the laboring men are persuaded that the Church does not sympathize with them. She is supposed to be on the side rather of wealth and power. She is an institution of the rich, supported by their money, and believed to be managed in their interest. Hence, in the great industrial centers, the laboring men, even if not positively hostile, are for the most part indifferent to the Church. They do not attend church. One of the most striking features of city congregations is the small number of the men who attend, and the almost total absence of laboring men. This is due doubtless to social causes. The employees of a great manufacturing institution would no more think of going to their employers' church, than they would think of eating at their employers' tables or sleeping in their beds. The style and fashion of the Church would prevent them from doing this, even if they had no other considerations. But they do not look upon the Church as a helpful ally in their struggle for existence. They

think they are getting more benefit from their associations and lodges; and the lodge room consequently has more attractions for them than the church. Many, moreover, claim that they could not afford to attend church, even if they desired to attend. They could not pay pew rent, and meet the demands for money which the churches are continually making. They need all that they can earn in the uncertain condition of the labor market, to keep soul and body together. They can not afford to clothe themselves and their children as the church people clothe themselves, and would therefore feel out of place in church. And the case is not helped by the establishment of chapels for their benefit, supported by the pockets of the rich. That would be a sort of living of the crumbs which fall from the tables of the rich, a thing which dogs may do, but men will not do.

This condition of the laboring classes presents one of the most difficult problems which confront the Church at the present time. A full discussion of this problem would belong to a treatise on Christian sociology; and in this place we must content ourselves with stating merely a few general principles. If, then, we would influence to any large extent the mind of the laboring classes, in their present attitude towards the Church, they must be made to understand, in the first place, that the Church is not merely an institution of this world, with merely worldly ideals and aims. Her main object is to prepare men for blessedness in a world to come. Men must be made to comprehend that they may be poor in this world's goods, and yet blessed. Neither manhood nor blessedness consists in the abundance of the things which men possess, but rather in what they are. And it is the office of the Church to labor for the making of the man, not for the procuring of riches for him. It is not the business of the Church to furnish the bread which perishes, but the bread which endures unto eternal life. And if men are caring for nothing but loaves, then the Church is not the place for them. To those who followed Jesus to Capernaum after the miraculous feeding in the wilderness, He said: "Ye seek me not because ye saw signs, but because ye ate of the loaves and were filled. Work

not for the meat which perisheth, but for the meat which abideth unto eternal life, which the Son of man shall give unto you," John 6 : 26-27. Christ does not want disciples who follow Him merely for bread and butter. This is a truth upon which the Church must ever insist. We do not agree with the Roman Catholic doctrine that the Church is merely a supernatural institution which is concerned only with men's lives beyond the earth ; but we must hold nevertheless that it is the main end of the Church to care for the moral and spiritual development of men, and that it can be concerned with temporal affairs only so far as they minister to that development. In so far the Kingdom of God is not of this world.

But, secondly, the laboring classes and the suffering classes must be made to understand that the Church is after all not indifferent to men's condition in the present life, that she desires the well-being of all men alike and labors for it, and that the Gospel which she preaches is the only means for the realization of this condition. Whatever may have been the actual shortcomings of the Church in the past, it is nevertheless true that the ethical principles of the Gospel which the Church preaches are the only principles that can bring relief to this sinful and suffering world. If the central doctrines of the Gospel were universally recognized and obeyed among men, they would soon effect a regeneration of society as well as of individuals, and make life even in this world vastly better and happier than it is. The doctrine of the universal fatherhood of God and of the brotherhood of men, the doctrine of the value and dignity of human personality apart from any earthly conditions, the doctrine of the impartial righteousness of God who desires that all men should be treated with fairness, justice and love, and who will punish any violation of the principle of humanity by rich or poor—these doctrines of the Gospel are the only principles that will ever serve to realize that condition of society in which unity, equality and fraternity shall be actual qualities. The preachers who treat the principles of fraternity and equality as extravagances of the French revolution, and who represent the Gospel as

a contrivance which makes it possible for sinners, especially rich sinners, to be saved along with the gains of their ungodliness, do but misrepresent the Gospel as well as the Church. They are not inspired by Christ and the New Testament, and they are not true servants of the Church. And this is what the laboring classes, the oppressed and suffering classes, should be made to understand. They should be made to understand that the Church after all is their best friend, and that there is no other institution in the world that is so deeply interested in their welfare as the Church.

But in order to accomplish this result the Church must not merely preach the Gospel of universal love, and humanity, and fairness, but she must also practice it. She must show by her works that she has not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ with respect of persons, James 2: 1. The people who grow rich by the exploitation of the labor of the poor, and who fare sumptuously every day and make a display of their fine apparel, must not be treated with more distinction by the Church than the humblest Christians who have neither money nor fine clothes. But in order to accomplish her mission in the world the Church must even go farther than this. She must have the courage to raise her voice against oppression and wrong in times of public excitement and clamor. It is not sufficient at such times to exhort those who have not the necessities of life to be content with their lot and obedient to the laws, while not a word of disapprobation is spoken in regard to the rich and powerful who are the other party in the contest. Too often have the ministers of the Church been led to pursue this unchristian and cowardly course; and the consequence is empty churches. A writer of sacred scripture manifests another spirit and a higher courage when he says to the rich oppressors of his day: "Go to now, ye rich, weep and howl for your miseries that are coming upon you. Your riches are corrupted and your garments are moth-eaten. Your gold and your silver are rusted; and their rust shall be for a testimony against you, and shall eat your flesh as fire. Ye have laid up your treasure in the last days. Behold, the hire of the laborers

who mowed your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth out: and the cries of them that reaped have entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth. Ye have lived delicately on the earth, and taken your pleasure; ye have nourished your hearts in a day of slaughter. Ye have condemned, ye have killed the righteous; he doth not resist," James 5: 1-6. Possibly if a Christian minister were now to use that kind of language some circuit court judge might be found who would serve an injunction upon him to keep silent; but we are sure that he would not be preaching to empty pews. Would not, however, in that case the rich withdraw from the Church and leave her without means to carry on her work? We do not believe that they would. We should not give the rich credit for being more depraved than they are; and we believe that the plain and positive testimony of the Church would in many cases serve to prevent those causes which contribute so much to the embitterment of the masses against the classes, and to the separation of the former from the Church.

But, finally, *the division of the Church* forms another cause of separation between her and great numbers of people. The question, which is the true Church, is often asked by people who are not insincere. Here are a variety of denominations—their number in the United States is 143—all of which claim to be the true Church, and some of which deny this quality to others. One claims to have the only correct mode of baptism, all others being wrong; and another claims that it alone has the correct method of conversion; another, that it alone possesses a legitimate ministry; and still another, that it alone confesses the true doctrine. What in these circumstances are humble souls to do, who want to be in the true Church, but can not make up their minds as to where the true Church is to be found? No matter where they may go, somebody will tell them that they are not in the true Church. The Lutheran will tell the Reformed that his religion is not satisfactory because he does not hold to the "sound doctrine;" the Methodist will tell the Lutheran that he is not converted and that his church membership will not save him; the Baptist will inform all three of them that they are outside of the

pale because they were not rightly baptized, although he may admit that they may still be Christians ; the Episcopalian will assure the whole company that they can have no true sacraments and consequently no true religion, because they do not have ministers of "apostolic succession ;" and the Catholic, finally, will serve notice upon all parties, the Episcopalian included, that he as the successor of St. Peter holds the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and that none will enter except by his door. In this confusion of voices, and pretensions, and claims, what are honest and serious people to do ? What many of them are doing is to stay out of the Church altogether. They say it will be time enough to join the Church when the Church people shall have settled the question, what and where the Church is.

But the divisions of the Church help to swell the number of outsiders in another way. It is impossible for each denomination to be everywhere. There are thousands of places in which but one or two churches can be supported. It must often happen, therefore, that, when people move about from place to place, they get into localities where no church of their denomination exists. What are they to do ? In many cases they cannot connect with any of the existing churches. The Baptists, Episcopalians, as well as Catholics, for instance, would exact conditions which no self-respecting Christian of the Reformed or Lutheran Church could accept. Some of the smaller sects would do so likewise. In these circumstances people who have moved into places where their own Church does not exist, will generally for a time keep up a sort of connection with their home church, but after awhile they become indifferent, and their church membership ceases altogether. This cause is doubtless responsible for the present separation of large numbers of people from the Church. Is there any remedy for this condition of things ? None other than the more general preaching of an unsectarian Gospel, and the lowering of the fences between the denominations. Denominationalism itself is no necessary evil, nor is it even inconsistent with the unity of the Church ; but sectarianism is something else. Sectarianism consists not in the separate existence of any body of

Christian believers, but in the spirit of exclusiveness which denies the quality of Christian to other equally pious bodies of believers. And this is a demon in American Christianity that must be exorcised before the success of the Gospel can become complete.

Besides these general causes of estrangement from the Church, which have now been enumerated, others also may be mentioned which, though less general in extent, are nevertheless not without considerable effect. One of these is *Sunday work*. In furnaces, rolling mills, and factories, on railroad trains, and trolley lines, and in numerous other capacities, large numbers of men are employed every Sunday. But men who are compelled to work every Sunday can not be expected to be very good church members. *Sunday amusements* and *excursions* are another cause which keeps many people out of church. During the summer season especially, the Sunday excursion trains carry hundreds of thousands of people from city, town, and country to places of amusement; and the trolley lines perform the same service on a smaller scale. It is in this way that rich and powerful corporations on Sunday filch from the pockets of the poor the little that is left of their small earnings during the week, at the same time that the officers of these corporations with their wives are in church perhaps hearing eloquent essays on "the divine legation of Moses," or "the blessings of Apostolic succession." The use of the *bicycle* also keeps many people out of the Church. Many young men who have gotten so far as to have possessed themselves of wheels, can not resist the temptation of a ride into the country on Sunday morning when the church bells are ringing. These are causes, however, which operate not so much to prejudice the minds of the masses against the Church, as rather to poison their morals and gradually wean them away from their spiritual mother. What the Church needs to do in the face of these circumstances is simply to exercise a more watchful care over her members, and utter more loudly her protest against these forms of evil; which, however, will not be entirely abated until the rights of Christians on Sunday shall be better protected by the civil law than they are now.

From what has now been said it will appear that the problem of the unchurched is largely a sociological as well as a theological and ecclesiastical problem. The Church, however, can not suspend her efforts to regain the unchurched masses until the sociological conditions shall be so changed as to eliminate this element of the problem. We believe that that change will come, and that the Church herself will be an important factor in bringing it to pass. But meanwhile it is her duty to do something towards reaching and gaining the unevangelized masses. What, then, can she do in order to this end? The only answer that we can think of is this, that, bearing in mind the causes which have landed these masses outside of the Church, she must preach to them the Gospel in a way adapted to their mental and moral condition. We believe that the Gospel, when rightly administered, with due consideration of the intellectual, moral and religious conditions of those to whom it is administered, will not fail to accomplish its result. Only we must be sure that what we preach is the Gospel, and not something else in place of it. But the Gospel means Christ—not a doctrine about Christ, but Christ Himself in His mind and person. It is not the evangelist's business to convert the world to any system of dogmas, or to any order of Church polity, or to any ritual of worship, or to any theories of science, but to Christ. But Christ must be presented in His adaptation to the moral and religious wants of men at the present time. If the masses are to be won, Christ must be preached now with the same directness and simplicity as He once preached Himself. The message of the preacher must be the same as that which Christ brought. It must be good tidings to the poor, the proclamation of release to the captives, the recovering of sight to the blind, and liberty to them that are bruised. Let this be the burden of the preacher's message, and let that message be clothed in a churchly and sacramental, not merely in a dogmatic and unethical form, and we believe that the masses will now hear the preacher as gladly as they heard the Master nineteen centuries ago. What is needed is that the Gospel be presented in such way as to bring regenerating and sanctifying

power to the hearts of men, just as the words of Christ Himself did. In that case men will come to hear. No flock of sheep could be kept to the fold by giving them *lectures* on the advantages of having food ; but they can be kept to it by giving them food itself. That is a parable, and the interpretation of it is easy.

A few words may here be devoted to the question as to what extent, if at all, any departure from the regular order of administering the Gospel, for the sake of reaching outsiders, may be lawful and expedient. The revival system, once relied upon as the power of God for this end, has proven a failure. It is this very system that is responsible to a large extent for the fact that so many people are now outside of the Church. This system is not diminishing, but increasing, the number of outsiders. And, besides, it has lost its power. An old-fashioned revival can now only be gotten up in out-of-the-way places, and among the rudest and most uncultured people. In its ruder forms this system has, therefore, been abandoned even by the churches that once practiced it exclusively. And the milder and more quiet system of Mr. Moody does not answer as an efficient substitute ; and, besides, Mr. Moody, too, has lost his power. In the days of his strength the result of a campaign was always the conversion of a great number of people ; but the difficulty was that the majority did not stay converted nor come into the Church. The essential vice of this system is that it is subjective, unchurchly and unsacramental.

But what shall be said of the educational or catechetical system, which we are wont to regard as the opposite of the revival system ? This, we believe, to be the best Church system. It is the best system for retaining within the Church her own children, and training them up into good and pious members. It is, moreover, in most essential agreement with the nature of Christianity as an objective system of divine nurture. It belongs essentially to the churchly and sacramental conception of Christianity. But it presupposes the existence of the Church, and of a well ordered Church life. It does not presuppose that every generation must be won for Christianity anew. It presumes that Christianity has

become a social power, and that the Church is co-extensive with the community. It is only under such conditions that the catechetical system can produce its best results. The proper subjects of catechization are not without, but within the Church—those who were born within the Church and carry the seal of their Christian citizenship in their Christian names received in baptism. These are the kind of catechumens especially presupposed by the Heidelberg Catechism.* In a somewhat modified form, indeed, the catechetical system may be applied in the training of unbaptized young people in the Sunday-school. Careful catechetical instruction concerning the leading articles of the Christian faith, emphasizing especially the necessity and benefit of Church membership, may do much towards diminishing the number of outsiders; and in this way the Sunday-school may be made to be much more of a missionary help to the Church than is the case now. But while the children and young people may to some extent be reached through the Sunday-school, the masses of unchurched adults cannot be thus reached. No minister would succeed if he should go among the churchless masses in mills and factories, with catechism in hand, and ask them to attend a six months' course of catechizing as a condition of connecting with the Church. In order to reach these masses, in places where they are found, some quicker and more direct method must be adopted. The systematic emotional revival campaign will not answer. But a more rational system of "missions," consisting in protracted series of services with sermons more or less of an apologetic character, adapted to the comprehension of the masses, will be likely to accomplish more. These, however, must be supplemented by constant personal effort on the part of the preacher. The preacher is to go out and compel men to come in. That is his duty. But that does not mean that the provisions of the feast are to be taken out into the highways and hedges, and

*It should be remembered that the catechetical system of the modern Protestant Churches is essentially different from that which prevailed in the early Church. The latter had for its end the preparation of the heathen for baptism; the former looks to the preparation of the baptized children of the Church for full membership.

served there. The abandonment of the consecrated house of worship, and the resort to halls and theatres for the sake of bringing in outsiders, must always be of doubtful propriety and effect. And the campmeeting, which was once supposed to be a powerful missionary institution, as it is conducted in modern times, we are sure, is doing far more evil than good. With its concomitants of Sunday excursions and traffic, it is demoralizing to any community in which it is held.

We have, then, no specific to offer as a remedy for the evil of a vast churchless population. The only effectual method of bringing outsiders into the Church and keeping them there, and thus making this really a Christian country, is to administer the old Gospel and the old Sacraments in such way as to adapt them to the mind and to the wants of this new and modern age.

IV.

JAPANESE BUDDHISM.

BY REV. D. B. SCHNEDER.

The growth of Buddhism after the death of its founder was rapid. Very soon after his first sermon Buddha sent out sixty converts with this commission: "I am delivered from all fetters human and divine. You, too, O monks, are delivered from the same fetters. Go forth and wander everywhere, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare of gods and men. Go forth, one by one, in different directions. Preach the doctrine in its beginning, its middle and its end, in its spirit and in its letter. Proclaim a life of perfect restraint, chastity and celibacy. I will go also and preach this doctrine." Buddhism was from the beginning, therefore, and has been more or less throughout its history a missionary faith. For this reason, the new way of salvation became known before many centuries in regions beyond the land of its birth, Ceylon, Siam, Burma, Anam and the islands of the South; also Nepal, Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, China, Korea and Japan in the course of time accepted the new faith, and Buddhism became the great religion of Asia. Curiously enough, however, it could not retain its ground in India, the land of its nativity. There Brahmanism reasserted itself, though not without becoming materially modified through its contact with Buddhism, partly owing to which it is now known under the new name of Hinduism. Another remarkable feature of the history of Buddhism has been its failure to displace certain native religions with which it came in contact in other countries. In some instances it succeeded in gaining the control over only a part of the territory, so to speak, of man's spiritual nature. In China, for example, it holds the ground conjointly with Confucianism and Taoism in such a way that most Chinese are Confu-

cianists, Taoists and Buddhists at the same time. A similar state of affairs prevails in Japan and Korea. For this reason there is great divergence in the estimates made of the strength of Buddhism, Rhys Davids, for instance, making the number of Buddhists in Asia about 500 millions, while Monier-Williams puts the figure at only 100 millions. The discrepancy is produced by counting, or refusing to count, people who belong to other faiths at the same time.

Hand in hand with the growth of Buddhism, however, went a profound change in its character. Primitive Buddhism was an atheistic humanitarianism, being without a God, without a revelation, without priests, without temples, without sacrifices, without prayer, insisting on the boldest simplicity, the most rigorous self-denial, and the extremest negative purity, and aiming at the extinction of personal existence. The Buddhism of to-day, while existing in Protean forms, is a cult that can nevertheless be generally characterized as an idolatrous polytheism with theistic tendencies. It has been an approach toward, rather than a movement away from, the true conception of a religion. Buddha is worshipped as a god, as are also many other beings, in the forms of numberless images. Both the historical and the legendary teachings of Buddha and of his early followers are held in abjectest reverence as being divine revelations. Vast hordes of priests perform the rites and ceremonies of an elaborate sacerdotalism in thousands of gorgeously built temples, making offerings and chanting prayers for the living and the dead. The glitter and pomp of hierarchy impress the vulgar mind. A great show of ascetic self-denial is but an ostentatious form devoid of reality. Ideas of purity are relegated to a secondary place. A paradise as sensual as that of the Mohammedans is held before the devotees, and Nirvana is transformed from a state of non-existence into a condition of hazy, dream-like beatitude. Why this change? Why this recoil to many of the features of the Brahmanism from which Buddhism sprang and against which it was a reaction and a protest? Because Buddhism ran counter to the eternal instincts of the human heart. Man craves for

home and property, for the presence and protection of a divine being—for life, in short, with all that helps to make it worth living, rather than for death and the emptiness of total extinction. And Buddhism with all the elaborateness of its programme for humanity found itself driven to pay its humblest respects to these human cravings.

As early as 337 B. C. a great schism occurred, out of which grew the two great divisions, variously known as Northern Buddhism and Southern Buddhism, or the Greater Vehicle and the Lesser Vehicle, or Mahayana and Hinayana. These main divisions exist until this day, the southern type of the faith being found in Ceylon, Siam, Burma, Anam and Java; the northern in Nepal, Tibet, China, Korea and Japan. Of Northern Buddhism the sacred literature is in Sanskrit; Southern Buddhism retained the original Pali. Southern Buddhism is the simpler, the more nearly like the original form of the faith; Northern Buddhism is such a confused mass of modifications and accretions as would probably make it unrecognizable to the founder were he somehow to reappear upon the scene. Other schisms followed this great one. Divisions and subdivisions occurred, the differences hinging largely on the question of a less or greater divergence from the simplicity of the early form of the faith. Generally the side of greater divergence gained the day. Modification followed modification, every new development being supported by the continuous weaving of new legends, or new and one-sided emphasis upon some particular portion of Buddha's doctrine. Religions of the lands which Buddhism entered, like the Shamanism of Tibet and the Shintoism of Japan, were taken up into it and assimilated. New deities were added; image worship increased; temples, pagodas, relics and charms were multiplied, until Buddhism became what it now is—the most elaborate system of idolatry in the world.

To all this Japanese Buddhism is no exception. The year 552 A. D. is generally agreed upon as the year in which Buddhism was brought to Japan. What was Japan when Buddhism knocked at its doors? That is an important question, for the successful

entrance of a religion into a new country depends very much on the religious, social, political and intellectual condition of the people to be won. Let us attempt a hurried answer. The population at the time consisted possibly of one million people—hunters, fisherman and farmers, divided up into many different clans. There was a dominant tribe whose head, called Mikado, exercised authority over a considerable portion of the main island, and there were already the beginnings of government, law and literature. The people were intellectually well gifted. Their latent æsthetic endowments later proved to be of a high order. The prevailing religion was Shinto, or the Way of the Gods. It was a cult whose soul was reverence and obedience toward the Mikado, combined with the worship of ancestors and of nature. It identified patriotism with religious devotion. It fostered the *Yarmato Darmashii*, that is, the spirit of unconquerable Japan. It thus became a useful engine for the conquest, unification and civilization of the outlying tribes. It looked upon Japan as the sacred land of the gods, and it peopled its mountains, trees, rivers and clouds with deities innumerable. But it was then already an unsatisfactory religion. Before the real religious cravings of the soul it was dumb. The rising tide of civilization demanded something better, and altogether Japan was, for the new and more elaborate faith of Buddhism, an inviting field.

Buddhism came in by way of Korea. The story runs as follows: In the year 552 A. D. a Korean king sent over to the Court of Japan some golden images of Buddha, together with some sacred books. The Mikado called a council to determine what should be done with the idols. The majority feared that the worship of these foreign gods would be a dangerous insult to the native ones, and decided to have nothing to do with them. However, one of the Ministers of State set up the images in his country residence, which he thus converted into the first Buddhist temple in Japan. Soon after the land was afflicted with a grievous pestilence, and this was attributed to the wrath of the native gods incurred by the harboring of these new rivals. War broke out, the temple was burned, and the idols thrown into a river.

Whereupon still greater calamities followed, seeming to indicate that Heaven was after all on the side of the new gods. Then the tide turned. Priests and missionaries were invited over from Korea in large numbers. Later, emissaries came also from China, and still later Japanese monks went over to China to drink at what was considered more nearly the fountain of the new faith. The emperors became patrons of Buddhism and helped to build great temples and monasteries. Still questionings as to the temper of the native deities occasioned some uneasiness, until early in the ninth century the great Kobo arose, who did successfully for Buddhism what Philo unsuccessfully attempted between Judaism and Neo-Platonism. He brought the two together through the supernatural discovery that all the Shinto deities were incarnations of Buddha, and, therefore, belonged to the Buddhist pantheon. The only thing that remained to be done was to re-christen the native deities with Buddhist names, and to give them due recognition as members of the already greatly overgrown family of Buddhist divinities. The scheme was a success. Temples acquired a mixed character, partly Buddhist and partly Shinto. Upon the family god-shelf sat cheek by jowl Buddhist and Shinto idols dispensing supposed favors to their happy devotees with equal alacrity. This *Ryobu*, or mixed Buddhism, lived in Japan for a thousand years. Out of the trunk of this mixture of the cults grew, however, about the thirteenth century, several new shoots, which together soon exceeded the parent trunk both in size and vigor. But the old and the new flourished together until the year 1870, when a crash came. The revived spirit of nationalism led the country to a consciousness of the wrong done not only to the old native faith, but much more to the government by retiring the emperors to lives of sacred and harmless seclusion, leaving the actual control of affairs for many centuries to those most capable of seizing it. The day of retribution was severe. Buddhism was disestablished. The priests were left to find their own rice. The *Ryobu*, or mixed temples, were purged of all Buddhist idols, as well as of every vestige of Buddhist furniture, decoration or symbolism. A strong

and persistent effort was made to revive Shinto, the native religion, and the effort was so far successful that this religion holds a place of comparative importance even now, owing, indeed, largely to the fact that it is the religion of the imperial household. And, yet, in spite of all, the religion which dominates Japan to-day is Buddhism.

So much by way of a brief glance at the external history of Buddhism in general and of Japanese Buddhism in particular. Turning now to the inner development of the cult in Japan, its present condition and its effects upon the people of the Empire of the Rising Sun, we find much that is interesting.

The inner history of Japanese Buddhism is interesting, not only on its own account, but especially through the light which it throws upon the religious structure and tendencies of the Japanese mind. For in the history of a religion in any country there is always a process of interaction between the forces represented by the religion itself and the forces of the national life, and sometimes the religion is modified as much as it modifies. The history of Buddhism in Japan is a history of sects. These sects represent all sorts of one-sided emphasis, on one or the other element of the Buddhist teachings, all sorts of deviations from these teachings, all sorts of foreign ideas superadded to, or substituted for, the original teachings. As has been said, it is the Northern type of Buddhism that prevails in Japan. However, the Southern, or Hinayana, type was not without its trial here. Early in the history of the introduction of the new religion three sects of the Lesser Vehicle found their way into the country and gained a considerable following. But they have long since ceased to be. The Japanese mind was not sufficiently lethargic and listless to offer a permanent welcome to a form of teaching so utterly negative and hopeless. Later came two sects that occupied a middle ground between the extremes of Northern and Southern Buddhism. But even of these the one has already died out, while the other, though still living, is doing so at a dying rate.

The sects that have held their ground are those distinctively

representing the Greater Vehicle. Of these there are seven in Japan to-day (not counting sub-sects), four of them having been imported, the other three being native to the soil. Of the four imported ones three are of Indian origin, while one is a native of China; all, however, entered Japan through China. The general characteristics of these four are that they came in a more concrete form than their predecessors, and were thus better fitted to appeal to the ordinary mind. They came beating drums and flaunting colors. They set up their numerous idols and welcomed the native deities into the crowd. They performed rites and ceremonies. They paraded the pomp of hierarchy. They sold charms and amulets. Instead of the dry husks of abstraction they interested the people in saints, sacred places and relics. Instead of austerities in this life they offered them prosperity and health; and instead of the nihilism of Nirvana in the hereafter, they depicted to them a paradise sufficiently sensuous to meet their liveliest appreciation. As to peculiarities distinguishing the individual sects, one, the Kegon, is noted for its very close resemblance doctrinally and practically to Brahmanism. Another, the Tendai, through the profundity of its speculations, on the one hand, has earned the name of the metaphysical sect, while on the other, by its wily practical methods, it has drawn upon itself the epithet of the Jesuits of Buddhism. The Shingon sect consummated the absorption of the Shinto deities into the Buddhist pantheon, and in doctrine is largely a reproduction of the ancient Yoga philosophy of Brahmanism, one of the most interesting phenomena of the intellectual and religious life of India, and the main philosophical basis of the modern phenomenon of theosophy. Still another, the Zen sect, may be denominated the Quaker sect, both on account of its pronounced mysticism and of its opposition to an excessive use of idols, sacred books, ceremonies and religious externals in general.

Most important for our study, however, are the three sects that are native to Japan, namely, the Jodo, the Shin and the Nichiren sects. These three sects arose during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when Japanese Buddhism was approaching the zenith

of its glory. Their rise forms an epoch in the history of Japanese Buddhism. Three strikingly new things manifest themselves in connection with them, namely, first, emphasis upon paradise as practically the goal of human striving; secondly, the idea of salvation by faith; and, thirdly, an approach to the theistic conception. An opposite tendency, however, also manifested itself in a doctrine of the Nichiren sect resembling somewhat the modern theory of atheistic evolution.

The first of the sects named, the Jodo, is based upon the teaching of the Indian philosopher Memio. But as a religious sect it originated in Japan. This was the first Buddhist sect to announce the doctrine of paradise, or heaven, and of salvation by faith, though it did so in a rather negative way. Owing to a conviction that men were no longer as earnest in matters of religion as formerly, and that thus few would attain to Nirvana according to the noble eight-fold path of original Buddhism, it was decided to lower the standard, and to find, not "a more excellent," but an easier way. This lower standard or goal was paradise, or the Pure Land, where Amida, the deification of boundless light, dwells, and where the saved abide in supreme bliss. The easier way was that of faith in Amida. It was the first appearance in Buddhism of the principle of salvation through the aid of another. Faith in Amida secures from him the compassionate help which man's weakness needs in order to reach paradise. According to the Jodo doctrine, however, this faith was to be supplemented by works. The works consist of the acquisition of merit, mainly by the endless repetition of the formula, "*Namu Amida Butsu*," or "Hail Eternal Buddha!" The founder of the sect himself is said to have repeated the formula sixty thousand times a day, and to-day priests in the temples, farmers and mechanics at their toil, wives at their needles and old men and women taking care of their grandchildren keep up an incessant hum of *Namu Amida Butsu, Namu Amida Butsu*.

But while the Jodo sect thus halted at the position of faith and works, it was not long before a new sect arose which planted itself squarely upon the doctrine of salvation by faith alone.

This was the Shin, or True, sect, which sect represents the crowning manifestation of Buddhism in Japan. The sect is a sort of Protestantism in relation to the older sects, and its founder, Shinran, is a sort of a Luther. The soteriological views of Buddhism experienced a revolution. Amida, the object of the faith upon which this and the previous sects built, is a Buddha-to-be according to most scriptures, according to some a Buddha already. Practically, among the adherents of the Jodo and the Shin sects he has transplanted the original Buddha, and occupies the highest place in their pantheon. "In preparation for his office as the saviour of men (I quote from Nanjo's 'Short History of the Twelve Buddhist Sects'), he practised good deeds during many periods of transmigration, with the purpose of bringing his stock of merits to maturity for the sake of other living beings. All his actions, words and thoughts were always pure and true, so that he achieved the fulfilment of his great compassionate desire." And he uttered what is known as the Original vow, as follows: "If any of the living beings of the ten regions, who have believed in me with true thoughts and the desire to be born into my country and have even to ten times repeated the thought of my name, should not be born there, then may I not obtain the perfect knowledge." This practice and this vow, it is said, gave to Amida an excellence surpassing that of all other Buddhas, and made him immeasurable light as well as boundless wisdom and compassion, the saviour of all who turn to him. "To rely upon the power of the Original vow of Amida," to quote again from Nanjo, "with the whole heart and give up all idea of self-power is called the truth." This reliance upon the all-merciful Amida was proclaimed by Shinran as the sole means of immediate and full salvation, in opposition to the synergism of the Jodo sect. Not antinomian, however, was the new doctrine. Good works were to be done, and they did not consist in the mere senseless repetition of formulas. It is the glory of the Shin sect that in its emphasis upon common morality it exceeds every other sect. And the motive is not, as in the case of the Jodo sect, the acquisition of merit, but the view is that purity of morals is only a

necessary proof of faith in Amida. It is not a meaningless coincidence that this view of salvation by faith and of the necessity of purity of life led Shinran, the founder of the new Buddhism, as it did Luther, the reformer, three hundred years later, to reject the practice of celibacy. Shinran married a lady of the imperial court.

Like Luther, moreover, Shinran together with his disciples, translated the most important of the sacred scriptures of Northern Buddhism, hitherto existing only in Sanskrit and in Chinese, into the vernacular of the people, and had them printed in the simplest form. He also inaugurated the practice of preaching to the people. He gave to women access to paradise, or the Pure Land, without being re-born first as men. Idols, relics and charms, cloister, pilgrimages and ascetic austerities were to a large extent discarded. The temples of the new sect were located right among the people, along the principal streets in the heart of cities and towns, so as to be easily accessible to all.

Much can be said in criticism of this great phenomenon in the history of Japanese Buddhism, resembling Protestant Christianity, as it does, so closely in its external features that the former might be called a caricature of the latter had not the Shin sect been in existence three centuries before Protestantism. It is true, for example, that Amida, the all-merciful Saviour of Buddhism, has no historical basis. He is not the original Buddha who was Gautama of India. He is a pure figment of the imagination created to satisfy a blindly groping religious instinct. Moreover, he is not a saviour from sin, but only a saviour from suffering. If the soteriology of the Shin sect were efficient it would not be sufficient. It would not deliver from the guilt and power of sin. And while the doctrine of this new Buddhism is an approach to a theistic form of faith, it still falls far short. Amida is not the Creator, not the omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent One, not the absolute. He does not bear distinctly the marks of personality. He is spoken of as exercising the functions of a person, but the deeper teaching is that he is a thing or a condition.

Yet when all is said it still remains true that of all manifesta-

tions among the ethnic religions of the Orient the rise of the Shin sect is one of the most remarkable and one of the most hopeful. And the facts that the birthplace of this new development in the ancient faith of Buddhism is Japan, and that this sect has nearly as many adherents in Japan as all the other Buddhist sects put together, speak volumes for the religious future of this most interesting land of the Far East.

So long as human conditions are so varied and human tendencies so divergent as they are now, probably the division of religious believers into sects is inevitable. Japan did well in the origination of her first native sect, much better still in the origination of the second. But there was also material among her people for the origination of a third division which fell far below the first two in quality. This was the Nichiren sect, or the Sect of the Sun Lotus. It is a sect of extremists and fanatics. Of all the other Buddhist sects none is so nationalistic, none so polytheistic, none so idolatrous, none so bigoted, none so controversial and fiery as this one. Its political motto is: "Japan for the Japanese." It includes in its catalogue of gods nearly every saint and hero of Japanese history. Its idols are the most numerous, various and hideous. It even worships its sutra, or sacred book, as a god, believing of course most devoutly in its verbal inspiration. The adherents of the sect regard themselves as the only true sect; and certain of their priests warned the authorities of the Parliament of Religions at Chicago against all the other sects as false and as misrepresenting Buddhism. Their controversies with other sects have been marked by violence and unscrupulousness. A thousand years in the lowest hell is the reward prescribed by them for the priests of all other sects—surely a sad departure from the spirit of the gentle Buddha. So far as doctrine is concerned, they reject the principle of salvation by the aid of another, and insist that every man must work out his own salvation. Their description of paradise is most sensuous. Their chief dogma is an extension of the theory of transmigration to such an extent as to include every form of existence from the gods down to mud. The clod, no less than the man is capable

by means of successive re-births of becoming a Buddha—a sort of evolutionary process uncontrollable by design.

Thus it will be realized that the manifold ideas and practices which have entered into the history of Japanese Buddhism constitute a grotesque compound. Certain elements, however, run through all the sects and throughout the whole history of the faith. Foremost among these is the doctrine of transmigration. Buddhism in all its forms rests unreservedly on this strange idea, the only variation consisting in the extent of its application. The universal acceptance accorded this theory in the Orient is something that to us is incomprehensible. Certain modern Japanese scholars have attempted to explain transmigration as nothing other than the doctrine of evolution. But between the two things there is a hopeless difference. The doctrine of transmigration is one of the things that helps to reveal the vast gulf between the Oriental and Occidental mind.

Another principle that is coextensive with Buddhism is pantheism. Primitive Buddhism, indeed, was only indistinctly pantheistic, but the early reaction toward the Brahmanism from which Buddhism sprang, everywhere accorded to pantheism again a large and avowed place. The idea of personality is nowhere clearly grasped. Men are phenomena, links in the chain of transmigration. The gods represent forces, or conditions, or principles, rather than distinct personal beings.

Another feature that is almost as general as the first two is the practice of religious contemplation. This is another of the strange phenomena of the Orient. It is of a piece with the pantheism of the East. The contemplation, or *dhyana* in Sanskrit, and *zen* in Japanese, connected with the religious life of the East is a mystic sinking of the individual mind into the great All, or rather, in Buddhism, into the great Nothing. The practice of it requires the subject to sit for long periods quite motionless, the legs crossed in the manner shown in nearly every image or picture of Buddha, the hands in a certain position, and the body erect. The thoughts must be withdrawn from the things of sense and from definite conceptions, and fixed upon vacancy. Gener-

ally the results aimed at are not definite truths that can be uttered in words, but rather a mental condition, a state of tranquility, an absolute imperturbability, an ecstatic quietude. In some forms of it, as in the case of the zen, or contemplation sect, the aim was to secure by direct mystic transmission from Buddha certain secret revelations which gave an insight into the deepest truth. Often, however, it became what has been aptly called "mind-murder," ending in indolence and listlessness.

The pessimism which was so fundamental with original Buddhism still lives in all Japanese Buddhism, though in a weaker degree in the three native sects. Polytheism finds an extreme development. Idolatry, which was discarded by Buddha, is universal in Japanese Buddhism, restrained in some sects, rampant in others. The acquisition of merit occupies a large place in religious practice, but is spurned by the largest, that is, by the Shin sect. There is taught the doctrine of self-dependence and of salvation by dependence on others. There is Universalism, Quakerism and Methodism. As to metaphysical principles, Japanese Buddhism furnishes examples of all sorts of manifestations—of absolute idealism and absolute nihilism; of a pantheism that would rival that of Spinoza, and of realism that goes to the utmost extreme. Its ethical thought, as was the case with original Buddhism, is controlled by both Stoic and Epicurean principles, though the fundamental ethical motive of Japan, as of the whole Orient, is endæmonistic. Amid all, however, must be remembered the fact that Japanese Buddhism answers much more nearly to the conception of a religion than its Indian original. In comparison with the latter it was in its best days not only a modification, but an elevation.

II. The present condition of Japanese Buddhism next claims attention. If in relation to its original the past of Japanese Buddhism was a modification and an elevation, its present condition must be called a modification and a degeneration. The actual condition of Buddhism as it exists in Japan to-day is, indeed, in part a reflection of the past. It is the logical result of the mixture of heterogeneous forces which has already been re-

ferred to. Although in 1870 the government made a strenuous effort to disentangle Shinto, the primitive Japanese faith, from the Buddhism into which it had been taken up, the result, so far as the people at large were concerned, was far from successful. The people of Japan to-day are, with a small exception, adherents of three systems of teaching, namely, Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism. The demarkations between these three, in the minds of the common people, are far from distinct. Many of them worship deities and observe rites without knowing or caring whether they are of the Buddhist or Shinto kind. This confusion is well evidenced in the case of the little group of deities called "The Seven Gods of Happiness," whose images are to be found upon the god-shelf of almost every home; whose names are upon the lips of the people everywhere; who are spoken of sometimes with reverence, often familiarly and even with merriment, in a land, however, where merriment by no means always implies disrespect; and who are so extensively used to exorcise the evil spirits from the home on New Year's Day. All of this popularity is enjoyed by these seven happy gods in spite of the fact that, though nominally a Buddhist group, only two of them are of Buddhist origin, while of the rest there are two of Brahman, two of Taoist and one of Shinto origin.

So far as the differences between Shinto, Buddhism and Confucianism are recognized, however, Shinto is the cult for the living, Buddhism for the dead, and Confucianism is the moral code. For worldly prosperity people pray to the Shinto household idols or at the Shinto shrines; for things pertaining to the dead, or to the prospect of death and the future life, they pray to the Buddhist idols and go to the Buddhist temples; for moral guidance they study the literature of Confucianism. Neither Shinto nor Buddhism has for the Japanese any definite ethical import; that belongs entirely to Confucianism.

Practically, therefore, all Japanese are Buddhists. The forty-two million people of Japan can properly be added to the Buddhist column, though they must at the same time be placed also in the Shinto and Confucian columns. But this means much less

than saying that all Japanese are received into the Buddhist community by a formal ceremony resembling those by which monks, novices and lay-members were received into the Order in the early history of the faith. There is no ceremony of admission into Buddhism in Japan, except for priests, as they are now properly called, rather than monks. Nor does it mean that all Japanese are believers in Buddhism, for there is no formal profession of faith. It means rather that the Japanese are born into Buddhism, and, especially, that they die in Buddhism. When a child is born it is registered in, and is looked upon as belonging to, the temple in whose vicinity it is born. By way of preparation for death people go to the temples and under the direction of the priests endeavor to acquire merit. At death itself Buddhism has much to do. The cemeteries are controlled by the priests, the granting of whose privileges is one of their sources of revenue. The evil spirits which are always supposed to congregate about a corpse must be dispelled by the priests. The funeral ceremony must be conducted by priests, in whose hands the safe passage of the spirit through the realm of shades is supposed to be to a large extent lodged. Lastly prayers for the dead must be said by the priests. The tendency of Japanese Buddhism, even more than that of original Buddhism, has been democratic. There is a decided disposition toward a doctrine of universal salvation. Originally it was very difficult to become a Buddha, but under Japanese Buddhism it became very different. Theoretically, indeed, it is held that there are two main states into which people may enter at death: the state of the good, who immediately enter paradise and become *hotoke*, or Buddhas; and the state of the wicked, who must pass through a long series of transmigrations yet, some of which may take them through the bodies of animals or the state of demons in hell. Practically, however, all people can become *hotoke* when they die, especially with the help of the priests. They may be obliged to linger in some intermediate state, or purgatory, for a while, but they can be delivered by prayers and offerings. When, therefore, a person dies priests are called, as many as the family can afford, who set

up the tablet bearing the new name of the dead. For, just as an individual on being born into the present state receives a new name, so birth into the next world requires a repetition of the process. Incense is then burned before the tablet and prayers are intoned. For seven successive days after the funeral the priests come to the house of the deceased to burn more incense and to say more prayers before the tablet, and after that they come once a week for a year. When the stage is reached when the deceased is supposed to have entered paradise and become a *hotoke*, or Buddha, the prayers may not yet cease. For the *hotoke* is a supernatural being, a deity, who needs to be honored accordingly. The priests must offer food to the *hotoke*, or spirit of the departed, and give him news about the home from which he went forth. Not only, however, is devotion to the dead a matter of the priests ; the relatives also visit the temple at which the dead is buried, on the monthly recurrence of the date of death, for the first year, and on the anniversary of the death after that. The object of these visits is, first, to serve the dead by bringing him food and flowers ; secondly, to pray that he may be truly born into paradise, and, thirdly, to pray that the dead may keep in peace and prosperity the house from which he departed. All these acts of the relatives, of course, take place under the direction of the priests.

Though nearly the whole population of Japan is Buddhist, it is in large part only so in name. The people of the country may be divided into three classes on the question of their relation to the faith. There is first the class of the religiously indifferent or sceptical. They have nothing further to do with Buddhism than to have their dead buried and perhaps also prayed for by the priests. A large proportion of those who are to-day crowding the government colleges and the two imperial universities of Japan, or who have gone forth from these institutions, belong to this class ; they have no religion. There is a second class who, though they have no positive faith in Buddhism, yet give alms to the mendicants, support the temples, and occasionally pray to the idols, as a mere matter of decency, or with a vague idea of being

on the safe side by so doing. And there is a third class consisting of those who endeavor to fulfil their religious duties faithfully, as prescribed by the priests. These worship their household gods faithfully. They visit the temples regularly. They show the spirits of their dead all due reverence. They worship, besides the seven gods of happiness, the images of Amide, the Eternal ; Kwannon, the goddess of mercy ; Hachiman, the god of war ; Dharma, the god of wisdom, and others, according to the customs of the place in which they have been reared or the particular sect under whose influence they happen to be. A general idea that prevails is that it is good policy to be on friendly terms with all deities, so that the traveller often stops to make his obeisance before a wayside idol or at a wayside shrine without asking any questions as to character or relationship of the god he is thus honoring.

What proportion these three classes hold to each other it is difficult to tell with any degree of accuracy. There are no statistics on the subject. There is much reason to believe, however, that the class of the strictly faithful is not the largest, and that it consists mainly of the very ignorant and of people who have retired from the active duties of life. Altogether, the impression that the situation makes upon the mind of the observer is that the day has come when the ancient religion sits lightly upon the Japanese heart. The Japanese still goes to the temple, but often only out of tender feelings for the dead. He keeps his idols in the house, but often largely as a matter of good luck, or custom, or even ornamentation ; for in general the idols of Buddhism do not partake of the hideous character that has characterized the images of other idolatrous religions ; the colossal image of Buddha at Kamakura has won high praise as a work of art. Alms to mendicants are often mere acts of commiseration. Gifts to temples, posted up as they always are in conspicuous places, may be shrewd business advertisements or bids for political favors. Pilgrimages to famous sacred mountains or shrines often possess to a large extent the character of pleasant summer outings, such as might furnish inviting themes for some Japanese Chaucer.

The *matsuri*, or religious festivals, held at almost every temple several times a year, are jolly religious picnics, which are often enlivened by very amusing theatrical performances, resembling possibly the miracle plays of European mediæval history. So far as knowledge of their religion is concerned, there is among the common people a woful lack. There is no reading of sacred literature in the house, no teaching of religion to the young. Even the more educated know little about the specific doctrines of the faith. The large body of the people only believe that they will go to paradise and become *hotoke* when they die; they talk about worshipping this or that idol as a means of securing this or that end, just as people talk about the comparative merits of this or that medicine for the cure of this or that disease; and they perform certain acts, such as repeating the formula, "*Namu Amida Butsu*," to secure merit and help toward entrance into paradise.

That the existence of superstitions should be another feature of such a state of things is not surprising. A great deal of trouble is occasioned the Japanese by evil spirits. In front of many a Japanese gate stands the beautiful holly tree; it is there to keep the demons out. When a dead body is carried out of a home the floor is quickly swept after it; it is the sweeping out of the evil spirits. Sick people are often supposed to be possessed of demons, sometimes in the form of foxes, badgers or cats, and it is one of the functions of the priest to exorcise them. To find a suitable day for a wedding is exceedingly difficult, owing to the existence of a very large number of unlucky days. Altogether, superstition in Japan has been well described as a vast undergrowth which it is as impossible to classify as to account for.

Let us turn now from the people to the priests. First of all, it is to be noted that the priests in Japanese Buddhism no longer occupy the important place proportionately that the monks did in early Buddhism. There are only about 100,000 Buddhist priests in Japan to a population of forty-two millions. Still they occupy an important position. Most references to Buddhism in

the secular or religious press are references, in fact, to the priesthood. What of the priests, then? So far as their doctrinal views go, it can be said in general that while Japanese Buddhism is "polytheism for the unshorn" it is "pantheism for the shorn." That is, there is in Japanese Buddhism an exoteric teaching for the people and an esoteric teaching for the priests, and the esoteric form is above all things pantheistic. As to particular doctrines the priests hold what has been handed down to them by the tradition of their respective sects. As to general intelligence the state of things is far from ideal. There are schools now for the education of candidates for the priesthood, as there were not in the early days of Buddhism. But the result is not the improvement that might have been expected. The general intellectual condition of Japanese Buddhist priests is shamefully low. There are, indeed, notable exceptions to this statement, of which such names as those of Nanjo, Inonye, Murakami and Nakanishi stand as guarantees. There are men among the Buddhists who have traveled extensively in Occidental countries and who hold degrees from some of the best universities of Europe. But about the generality of the priests there is much complaint, not only by the secular press, but even by Buddhist periodicals themselves. And the dissatisfaction is not only with the ignorance, but also with the immorality of the priests. Priests frequent prostitute quarters or keep harlots in the temples. A high priest of the greater of the two branches of the Shin sect—a sect which above all others has stood for morality—who died a few years ago kept, besides his own wife, a number of concubines, and the story is told that once a Japanese father journeyed many miles to bring his extraordinarily lovely daughter to the Japanese pope as a gift, and returned to his home filled with life-long joy that his offering had been condescendingly accepted. Even the government itself in 1895 felt impelled to issue a warning on the subject of the ignorance, the indolence and the immorality of the Buddhist priesthood.

The occupation of the priests, far from being that of the early monks, is well described by the one word—priestcraft. The cere-

monies over the dead are a cunningly devised scheme to filch money from the pockets of the people. The selling of prayers and charms, the practice of blessing certain objects and of exorcising evil spirits, are all inventions with the same end in view. Their methods savor so strongly of trickery that to a very wide extent the respect of the people has been totally forfeited. Much of their time is spent in sheer idleness. Preaching or pastoral visitation are scarcely dreamt of, except by the priests of the Shin sect, who are to a limited extent in the habit of delivering discourses to their people. Taking into consideration all these things and many more that might be added, the conviction forces itself upon one that, while there are many men of intelligence and character among the Japanese Buddhist priests of to-day, the life of the great body of them is such as to be to the people of Japan not a blessing but a curse.

To sum up, then: Considering the lack of religious fervor among the people and the low intellectual, moral and spiritual status of the priesthood, it is not too much to say that Japanese Buddhism is a decaying faith. Intelligent Buddhists themselves declare that unless the religion can be reformed it is doomed.

III. Japan owes much to Buddhism. It was under the influence of Buddhism that her civilization grew up. For a thousand years Buddhism was at work silently, patiently, persistently inculcating that gentleness, that peculiar kindness, that extreme regard for life, that boundless courtesy which have made the Japanese people famous. Harsh speech and rough, excited action are highly repulsive to Japanese feelings. There are Buddhist priests who still will swing a brush before them when they walk, so that no insects may be left in their path to be crushed by their feet. Japanese etiquette is not mere hollow ceremony, as has been charged; there is much genuine politeness underneath it all.

Buddhism fostered education. When there were no other schools, excepting, perhaps, the training schools for the young *samurai*, or warriors, Buddhist priests whiled away the tedium of their monotonous lives by gathering in the children of the

neighborhood and teaching them to read and write. The monasteries were often the only place where libraries were to be found. The native alphabet was brought into general use through the priests. Printing and the circulation of literature received much encouragement from them.

Moreover, Buddhism called into play the æsthetic activities of the people. Buddhism, in its highly polytheistic form, fed the imagination of the people and furnished many subjects for the art which gradually arose under its influence. The striking fondness for flowers, as well as for the beauties of landscape scenery, are probably not unconnected with the teaching of him the favorite seat of whose images is the beautiful lotus flower.

In its spolytheistic modifications Buddhism, through long centuries, sustained the religious instincts of the people of Japan. Between Shinto and Buddhism the latter is far superior as a religion, and so far as it displaced the former it conferred upon Japan a positive benefit. In its highest form, that of the Shin sect, it is a decided and remarkable "feeling after God" and a vast preparation toward finding Him.

On the other hand, when one contemplates the totality of the effects of this caricature of religion upon the life of so large and gifted a portion of the human race as the Japanese nation is, the impression can not be other than that of melancholy and unspeakable havoc. While Buddhism was kind to animals it was often cruel to men. It is largely responsible for the existence of the *eta*, the pariahs of Japan. Its political influence, while generally peaceable, was destructive of the national spirit. And it was not always for peace; often it instigated internal strife. It kept woman relegated to a position of unnatural inferiority. It palsied the aspirations of men, and trained them into a state of hopeless resignation and of widespread fatalism which grew out of its inexorable law of cause and effect. The very temple bells, hung low as they are, instead of pealing forth the glad notes of joy and faith and hope, send abroad the low, melancholy sounds of a gloomy pessimism. "Sad as a temple bell," is a Japanese saying. The little music that is heard is all in the minor key.

With pessimism pantheism is linked. "How can you worship idols?" you ask the priest who has studied at Oxford. "God is in everything; He is in the image; the image is a helpful representation to the common mind; therefore we use them." Of the prevalence of the pantheism the loss of that greatest essential necessary to make man man, namely, a sense of personality, has been a consequence. An indistinct sense of personality implies the loss of the key to the whole fabric of higher truth. Japanese Buddhism has thus, not indeed to the same extent as original Buddhism would have done, but still to a profound degree, robbed the people of Japan of their self-consciousness, of their sense of individuality, and of their appreciation of individual worth and individual responsibility. And it has, not, indeed, as completely as original Buddhism would have done, but still to an appalling extent, atrophied their God-consciousness, and hardened them in their abnormal state of mind. To sum up all, under the influence of a thousand years of Buddhism, the Japanese spiritual nature has suffered amazing distortion, and it has become fixed and hardened in this distortion.

V.

TRUSTS AND OTHER COMBINATIONS OF CAPITAL. THEIR RELATION TO THE PUBLIC GOOD.

BY REV. STANLEY L. KREBS, A.M.

(Works consulted in the preparation of this article: Report of the Commission appointed by the New York State Legislature to Investigate Trusts; "Monopolies and the People," by Chas. W. Baker; "Practical Christian Sociology," by W. F. Crafts, D.D.; "Wealth *vs.* Commonwealth," by H. D. Lloyd; "The Public Ownership of Monopolies," by Professor Frank Parsons; "Our Country," by Dr. Josiah Strong; "Railways and the Republic," by J. F. Hudson; "The Decadence of Public Functions," by F. O. MacCartney; articles in Johnson's *Cyclopedia* by Geo. W. Krichwey; "Social Reform," by W. D. P. Bliss; "The Labor Movement," by Geo. E. McNeill; "Principles of Sociology," by Professor F. H. Giddings, A.M.; Professor Ely's works; writings of Henry George; and "History of Monetary Systems," by Alexander Delmar.)

The history of the first industrial trouble that ever perplexed and plagued mankind, at least so far as we know, is found in Genesis, the 13th chapter. The economic friction therein recorded was caused by a dispute between two men of immense wealth, involving their respective dependents and partisans. From that hour to the present the problem thus for the first time discovered and felt has been growing in proportions and importance with the increase of the world's population, until now it imperatively challenges world-wide attention, and in this age, for the first time in all history, is man seriously rousing his best talents and enlisting his highest wisdom in an effort to solve this century-long gigantic problem, of which the subject stated in the

caption of this article forms an integral and highly important part, if not the *vital center* of the whole.

In this paper we shall treat the subject under the following heads, and in the order stated: Definition, Cause or Origin, Arguments against, Arguments for, Ineffective Remedies, The True Remedy, and Economic Significance.

DEFINITION.

We waive legal refinements and come at once to a practical definition of the industrial phenomenon. W. D. P. Bliss defines a trust as a case where "by a device of trusteeship various corporations practically form one monopoly without losing their separate corporateness." The Committee appointed by the New State Legislature to Investigate Trusts defined them as combinations "to destroy competition and to restrain trade through the stockholders therein combining with other corporations or stockholders to form a joint-stock company of corporations, in effect renouncing the powers of such several corporations and placing all powers in the hands of trustees." C. H. Baker says, "A trust is a combination to restrain competition among producers, formed by placing the various producing properties in the hands of a board of trustees, who are empowered to direct the operations of production and sale, as if the properties were all under a single ownership and management." Ex-President Cleveland defines them as "huge aggregations of capital, the object of which is to secure the monopoly of some particular branch of trade, industry or commerce, and so stifle wholesome competition." Associate Justice Henry B. Brown, of the Supreme Court of the United States, and Professor Ely agree independently of each other in calling them simply "combinations of corporations." Now if to this last brief definition we add the clause "for the purpose of eliminating the suicidal policy of competition and substituting the conserving policy of corporate coöperation" you have, it seems to me, the best and *most liberal* definition that can be given. Trusts are the most prominent factor in the present-day economical and industrial aggressive movement.

CAUSE OR ORIGIN.

The cause is found in the fierceness of modern industrial competition ; the favoring conditions in prohibitory tariffs and in the invention of labor-saving, distance- and time-annihilating machinery ; the motive, in a mingling of a good and a bad element, namely, that of self preservation and greed. I remark incidentally in this connection that for the above reasons we must all think less of the individuals who form trusts, and more of the underlying conditions out of which they spring and to which they lead. The physician, psychologist and clergyman may and must examine individuals ; the political economist examines systems, general conditions and broad tendencies.

To illustrate the above points : “ Consider for a moment the process of railroad pooling—a process similar, in a general way, to trust-formation. The spirit of competition prompted the building of parallel lines of railway from and to great distributing centers, and these parallel lines find that in the struggle for traffic their freight rates are forced down below the actual cost of transportation. In order not merely to reduce the cost to themselves, but also to raise rates high enough to meet their expenses, they are obliged to enter into agreements with one another, which fix charges to shippers and determine the percentages of freight each may carry.”

The above is a case where we see competition *forcing* men to trust-formation. The competitive system is responsible for them. The mother of the first trust has had a prolific progeny since, and her womb is big with triplets, quadruplets, sextuplets, etc., to day. The first trust formed was the Standard Oil Trust in 1882. Since that date and precedent, so rapid has been the multiplication that Mr. H. D. Lloyd, in the appendix to his book, gives a list of articles in commerce affected by trusts or combinations of capital of one kind or another, and the list occupies eight pages. The Committee of Congress which investigated trusts in 1889 did not report any list, “ for the reason that new trusts are constantly forming, and that old ones are constantly expanding their relations so as to cover new branches of the business and

invade new (economic) territories." The *Philadelphia Times* a few years ago gave a list of trusts numbering 137, representing a capital of \$1,507,000,000.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST TRUSTS.

1. They artificially and despotically raise the prices of necessities and thus tyrannize over consumers and the masses of the people, all of whom are forced to pay tribute, and thus swell enormously the exchequer of the "plutocrats" or trust-barons. The New York State Investigating Committee, after careful investigation, came to the conclusion that the purpose and effect of trusts were "to control the supply of commodities and necessities; to destroy competition; to regulate the quality, and to *keep the cost to the consumer at prices far beyond their fair and equitable market value.*" We have a sugar and coffee trust, which holds up the prices of these commodities and dictates to every breakfast table. "There is a leather trust, so that, from the sole of your foot to the crown of your head, every day, whichever way you turn, if you live the life of a civilized man in America, you must pay tribute to trusts. You cannot put a rubber band on your letters or put a shoe upon your feet without paying a tribute to trusts. You cannot paint the house you live in or the carriage you ride in without paying a tribute to the lead trust and the linseed-oil trust."

In fact, we live, move and have our being in trusts. That is, they *permit* us to live, move and have our being. We live, move and have our being *by their grace!* Some people think the trusts deserve the profound thanks of humanity for not squeezing *all* our being out of us altogether. Indeed, and in all seriousness, it is becoming a problem whereunto their power may grow. Associate Justice Brown, of the U. S. Supreme Court, sounds the note of non-sensational, cool and deliberate alarms as follows: "If no student can light his lamp without tribute to one company; if no housekeeper can buy a pound of meat or coffee or sugar without swelling the receipts of two or three all-pervading trusts, what is to prevent the entire productive industry of the

country becoming ultimately absorbed by a hundred gigantic trusts?"

Their profits are enormous. Labor Commissioner McDonough, of New York State, shows from figures gleaned from the confidential reports of gas and electric-light companies that, while their total annual cost and running expense is \$9,000,000, their receipts from consumers were \$19,000,000, a profit of *far over 100 per cent.* In 1896 the coal combine raised the price of coal 20 cents a ton, and thus levied a monopoly tax of \$9,000,000 on the people of this country, and they deliberately did this although the cost of running was diminishing and the price already high. The Western Union Telegraph Co. has averaged from its organization to the present time *300 per cent.* dividends per annum on its original stock! No wonder that when it developed in the Lexow Committee's work that Mr. Havemeyer wanted 20 per cent. profit on his investments *some* men thought he was *very modest* in his demands! During the year 1887 the linseed-oil trust, which was formed in January of the same year, raised the price of the oil from 38 to 52 cents per gallon. That is to say, every purchaser of oil pays to this trust 14 cents per gallon over and above the sum he would pay if free competition were allowed to do its work. (For some suggestive and pertinent Scripture references along this line see Is. 5 : 8 and Ezk. 5 : 9.) Many other examples of arbitrary price-raising might be cited, but the above exhibit the principle and power.

I have often wondered what would happen if the farmers would form a trust and retaliate upon manufacturers and others, paying them in their own coin! And the fact is that such a trust is said to be now under way. The movement originated in Lancaster, Pa., and expects to be in working order by 1899. Surely if one economic factor may resort to this power, all may.

2. The formation of a trust generally results in the closure of a number of mills or other productive plants, and consequently throws many hands out of employment, entailing loss and suffering upon families and entire communities. This injury is so patent that it needs no further elaboration.

3. The power they possess over the labor market. The trust is a combination for more than producing and selling purposes merely. It is able to "introduce the economics" into its management in the way of forcing down the wages of its employees, as Pullman did in hard times, but *kept up the house rent of his wage-earners* and the salaries of his superintendents.

Being by the very nature of its organization monopolistic, and therefore despotic in its particular line, it can do practically as it pleases. The only influences at work to check it are the trades-unions and other organizations of workmen. But they grind the wages down to the lowest notch that will be tolerated by workmen. They have the power to do this and they exercise that power, whether morally right or not. (Amos 2: 6-8; Mic. 2: 1-2; Is. 3: 15; Jer. 22: 13ss.)

4. One of the strongest arguments against them is their political power, secured by bribery of legislators, municipal councils, school boards and other public officials.

Professor E. W. Bemis, of the University of Chicago (formerly), in a paper before that national convention for Good City Government held in Minneapolis in 1894, tells of a corporation voting \$100,000 to buy the Chicago city council as coolly and calmly as it would vote to buy a new building. President George A. Gates, D.D., LL.D., has a two-page article in the *Kingdom*, a Christian Socialist paper of the West, in which he cited eight cases of what he calls bribery of school controllers by trust agents in order to get their text-books into public schools.

Trusts carry this corruptionism into higher bodies than these. When important Mormon legislation was impending in Congress certain New York merchants, members of combines, telegraphed to members of Congress as follows: "New York sold \$13,000,000 of goods to Utah last year. Hands off." (!!!)

When the President of the Sugar Trust was asked for data concerning the political contributions of the Trust he replied by claiming that he did not carry the data in mind, and to get them would require a search of the books, which he declined to produce. He was then asked whether the Trust had made political contri-

butions in the Presidential campaign of 1892, and he again declined to answer. And now, although the Supreme Court has confirmed the right of an investigating committee to *compel* testimony, Mr. Havemeyer goes scot-free. It seems almost beyond question and cavil that it was the money of the Sugar Trust operating in the Senate which thwarted the purpose of the great majority of the House and re-established the odious sugar tax. It has been charged that 30 Senators were the paid agents of corporations and trusts. With a Senate constituted of 60 per cent. of lawyers and a House of Representatives of a like proportion, and realizing whence a successful lawyer to-day must draw his *large fees*, it is only too evident what must be the character of our legislation.

“The most conspicuous of all is the complete control which a great corporation has had for twenty years or more over the State of Pennsylvania. The old joke of moving to adjourn the Legislature ‘if the Pennsylvania Railroad has no more business for this body to transact’ dates from the early stages of corporate development,” says Mr. J. F. Hudson in his book, to which Mr. J. D. Lawson adds, in “Leading Cases Simplified,” “The Pennsylvania Railroad appears to have run the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania during the last ten or fifteen years with as much success as it does its own trains.”

The power of the Standard Oil Trust in the Legislature of Ohio is too well and notoriously known to require anything but an allusion. That Legislature was deliberately bribed, *i. e.*, the majority of its members were, and the agent of the crime has acknowledged it. The case was carried to Congress, and there as will be remembered was quashed, *i. e.*, the Senate *refused to investigate*. When this action was taken, it was then that Senator Edmunds turned to his neighbor in the Senate and said, “This is a day of infamy for the Senate of the United States.”

Charges were brought against the Secretary of the Treasury in 1891 and against the Secretary of the Navy for the intimate relations held by them with trusts and their operations, but space forbids entering into details. It seems to prove that trusts were

trying to project their corruptionism into the very Cabinet itself. Whether they succeeded or not, every man must be his own judge.

5. Another strong argument against them is that they subsidize, intimidate, muzzle and mould our educational agencies (or are at least attempting to do so) in their own interests. I refer to their power over the press, the colleges and even the pulpit.

OVER THE PRESS.

In 1895 the Bell Telephone Company attempted to pass through the General Court of Massachusetts a bill authorizing the increase of capital stock from twenty to fifty millions of dollars, without placing such shares of increased stock before the public for sale at auction. The scheme was to have those on the "inside" buy up the increase at 100 % and then sell it at market price, 170 %. This project was pushed by an ex-Governor. The attorney for the people was "a veteran reformer, who, without 'pay,' fought the corporation and attempted to have the interests of the people protected." In his presentation of the case he boldly made the charge, in the ex-Governor's presence and before the special committee, that the newspapers of Boston had published the ex-Governor's speech, ostensibly as news, but that they had in reality received *one dollar per line for the insertion*. This charge was never denied either by the ex-Governor or by the newspapers. Again. During one year of the administration of Mayor Pingree, of Detroit, so completely were the papers of that city under the domination of the corporations, which the Mayor was attacking, that they *refused to publish his proclamations*. The only way the Mayor could get his manifestoes before the people was by the use of bill boards and posters.

A gentleman who is acquainted with the metropolitan papers and with the men who manage them asserts that they *suppress their inmost* convictions on social and economic questions, remaining silent on public questions of vital importance to the people, or else prostituting their powers by *actually writing against their convictions*. (Hab. 1:15-17 ; Jer. 5:26-28 ; 17:11 ; Ezk. 22:12-12.)

THEY ATTEMPT TO CONTROL SCHOOLS AND CHURCHES.

The book trust (although its officers assert it is not a trust—perhaps it would like mightily to be one?) was trying last summer to introduce into our high schools and colleges a new work on sociology. The work contains 400 pages, and wherever trusts, combinations and monopolies are mentioned in it they are defended and excused, even as they exist at present. This is the kind of political economy the combinations of capital want our sons and daughters to study. They would, if they could, not only dictate prices, but dictate principles.

The President of the Standard Oil Company is a multi-millionaire, a member of the Baptist Church, attends prayer-meetings, and gives immense donations to colleges and universities, whose professors, rumor has it, are discharged if they disagree with this money-king in their political, economic or currency views. The stories of Professor Bemis and of President Andrews are still fresh in the public mind, and I hope will never fade therefrom. Those events were a stigma and blot upon our boasted civilization. Nay, they are more than that; they constitute a veritable threat to its permanence and continuity. It is the old papal spirit of shackling the liberty of speech and thought. It was a most disgraceful effort to shackle the liberty of speech and the liberty to teach honest, intelligent and scientific convictions. Mark you, this evil tendency, this effort to transform professors into slaves, issues from the money-power pure and simple, from the gigantic capital-power in the land. Every well-bred, moral, intelligent, Christian man in the country should take it as an affront to his manhood, and let his loathing and disgust be known whenever opportunity offers. May God preserve our schools and colleges in the glorious atmosphere of intellectual and moral freedom! “If the Son make you free, ye shall be free indeed.”

THE PULPIT.

“One of the ablest and brightest young clergymen of the city of Boston, after having listened to a portrayal of the present alarming economic conditions of this country, and after having

admitted that the presentation was essentially trustworthy, was asked by the lecturer why the ministers did not reveal these facts to their congregations. He replied, "we dare not—we are cowards." What are the clergy afraid of? Certainly not of the people. Only and solely of the wealthy pew-holder or large contributor to the parish expenses and salary. "The great number of the ministry," writes one of their own number, the author of "The Decadence of Public Functions," "are doing nothing in this great economic struggle. They are either culpably ignorant, and therefore incompetent to have an opinion, or they are partially informed, thus vacillating and ineffectual in treatment and presentation, or they know the truth and are recreant," intimidated into connivance or silence by the proximity of gigantic wealth or capitalistic combination, which projects its chilling shadow into their congregations in the person of some wealthy and financially influential parishioner connected personally therewith. Many clergymen are studying the problem, learning the facts and courageously speaking out. But the above statements are on the whole correct. (Jer. 5:30–31; Mic. 2:11; Matt. 23:23 ss.)

We have now rehearsed the main argument against the trusts. Fairness and truth demand

THE ARGUMENTS ON THE OTHER SIDE.

1. Trusts and combines of capital are necessary and natural to our present wonderful economic and industrial development. The multitude of little capitals that once did the work of the world can never do it again, that is certain. We shall not need horses and mountain geer to carry us to and fro in the world, nor sail boats across the sea. Hand weavers will no longer furnish us with our cloth, nor cabinet-makers with our furniture. New and expanded methods and facilities for work and production absolutely demand new and expanded forms of business organization. The steam engine, electric power and automatic machine are compelling men to coöperate in larger commercial relations. Combines of capital are therefore suggested and induced by the scientific advance of the age, and are necessary to the further evolution of society.

2. Trusts and combines substitute the fraternal principle of coöperation for that of suicidal and cut-throat competition. For instance, the railroad pool was forced to formation by the fierce competition between parallel lines. After the pool was formed the business was much simplified, and a number of advantages accrued to both road and patrons, *e. g.*, every shipper is assured of fairness in the freight rates he has to pay; unusually heavy traffic over a particular line may be relieved by shifting a part to another line; freight reaches its destination more promptly, and it costs the railroad less to handle it.

The same statement can be truthfully made with reference to all lines of business that have been obliged to form trusts for self-preservation. Take the petroleum refineries prior to 1875. There was numerous disasters and failures among them, owing to imperfect methods of refining, want of coöperation, cut-throat competition, etc. These disasters, together with the invention of improved machinery, led to a declaration of peace between the rival refineries, led to coöperation, to union, *i. e.*, to the formation of the trust, with the result that the business has been simplified, perfected and developed, while at the same time the price to the consumer *has been reduced*. And this remark leads us to

3. The third argument for trusts, namely, that they reduce the price of their produce to consumers. The oil trust, by uniting knowledge, experience and skill, by building manufactories on a more perfect and extended scale, with improved machinery and appliances, all legitimate means surely, has been enabled to manufacture a better quality of oil, at a reduction of 66% in its manufacture, and of 9 cts. per gallon to the consumer. Similarly the sugar trust has been enabled to give the people their sugar at a great reduction over old prices. Sugar that was selling at 18 cts. per pound is now selling at wholesale at 5½.

These are the leading arguments for the trusts: that they are the natural products of advancing science and civilization; that they are necessary; that they substitute the principle of coöperation for that of competition, and that they inure to the good of the consumer.

Nevertheless, in the minds of the people and of the public the arguments against them predominate. The evils of the present status of trusts and other combinations of capital are all too real and apparent, and the perils too patent. Therefore

VARIOUS REMEDIES

have been proposed, which we must now briefly review.

1. *Anti-trust Laws*.—Georgia probably passed the first anti-trust law as early as 1887. Thirteen States, mainly in the West, passed such laws in 1889, and five more States in 1890. New York passed one in 1893. Pennsylvania has none. All of these statutes are penal and appear to be sufficiently explicit and drastic. They declare all combinations or agreements regulating the supply or price of commodities to be a criminal conspiracy, and that all such contracts are null and void. But these laws are ineffective. True, by a momentous decision of the Supreme Court on the Sherman Anti-Trust Law rendered April, 1897, the Trans. Missouri Freight Association was compelled to dissolve, and other similar associations, except the biggest one of all, namely, the Joint Traffic Association. So that trusts have gone on multiplying, until now there is a mighty list and a formidable phalanx of them, seemingly stimulated into existence rather than electrocuted out of it by these flashes of legislative lightning.

2. *The Policy of Laissez Faire*.—The advocates of this remedy believe that if you simply let the trusts alone and give them plenty of rope they will eventually hang themselves. The disintegration of the nail trust, for example, in 1896, has fortified the belief of the laissez faire optimists that unrestricted competition, let-aloneism and "natural law" will in the long run limit the power of great combinations, cause their eventual collapse, and thus render all artificial or legal interference unnecessary. They also point triumphantly to the collapse of the Steel Rail Pool in February, 1897, as a further object-lesson in point. "Conceding for the moment that the combination was contrary to the public good and ought to have been suppressed, what conceivable statute, Federal or State," ask the laissez faire philosophers,

“could have suppressed it more quickly, effectively and easily than those natural, self-acting laws which govern all trade? We have heard much talk of the gigantic Carnegie steel monopoly, and how it was able by its immense resources to control the market for steel, on the one hand, and the market for labor, on the other. But in the Steel Rail Pool the Carnegie was only one of several powerful companies united in an effort to control output and prices. And yet in a single day the combination fell to pieces and the price dropped from \$25 down to \$17. The Pool had been in existence many years, and it was considered too strong to be successfully attacked. How was it that it was broken so suddenly? Two theories have been advanced to account for it. The belief that some of the companies were violating the agreement and secretly selling at cut prices is one; the fear that a new enterprise was about being started to undersell the Pool and get contracts is the other;” both of which the laissez economists catalogue as “natural” laws.

The reply to these let-alone economists is this: Your policy or remedy has proven itself miserably ineffective. That two trusts have crumbled by internal corruption is no argument that *all* will eventually. Such reasoning is a total misinterpretation of the facts. The true theory is that artificial monopolies may thus come to an end, but natural monopolies never. There is not one case on record of a natural trust or monopoly committing economic suicide, and only two cases even of artificial monopolies doing it. (See differentiation between “natural” and “artificial” below.)

No, trusts that are clearing from 10 to 100 per cent. on their capital are not likely to tumble over each other in their incontinent haste to go hang themselves. Moreover, to let your garden alone to its own sweet will is a poor way, indeed, of uprooting the weeds or of transforming them into flowers or parterres.

3. *The Single-tax Remedy.*—The single-taxer asserts that were natural opportunities taxed to their full rental value private monopolies would disappear, because then the value of all natural opportunities, like building sites, mines, oil wells, railroad beds,

streets, etc., would go to the community ; other monopolies, they assert, could not be developed, because if *all* had access to land or its equivalent even the weakest competitors could exist and so prevent the stronger from gaining a monopoly. Till the great parent trust or monopoly of private ownership in land is destroyed, it is hopeless to fight lesser monopolies, say the single-tax men.

We admit the logic of this argument and the beauty of this remedy, as it lies before us on paper ; but it is a remedy so remote in the misty folds of the future that the most powerful prophetic telescope which we possess fails to catch sight of its realization in law and in fact, however ardently we might wish it and do wish it. But there seems to be a growing probability of the not-remote realization of

THE TRUE REMEDY, NAMELY THE GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF ALL NATURAL MONOPOLIES.

We distinguish between natural and artificial monopolies. Natural monopolies may be defined as those industries in which the number of competitors who can engage in the business *on equal terms* is limited to a very few. Artificial monopolies are those in which the number of possible competitors is large, but the advantages and economies arising from production on a large scale are so great as to induce concentration of the industry into one organization under a centralized management. The above is Mr. Baker's differentiation. It is a good one, clear, easily remembered, comprehensive and comprehensible. Professor Ely subdivides natural monopolies into two classes, which he does because the classes actually exist ; the first class consisting of the means of transportation and communication, including street franchises (for all highways belong of right to the people of the City, State or Nation) ; the second class composed of industries which become monopolies because the supply of *raw materials* is so limited that it can all be acquired by a single combination of men. Anthracite coal is an illustration, and mines generally. Now the writer's belief is that all *natural* monopolies should be owned and controlled by the municipality, State or Nation respec-

tively. We believe this for certain philosophical or general and certain practical reasons.

GENERAL REASONS.

1. Any *large* business necessarily becomes a corrupting element in politics on account of government efforts to control it, for the simple reason that those controlled attempt to defeat the ends of control and they strive to enter politics to do this. President Eliot, of Harvard, has pointed this out already regarding the liquor business. Hence, when the number of businesses controlled increases largely, as is the case with the multiplication of enormous trusts, the corruption becomes more widespread and the difficulties of government control infinitely greater. It has been urged that we should establish commissions to exercise control over trusts and combinations. But the point above noted should afford sufficient objection to anything of the kind, for the trust would control the commission by the glitter and the gleam of gold. This idea of government control of *private* business has been pushed to an extreme. But if the people, that is the government, would *own* these great natural monopolies, the people, *all* the people, would be *equally interested* in their *successful and equitable operation*.

2. "At the present time (we quote Professor Ely) we have no satisfactory equilibrium between private business and public interests. The great prizes of life in the United States are in the *private* field, and it is this field which tends to attract the brains and energy of the youth of the land. Public employment is disparaged, and young men of capacity are warned against it. How can we expect a *noble* public life under such conditions. These conditions are quite different from those described by Josiah Quincy in his delightful book, 'Figures of the Past,' for he tells us that in 1825 the strongest men in the country were in Congress and were *proud to be there*. Now there are many men not at all distinguished who are so absorbed in immense private business that they would consider an acceptance of an election to Congress a condescension on their part. We must enlarge the field of public

life and render it more important in order to secure a proper balance between private and public life and the prizes which they respectively offer."

Government ownership of these gigantic businesses would effect this desirable end. The best business talent would here find wide fields for its exercise stimulated, too, by the patriotic ambition of doing good to the Nation at large, similar in importance to, if not greater in responsibility than the position of Postmaster-General at present.

But these general or philosophical reasons for an advance from government control to government ownership are fortified by eminently

PRACTICAL REASONS.

1. Government *control* by statute law or otherwise *without* ownership, which is the present and has been the past régime, has been tried and has failed to remedy the situation. The experience of the Interstate Commerce Commission shows that the United States cannot, for example, control the railroads unless it also owns them. This indicates a *fundamental principle*. Government control should be looked upon as a *shift in an emergency, a temporary arrangement in a transition age*, and therefore we would expect it to have, as it really does have, many of the *difficulties*, but few or none of the *advantages*, of government ownership, to which, therefore, reason would urge, it should give place as rapidly as possible. I repeat, therefore, that public control without ownership has been tried and *has failed*. Trusts are becoming more and more self-conscious (if that is possible), more despotic and powerful. It is now simply, without any exaggeration whatever, a question of whether they will eventually own and control the government or the government own and control them.

2. Of the practical working and perfect feasibility of the public ownership and operation of natural monopolies we are happily furnished with numerous examples. This remedy is no longer in the speculative or *experimental* stage. Railroads, telegraphs, telephones, are publically owned and managed in most of the civilized countries of the world, and usually with complete sat-

isfaction. Take, for example, England's ownership of the telegraph. From the report of our Consul to the State Department in Washington we summarize the benefits as follows: (1) a ten-fold increase in the messages sent; (2) a more than doubling of the lines, thus giving many new communities telegraph service; (3) a reduction of over three-fourths in cost of a message; (4) a large indirect pecuniary benefit to people and government; (5) an enormous decrease in time of sending a message. In Germany the public ownership and operation of the railroads has succeeded better than its own advocates anticipated, and the opinion of experts in Germany favors them almost unanimously. There are a few individuals who would like to return to the old system; but they are few, indeed, and are those who would be apt to derive some special personal advantage from the change.

There is scarcely an instance where an industry which has once reached the stage of public ownership and management has reverted to private hands. The tendency is *all the other way*. Public ownership is almost invariably cheaper, and serves the public convenience and necessity adequately and fully, and on a sounder and safer basis to all related interests and industries. In a few instances, such as carrying mails, private companies can do it cheaper, but simply because they carry them *only where it pays*, while the government delivers the mails to small towns and villages where it would not pay a private company. This fact but furnishes another argument for public ownership and management.

There is one standing argument against this remedy which we must notice. I call it a "standing" argument not because of any intrinsic strength, but simply because it still stands in some minds like a scarecrow in a stubble-field. The argument is this: Government ownership would be dangerous because of the political corruption it would introduce or create. The answer is simple and easy. *Private* ownership and control of monopolies is the *main cause* of public corruption. For example, in proof of this I refer the reader to the earliest part of this paper under the head "Arguments Against Trusts." Moreover, government

ownership and operation of the mail business is not a source of great political corruption, if of any at all; but were it a *private monopoly* we would certainly be furnished with the spectacle of its managers, not for the public, but for their own selfish weal, leading many of our Congressmen and Senators in dire financial temptation. But this demoralizing element is eliminated from the Postoffice Department simply because it is owned and controlled by the government. If, therefore, other natural monopolies should happily pass under government ownership their respective and collective contributions to the sewer-stream of political corruption would similarly disappear.

In view of these facts many are willing to admit that government ownership of *natural* monopolies might be wise and advantageous, but they say the scheme would not work with *artificial* monopolies. In reply we say that we are beyond the speculative and experimental stage even here; for Mr. Sydney Webb, in the *Fabian Essays*, gives hundreds of instances of all kinds of industries successfully conducted by government. The examples belong to Great Britain. Step by step the community has absorbed them and the area of private ownership and control has been lessened.

We refer to Mr. Webb's list, not as commending government ownership of artificial monopolies, but simply as a confirmatory fact showing that such ownership is *not* impracticable or chimerical, as so many ill-informed people suppose. The writer, however, is personally in favor of the government ownership and operation only of *natural* monopolies. His economic creed on this subject is that the telegraphs, telephones, railroads and mines should be owned and operated by the State, and that the street-car lines, water, gas and electric-light plants should be owned and operated by the municipalities. (The necessary steps required to effect this change from government control to government ownership are neatly summarized in Dr. Craft's work, page 182, to which the reader is referred.) If the reader calls this municipalism, nationalism or socialism, then the writer is glad to avow himself a municipalist, a nationalist or a socialist.

A word in conclusion as to

THE ECONOMICAL AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE

of this striking industrial phenomenon, namely, the rapid development and multiplication of gigantic combinations of capital. We believe that such combinations must and will multiply, all statute laws, labor demagogues and public agitation, misconception and vituperation to the contrary notwithstanding. The remedy or reform needed is NOT THEIR ABOLITION, THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE. The roots of this gigantic oak sink too deep into sociological soil. The reform needed is not to try to uproot this oak, BUT TO UPROOT FROM THE PUBLIC MIND the erroneous conception regarding it, namely, THE PERSISTENT IDEA THAT TRUSTS AND MONOPOLIES ARE ESSENTIALLY WRONG, EVIL PER SE, AND TO PLANT IN ITS STEAD THE TRUTH THAT THEY ARE THE INEVITABLE ACCOMPANIMENTS of the *new civilization of coöperation* on which the world is entering. The arguments against trusts, WHICH ARE VALID AND SOUND, simply prove the *mal-adjustment* of their *present status* or relation to the public. The arguments for them, WHICH ARE ALSO VALID AND SOUND, prove that combination, consolidation, concentration, coöperation is an industrial *vital necessity*, and IS GRADUALLY SUPPLANTING THE VENERABLE BUT SURELY DECADENT PRINCIPLE OF COMPETITION. The century-long age of competition is closing, that of coöperation dawning. Trusts in *private* hands are the natural and inevitable phenomena of a *transition period*, "evolutionary links" between competition and socialistic coöperation.

Years ago John Stuart Mill laid down the general principle, which is invulnerable, that "different stages of human progress not only *will* but *ought* to have different institutions. Government is always either in the hands or *passing into the hands* of whatever is the strongest power in society; and what that power is does not depend on institutions, but institutions on it." In view of all these things, let us realize that our aggressive business men, despite the fact that they are actuated by more or less of a selfish motive at present, are nevertheless unconsciously creating

the power and leading us on to the coöperative policy of the future. God will overrule the wrath of man to the praises of the Truth. Let the people, therefore, through their government, take this NEW POWER rising in the land, which is an angel in disguise, into their own hands, and cherish and use it for the higher, nobler and grander development of our common brotherhood of humanity.

READING, PA., February 22, 1898.

VI.

THE PROSE OF JAS. RUSSELL LOWELL.

BY CHARLES H. LERCH.

James Russell Lowell's prose, like his poetry, is not of him or by him, but it is his very self. The man Lowell is of more value than his many volumes of prose or of poetry. There were certain creative forces which made the man Lowell. Some of these are evident, others not so evident. We have the best reason to believe that one of these creative forces, and not the least potent at that, was the very locality or the place in which he lived, from the very soil of which he drew his loftiest inspirations. Elmwood, or even Cambridge, without Lowell in them would lose a good deal of meaning for us. It was the only home which he had in America and it should be kept intact in remembrance of him. The birds should still and forever be allowed to build their nests in the trees and bushes of old Elmwood with the same freedom as when the master-spirit of that place loved to see them do so. Land agents and real-estate speculators are, no doubt, contributors to that general advance of civilization by which sometimes deserted and even desolate places are converted into inhabitable and sanitary abodes ; but we wish for once that the advance agent of such civilization would not make his *début* in that locality where the poet and prose-writer loved and sang.

"Cambridge Thirty Years Ago" is a prose narrative that for insight into nature and clearness of interpretation would put Lowell on a level, if not above the level, of such an admirable writer upon these subjects as John Burroughs. Burroughs and White of Selborne have their eyes and senses in general trained simply for the flora and fauna of the localities which they have made famous by the poetic fervor of their prose, but Lowell is all alert and weaves nature into his treatment of the subject so that

very frequently it escapes notice. Cambridge has Harvard College in it, besides the Charles River and its marshes. His account of the place is full and he unites in one whole the nature, the traditions, the quaint manners and language of the good old Cambridge which he loved so well. "Approaching Cambridge from the west," he writes, "you would pause on the brow of Symond's Hill to enjoy a view singularly soothing and placid. In front of you lay the town, tufted with elms, lindens and horse-chestnuts, which had seen Massachusetts a colony, and were fortunately unable to emigrate with the Tories by whom or by whose fathers they were planted. Over it rose the noisy belfry of the College, the square, brown tower of the church, and the slim yellow spire of the parish meeting-house, by no means ungraceful, and then an invariable characteristic of New England religious architecture. On your right the Charles slipped smoothly through green and purple salt-meadows, darkened, here and there, with the blossoming black-grass as with a stranded cloud-shadow." This essay on "Cambridge Thirty Years Ago" in itself furnishes a strong argument against Canon Farrar's wish that Lowell should have written only poetry. What fine, delicate, refined prose would the English language not miss if Lowell had remained all poet!

It was with the eye and instincts of a poet that Lowell wrote prose, and it is this combination in him that makes his essays and addresses delightful reading. To be sure, such a man's poetical zeal sometimes gets the better of his prosaic reason and causes him to break the rules of good prosaic prose. The literary exuberance of the poet occasionally carries the prose writer into regions where the small rhetoricians do not think it safe for those who study the rules of rhetoric to go. Hence we have seen examples of his prose held up to the criticism of the reader with a warning that you must carefully manufacture your figures of speech and all the adornments of your composition, not after the manner of these men who are buoyed upward by their own inward life, but according to the common, good, everyday laws of uninspiring prose. One could weep sometimes when he hears

the teacher of rhetoric before his class dissect some of the passages of Lowell, or Emerson, or Carlyle, and add thereto a bit of inspiring criticism that it is worse than mental dissipation to read them. Still Lowell may not have put his Pegasus under restraint and the steed may have carried him along at too rapid a gait at times. What of it? We can do something better than ferret out errors. We know that he shows a lack of sense of proportion in some instances. He has so much to say and is so anxious to say it that he can not get it all into the conventional paragraph or page. His introductions are long in comparison with the treatment of his theme. The vestibule is more pretentious than the house which he builds.

Lowell's range was wide; he was the master of many literatures; he could write upon many subjects. And yet there is a sense in which he keeps well within the borders of that literary sphere in which we would expect a man of Lowell's tastes to be. Like all great prose writers, he must have a theme, and the realm of knowledge in which he could seek for one was not, for him, inclusive. He was no more an objective prose writer than an objective poet. The times in which he lived called for earnestness and activity and he listened seriously to their summons. The affairs of his country received more than a mere passing notice from his pen.

Lowell's political essays and addresses form by themselves considerable of a prose literature. His views on such matters were not derived from a narrow study and interpretation of the text, but their scope was in keeping with his wide-mindedness in all other matters. They were, therefore, not always received by those of sectarian and insular tendencies with the candor and liberality due to them. In politics he might, perhaps, have been called a Republican, but his vision was not bounded by the profile or horizon of any political party. Thus the Republicans and their organs were not a little chagrined when on one occasion he took great pains to point out what seemed to him the strength and patriotic stalwartness of a Democratic President. "Personally, I confess," he says, "that I feel myself strongly attracted to

Mr. Cleveland as the best representative of the higher type of Americanism that we have seen since Lincoln was snatched from us."

That was enough said for all good Republicans. This assertion was anything but good orthodox Republicanism. According to conventional notions which prevail under such circumstances he was disloyal to his creed, and there was only one thing for him to do, to go over to the party whose leader he eulogized. The writer remembers distinctly how one leading Republican daily took him to task for his heresy. But the catholic temper which is displayed in the address from which these remarks upon Ex-President Cleveland are taken is strikingly in keeping with Lowell's mental development. Whether his view be correct or not we must still admire him for his frankness and fearlessness, even if we do not agree with him.

Many a noble address which he delivered would make excellent reading for those whose political hero is the boss and whose gospel is that preached by the small-minded political organ. His Americanism was also sometimes called into question. But the printed prose here will again come to the rescue. True Americanism, as that word is interpreted by some Americans, means despising and looking with contempt upon everything that is not indigenous to America. That we are glad to say was not Lowell's notion of Americanism. He belonged to that lofty type of statesmen who view things differently from and take issue with a class of journalists who are at once ready to declare war when their notion of what constitutes a true patriotism is infringed upon.

"Take them editors thet's crowin'
Like a cockeral three month's old,—
Don't ketch any on em goin'
Though they be so blasted bold ;
Aint they a prime lot o' fellers ?
'Fore they think on't they will sprout
(Like a peach thet's got the yellers),
With the meanness bustin' out."

But Lowell, as a writer on politics, is not so well known as a

writer on criticism. From a professor of belles lettres at Harvard we have a right to expect lectures and essays upon the great writers. He does not disappoint us. From Chaucer to Thoreau he has sounded almost the whole gamut of literary music, and there is no evidence of uncertain notes. If one would like to read discriminating interpretations and criticisms of the makers of English literature, let him simply turn to the volumes "Among my Books" and "My Study Windows." If you would like to know something of The Philosopher of Concord, or The Sage of Chelsea, or The Wizard of Walden, turn to his pages of prose and read the life-like and, one might say, the life-size portraits of these great and good men. Perhaps those essays on Emerson, Carlyle and Thoreau are nearer to some of us than others, especially to those of us who in our college days were inspired by the bold profile of these men as they stood over against the background of truth. Those who feel grateful to the Philosopher of Concord for inspiring lifts can find no better expression of their own feeling, however unliterary their own expression of that feeling may be, than in Lowell's essay "Emerson the Lecturer." "Search for his eloquence," says Lowell, "in his books, and you will perchance miss it, but meanwhile you will find that it has kindled all your thoughts."

Lowell was still in college when Carlyle's first writings appeared. He no doubt grew into an appreciation of the great Scotchman's powers, but never, we must infer from his words, into an exalted state of feeling over his perversity and ill-humor. A man of such evenness of temper would naturally not take kindly to the fulminations and wailings of Carlyle. It is the dominie spirit in Carlyle that is not congenial to Lowell. "He continues," says Lowell, of Carlyle's later years, "to be a voice crying in the wilderness, but no longer a voice with any earnest conviction behind it."

Thoreau is the third one of this group whose eccentricities and merits do not escape Lowell's critical pen. He did not think that Thoreau's idea of living apart from society was conducive towards developing a healthy frame of mind. He did not think

his contemporary had attained to that originality which he claimed for himself. Lowell's words on originality in this essay are especially significant and happy. "This notion of an absolute originality, as if one could have a patent-right on it, is an absurdity. A man can not escape in thought any more than he can in language, from the past and present. As no one ever invents a word, and yet language somehow grows by general contribution and necessity, so it is with thought. Mr. Thoreau seems to me to insist in public on going back to flint and steel, when there is a match-box in his pocket which he knows very well how to use at a pinch. Originality consists in power of digesting and assimilating thought, so that they may become part of our life and substance. * * * In Thoreau much seems yet to be foreign and unassimilated, showing itself in symptoms of indigestion. * * * A greater familiarity with ordinary men would have done Thoreau good by showing him how many fine qualities are common to the race."

These three studies of his contemporaries are only a few of the many critical contributions which Lowell made to literature. The wit, the learning, the mastery of material displayed by his critical prose, is somewhat astonishing. To be under the literary influence of such a teacher, a creator of literature, was a privilege for the Harvard student in the days of Lowell's professorship. A study of English literature meant for Lowell more than a dissecting of the English language. To him the life of the English was more than the raiment. A knowledge of English was for Lowell getting and keeping oneself in living sympathy with the life and thought of the best writers and thinkers. Perhaps the high-water mark of Lowell's prose was reached when he delivered the address before as distinguished a body of alumni as any university ever graduated, at the 250th anniversary of Harvard College. He was a fitting representative on such an occasion. He was the orator of the ripest culture and a scholar when that word means something more than a man of attainments. He was a personality, very much alive, with whom the truth was everything. He was a part of the making of that literary epoch which we might easily call the Augustan Age of American Literature.

VII.

THE PLACE OF THE GENERAL CONFESSION OF SIN IN THE ORDER OF DIVINE SERVICE.

BY REV. J. F. DE LONG, D.D.

This confession is called "general" because the whole congregation is supposed to unite in making it. It is also expressed in general terms, referring to sin in those rudimental forms in which it is common to all men and ought to be confessed by all, without descending to those particular sins of which only some in the congregation may be guilty. The word "general" also carries with it an implied contrast with private auricular confession to the priest as it prevails in the Greek and Roman Churches. It is usually preceded by a brief exhortation which is intended to instruct the people concerning the duty and necessity of confession as well as to exhort and encourage them thereto. The confession itself consists of two parts, beside the introduction or address to God: the first, a confession of our sins of omission and commission; and the second, a supplication of pardon for the past and of grace for the future.

One noteworthy fact in modern liturgies is the unanimity with which the churches have agreed upon such general confession of sin as the proper introduction of the public worship of the sanctuary. Every Christian denomination of the present day which has published or authorized to be published an Order of Service for Public Worship begins such service with an act of penitential confession and prayer for pardon. So the Reformed Church in all its branches, Swiss, German, French, Dutch and American. So also the liturgies of the Presbyterian Church, both in Scotland and America, among which may be named the Book of Common Order, prepared by John Knox and used by the Presbyterians until 1645; also the liturgies

published in recent years by the several branches of Presbyterianism in Scotland, as well as the private liturgies published in this country by Dr. Shields, of Princeton, and Professor Hopkins, of Auburn Theological Seminary. Of the Episcopal Book of Common Prayer, all its manifold editions since 1552 have this same arrangement, the first edition of Edward VI., published in 1549, being the only exception. The Lutheran Church originally retained the use of private confession to the priest or pastor, and in its earlier history was without a general confession of sin in its service. Later it introduced a confession with absolution after the sermon. But during the last century and a-half the feeling that its confession of sin was in the wrong place has become so general and convincing that one branch of Lutheranism after the other has abandoned this action after the sermon and introduced it in the beginning of the service, and now almost all the principal bodies of Lutherans, both in Europe and America, have in this respect the same Order of Service as the other Protestant Churches. Nor is this arrangement limited to Protestantism. The celebration of the Mass in the Roman Church begins with the Confiteor—the well-known Roman formula of the Confession of Sin. And looking at the steady persistent gravitation of the churches for centuries past toward this order of service, it would seem to be easily within the limits of moderation to predict that this custom of having a general confession of sin with some declaration of grace as preliminary to the rest of the service is destined, at no distant day, to become altogether universal in the worship of the Christian Church.

Now how shall we account for this noteworthy fact? What may be the reasons underlying this steady gravitation of all the churches toward this form of introduction?

First, it will be readily admitted that the *order* of the service—the proper succession of its several parts—is a matter of much importance. A true service is not a shapeless, unorganized mass of devotional acts, thrown together into mere outward juxtaposition like beads upon a Roman rosary without inward connection

or unifying idea. Man's devotional life, as well as every other part of his being, moves within the realm of law; and this implies that in structural outline at least the public service should be an organic whole, that there is an inward order and succession with which the outward order and succession ought to correspond. It implies that every action entering into the service has its own proper place and function, and that all its parts ought to be so arranged that each part preceding would naturally lead on to and prepare the worshipper for that which immediately follows, thus giving the service an easy, natural, organic, onward movement from beginning to end. As an illustration of this principle, I will give an example in which it is violated. The example is given by Dr. Hagenbach in his *Grundlinien der Liturgik*. The old liturgy of the Reformed Church of Basel, Switzerland, had in the opening part of its service a long prayer which contained three elements or topics. The first was a confession of sin which Dr. H. says was very good and also in its proper place, but would well have deserved to constitute a prayer by itself. The second was a petition for illumination and the profitable reception of the divine word, which, he says, was also very good, but should have come in close connection with the didactic portion of the service—the reading and preaching of the word to which it referred. Instead of this, however, it was followed by a series of supplications for all conditions of men which would be in questionable position at this stage of the service in any arrangement, but was doubly so in this, inasmuch as a similar prayer of supplication was repeated after the sermon.

A service so loosely and disjointedly arranged as the above can be neither strong nor pleasing. It can not be strong, for the parts referring to each other, being so widely separated, fail to give each other proper support. Neither can it be pleasing, for the movement is not natural, the outward order not corresponding to the inward unfolding of the devotional idea. Let us contrast with this the opening, penitential part of the service in our Order of Worship or in the Directory. It begins with the exhortation. This naturally leads to the confession and supplication for for-

givenness. The earnest cry of this prayer is met and answered by the declaration of pardon. But this declaration is expressly conditioned upon the exercise of faith in the Lord Jesus. Hence the congregation arises and makes confession of its faith by the use of the Apostle's Creed, and then very appropriately breaks forth into a hymn of praise and thanksgiving to God for the mercy and deliverance authoritatively announced to it in the declaration of pardon. Here is inward connection and unity. One action leads to the other by inward impulse, and the devotion of the worshipper is sustained and carried forward by the spontaneous movement of the service itself. But if a true service be such an organic unity, then the confession of sin has its own proper place in the service, and it will not do to say that one place is as good as another, and that it does not matter where it comes in, only so it comes into the service.

Furthermore, a true service has not only an onward, but also an upward movement. It rises as it advances. Beginning with the humbling of ourselves before God in view of our manifold sins and transgressions, it moves upward until it ends at last in a song of universal praise and divine benediction. This much we might infer even from the broad fact that the Kingdom of God at large, of which this service is a part, is characterized by such upward movement. The same law which governs the growth of a tree as a whole reproduces itself in the growth of its every branch. And so here. The public service of the sanctuary, like the kingdom at large, has an upward movement. The law is preparatory to the Gospel. Lessons taken from the Old Testament precede those taken from the New. The Gospel as the higher properly follows the epistle as the lower, though the opposite arrangement may be and has been defended on the ground that the epistle resting on the Gospel and being a fuller explanation of its contents is the higher and fuller revelation. In the early Church, while four lessons were read in the service, the order was first the law, then prophecy, next the epistle and lastly the Gospel. So with the element of prayer. After confession of sin comes thanksgiving for the mercies and attainments of the past; then it passes on to

supplications for still larger measures of grace and higher spiritual attainments in the future, and at last broadens out into intercessions for all conditions of men, asking for all mankind the same fulness of grace which we have already asked for ourselves. This is the order of thought in the general prayer of the Sunday morning service in the Order of Worship and the Directory. It is also the order of our communion service. It is, moreover, a law of liturgics so plainly felt as to have won for itself universal recognition both in the old dispensation and the new that the divine service should never end with words threatening or foreboding evil—*verbis male ominatis*—but always with ascriptions of praise and divine benediction. In a word, the public service should be like a golden stairway leading sinful prostrate humanity up step by step to the Great White Throne. The first and lowest step—the first act of the sinner in this ascending movement—naturally would be the humble acknowledgment of his sin, followed and answered with the declaration of pardon. On the ground of this general upward movement, we would say the introduction of the divine service should be, not the singing of the doxology nor any hymn of praise, but an act of penitential confession with a prayer for pardon.

Again, that this is the proper introduction of the service is plain from the nature of the case. The first thought of the sinner coming into the presence of the Holy God is of his sins, and the first impulse is confession and supplication for pardon. When Peter, on the Sea of Galilee, caught a glimpse of the out-flashing divinity of Jesus he immediately fell on his knees and said: “Depart from me, O Lord, for I am a sinful man.” When the returning prodigal of the parable came to his father his first word was: “Father, I have sinned against Heaven and in thy sight and am no more worthy to be called thy son.” And this free, frank, full confession of his sin opened the way for his restoration. This brought him forgiveness, reinstated him as a son in the father’s house, and made room for the affectionate fellowship and happy festivities which followed. Nor would it have been possible for this returning prodigal to be fully forgiven and

to be readmitted to all the privileges of sonship in the father's house, if such a sincere, penitent confession had not first been made. Confession is in order to forgiveness, and forgiveness reinstates, opens the way for the bringing of acceptable sacrifices and for the supplication of new mercies. In the nature of the case the confession of sin is the proper introduction of the Divine Service and preliminary to all other acts of worship.

And this is fully confirmed by such intimations concerning the order of public worship as are found in Holy Scripture. In the Mosaic ritual the divinely appointed order of sacrifices was first the sin-offering, then the burnt-offering and lastly the meat or thank-offering, thus indicating the order of the several steps of approach into the Divine presence. To this rule there was only one exception, and that was in the offering brought after the birth of a child. In this case the burnt-offering preceded the sin-offering; and the reason of this remarkable exception to the rule, Lange says, "appears to lie in the fact that at the birth of a child feelings of joyful gratitude are naturally uppermost, the thought of the child's heritage of sinfulness coming afterwards." In all other cases when the several kinds of sacrifice were brought together the fixed order was as above stated. And even when the burnt-offering was brought by itself as an offering which gathered up into itself in abbreviated form the elements of all the sacrifices—even in this case that manipulation of the blood which made ceremonial atonement for sin came first and, Oehler says, was the *conditio sine qua non* of all that followed.

Moreover, in the Old Testament as often as Jehovah especially revealed Himself to His people, or when they were about to draw nigh into His presence, this doing away of sin was a preliminary act. When Jehovah was about to come down on Mt. Sinai in sight of all the people His command to Moses was that he should sanctify the people and be ready against the third day, for on the third day the Lord will come down in sight of all the people on Mt. Sinai. In the celebration of the great religious festivals a day of preparation preceded. Our Saviour Himself, speaking of this very thing, says: "If thou art offering thy gift at the altar

and there rememberest that thy brother hath aught against thee, leave there thy gift before the altar and go thy way, *first* be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." What else does our Saviour say here than that the first thing to do in our approach into the Divine presence, the act preliminary to all other acts of worship, is the putting away of sin, reconciliation with God and man ; or that before we bring our sacrifices of praise and thanksgiving, before we undertake to make supplications for new blessings in the future, we should make humble acknowledgment of our transgressions and shortcomings in the past.

Facts and sentiments such as these, no doubt, underlie this steady gravitation for centuries past toward this usage of beginning the public service with an act of penitential confession.

If now we inquire into the history of this usage we will find that it is peculiarly Reformed. It originated in the Reformed Church, and for a long time was distinctive of the worship of the family of Reformed Churches. As to the Church of the first centuries our knowledge is somewhat limited. The "Teaching of the Twelve Apostles," probably the oldest post-apostolic writing now extant enjoins confession as a regular part of public worship and that it shall precede thanksgiving and the other acts of worship as a preparation. We have, also, the testimony of St. Basil that in his day this custom was widely prevalent. But with the rise of private confession to the priest, in the fifth century, the use of a general confession in the service was discontinued ; and from that time until the Reformation the Christian Church was without a general confession of sin in its service. At the time of the Reformation the Lutheran Church retained the use of private confession to the priest and had no general confession at all in its service, following in this respect Roman usage. But the Reformed Church from the beginning rejected private auricular confession, and substituted in its place a general confession to be made jointly by the whole congregation as a part of the public service. Its place in the service, however, was not everywhere the same. In Switzerland, under Zwingli, Leo Juda and others,

it was placed after the sermon without a declaration of pardon, Under Bucer, Calvin and others it was placed in the opening service and was followed with a declaration of pardon. And here the position of first honor belongs to Martin Bucer and his associate pastors of the city of Strassburg. It has often been assumed by liturgical writers that the idea of such a penitential introduction of the service originated with John Calvin, and that it is another mark of his keen spiritual originality and logic. Even so well-informed and careful a writer as Dr. Shields says in his *Liturgia Expurgata*: "The idea of such a penitential introduction to take the place of private confession and absolution was due to Calvin." But this is a mistake. The first liturgy in which it occurs, at least so far as known to the writer, is the *Strassburg Amt*, prepared by Bucer and his associated pastors in 1524.* But to John Calvin is due the extension and popularizing of this form of introduction throughout the Reformed Churches. In 1538 he prepared his first liturgy for his congregation of French refugees in Strassburg. In this liturgy he adopted this arrangement, and by the influence of his example and advice it very speedily became the accepted order of service in almost all the Reformed Churches, including the Presbyterian Church of Scotland and the Episcopal Church of England. In more recent years it has also become the prevailing order of service in the Lutheran Church and in a measure also of the Roman Church. But for more than two hundred years after the Reformation this usage, which has now become almost universal among churches having an authorized order of service, was limited almost altogether to the Reformed Church. A somewhat fuller statement of facts will show the truth of this claim.

First as to the Roman Church. I stated above that from the introduction of private auricular confession in the fifth century to the Reformation, the Christian Church was without a general confession of sin in its public service. It is, indeed, true that the

* *Grund und ursache der neuerungen zu Strassburg*, written by Bucer to Prince Frederick of the Palatinate in 1524 and published in *Luther's Leben und Schriften* by Walch, Vol. XX., p. 458.

Roman Confiteor made its appearance as early as the tenth century, had come into very general use by the beginning of the sixteenth, and in 1570 was made obligatory throughout the Roman Communion by a decree of Pope Pius the fifth. But the Roman Confiteor, as then used, was not a general confession of sin for the whole congregation. It was only a private personal confession for the priest and his assistants—a part of their official preparation for the celebration of the mass. The Roman Church has an elaborate service of preparation for the officiating priest. It has none for the people. The reasons are plain. First, on account of its doctrine of the necessity of auricular confession to the priest. A direct confession of sins to God, such as is implied in a united confession of the whole congregation, though never so true and worthy, is not sufficient for forgiveness. To the priest has been entrusted the exercise of the power of the keys ; he has been appointed of God to judge of the worthiness or unworthiness of your penance, to loose or bind, forgive or retain your sins as the case may be ; and unless you confess your sins to him and receive special absolution from him you are not loosed from your sins and have no admission into the Kingdom. Such is Roman doctrine, and it would be inconsistent therewith for the priest to absolve a whole congregation on the basis of a united confession to God alone apart from His priest. Secondly, the celebration of the mass is not a congregational but a priestly act. It is a sacred transaction between the Lord and His priest. The congregation, strictly speaking, is not a party to it. Their prayers and praises are not essential, and the mass can be celebrated just as well in their absence as when they are present. This is the idea underlying private masses. The mass consists essentially of two priestly acts ; the first is the producing of the divine victim upon the altar, which is done in the consecration of the elements ; the second is the offering of this divine victim unto God in the prayer of oblation as an atonement for the sins of the congregation and for whomsoever it may be intended. These two acts constitute the sacrifice of the mass ; and these are both priestly acts in which the congregation as such has no part, for the Roman Church de-

nies the priesthood of all believers. Hence the priest alone comes into really close contact with the holy mystery. He alone enters into the Holy of Holies and offers the awful sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ. The people tarry without and look on with prayerful reverence from a distance even as in the temple worship of the old Testament. For the priest, therefore, the Roman Church provides an elaborate *modum preparandi ad missam* both in the sacristy and after he comes to the altar, that he may be worthy to appear before the Lord and offer the awful sacrifice in behalf of the people ; but it provides no similar service of preparation for the people. For the same reason the most solemn parts of the mass are read in a low voice, inaudible to the congregation. And upon the same ground, also, Romanists attempt to justify the use of a dead language in the service, for the mass is essentially a transaction between the Lord and His priest ; and as for the people it is not necessary for them to understand it, for the mass is a service rendered for them and not by them. These facts give us the rationale of this part of the Roman service and make it plain why the said Church has an elaborate service of preparation for the priest at the beginning of mass, but not a general confession of sin for the people as it was introduced by Bucer, Calvin and the Reformed Church.

And, now, how with regard to the Lutheran Church? Luther retained the use of private confession and absolution, though he denied its necessity to forgiveness as taught in the Roman Church. But he esteemed it as an institution which, rightly administered, would be most beneficial to the people, and, therefore, earnestly recommended its continuance and diligent cultivation among his followers. He taught it in his catechism, and through his influence it became the established practice of the Lutheran Church in the sixteenth century. Provision is made for it in all its liturgies. Many of them will admit no one to the Holy Communion unless he has first privately confessed his sins to his pastor and received absolution from him. Because of this use of private confession the Lutheran Church felt less need of, and was less inclined to, a general confession in the public service. In addition to this,

Luther and his followers took very high ground concerning the nature of the absolution, investing it, in fact, with the dignity of a sacrament, yea, even going so far as to put it on an equality with Baptism and the Lord's Supper; and they were not willing that the absolution should be given to a promiscuous assembly.

For example, the second liturgy of Wittenberg, published in 1542 and subscribed by Luther himself, speaks on this wise: "Care shall be taken that uniform usage be followed with the confession, that a pastor give separate Christian absolution to each one confessing his sins; and if anywhere it has happened that persons were received to the Holy Sacrament without previous confession, or that a pastor allowed those who were about to commune on the following day to appear before him in a group and gave them the absolution in common, it shall in no wise be." Many other Lutheran liturgies of the sixteenth century contain similar directions. I can, perhaps, quote no better authority for Lutheran usage in the sixteenth century than that of Dr. C. F. W. Walther, for many years the recognized head and leader of the Missouri Synod. In his *Pastorale*, p. 158, he says: "By the advice of Luther private confession was authoritatively appointed in the liturgies of almost all the Churches of the sixteenth century standing in fellowship with the Church of Wittenberg, while no provision was made for a general confession." In a word, the position of the Lutheran Church in the sixteenth century, which is now regarded as the classic period of Lutheran cultus, was to have no confession of sin and no declaration of pardon at all in the public service.

This general statement, however, needs some modification. In the first place, there were some exceptions in southwestern Germany due to Reformed influence. In those countries lying in close proximity to Switzerland the two streams of Protestantism met and modified each other, resulting in a unionistic type of Protestant cultus. Their liturgies try to take a mediating position between the Reformed and the Lutheran types, for which reason Kliefoth calls them "unionistic," and Daniel, "Luthero-Calvinizing." In Wurtemberg, for example, the population was divided,

part sympathizing with the Saxon and part with the Swiss movement. Duke Ulrich, its ruler, called two men, Ambrose Blaurer, a Reformed, and Erhard Schnepf, a Lutheran, and entrusted the work of reforming the Church into their hands, first, however, exacting a promise from them that they would make concessions to each other. The result was, as we would expect, a compromise; and the first liturgy of Wurtemberg, published in 1536, retained private confession in accordance with Lutheran ideas, but also accommodated the Reformed by introducing into the principal service on the Lord's Day a general confession of sin with declaration of pardon, placing it, however, not at the commencement, where Calvin afterwards placed his, but after the sermon, in accordance with the practice of the Swiss Reformed Churches under Zwingli. This first Wurtemberg liturgy became the source of a number of other liturgies; and in this way a general confession of sin was adopted into the worship of some adjoining Lutheran countries, including the Lutheran Palatinate liturgy of 1554. And this accounts for the position of the confession after the sermon in the Reformed Palatinate liturgy of 1563. The people, having become used to that position of the confession while the Electorate was Lutheran, it was retained there in deference to popular custom; but, in order that they might bring it also into harmony with what had by that time become the recognized genius of Reformed cultus, its framers placed another confessional prayer at the commencement of the service, thereby giving the penitential element undue proportion.

But the above general statement that the Lutheran Church had no general confession of sin in its public service needs another modification. For a brief period, in the middle of the sixteenth century, even the Reformed or Calvinistic usage of a penitential introduction of the service won for itself recognition in a few Lutheran liturgies of middle and northern Germany. The first of these was Archbishop Hermann's liturgy of Cologne in 1543. This was the production of Bucer and Melanchthon, who were called by the Archbishop to Cologne specially for that purpose. Bucer prepared the ritual or service part, as Melanchthon himself informs us. This Cologne liturgy afterwards entered largely into

the composition of the English Book of Common Prayer, and there has been considerable sparring as to whether it ought to be accounted Reformed or Lutheran. Dr. Shields, of Princeton, after carefully examining into the whole question, has this to say in his *Liturgia Expurgata*: "It would, in fact, simply be absurd for any party now to lay exclusive claim to the authorship or purport of a production which was compiled by divines noted for their liberal views and union tendencies and with the express design of reconciling the two extremes of the reformation." But since Bucer prepared the service part of this Cologne liturgy, we may truthfully and fairly claim that the general confession of sin and declaration of pardon with which it opens the public service was the introduction of Reformed usage by a Reformed man into the Lutheran Church. The second Lutheran liturgy in which such penitential introduction of the service occurs is the Mecklenberg liturgy of 1552, prepared by Melanchthon and Aurifaber; and from this it was adopted into a few other Lutheran liturgies of that period, including the third Wittenberg liturgy of 1565. But it found no permanent home in the Lutheran Churches of Germany. It soon disappeared. Even in Mecklenberg, where it was first introduced, it lasted only for a season. It was not Lutheran, but Reformed; and when, in the course of the seventh and eighth decades, the strict Lutheran party under Flacius and others triumphed over Melanchthon and his friends, this Reformed usage in Lutheran Churches was done away with.

Such are the facts. Now, when this Calvinistic and Reformed usage has won for itself universal recognition, and the followers of Luther have themselves adopted it both in Europe and America, being convinced of its eminent fitness and propriety, it would very naturally be pleasing to them to find some early Lutheran liturgies of a pure type on its side, to show that it is a product native to the soil and not an imported article. Several of its well-known writers on this side of the Atlantic have cited Bugenhagen's liturgy of 1524, Döber's *Ev. Messe* of 1525 and the Brandenburg-Nuremberg Order of 1533, claiming that these liturgies change the private personal confession of the priest in

the Roman mass into a general confession for the whole congregation; but, as is plain and admitted by other Lutheran writers, these liturgies did not change the private confession of the priest into a general confession for the congregation, but they simply revised and adapted that confession into a suitable private prayer for the Protestant minister, which he was to offer up silently for himself as a preparation for conducting services. In Döber's Messe he offers up this prayer, *while the choir sings the Introit or first hymn.** The Brandenburg-Nuremberg Order says: "First, when the priest comes to the altar he shall say the confiteor, or *whatever his own devotions may bring to mind.*" This meant a private personal prayer, for it was not the custom of the period to leave any part of the service intended for the people to the uncertain care and discretion of the minister.† The Bugenhagen Order of 1524 is not so clear. It was used very little, and, until quite recently, it was questioned whether such a liturgy ever existed. What has come down to us is very fragmentary. This much is certain, however, that for the principal service on Sunday and on festival days it provides the usual Lutheran service of that period without a general confession of sin at all. In addition to this, however, it provides also a service which seems to be something of a Protestant counterpart of low mass in the Roman church. In this second service there is a place provided for a confession of sin, but no formula of confession is given. Its space is left blank. What this may have been and how used the writer does not know. But, however used, it was, at least, not in the beginning of the service.‡ Therefore the writer is of the opinion that it can truthfully be said that no Lutheran liturgy of the sixteenth century, dominated purely by influences emanating from Lutheran Saxony had a general confession of sin with declaration of pardon in its public service. It was looked upon as Reformed and not Lutheran, and the intense controversial feel-

*Reformation of Worship in Nuremberg, by Rev. Dr. E. T. Horn, *Lutheran Church Review*, Vol. 11, p. 127.

†Grüneisens Ev. Gottesdieust Ordnung in Wurtemberg, p. 67.

‡A translation of this Bugenhagen Liturgy by Dr. Jacobs is published in *Lutheran Church Review*, Vol. 10, p. 288.

ing which then unfortunately existed between these two branches of Protestantism had probably much to do with the refusal of the Lutheran churches of the sixteenth century to receive such a general confession into their service.

With the commencement of the seventeenth century however, came a change. Private confession was losing its hold upon the people. Its frequent abuse in the hands of unworthy pastors made it unpopular. Rightly used and improved, it would, unquestionably, as Luther thought, prove a rich blessing to both pastor and people ; but in the hands of a degenerate ministry it is a source of much evil. Beside this, the eminent fitness and propriety of such a penitential action by a whole congregation in the service of the sanctuary was being felt, and therefore a general confession of sin with a declaration of grace began to be introduced, at first in addition to private confession, but, by and by, as a substitute for private confession. Its position in the service, however, was not in the beginning, but after the sermon. Everywhere in the Lutheran Church that was the position adopted for this penitential action. And this continued to be its position through the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century. But to-day this position after the sermon has been almost everywhere abandoned, and the confession placed at the beginning as the introduction of the service.

This third usage of the Lutheran Church in this matter had its beginning here in America. The first American liturgy, prepared by Dr. Muhlenberg, in 1748, led the way. In Europe Dr. Muhlenberg had been used to a confession of sin and absolution after the sermon. When he prepared his first liturgy for this country he inserted it at the opening. What suggested to him this change? We do not know for certain, but, as Dr. Jacobs suggests, probably the English Book of Common Prayer. On his way to America he stayed for six months in London as the guest of his friend and patron, Dr. Ziegenhagen, pastor of the Royal German Lutheran Chapel in that city during the reign of the House of Hanover. In this congregation a German translation of the English Book of Common Prayer was used ;

and it is altogether probable that his acquaintance with the service in the Book of Common Prayer during those six months suggested to him and made him realize this improvement of the Lutheran service by transferring the confession to the beginning of the service. Through this Muhlenberg liturgy it has passed into all the Lutheran churches of America except the Missouri Synod. In Europe the beginning was made by the Prussian liturgy of 1822, the liturgy produced and adopted in connection with the union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches throughout the German Empire ; and to-day it has come to prevail practically in all the Protestant churches of Europe. Thus the Lutheran Church has had three different usages touching this matter of a general confession and absolution in the service. The first was to have none at all ; the second, to have it after the sermon ; and the third is to have it as the introduction of the service where the Reformed Church had it from the beginning.

In conclusion the writer would say that he very gladly acknowledges the great services rendered by the Lutheran Church to the cause of Christian worship, and that he feels grateful to it for holding fast to not a few excellent things which our Reformed fathers were inclined to throw overboard ; but, whatever the relative merits of these two great branches of Protestantism may be in other respects, in respect of this usage of having a general confession with declaration of pardon as the proper introduction of the public service at least, we may fairly claim that Wittenberg has come to Geneva and Luther is paying homage to Calvin.

VIII.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

ETHICAL CONCEPTION OF THE DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

During the past year the Presbyterian Churches of this country celebrated the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the Westminster Confession and Catechisms. This has resulted in the production of a considerable amount of Westminster literature. The Southern Church, for instance, has published a neat volume of addresses delivered before the General Assembly at Charlotte, N. C., in May, 1897. A notice of this volume will be found in its proper place in this number of the REVIEW. The *Princeton and Reformed Review* also has contained several articles which owed their origin to this anniversary occasion. Thus, for instance, we have in the July number an interesting paper on "The Place of the Westminster Assembly in Modern History," by Dr. John De Witt, which was first delivered as an address at the anniversary celebration by the Princeton Theological Seminary.

There is in this anniversary literature, as might be expected, a good deal of enthusiastic glorification of the Westminster Standards. The men of the Westminster Assembly, as seen through the medium of this literature, were men without compeers, and their work has no parallel in history. The Westminster Symbols form the ultimate goal of Christian theology; and Christian thought, whenever it goes beyond them, only finds itself in "wandering mazes lost," from which it is ever bound to come back again to the sound words of the Westminster Standards. Such is the tone which runs through much of this new Westminster literature. It is apparently an expression of absolute present satisfaction with a theological work that is two hundred and fifty years old—a work, moreover, that was produced in a time of intense agitation and excitement, and that bears upon its

face the marks of a logical scholasticism that shrinks from no consequences, and that is now well-nigh extinct. To the sober theologian of another denomination all this may look like extravagance ; but such extravagances are to be expected on occasions of the kind here under consideration. When celebrating historical events, the eye of the mind is apt to be turned so exclusively to the past, that it fails to perceive the light of the present. To look both backward and forward at the same time, and rightly to appreciate things new and old is a difficult performance ; and our Presbyterian friends, in their jubilee essays, have not always succeeded, as we think, in the performance of this difficult task. The past has bulked so largely before their imagination that they have to some extent failed in appreciation of the value of the present.

But after all the most determined adherents of past systems of thought can not entirely rid themselves of the influence of modern ideas. The world of thought is moving, as well as the world of matter. This is true of religious and theological thought, as well as of scientific and philosophical thought. And this general movement of thought involves and carries with it individual minds more or less unconsciously to themselves ; so that while they imagine that they are only thinking the thoughts of past generations, they are after all not thinking them as past generations did. One of the evidences of this truth is to be seen in the fact that in the course of time old words and old formulas come to be used in new senses. They no longer express the ideas which they were once intended to express. This is a very common phenomenon in the sphere of religious thought. The same phrases no longer produce the same feelings and ideas which they once produced. We have an illustration of this fact in the manner in which some Calvinistic writers now treat the conception of the divine sovereignty. Notably Dr. De Witt, in the article already referred to, insists that the doctrine of the divine sovereignty must be subordinated to an ethical conception of God ; or, in other words, that the divine sovereignty must be conceived ethically. And this he thinks was the original meaning of the

Westminster Symbols ; and in this view other writers agree with him. This, we think, is reading into the Symbols an idea which was entirely foreign to the minds of the framers of those Symbols.

Of course, the fundamental idea of the Westminster standards, according to these modern writers, is the idea of the divine sovereignty ; but this idea, it is supposed, must be apprehended in the light of the modern conception of the ethical nature of God. "The vital and pregnant idea of the Westminster Confession," says Dr. De Witt, "is the idea that the living and holy God is the one absolute sovereign, realizing in history His eternal and perfect plan, with means by His Providence or without means by His Spirit when and where He pleaseth." It is, then, not the idea of an absolute, heartless sovereignty, or the idea of a mere power which in its exercise recognizes no reason or motive outside of itself as power, that must be supposed to be the distinguishing characteristic of God. God is sovereign ; but His sovereignty must be supposed to be exercised in accordance with an ethical character that belongs essentially to the being of God, and that corresponds essentially to the ethical nature of man. "We shall not have this idea (of the divine sovereignty) before our minds in an adequate way," says Dr. De Witt, "unless we emphasize the truth that the God whom it represents is the free personal and ethical God of Holy Scripture. * * * The Biblical representation of deity not merely excludes all those conceptions of Him which convert Him into a gnostic abyss, and place Him in such unrevealed depths that He ceases to be an object of either love or fear, but it clothes Him with individuality of emotion or feeling. * * * It is the free, living, ethical, and emotional character of God, whose sovereignty the idea announces, that gives to the idea its energizing influence when it enters the individual soul."

As thus stated we can not see that there can be any objection to the doctrine of the divine sovereignty. Certainly, God is the sovereign ruler of the universe, who is accomplishing an eternal plan in human history. The idea of monotheism implies that. And a Church which considers it to be its chief task to empha-

size the divine sovereignty does not now seem to have a very difficult or very important calling. There is no being besides God that could presume to dispute with Him the power of His throne. And there are no theologians who question the supremacy of God's power and dominion. The exercise of His power can only be limited by His moral nature, and by nothing else. In this sense the Arminian recognizes the sovereignty of God no less than the Calvinist. And to see some Calvinists go into hysterics over what they imagine to be attacks upon the divine sovereignty, one might suppose that God were actually in danger, like another Kronos, of being dethroned by His own children. Such a fear is not the mark of a Christian, but of a heathen mind. No Christian theologian ever objected to the doctrine of the divine sovereignty when set forth in a Christian sense. But what has been objected to, and what we object to, is the doctrine that the divine sovereignty or power is exercised without any rule of reason or without any feeling of emotion—the doctrine that the deepest thing in God is pure abstract will that is determined by nothing whatsoever but absolute caprice. Such a conception of the divine sovereignty leaves no room for an application of the ethical idea to God. A God who is mere absolute will could not be an ethical God, any more than the force of gravitation could be an ethical power. A God without ethical ideas and feelings would be an omnipotent tyrant to be feared, but He could not be a Father that may be loved. To such a monstrous representation of God we must ever object. But when we are told that the God whose sovereignty is insisted upon, must be conceived, first of all, as an ethical being—a being possessing an ethical and emotional character corresponding to our own highest ethical ideal—a being whose inmost nature is love, then, of course, our objection ceases. The idea which represents the sovereign God as being moved in His activity, not by mere cold formal volition (*arbitrio nutuque*), but by an ethical character belonging to His eternal personality, and intelligible to us, we recognize as the Christian idea of God. And we are glad to see that this idea is gaining acceptance among an ever increasing number of Chris-

tian thinkers. This fact proves to our mind an ever advancing triumph of Christianity over human thought.

But when we are told that this is the original idea of the Westminster standards, we respectfully beg leave to differ. The conception of the divine sovereignty which was held by the Westminster divines was not an ethical conception. It was the conception merely of an absolute power which in its exercise takes no account of anything but its own nature *as power*. This is the ruling idea of God in the Westminster symbols, where the eternal decree and purpose of God are supposed to have no other ground than the absolute pleasure of His will, and no other end than His own glory. In fact, the glory of God is so frequently set forth as the end of all His activity that it must make the impression as if *selfishness* were the supreme impulse of God's nature. The fact that in the Westminster Confession and Catechisms ethical attributes are ascribed to God, such as holiness, righteousness, goodness, does not prove that the conception of God is really ethical, for these terms are neutralized by opposite representations of God's character and conduct. These ethical terms were simply taken from Scripture and externally connected with the concept of God ; but the qualities denoted by them were not supposed to constitute the very essence of God. Even in Scripture these terms do not always denote the ethical qualities which the Christian consciousness now connects with them. Just as among the Greeks the phrase "holy and righteous gods" did not convey the ethical sense in which the Christian now understands the character of God, so also it was among the early Semites. The holiness of God at first meant merely His exaltation above the creature, and His righteousness was his sensitiveness to the right performance of ritualistic ceremonies. Hence it will appear how easily Scriptural phrases may be used in regard to the character of God without really connecting with them Christian ideas. This was the case through the middle ages, and largely also during the scholastic period of Protestantism. It has only been in comparatively recent times that the idea of God has been thoroughly *Christianized*, or, to use an expression of H. B. Smith, *Christologized*.

During the middle ages there was an influential class of theologians who, like Duns Scotus, maintained that morality has its source not in the *nature*, but in the *will* of God. That is moral, they said, which God wills to be moral, and that is immoral which God wills to be immoral. Morality, accordingly, is something contingent. It has no ground in the eternal being of God. God is not Himself an ethical being. He is exalted above all ethical distinctions, and His will, which might be otherwise than it is, establishes these distinctions. This was evidently also Calvin's fundamental idea of God. It is only thus that we can understand the emphasis which he continually lays upon God's will. "The will of God," he said, "is the highest rule of justice." And when objection was made to his doctrine of predestination on the ground that it would be unjust for God to punish creatures for the commission of sins which they were by Himself foreordained to commit, Calvin replied, "How could any injustice be committed by Him who is the judge of the world?" The meaning of this is that God as judge of the world is, like the Roman Emperor, Himself above the law which He has ordained, and so does no wrong when He does what would be sin in the creature. The Emperor can violate no law because he is above the law; and so God can do no wrong because His will constitutes the distinction of right and wrong. But surely that is not an ethical conception of God. But Calvin also applies to the predestinating will of God the figure of the potter, which Jeremiah and after him St. Paul apply in a wholly different sense, and contends that God has as much right to create one man for eternal salvation and another for eternal damnation, as the potter has of the same clay to make vessels for high and low uses. That indicates a physical, a mechanical, but certainly not an ethical conception of God. A mechanic may rightfully use the machine which he has built for any purposes he pleases; but may a father so use his child? What does our ethical nature say to that question? The very conception is unethical.

And that, we are convinced, is the conception of God which belongs to the Westminster standards. In fact the determinism

of the Calvinistic system, as we find it accepted in the Westminster symbols, admits of no really ethical conception of God. As He has eternally foreordained all that comes to pass, and therefore sin too, it follows either that sin has no reality for Him, or that He is the author of it. Moreover a God would not be ethical who, in the formation of His eternal purposes or decrees, should take no account of any ethical considerations, but allow Himself to be moved merely by the impulse of His will and with reference to His own glory. A God who should create one man for salvation and another for damnation for no other reason than that He so wills, would not be an ethical God in any intelligible sense. And yet this is the view which Calvinists, and with them the Westminster Symbols, continually take of the divine election. That they themselves somewhat feel the unethicallness and harshness of this doctrine, is evident from the fact they sometimes seek to clothe their ideas in the language of agnosticism, pretending either that God's motives are too deep for our comprehension, or that His morality is entirely different from our morality. Thus one of the speakers of the Charlotte Assembly says : " Why God did not elect to save all men Calvinism does not know. It only knows that such was not His sovereign pleasure." How it knows *this*, we do not know. But we do know that such a conception of God is not ethical in any intelligible sense of the term, and that a God who should thus deal with His offspring could not feel towards them the emotions of a father, and could not be loved. And yet that is the character given to God in the Westminster Confession ; and accordingly one of the speakers of the Charlotte Assembly labors to prove that the modern idea of the universal fatherhood of God is all a mistake. In harmony with this unethicall conception of God's character in general are some of the Westminster views of His conduct and dealing with men. Thus we are told by one of the Charlotte speakers—and the representation is unfortunately correct—that " Westminster divines assert that the guilt of Adam's first sin is imputed and his corruption conveyed to all the race except the divine Son of Mary ;" and we are assured further that " the Confession asserts

with most positive precision the penal substitution of Christ, the imputation of our guilt to Him, His punitive suffering and sacrifice therefore, and the imputation of this satisfaction to believers for their justification ;” and finally we are informed that “the Confession holds fast the truth of a particular redemption.” This last we presume is supposed to be the crowning glory of the Confession. Now all these conceptions may be mechanical, legal and commercial ; but they are certainly not ethical, and the notion of God which they imply is not moral. In what sense could we suppose a God to be moral, who should be willing to damn infants for the “imputed sin” and the “conveyed corruption” of a remote ancestor ?

But we are glad to see that such ideas are beginning to be rejected by an increasing number of Calvinistic and Presbyterian divines. They no longer teach infant damnation, but only because they think that they have found out somehow that all dying infants are elect. But even that is a gain. These divines are beginning to feel that the old idea of divine sovereignty is not consistent with the Christian conception of God, and that that idea must now be Christologized in order to make it true. These theologians are more or less under the influence of those modern ideas of the divine fatherhood and of human brotherhood which form so large a part of the teaching of Jesus and distinguish Christianity from every other religion. God, according to these ideas which the modern church has gained by going back to the mind of the Master, is not a being of pure force or will, as void of feeling as the law of gravitation, but He is a being of infinite love—a father who treats all His children with absolute reason and fairness, and justice, and with infinite compassion. God, according to these ideas, is not a selfish God who sacrifices His children to His glory, but a loving father who brings sacrifice in behalf of His children. We are glad, indeed, to see that these ideas are spreading among the theologians of the Presbyterian Church. They have become dominant ideas among Presbyterians in Scotland ; and in time they will become dominant also among Presbyterians in America. They may for a while try to read

them into the Westminster symbols ; but the incongruity of that will by and by become apparent ; and then there will come revision in earnest. And we earnestly hope that God may speed the day when this end shall be realized ; for we are especially interested in the Presbyterian Church, as we sustain closer relations to it than to any other. We too are Calvinistic ; but we reject from our creed any form of determinism as unethical and unchristian ; and we are convinced that no amount of logical juggling can ever relieve the Calvinistic doctrine of election from the charge of determinism. We hold that there is more in Calvinism than its determinism ; which we regard as a heresy into which not only Calvin but all the Reformers were led by a blind following of Augustine. Calvinism may remain, but determinism must go.

CALVINISM AND LIBERTY.

In the Presbyterian jubilee literature, referred to in the preceding article, much credit is claimed for Calvinism as a promoter of liberty, both civil and religious. This is in accordance with a fashion set by some casual remarks of a few able historians, and followed without much consideration by a host of others. Mr. Bancroft, for example, speaks of Calvinism as “the system which for a century and a half assumed the guardianship of liberty for the English speaking world ;” and Ranke asserts that “John Calvin was virtually the founder of America.” In view of such examples Presbyterians and others, who have an interest in Calvinism, may well be pardoned for occasionally speaking with pride of the merits of their system of faith in its supposed relation to the sacred cause of human freedom.

In order, however, that such self-congratulation may not grow into mere senseless boasting, that shall draw upon itself the derision of the world, it would be well to inquire somewhat more closely into the grounds of it. What reason is there for the assertion that Calvinism has been the special nurse of liberty ? Undoubtedly some Calvinistic communities have cherished the

spirit of civil and religious freedom, and others have served as occasions, more or less direct, of its promotion. But the same is true also of communities that have not been Calvinistic. And, then, there have been communities holding the tenets of Calvinism that were not conspicuous for any love of liberty. What, then, is the relation between Calvinism as a system of religious and theological thought and the interest of human freedom? Is it a relation of cause and effect, or is it merely a relation of accidental association? Is liberty related to Calvinism as a *propter hoc* or merely as a *post hoc*? And in case there should be supposed to be a causal relation between the two, what would appear to be the precise principle in Calvinism that especially favors the liberty of man? There is more than one principle in Calvinism. In the original system of Calvin himself there was a church principle, a sacramental principle, and a democratic principle, as well as a decretal principle. In the Calvinism of the Synod of Dort, half a century after the death of Calvin, there are *five points*, or principles, all of which, however, may be reduced to the principle of the divine sovereignty. Which of these principles, then, is the one that may be supposed especially to have favored the cause of liberty? The answer which our Presbyterian friends give to this question is that it is the principle of divine sovereignty, or the principle of absolute predestination. "Let the truth of the sovereignty of God be lodged in the minds of the people," says Dr. De Witt, "and let it work there its legitimate conclusion; and pope of Rome, and my Lord Bishop in England, and kingly thrones alike must tremble." The same view substantially is presented by several writers of the Southern Church in their anniversary addresses. The idea is that the conviction of being elect, that is, of being a chosen instrument for the promotion of the divine glory, will work such an exaltation of mind in an individual as will make him unwilling ever to be in subjection to anything lower than God. The slave of God can not be the slave of any man.

This, indeed, may be supposed to be the usual view of the case. The idea of the sole causality and efficiency of God in the deter-

mination of human life implies the thought that the subject is free from the control of every lower influence, and must resent every effort to be brought under such control. This, however, we consider a very defective view of liberty ; and we, therefore, do not hesitate to take decided issue with the whole theory here under consideration. We totally deny that, as here understood, Calvinism is directly favorable to the progress of liberty, and we believe that history will bear us out in our position. We hold that, in the nature of the case, no system of fatalism, by whatever name it may be designated, can be favorable to the idea of liberty. Now Calvinism teaches that man is in his own constitution absolutely without moral ability, and consequently without freedom. When the divine grace takes hold of an elect person it works in him irresistibly and makes him into a saint. There is no freedom in this process, except the mere freedom from external constraint. The man is free to yield to divine grace only in the sense that he is not hindered by anything outside of him. But this is not moral freedom ; it is merely the spontaneity of the plant or animal, in which the creative will accomplishes its purpose in this absolute way. But how any system of moral determinism could be supposed to favor directly either civil or religious liberty, we can not understand. It is true that the conviction of being a chosen organ of an absolute divine sovereignty may cause a certain feeling of independence of all lower powers, and a certain strength of character, that will yield to no obstacles and give way to no suffering. In this way Calvinism, like Stoicism, may make heroes of a certain kind ; and it may make martyrs. But it may also make tyrants. The chosen instrument of God may imagine that he is predestined to be a *master of men*, and that others are predestined to be his slaves. But all this is not in the spirit of liberty. Liberty consists not merely in claiming certain rights for oneself, because of some supposed divine favor, but in allowing the same rights also to others.

If the mere adoption of the doctrine of divine sovereignty, in the sense in which this doctrine has been generally understood

among Calvinists, were sufficient to make a people free, then the Mohammedans ought to be the freest people in the world, for Mohammedanism teaches the sovereignty of God in the most extreme form. "It is the will of Allah," is the stolid expression with which the Mohammedan meets every event in life. Allah is everything, man is nothing. A man goes to heaven or hell as Allah wills. Surely that is a sufficiently large view of the divine sovereignty. But instead of favoring, it crushes out every spark of the feeling of liberty. There is no country in the world in which there is so little of the feeling of personal liberty as in Turkey, where the doctrine of divine sovereignty is accepted in its most exaggerated form. But it may be said that Mohammedanism is a false religion, and that, of course, everything good must there be perverted. We hold, however, that everywhere the like causes must produce like results. But let us pass into the domain of Christendom. St. Augustine taught the doctrine of the divine sovereignty as strongly, if not as consistently, as did Calvin; and yet this did not lead him to respect the rights or the liberty of the Donatists. Nor did Augustinianism during the Middle Ages favor the development of freedom, but it lent itself quite easily to the tyranny of the papacy and the abuses of Roman Catholicism.

And what about John Calvin? He claimed liberty for himself—independence of thought and action both in religious and civil life—but he set up a theocracy at Geneva which repressed the aspirations of personal liberty as much as any oriental despotism ever did. The saints of Geneva were free to think and to act as they were bidden; but if they presumed to think and act otherwise, they soon discovered that there was a limit to their liberty. The story of Michael Servetus shows how much freedom of thought was permitted in Geneva. But it is said that that affair about Servetus happened in accordance with *the spirit of the time*, and that all the Reformers then living approved of it. Calvin was no worse than the rest; but neither was he any better, as he should have been, if all that is sometimes claimed for his system were true. It was the common belief at the time

that it is the duty of the temporal prince to punish heresy and protect and defend the purity of the Church. That is the teaching even of the Westminster Confession (Cap XX., Art. IV. and Cap. XXIII., Art. III.), which, in spite of its Calvinism, shows in this regard no superiority to other confessions of the time; although its teaching on this point is in striking contradiction with the statement contained elsewhere in the Confession, that "God alone is Lord of the conscience." So, then, Calvin only fell a victim to the spirit of the time when he burned Servetus. His belief in divine sovereignty did not raise him above that spirit. It did not make him a champion of liberty. The fact is that he argued in favor of persecution from the example of the Roman Catholics. If Catholic princes show so much zeal against the true religion, he said, how much more ought Protestant princes to show in favor of it!

All this shows that liberty is rather a product of the conflict of ages than of the logic of a system. And history has shown that Calvinists can be as good persecutors as any other class of men. The Calvinists of the Netherlands defended themselves bravely against their Spanish oppressors; but when they were in power, they persecuted Arminians and Mennonites with as much zeal as the Spaniards had shown in persecuting them. And the same was the case in England. They who pleaded for liberty when they were down, forgot to exercise toleration when they were on top. William A. Cox, one of the speakers before the Charlotte Assembly, complains that Cromwell did much injury to the cause of Presbyterianism in England, and says that "he gave to England a government of great power, vigor and wisdom, but which was after all as thorough-going a despotism as that which Charles I. lost his life and crown in seeking to establish." That is doubtless true; but surely it must not be forgotten that Cromwell was as good a Calvinist and fatalist as any that ever breathed in Scotland. There was not much reverence for liberty in the ranks of his Ironsides, but every man of them was a firm believer in the divine sovereignty. And the same story is repeated again in American history. The pilgrim fathers, all of

them good Calvinists, fled to America in order here to enjoy the rights of freedom which were denied to them in their own land ; but as soon as they were established here, they proved that they had as little conception of true liberty as had their persecutors at home. In proof of this we need but refer to the story of Roger Williams and of Ann Hutchinson.

Liberty in the true sense, then, is not a deduction from a theological system, but a growth of the ages. And more than one circumstance, and more than one religious community have contributed to its development. There are some elements in Calvinism, in the wider sense, which have undoubtedly contributed to the progress of liberty. The democratic factor which Calvin introduced into the government of the Church is such an element. But this was merely an induction from Scripture, and had nothing to do with the doctrine of Divine sovereignty. In fact, it was rather in opposition to that doctrine, as the notion of democratic equality among men has nothing in common with the notion of the partiality of unconditional election. As a theoretical factor in the development of freedom may be mentioned the comparatively modern doctrine of personality. This, indeed, is a thoroughly Christian conception, but it has been properly recognized only in modern times. It is the conception that every created personality is the realization of an eternal thought begotten of the eternal love of God, and is, therefore, of infinite value, and may never be used as a mere thing either by God or man. Kant has given expression to the practical implication of this conception in the famous maxim : " Always treat humanity, whether in yourself or in another, as a person, and never as a thing." Every child of man is a child of God, and, therefore, has a right to liberty and happiness, which God never violates, and which man may never violate. But this is not a Calvinistic conception, and by no means fits into the scheme of partial redemption, limited atonement and absolute predestination.

But this modern Christian conception of personality and of personal liberty has not been gained without much effort and conflict. It is the product of the struggle of innumerable forces in

the ages of history. Indeed, countless individuals and numerous religious and civil communities have had a share in the work of bringing it to perfection. Catholic and Protestant, Lutheran and Reformed, Calvinist and Arminian, Presbyterian and Independent, Baptist and Quaker, all have had a share in working it out. A large amount of credit is due especially to the smaller religious communities, like the Mennonites and Quakers, who by suffering much for conscience's sake contributed much to the establishment of civil and religious liberty. Let it be remembered that in this country it was not a Calvinist but a Quaker who established the first colony in which perfect religious liberty and equality were to be the law; and that colony was not Massachusetts, but Pennsylvania. The liberty which we enjoy in this country is not the creation of Calvinism, but the product of the association, the conflict, and the attrition of men of many nationalities and many creeds, who were brought together in this land by the providence of God to constitute a new and peculiar nation.

Truly, then, our liberty has been purchased at a great price, and its preservation will require the exercise of eternal vigilance. Some Churches and individuals, indeed, may have something to learn yet in order that they may be able quite to appreciate the boon which in the providence of God has here fallen to their lot, and willing to allow others to enjoy the same boon on the same conditions. In this respect we do not think that our Presbyterian brethren, with all their Calvinism, have reason to boast above other Churches. They are not any more free than others, or any more liberal. Indeed, there is no Protestant Church in the world in which there seems to be less ability to tolerate real freedom of thought than there is in the Presbyterian. When any considerable difference of thought arises in the Presbyterian Church, straightway there is a conflict and an expulsion of one party by another. Men of different theological tendencies can not dwell together in unity and peace. Hence it is that there are nine different Presbyterian bodies in this country, and eleven in Great Britain. How does that agree with the claim that Calvinism especially favors liberty? Verily, before that claim can

be substantiated, the Presbyterian Church will have some things to learn and some things to repent of ; although it may not be true that the Presbyterians alone are sinners in this matter. There may be others, perhaps as intolerant as the Presbyterians, but they at least do not make the same claim to liberality.

EXTENT OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE.

There was a time when it was generally believed that the authority of the Bible extends to all matters of human thought. History, geography, science, philosophy and even medicine were all bound to be subject to its teaching ; and the man who in any of these departments of knowledge dared to entertain thoughts different from those which were believed to be authorized by the statements of the Bible, was regarded as a heretic. Thus, for instance, the Bible was once believed to lend its authority to the Ptolemaic system of astronomy, and men like Galileo and Descartes were heretics because they refused to accept this authority. So the Bible was believed to teach that the world was created in six days, about six thousand years ago ; and the modern geologists who refused to accept this teaching, were heretics who sinned against the authority of the Bible.

But in course of time the new science of astronomy and the new science of geology demonstrated the correctness of their principles so clearly that no intelligent person could reasonably refuse to accept them. And what was the consequence ? The theologians somehow discovered that the Bible had always taught the very truths which astronomy and geology now claimed to have brought to light ; and it became fashionable for theologians to be employed in "reconciling" science and the Bible. If geology claims that the earth with its inhabitants was brought into its present condition through a series of long continued periods of development, why, it was said, the author of Genesis knew that long ago ; and that is just what is meant by the "six days" of creation. These "days" were periods of indefinite duration ; and the order of succession in the geological record agrees beautifully

with the order in the Biblical record ; and thus the universal authority of the Bible was vindicated. This view has been entertained by some eminent scientists, such as Professors Guyot and Dana, and is still entertained by Sir J. W. Dawson.

But this vindication of the authority of the Bible, it is now claimed by the best Biblical scholars, rests upon a misapprehension of the original sense of the record of creation in Genesis. The older theologians were right when they understood that record to teach that the creation took place in six literal days. The word "day," it is true, may in Hebrew, as in other languages, sometimes be understood in an indefinite sense. But that is not its sense in the first chapter of Genesis. The writer of that chapter meant a literal day. His days of creation are conceived just as literally as is the Sabbath "day," to which the first account of creation is intended to lead up. If the "seventh day" of Gen. 2 : 3 is not an indefinite period, then neither are the preceding "days" indefinite periods. Suppose we were to substitute *period* or *age* for *day* in this record, and read as follows : "And there was evening, and there was morning, one *age*." Who can not see the absurdity of such a rendering? It is claimed sometimes that Augustine favored this interpretation. But nothing could be farther from the truth. Augustine says : "What kind of days these were it is extremely difficult, or perhaps impossible for us to conceive, and how much more to say ! We see, indeed that our ordinary days have no evening but by the setting, and no morning but by the rising of the sun ; but the first three days of all were passed without sun, since it is reported to have been made on the fourth day." (City of God, XI., 6, 7.) Augustine then goes on to allegorize, and maintains that what is meant by the "light" of the first day are the *angels*. "There is no question," he says, "that if the angels are included in the works of God during these six days, they are that light which was called 'day,' and whose unity Scripture signalizes by calling that day not the 'first day,' but 'one day.' " (xi. 9). This account of the creation of the heavenly bodies on the fourth day has always given trouble to the harmonists, and the usual explanation has been that these

bodies, which of course existed before, first became visible on this day, and assumed their proper functions with relation to the earth. But the record says that God "made" them on this day, just as it says that He "made" the animals on the next day. There are other circumstances in this account, which cause insuperable difficulties to the "reconcilers," and show that the writer of Genesis did not anticipate the scientific conclusions of modern times.

The writer of the first chapter of Genesis knew no science except that which was generally current in his day. His inspiration did not make him an infallible authority in all departments of human knowledge. And the case of this writer is a typical one. If the idea of an all-comprehensive authority of the Bible breaks down on its very first page, it surely can not be maintained elsewhere. The authors of the Bible did not write with the view of communicating infallible knowledge on all possible subjects. Their concern was with religion, and with nothing else; and on religion alone are they an authority. On all other subjects they thought just as their contemporaries thought, and were no more infallible. Hence no infallible knowledge concerning subjects other than religion can be drawn from the Bible. Any such pretended use of the Bible must consequently be an abuse of it, and must tend in the end to bring it into discredit. To suppose, for instance, that historical statements, like those relating to the life of Abraham, or psychological statements, like those relating to demoniacal possessions, must be accepted as absolute truth because they are in the Bible, would tend at last to impair its authority in its own proper sphere.

The authority of the Bible, then, must be limited strictly to the spiritual sphere, or to the sphere of religion and morals. It is only in this sphere that its inspiration can be supposed to have any reality; and here it consists, not in the formulation of abstract doctrines, but in the power of bringing the reader into the same spiritual mood in which the writer was in the moment of composition. Hence the Bible can properly be used only for spiritual purposes; just as a work of art can only be used for æsthetic

purposes. Shakespeare is an authority on æsthetic truth, not on history, geography or medicine. There are many historical, geographical and scientific allusions in Shakespeare's dramas, but these are there not for their own sake, but for the sake of the æsthetic sentiment which is to be expressed through them. Shakespeare evidently believed in witchcraft, and often introduced the professors of the black art into his scenes. Are we therefore bound to believe in witchcraft in order to get the full benefit of Shakespeare's poetry? So with the Bible: in order to get the spiritual impression which it is intended to make upon the mind of the reader, it is not necessary to regard it as infallible in all its statements on all sorts of subjects. But, it may be asked, where shall the line be drawn between the spiritual and that which is not spiritual? We answer frankly that, in our opinion, this is a matter that is not always easy; but we have at least no greater difficulty here than we meet with in other departments of thought. There is a difference between plants and animals, but it is not always easy to draw the line between them. So there is a difference between good and bad actions, but it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the good from the bad. We are often in moral situations in which it is not easy to formulate any judgment, and yet it must be done. All spiritual life has its difficulties, and we should therefore not expect to be saved from all difficulties in our use of the Bible. Every Christian must decide at his own risk what in the Bible is spiritual or inspired truth, profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness and what serves only as *setting* for this truth.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

LAO-TZE'S TAO-TEH-KING. Chinese-English, with Introduction, Transliteration and Notes, by Dr. Paul Carus. Pages, 345. Price, \$3.00. 1898. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, Ill.

This work, which is appropriately bound in yellow and blue, with gilt top, consists of the original Chinese text and translation of Lao-Tze's *Tao-Teh-King* (*Book of Reason and Virtue*), preceded by a historical and philosophical introduction, and followed by a transliteration of the Chinese words used in the work, with their meanings, critical notes, and a complete index. It seems to be a convenient volume through which to make such acquaintance with the Chinese language and Chinese thought as an American scholar must consider desirable in view of the present increased intercourse with the oriental world. Dr. Carus, who seems to be well fitted for the purpose, has rendered his countrymen a real service by making accessible to them this work of Chinese thought, in which there is much that resembles the teaching both of Buddha and of Christ.

Lao-Tze flourished during the sixth century before Christ. But *Taoism*, or the cult of *Tao*, existed long before him. *Tao* means *Reason*. But the word is used in two senses : first, in the sense of the eternal, immutable reason or law, which constitutes the principle of the universe, in which sense it is equivalent to the Greek *logos* as used by the Stoics and by Philo, and to the Hindoo *vach* (Latin in *vox*) ; and, secondly, in the sense of the human understanding, which is the infinite Reason individualized in finite form. We thus see at once that those old Chinese thinkers, with all their quaintness, and with the difficulty of their monosyllabic language, had minds like our own, and were interested in questions which engage our own attention. "The philosophy of Lao-Tze, which places the Tao at the beginning of the world," says Dr. Carus, "is the echo of a thinker who was engaged with the same problem as the author of the fourth Gospel. We read in the Tao-Teh-King that the Tao, far from being made by God, must be prior even to God, for God could never have existed without it, and that, therefore, the Tao may claim the right of priority. * * * What a strange contrast ! The Logos or Tao (*i. e.*, the eternal rationality that conditions the immutable laws of the world-order) is, according to Lao-Tze prior to God ; it is God's ancestor or father ; but according to Christian doctrines, it is the son of God, not created but begotten in eternity. At first sight both statements are contradictory, but is not after all the fundamental significance in either case the same?" p. 13. Not exactly, for "the Tao," according to Dr. Carus, "is a principle, not

a personal being, it is an omnipresent feature of reality, a law fashioning events, not a god, nor an essence or a world-substance." But the Logos in the Christian sense is God.

Lao-Tze's ideal of morality consists in realizing the nameless or unnamable Tao. The imitation of Tao is virtue. But virtue is "non-action;" it is "not acting, not making, not doing." "Through non-action everything can be accomplished" This seems to be a strange doctrine. But virtue after all is not inactivity. It is simply allowing the absolute principle of reason or wisdom to act through a person, without any attempt on the part of the person to be or do anything himself; somewhat as the law of gravitation acts in individual masses of matter. Virtue is simply surrender to the nature of things and allowing one's self to be passively controlled by it. To resist this nature of things is the opposite of virtue and leads to destruction. "He who attempts to alter the nature of things," says Dr. Carus in explanation of this Chinese conception of virtue, "will implicate himself in a struggle in which even the most powerful creature must finally succumb. But he who uses things according to their nature, directing their course, not forcing them or trying to alter their nature, can do with them whatever he pleases," p. 18. "Man is required," says Dr. Carus again, "not to have a will of his own, but to do what according to the eternal and immutable order of things he ought to do." This is virtue. And he who understands what is meant by the Christian principle of surrendering one's own will to the will of God, and being led by the grace of God, will have no difficulty in understanding in what sense virtue could be defined as non-action. These quotations may serve to show the interesting character of the work before us. It has a bearing upon the history of religious and philosophical thought universally. And we agree with Dr. Carus "that no one who is interested in (the science of) religion can afford to leave it unread." The words in parenthesis in the preceding sentence are our own. There is a difference between religion and the science of religion—a difference which is real, although even theologians do not always recognize it. In order to be religious one need not to read Chinese classics; but in order to understand the science of religion one ought to read the *Tao-Teh-King* of "the old philosopher," Lao-Tze.

MEMORIAL VOLUME OF THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY, 1647-1897. Containing Eleven Addresses Delivered before the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, at Charlotte, N. C., in May, 1897, in Commemoration of the Two Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Westminster Assembly, and the Formation of the Westminster Standards. Second Edition. Pages 297. 1898. Presbyterian Committee of Publication, Richmond, Va.

This volume opens with an introductory essay treating of the historical framework of the Westminster Assembly. The subjects

of the various addresses, with the names of their respective authors, are as follows: I. The Political History of the Time, by the Rev. H. A. White, Ph.D., D.D.; II. The Religious Situation of the Time, by the Rev. Robert Price, D.D., LL.D.; III. The Westminster Assembly Itself, by the Rev. T. D. Wither-
spoon, D.D., LL.D.; IV. The Doctrinal Contents of the Confession, by the Rev. R. L. Dabney, D.D., LL.D.; V. The Catechisms, by the Rev. G. B. Strickler, D.D., LL.D.; VI. The Polity and Worship of the Standards, by the Rev. Eugene Daniel, D.D.; VII. Relation of the Standards to Other Creeds, by the Rev. James D. Tadlock, D.D., LL.D.; VIII. The Standards and Missionary Activity, by the Rev. Moses D. Hoge, D.D., LL.D.; IX. The Standards in Relation to Current Theology, by the Rev. S. N. Smith, D.D.; The Standards in Relation to Family and Social Life, by the Rev. John F. Cannon, D.D.; The Standards and Civil Government, by the Hon. William M. Cox, A.M.

These papers are all interesting, and serve to give one a pretty accurate idea of the theological atmosphere of the Southern Presbyterian Church at the present time. The Southern Church is probably the most orthodox and the most conservative of all the Presbyterian Churches in this country. The desire of revision has not yet taken hold of the ministers and members of this Church to any perceptible extent. At least this is the conclusion to which any one would be likely to come from the reading of the representative essays contained in this memorial volume. These essays, while all able and interesting, are, of course, not all of equal value. We have read with especial interest those on the doctrinal contents of the Confession and on the Standards in relation to current theology. In the former of these we have, besides an exposition of the contents of the Westminster Confession, a defense of Confessions or Creeds in general. The author holds, and we think rightly, that creeds are a necessity for the Church. But when he puts this necessity on the same ground as that which exists for the translation of the Scriptures, we cannot go with him. The author of this essay holds that "Only the Greek and Hebrew originals of the Scriptures are immediately inspired; the translators must be uninspired." "Therefore," he continues, "these versions (that is, translations into modern languages) are human expositions of the divine originals (and hence in the nature of confessions). Wycliffe's version, Luther's, Tyndall's, are but their human beliefs of what the Hebrew and Greek words are meant by the Holy Ghost to signify." Now, if the case stood thus, then we should like to know how many preachers of the Presbyterian Church, and even how many of the *doctors of divinity and law* who figured on the programme of this Charlotte Assembly, really have an inspired Bible. How many of them could read the Hebrew and Greek originals without the aid of grammar and lexicon, and with sufficient ease to catch

their inspiration? This theory is adopted in order to exalt the doctrine of inspiration; but, to our mind, it is a folly that is unworthy of any mature theologian, and that ought to be abandoned for the sake of the good reputation of the theological profession.

One of the most interesting and at the same time also most *amusing* of the essays in this volume is that by Dr. Smith on "The Westminster Symbols Considered in Relation to Current Popular Theology and the Needs of the Future." By current popular theology is meant the "New Theology," which has arisen within the confines of Calvinism as a protest against the unchristian elements in the Calvinistic system. The author of this essay has some difficulty in determining what the "New Theology" is, but comes to the conclusion at last that it is *Mysticism*, *Pantheism* and *Rationalism*, and that it has for its father the famous German theologian Schleiermacher. To say that it comes from Schleiermacher is, of course, considered sufficient at once to condemn it; for he, Dr. Smith tells us, is not sound on a single doctrine. As some of his special heresies are mentioned the doctrine of the *divine immanence in the world*, the doctrine of the *divine fatherhood*, the *emphasizing of the incarnation*, the *centralizing of Christ in theology*, and the acceptance of the *Christian consciousness* as a source of theological knowledge. That these doctrines of Schleiermacher, which the new theology has appropriated from him, are wrong is supposed to be so self-evident a fact that it needs no proof. Is not all this in conflict with the Calvinistic system, and is not that sufficient to warrant its condemnation? Dr. Smith thinks that a *sincentric* theology would be a far better theology than a *Christocentric* theology. And as for any *Christian consciousness*, he simply denies that there is such a thing. Dr. Smith, judging from his portrait—and by the way all the essays of this volume have prefixed to them the portraits of their authors, a thing which is eminently proper in a volume of this kind—seems to be still a *young* man, and it is to be hoped that he will live long enough to be convinced of the untenableness of his present theological position, and of the foolishness of many of his present utterances. There was a time when prominent men in New England spoke and wrote of Schleiermacher, and of anything that was German, in the same vein in which Dr. Smith speaks now. But all that is changed now in New England. And we believe that the time will come when the same change will pass over the mind of the sunny South.

LUTHER, THE REFORMER. By Charles E. Hay, D.D. Pp. 209. Price 40 cents, 1898. Lutheran Publication Society, Philadelphia, Pa.

This work belongs to the Lutheran Hand-Book Series. It presents the life of Luther in brief compass, but omits nothing of essential importance to the general reader. It is clear and vigorous in style and will be read with pleasure by those who are interested in the subject of which it treats. It is not intended,

of course, to displace the larger and more elaborate works upon the life and work of Luther; but neither is it intended as a work merely for the young. It is adapted to the wants of educated men and women generally, who desire information on the subject with which it deals, but have not the time to read the larger works. The work is written by a Lutheran with some degree of predilection, of course, for his hero. This may account for the manner in which some of the deficiencies of Luther are passed over. For instance, in reference to Luther's view of the divine sovereignty as expressed in his treatise against Erasmus on *The Enslaved Will*, in which he teaches the grossest fatalism, and maintains that "all things come to pass of necessity," our author makes the remark that "in estimating the positions here assumed by Luther it is important to remember that they are not the deductions of abstract reasoning," but were maintained in the supposed interest of the Gospel. No doubt; but does that make them any the more true? And what shall be said of Calvin's views, which are the same as those of Luther here maintained? May not the same apology be made for them? We fail to perceive how absurd deductions from Scripture are any better than absurd deductions of abstract reasoning. Luther's refusal of the hand of Zwingli at Marburg is excused on the ground that Luther was conscientiously convinced that the difference between himself and the Swiss Reformer was a deep and vital one that admitted of no compromise. Besides he was somewhat chagrined at the thought that any one should consider him capable of yielding on a subject on which he had given to the world what he considered his final views in a book previously published. On the Lutheran denial of altar-fellowship on the ground of the example and teaching of Luther our author makes the following remark: "That those who bear the name of Luther to-day should be led by his example upon this critical occasion to permanently refuse fellowship at the Lord's table with all who do not accept the strict Lutheran view of the sacred ordinance, can be consistently maintained only upon the supposition that the persons thus excluded really occupy the position attributed to Zwingli and his followers, *i. e.*, that they are insincere in their professions of piety, depisers of God's Word, and inspired by Satan in their stubborn opposition of the truth." This seems to us to be saving the credit of Luther, at this point, at too great a cost to his Christian character. Did Luther really believe that Zwingli and his party were, not merely erring Christians, but bold and defiant enemies of Christ with whom no Christian could have any fellowship? If we were bound to believe that, then we should have to suppose that there was something demoniacal in the character of Luther himself. Such a delusion could hardly have been anything less. But we are inclined to believe that Luther on that occasion yielded to a more common and more human weakness.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL, from the Earliest Times to the Destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, Written for Lay Readers. By Carl Heinrich Cornill, Ph.D., S.T.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Königsberg. Translated by W. H. Carruth, Professor of German in the University of Kansas. Pp. 325. Price, \$1.50. 1898. The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, Ill.

Professor Cornill is recognized as one of the most competent Biblical scholars in Germany. He has already become known to the readers of this REVIEW by means of his work on *The Prophets of Israel*, a few years ago. The present work is conceived and executed in the same spirit as the one just mentioned. The object is to meet the wants of intelligent lay readers—men and women who want to know the Bible in the light of modern critical scholarship. Hence, there is no display of critical apparatus. We have only results or conclusions without the process by which they are reached. In language clear and precise the story of Israel is told from the earliest times to the last conflict with the Roman power, in which Israel's nationality forever perished.

In this volume Professor Cornill treats the history of Israel from the standpoint of the Higher Criticism. What his view of the Bible is, and of "Bible History," may be made evident by means of the following paragraph: "I must beg you to forget here all recollections of 'Bible History.' Not on the ground that everything is untrue that is told in the Bible on the history of Israel; but in the Biblical accounts the material has all gone through the medium of popular tradition, and then, again, this popular tradition has been treated and presented by later compilers from special points of view. The Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament do not claim to be history, but books of devotion. It is very characteristic that the Jewish canon itself does not know the designation 'historical books,' but includes the writings which we are accustomed to call the historical books of the Old Testament among the *prophetic*, with a correct perception that we have not in this case historiography but prophecy. That the historian, who is concerned with these books only as historical materials, looks at them with different eye from the Bible reader, who is seeking in them only edification, is a matter of course and cannot be otherwise, and accordingly the historian will often be obliged to draw a different picture of the matters reported in them from that made for devotional purposes by the Biblical writers themselves," pp. 4, 5.

In accordance with this conception of the Bible the history of Israel is written in this volume. The author holds that the traditions of the early times of Israel contain always a kernel of historical reality, but that this historial reality has in many cases been enclosed in a shroud of legendary representation from which it can be disentangled only by historical criticism. For purposes of history such criticism is needed; for edification it is not needed. In agreement with most critics the author holds that

written documents did not exist in Israel to any considerable extent previous to the commencement of the period of the kings. All the information we have concerning events preceding this period must, therefore, be based upon traditions with which the legendary spirit must long have been busy, as, indeed, it was also with much that belonged to later times. In accordance with this principle the author believes, for instance, that Abraham was a historical personage who conducted a colony from the region of the Euphrates to Canaan, perhaps in consequence of political disturbances in the land of his nativity; but that he was in the literal sense the father of the Hebrew race this author does not think can be admitted.

It should be remarked that in the work before us the history of Israel is presented mainly in its political and secular character. This may be due to the fact that the religious side of that history had already been presented in the preceding work on the *Prophets of Israel*. A peculiarity of this history is that there is relatively more attention given to the period between Ezra and Christ than used to be the case in such works in the past. It used to be supposed that during the four hundred years between Ezra and Christ there was no divine revelation, and that for the history of religion that whole period was all a blank. Now, when we know that a number of canonical books belonged to this period, like Chronicles, Daniel and many of the Psalms, and that it was, indeed, a period of intense religious thought and development, it can no longer be thus ignored either by the historian of the Bible or the historian of Israel. And we find, accordingly, that Cornill has treated this period quite fully. In conclusion we allow ourselves, for once, to adopt the common but cheap phrase of the reviewer, and to say that, "without endorsing all that is contained in this book," we commend it to the attention of our readers.

CHARLES PORTERFIELD KRAUTH, D.D., LL.D., Norton Professor of Systematic Theology and Church Polity in the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia; Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy, and Vice-Provost of the University of Pennsylvania. By Adolph Spaeth, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Lutheran Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. Volume I., 1823-1859. Pages, 425. 1898. The Christian Literature Company, New York.

The subject of this memoir was one of the most remarkable and most influential men of the American Lutheran Church, and the history of that Church could not be properly understood without a knowledge of his life and activity. The author, Dr. Spaeth, who by the way is a son-in-law of Dr. Krauth's, has by its publication put under obligation not merely the Lutheran Church, but the scholars in all the Churches who are interested in the history of American Christianity. We need not say that the biographer's task is well performed in this volume. The author was evidently inspired with enthusiasm for his subject, and the result is a book which to read with interest and profit one need not be a Lutheran.

Of course, in a work of this kind the author disappears much behind the person of his subject. It is not the author's ideas and acts which are set forth in these pages, but those of his hero; who, accordingly, is permitted in a large measure to speak for himself, in letters, newspaper and review articles, and in extracts from books, the author only giving these their proper setting with a view to making them easily intelligible to his readers.

Dr. C. P. Krauth, as portrayed in these pages, was in many respects one of the most fortunate as well as most brilliant of men. Descended from a distinguished Lutheran ancestry he possessed by nature and environment advantages the like of which but few men are permitted to enjoy. His father, Charles Philip Krauth, was for many years professor of theology in the newly established Seminary at Gettysburg, where Charles Porterfield entered the preparatory school at the age of nine years and graduated in theology at the age of nineteen. He seems not to have been a hard student during his college and seminary days, for the reason probably that he gained knowledge so easily that no great exertion was needed. He was, however, an incessant reader, and, possessing a retentive memory, he showed himself to be an accomplished scholar at a very early period in life. He owned a library of seven hundred volumes at an age when most young men are still in college, and he had read and digested it. His library in course of time came to be the largest and best selected private library probably in the United States, and he knew how to use it.

Dr. Krauth's early life was passed during what may be called the formative period of the Lutheran Church. He was born two or three years before the establishment of the Theological Seminary at Gettysburg. When he entered the ministry the Lutheran Church was not as *Lutheran* as it is now. The General Synod had been formed with the Augsburg Confession as its doctrinal basis; but the Confession was held in a rather loose way by many of the ministers, and the general tendency of the Church had been away from her standards. The anxious bench revival system had been introduced and flourished in large sections of the Church. Dr. Krauth himself during the early period of his ministry held "revivals" and spoke of the results of them in the style which was in fashion at that time, although it seems that he early had scruples in regard to some of the means which were then employed in the interest of revivalism. But he had not been in the ministry very long when a tendency in the direction of a more pronounced Lutheranism began to manifest itself. The Church became divided into two camps; one consisting of the "American Lutherans," who held lightly to the Confessional standards and practiced Methodist customs; the other consisting of the "Symbolists," who advocated a return to the symbolical books and the peculiar practices of the Lutheran Church in the time of the Reformation. Dr. Krauth gradually ranged himself with the latter party, and in course of time became its chief apos-

tle and spokesman. It is in this relation that we must look for the significance of his life and work, although the volume before us shows him rather in the process of preparation for his work than in the actual performance of it. For that picture we shall have to wait for the second volume of this memoir, which will, accordingly, be looked forward to with much eagerness, not only in the Lutheran Church, but also among thoughtful men outside of it.

Dr. Krauth studied Lutheran theology until he knew it better than any other man in America knew it. And this constant study made him intensely Lutheran. Indeed, so large did Lutheranism bulk before his soul that he scarcely had an eye for any other form of Christianity. He could see but little good in any other Christian denomination; and in fact it was not often, we suppose, that any other denomination engaged his serious thought. It seems to be a peculiar fatality of all such movements as that in which Dr. Krauth and his associates were then engaged that they can not be kept within reasonable measures. They seem to be bound to be extreme. It was at a time when the first great wave of Methodist revivalism and unchurchly fanaticism, which had rolled over the Protestant Churches of Great Britain and America, had expended its force. There began to be a reaction in favor of the older Church systems. In England during this period we see Puseyism developing itself until it ends in wholesale conversions to Rome. In the Lutheran Church in this country we see the revived Lutheranism developing until it puts on the airs of Romanism itself in the doctrine of "Lutheran pulpits for Lutheran ministers and Lutheran altars for Lutheran communicants." And in other Churches similar phenomena are manifesting themselves. We may say, therefore, that the movement in which Dr. Krauth and his associates were engaged was only a part of a larger movement of the time. In the Lutheran Church the effect was a division of the General Synod and a reorganization of parties according to theological affinities. That division still continues and contributes to an intensity of Lutheran feeling which closes some sections of Lutheranism, at least, against all modern theological ideas, and serves to set the hope of any reunion of Protestantism very far out in the future. What Dr. Krauth thought of union movements may be inferred from the following sentence relating to the union of the Reformed and Lutherans in Germany: "Where their influence prevailed she (the Lutheran Church) had become rotten in doctrine, destitute not only of the power of godliness, but even of the decencies of its forms, and ready, at the command of a royal devotee of Dagon, for a conjunction which she once would have regarded as the adding of a scaly tail and fishy fin to the fair bust of woman; but the bust was as fishy as the tail now, and they were frozen into happy conjunction." The "scaly tail and fishy fin," of course, is the Reformed Church, and the "fair bust of woman" is the Lutheran Church in her original glory as she ap-

pears in the Form of Concord. Any mind that could give such a turn as this to Horace's famous lines *to the Pisos* thereby shows itself to be rather stronger in literature than in Christian charity. And the case shows that the greatest men, and the most illustrious, have their imperfections and their weaknesses, which make them unfit to be models for universal imitation. Dr. Krauth was a great man and rendered the Lutheran Church and the cause of Christianity in this country eminent services, but in our humble opinion he would have been a greater *man* if he had not been quite as great a *Lutheran*. *Denominationalism* is not inconsistent with Christianity, but *sectarianism* we believe is; and sectarianism consists in denying the quality of Christian to bodies of men who manifest the virtues of Christianity as fully as that to which one belongs himself. That Dr. Krauth did this we do not say, but he at least sometimes came perilously near doing it.

THE LIFE OF PHILIP SCHAFF. By David S. Schaff, D.D., Professor of Church History in Lane Theological Seminary. With Portraits. New York, Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1897.

At the close of a series of *Personal Reminiscences* intended for his family as a record of his preparation in Europe for his work in America, Dr. Schaff remarks that "they may furnish authentic material for a biography, if," he modestly adds, "I should be found worthy of one." There are few men better entitled to have their lives recorded, for there are few men to whom it has been given to do a larger or more important work for the Church and Christian society.

Dr. Schaff was an eminent scholar, a man of the most extensive and accurate knowledge. He was also for fifty years a brilliant and successful teacher, whose pupils, numbered by thousands, will ever revere his memory. He was no recluse, confining himself to the study and the class-room. He freely and gladly gave to the world the ripest fruits of his encyclopædic learning and varied experience. He was a voluminous author; a list of his works furnished by his biographer covers no less than eight pages. They constitute a library in themselves. Partly in German and partly in English, some of them have been translated, not only into the languages of western Europe, but also into Russian, Bulgarian, Arabic, Syriac, Persian, and even into Chinese and Japanese. The field they cover is wide and varied. And some of them, especially in the department of Church history, are among the most valuable theological publications within the last half century.

Dr. Schaff exerted a widely extended influence, not only as a professor in two theological seminaries and a writer of many books as interesting as they are learned, but besides he entered with enthusiasm into movements which had for their object the general good of religion and society. He threw his whole soul into any enterprise he took in hand. He was indefatigable in any

cause he espoused. For six years he was Secretary of the New York Sabbath Committee, and through his exertions its influence extended beyond New York to the great centers of population in this country. Not content with this he advocated the cause in Germany, setting it forth before ecclesiastical conventions and other religious bodies. It was a personal appeal from America to the churches of the Continent, nor was it made in vain.

Dr. Schaff felt the deepest interest in all movements looking toward Christian union. He was in full sympathy with the Evangelical Alliance, and later, also, with the Alliance of the Reformed Churches. In their deliberations he always held a prominent place. The sixth meeting of the Evangelical Alliance, held in New York in 1873, was, perhaps, the most successful ever held. This was due in a large part to the energy, tact and organizing skill of Dr. Schaff, on whom the chief burden of responsibility fell.

When the movement for the revision of the English Bible was inaugurated by the Convocation of Canterbury, and it was resolved to invite the coöperation of some American divines, it fell to Dr. Schaff's lot to take the initiative and the leading part in this country. When the American revisers met he was appointed chairman of the body. He was also a member of the New Testament Company. "It was owing to him," says the Committee in its *Historical Account*, "more than to any other, that the work was undertaken in this country. And to him likewise is largely due the success with which the means for carrying it forward have been secured."

Dr. Schaff used to say of himself: "I am a Swiss by birth, a German by education, an American by choice." No man ever was better qualified to mediate between German theology and American thought. By the numerous and original contributions of his pen, by translations from German works, such as Lange's Commentary, and by his instructions in the class-room and in private intercourse, he made Germany, its institutions, science and literature well known to America. No less did he make America known to Germany. By articles in German periodicals and by addresses before German ecclesiastical assemblies he presented the conditions and needs of the German-American Churches, and thus secured contributions of books and endowment funds for Mercersburg and other institutions.

The life of such a man ought to be given to the world. And happily it has been. The son is biographer of the father. It was a delicate task, but one that has been admirably accomplished. By a judicious selection from the *Reminiscences* written for his family, from diaries, notes and letters to personal friends, the book is in large part an autobiography. Dr. Schaff unconsciously but vividly portrays himself. Such a life ought to be an inspiration, especially to those who are just entering on their career. We trust it will find a wide circulation and accomplish much good.

F. A. G.

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